THE ATTACK

"Surprise is at all times the assailant's strongest weapon."--"Field

Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920).

The aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to

seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces. The Attack is the

culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end, and every commander

will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected assault on

a part of the enemy's defences.

The achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has

assembled a sufficient force for his purpose, and has obtained, by

reconnaissance and by fighting, information as to the vulnerability of

the hostile position. The commander will then endeavour to break the

enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans; to retain

a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the

enemy a moment's breathing space; to drive a wedge into the heart of

his disordered masses, forcing his wings asunder; and to pursue and

annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy.

"Unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern

campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile, chiefly owing to

the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. The

armies will then be distributed in great depth, and the attackers are

faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only, but

a series of positions, extending back to a depth of several miles"

("Infantry Training, 1921").

Penetration, followed by the sundering of the Franco-British Armies,

was clearly the intention of the German {52} High Command in the

_Second Battle of the Somme_, which opened on March 21, 1918. The

German Armies had entrenched themselves after the First Battle of the

Marne (September, 1914), and for 43 months had been confronted by the

Allied Nations of Britain, France, and Belgium, reinforced at the close

by Portuguese troops and by the National Army of the United States.

Within the investing lines of the Western Front the German Armies were

besieged, the barrier reaching from the Belgian coast to the frontier

of Switzerland, while the armies of Austria-Hungary were similarly

penned in by the army of Italy, from Switzerland to the Adriatic. The

internal collapse of Russia, in 1917, enabled von Hindenburg to assume

the offensive, with upwards of 1,500,000 men released from the Eastern

Front, and part of this reserve power was projected, with the

Austro-Hungarian Armies, in a fierce attack on the Italian lines. The

success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were

dispatched from other parts of the Allied lines, and a diversion in the

region of Cambrai by the British III. Army, under Sir Julian Byng

(November 20, 1917), prevented the dispatch of further German reserve

power to the Italian Front, and necessitated a counter-thrust in

France. The battlefields of France again resumed their importance as

the vital point in the theatre of operations, and in the spring of

1918, profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the West,

Ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a 50-mile

front. The attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment, and

culminated in a desperate thrust against the British Armies north and

south of the River Somme, the points of penetration aimed at being the

British right, where it was linked up with the French on the River

Oise, in the neighbourhood of La Fère, and the British line of

communications in the neighbourhood of Amiens. The whole British line

opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the

Franco-British {53} advance on the Somme in July, 1916, was recaptured

by the German Armies. But this was not a battle for towns or

territory, as the German hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge

between the British and French Armies, to roll up the British flank

northwards to the sea-coast and the French flank southwards to Paris,

and to capture the main line of communication between these Northern

and Southern Armies. By skilful reinforcement of threatened points,

Marshal Haig frustrated the primary object of the attack, and by the

aid of the French Armies the whole line fell back, disputing the ground

with the utmost resolution, and maintaining the line without losing

touch between the south and north. The German wedge was thrust in, but

every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was

frustrated by the Allies. During the battle the French and British

Armies became intermingled, and to preserve unity of control a

Generalissimo was appointed in the person of General Foch, who had

commanded the French IX. Army at the First Battle of the Marne in

September, 1914, and the French Armies of the Somme during the advance

in July, 1916. General Pershing, commanding the Army of the United

States, gave a free hand to the Generalissimo to incorporate American

troops wherever they might be needed in the field, and Marshal Haig and

General Retain remained in command of the British and French Armies.

METHODS OF ATTACK.--The object of every attack is to break down the

enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete

his overthrow by assault, by the delivery of a decisive blow with as

large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected

point or portion of the enemy's position. The term "Decisive Attack"

does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive, but

rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure

relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him

is first obtained.

{54}

TWO PLANS OF ATTACK.--There are two plans of attack. In the first, the

direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined

beforehand; an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this

purpose, and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to

attack another portion of the enemy's position, to keep his attention

there, to pin his troops in position, to prevent him sending

reinforcements to the part mainly threatened, and ultimately to drive

home with the successful assault of the main attack. The rest of the

force is small and is retained in General Reserve to meet emergencies.

In the second plan, a general action is developed by a part of the

attacking force and the remainder is retained in General Reserve, to be

thrown in when the opportunity arrives, at the right time and in the

right place. In this case, the "remainder" is not less than half the

available force.

The first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force

has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position, when

he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate

strength of the forces arrayed against him. It must also be possible,

without undue risk, to divide the attacking force into parties of such

strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail, and it

is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a

small General Reserve to restore the battle. The second plan can be

adopted when information is incomplete, and owing to the strong force

retained by the commander in General Reserve, the situation can be

exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk.

STRENGTH OF THE ATTACK.--It must always be remembered that a commander

can never be too strong when making an attack, for he can never be

perfectly sure of what force he may encounter, or at what moment the

adversary may make a counter-attack. An attack {55} on an enemy

presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is

made, for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the

right place at the right time, and for an attack to have a reasonable

hope of success the attackers, at the point where the penetration takes

place, must be superior.

DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.--Each phase of the Attack will normally

require three separate bodies of troops for its execution: a _Forward

Body_ to seek out for, and when located attack, the enemy along the

whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to

wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions

of the defence; _Supports_ to penetrate the weak portions of the

defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions

of the defence which are holding up the Attack; with Local Reserves for

dealing with local counter-attacks; and a _General Reserve_ by means of

which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure.

THE FORWARD BODY, THE SUPPORTS, AND THE LOCAL RESERVES.--The paramount

duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward,

and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the

enemy, he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbour also, for, as a

rule, the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance.

But an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire, and

by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared

positions. The tactics to be pursued under these circumstances are

thus outlined in "Infantry Training, 1921": "When forward troops are

held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep

him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a

vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers. It

will be the duty of the Supports to turn the flank of, and enfilade,

that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing {56}

the Forward Body. To achieve this, Supports may have to quit their

direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit,

which is able to advance. It must constantly be borne in mind that

pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places

where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up, never

by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have

been unable to advance. There must be no slackening of pressure,

meanwhile, by the forward troops who are temporarily held up, or the

defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks

which are being directed against them." The Local Reserves are for

local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by

the Local Reserves of the enemy. In modern campaigns this work is

effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns

distributed in depth, and the mobile Local Reserves may thus consist of

smaller units detached for the purpose by the Forward Body or by the

Supports. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the

_Attacks on the Somme and the Lys_ were constantly held up by the

vigour and tenacity of the Franco-British defence, and to meet the

necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the

German General Staff: "If the assaulting troops are held up by

machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire,

while Supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the

flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the

Attack. Meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible

for the Attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar

support, and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by

means of smoke."

THE GENERAL RESERVE.--In a modern campaign against civilised troops it

will seldom, or never, happen that the efforts of the Forward Body,

Supports, and Local Reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent

him from regaining cohesion and fighting power. Even if {57} every

part of the position against which an assault is delivered is captured

and held, the enemy will not, by that means alone, cease to exist as a

fighting force, and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of

order and moral the work of the Attacking Force will be of little

avail. The destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the

ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander. He will,

therefore, accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of

the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during

the successful operations of his Attacking Force. It may, however,

happen that the efforts of the Attacking Force are generally

unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper

hand. By means of the General Reserve the commander exploits the

success or retrieves the failure of the Attacking Force. The commander

will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive

system against which he can direct his decisive attack. This point

cannot, as a rule, be determined until it has been revealed by the

successes of the Forward Body and the Supports, and when it has been

selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible

strength. While, therefore, the Forward Body, Supports, and Local

Reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them, a

commander will generally retain about half his available force for the

delivery of the Decisive Attack, and when this decisive blow has been

delivered the Reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy

until such time as other Infantry, or Cavalry, or Tanks, have caught up

and passed them. If the attacking troops fail to obtain their

objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving

exhausted troops and of dealing with the "decisive counter-attack" of

the enemy.

THE COMMANDER'S PLANS.--Once troops are committed to the assault the

commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose. His control

is exercised in {58} the correct interpretation or adaptation of his

original plan by his subordinate commanders. Before launching his

troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from

information received, the commander will assemble his subordinates and

the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that

his plans may be explained. This conference should be held at such a

time as will enable his subordinates to explain their _rôle_ to the

sub-unit commanders. Wherever possible the conference should be

preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the

attack is to be made, otherwise a map of the district concerned must be

substituted for the actual view.

The commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the

campaign at the time of the decision to attack. In the opening stages

of a campaign in a thickly populated country, and generally throughout

a campaign in less settled districts, a war of manoeuvre will lead to

the "Encounter Battle," and the objective to be aimed at will be

limited only by the power of endurance of his troops, the weather

conditions, and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with

ammunition and food. Under other conditions, the objective will be

subject to further limitations, as the defensive position will be

organised in great depth, and while effective penetration will thus be

more difficult to achieve it must, of necessity, be accompanied by

widening in proportion to its depth in order that space for manoeuvre

and facility for communication may be secured. The Infantry Attack

will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle, but the

greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited

will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater

difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit.

THE POSITION OF ASSEMBLY.--A column in march formation will very rarely

move to its attack position, or "jumping-off place," from column of

route except {59} where there are concealed lines of approach to the

spot. A Position of Assembly will therefore be assigned, and this will

be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the

issue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the

filling of water bottles. As a general rule, it is left to the

battalion commander to select Positions of Assembly for each of his

companies. When large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to

immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot

be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at

the right moment. In April, 1864, General Banks, with 25,000 U.S.

troops, moved from Grand Ecore to _Pleasant Hill_ in the Red River

Valley. Although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main

road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. As he came

into action with General Forrest, of the Confederate Army, the head of

his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces

inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter.

Had General Banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available

for his use, the Confederates on the spot would have been quickly

overpowered.

THE ATTACKING FORCE.--The commander must decide against which portion

or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance,

his Fire Attack shall be developed. As the object of this movement is

to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance

generally, and particularly at the point where the Decisive Attack is

to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is

clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one

or both flanks should be threatened if possible. But whenever a Fire

Attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the

enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once

begun. One {60} to three rifles per yard of the objective to be

assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the Forward

Body, Supports, and Local Reserves. At _St. Privat_ (August 18, 1870)

a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of

the French chassepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could

make no effective reply. The lines pressed on, but were ultimately

brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could

have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was

holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in

position, and would thus have carried the Forward Body to the assault.

Equally unsuccessful was Osman Pasha's attempt to break through the

investing lines at _Plevna_ (December 10, 1877). With 15,000 troops he

pierced the Russian lines, and another resolute effort would have

carried the sortie through the investing forces. But the 15,000

Supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were

blocked with fugitives and wagons.

THE DECISIVE ATTACK.--The commander must also decide the point and

direction of the Decisive Attack. This will be made on a part of the

front or on a flank, and it may be predetermined in accordance with

information concerning the hostile dispositions, or it may have to be

ascertained by further fighting. The advantages of a _Frontal Attack_

are that, if successful, the enemy's force is broken in two parts, the

separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and

overwhelmed in detail, and a decisive victory is thus obtained. The

disadvantages are that the force assaulting a part of the enemy's front

draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line, and

unless the Fire Attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be

held up, while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to

advance and to envelop the assailants. The advantages of a _Flank

Attack_ are that {61} the enemy's line of retreat is threatened, and

only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the assailant.

The disadvantages of a Flank Attack are that the enveloping troops have

to face a similar danger on their own outer flank, for upon this point

the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke, and for

this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by

strong reserves. The flank chosen for attack will be that which

affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting

artillery, which gives the best line of advance for the infantry, and

where success will have the most decisive results, the last depending

mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is

threatened. Where the various requisites are in conflict, the flank

affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the

artillery will be chosen. Nothing destroys the moral of men in action

so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this

method good infantry will seldom be beaten.

A decisive attack, to be completely successful, must be followed up by

fresh troops before the assaulting waves have been checked. Lee had

crossed the Potomac and desired "to defeat the last army of the

Federals in the east and drive the Northern Government from

Washington." The battle of _Gettysburg_ lasted three days (July 1-3,

1863). On the first, the army of Northern Virginia was uniformly

successful; on the second, the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro; on

the third, Lee decided to make a Napoleonic decisive attack with half

his available troops against Meade's centre. But the spirited attack

of the first 15,000, after penetrating the line, was checked, and the

remaining 15,000 did not arrive in support, so that the attack died

down, was repulsed, and withdrew in disorder.

At _Chattanooga_ (November 25, 1868) Grant's decisive attack was

successful, although delivered against a part of the position which

appeared to be impregnable, on account of the strength of the attack,

through {62} distribution in depth; 25,000 men were hurled against the

entrenchments in three lines, and the support of the third line carried

the waves of the attack through the defences.

DETAILING THE UNITS.--The commander will detail the units for carrying

out the Fire Attack, which will generally require one to three rifles

per yard of the objective. This force will be placed under a definite

commander, who will distribute it into a Forward Body to develop the

attack in the firing line; Supports, to enable the Forward Body to

assault the position; and Local Reserves to maintain or restore the

advantages gained, their main function being to repel counter-attacks

by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit.

The commander will also detail the units for carrying out the Decisive

Attack, which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion

of the position against which it is projected. This force, under a

definite commander, is distributed for the attack in depth, so that the

strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition.

The force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops,

to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place. It also

remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check,

or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is

desired to break off the engagement.

THE ARTILLERY.--The position of the artillery will be settled in

consultation with the artillery commander, the decision resting on the

objects in view, which are, to assist the infantry in its advance by

keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial

stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage

concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and

after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward

to repel {63} counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and

to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy. When the attack

is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have

been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of

an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack

advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is

launched. It will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns,

unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides

such protection. At the _Battle of Verneville_ (August 18, 1870) the

9th Prussian Corps Artillery had been pushed forward against the French

position at Armandvillers-Folie. The fire of the French infantry

caused a loss of 13 officers and 187 other ranks, and one battery was

disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. There was no infantry escort

to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. At the _Battle of

Colenso_ (December 15, 1899) two batteries of field artillery advanced

into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance

unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the Tugela River.

Frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade

fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part

of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all

ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in Boer hands. Infantry

regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with

the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in

order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets

of secondary importance. All reserves, whether they have been

specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord

make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition.

One of the outstanding lessons of the War of 1914-1918 is the

possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the

infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction

and to the security against {64} counter-attack provided by the deadly

fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort, and of

the Lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves.

THE CAVALRY.--The opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend

upon the character of the defensive operations. Against a highly

organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted

troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre. Before the

attack during an "Encounter Battle" the cavalry will have been out on

reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they

may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action, and by local

counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry

disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed

to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful assault the

Pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the

enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements,

to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications.

Generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a

flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force.

"Cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of

all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at

_Appomattox_ or _Paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of

Grand Tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to

attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (Henderson). In the

Mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of General Sir S. Maude's

forces on September 27-29, 1917, against the Turkish forces assembling

near _Ramadie_, 65 miles north-west of Baghdad, was converted into the

surrender of the Turkish commander and about 4,000 all arms by the

enveloping tactics of the Anglo-Indian Cavalry Division. A similar

manoeuvre on March 26, 1918, by the cavalry of the Mesopotamian Field

Force (commanded at that time by General Sir W. R. Marshall, {65} who

succeeded after General Maude's death from cholera), resulted in the

surrender of over 5,000 Turks, including a divisional commander, 22

miles north-west of Hit. The prisoners were fugitives from the battle

of _Baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications.

"On the morning of the Armistice (November 11, 1918) two British

Cavalry Divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before

orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 miles in

front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the

advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's

disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (Sir D. Haig's

Dispatches). The absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often

decided the issue of a campaign. After the action of _Gaines's Mill_

(June 27, 1862) General J. E. B. Stuart was dispatched by Lee with the

Confederate cavalry on a false scent to White House, south of the York

River, to which base Lee believed McClellan to be retreating. But

McClellan had shifted his base to Harrison's Landing, on the James

River, and the Confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the Army

of the Potomac until July 3, two days after the failure of Lee's attack

on Malvern Hill. Had Stuart been available with his cavalry throughout

that critical period McClellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy

prey to the Confederate horsemen, and the roads through the forests and

swamps to Malvern Hill could have been blocked. Absence of cavalry

before the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863) hampered the

Confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with

unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before

them. General Stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding

expedition. After the victorious attack of General Early's division a

handful of General Buford's U.S. cavalry enabled the defeated 1st Corps

of Meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. A

thousand {66} Confederate sabres would have brushed Buford aside, and

July 1 would have been disastrous to the National cause.

During the German offensive of March-July, 1918, "even two or three

well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the

French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to

have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's

Dispatches). During the _Battle of Cambrai_ (November 20, 1917) a

squadron of the Fort Garry Horse crossed the Scheldt Canal, and after

capturing a German battery and dispersing a large body of infantry,

maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when

it withdrew to the British lines with its prisoners. During the

_Battle of Amiens_ (August 8-18, 1918) the cavalry were concentrated

behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first

day of the battle they advanced 23 miles from their position of

assembly. Throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and

valuable service. During the Second _Battle of Le Cateau_ (October

6-12, 1918) cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his

retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the

railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire

from Cattigny Wood and Clary "a dashing charge by the Fort Garry Horse

gained a footing in Cattigny Wood and assisted our infantry to press

forward. Further east, Dragoon Guards and Canadian Cavalry were

instrumental in the capture of Hennechy, Reumont, and Troisvilles" (Sir

D. Haig's Dispatches). In the early stages of the campaign in _North

Russia_ (August-September, 1918) a handful of cavalry on either bank of

the North Dwina River could have kept the Bolshevik forces constantly

on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of

their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing

infantry was unable to accomplish. A few squadrons of cavalry could

have dispersed the whole {67} Bolshevik force in the Archangel

Province. Tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit, as artillery,

the only effective enemy of the tank, is unlikely to remain in action

with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy; and a new terror has

been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled, man-carrying

Aircraft, armed with machine guns and bombs, and possibly even with

light quick-firing artillery. During the final stages of the

victorious _Allied Advance_ in November, 1918, the retreating German

Armies were continuously harassed from the air. "Throughout the day

(November 5, 1918) the roads, packed with the enemy's troops and

transport, afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full

advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather.

Over 30 guns, which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced

the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of the 25th Division

in the field near Le Presau" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.--The position and employment of the Royal

Engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the

Attack, and as the main function of this corps in the Attack is the

removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance, and the strengthening

of the position when captured, the Royal Engineers will probably remain

with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.--The position of hospitals and clearing stations

will be settled in consultation with the S.M.O. Aid posts and advanced

dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in

connection with the medical officer of the units concerned.

SUPPLY.--The position of the Train, with its reserve supplies of

ammunition and of food for men and horses, will depend upon facilities

for communication with the attacking force and upon security against

artillery fire {68} or surprise attack from the air or land. The

position will probably be well in rear, and at the junction of roads

leading forward to the attacking troops. Rations will be brought up to

units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other

units concerned.

THE COMMANDER'S POSITION.--The position of the commander who issues the

orders for the Attack must be fixed, and must be made known to

subordinate commanders, as it will be the place to which reports will

be sent. In the case of a small force the commander will generally

stay with the General Reserve; if the force is fairly large, and

composed of all arms, he will probably be on the main artillery

position; but in the case of a large force he should be well out of

reach of the distraction of local incidents. If the commander of a

large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior

officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent

communications to him in his changed position. In the case of a small

force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave

a runner in the position stated as his headquarters, in order that

messages may reach him without delay.

BATTLE REPORTS.--The successful exploitation of success depends largely

on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all

parts of the battlefield. Reports are required from all who have

information to impart and they should be made out on previously

prepared message cards, stating the exact position of the sender at the

time of the report; the progress made by the unit under the command of

the sender, or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been

observed; the degree of the enemy's resistance; enemy movements; and

the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted

in carrying out such plans.

{69}

REORGANISATION AND PURSUIT.--Once a successful assault has been

delivered, subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of

their commands, and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire,

while local reserves follow up and secure the position against

counter-attack. Superior commanders must take steps to organise the

pursuit, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and to complete his

overthrow. No victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to

retire unmolested from the field of battle, and given time to recover

order and moral. "Never let up in a pursuit while your troops have

strength to follow" was a favourite maxim of Stonewall Jackson. The

pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft,

cavalry, and tanks, and the limits to which the infantry will carry the

pursuit will be fixed by the commander, who will bear in mind the

principle that "Success must be followed up until the enemy's power is

ruined" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). If the fruits

of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the

enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat. A few hours' delay

gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rearguard, and

to gain several miles on his rearward march. In modern warfare motor

transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the

mobility of cavalry, if arrangements for embussing them have previously

been made, and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond

the reach of pursuit.

{70}