"The soul of the Defence is the Counter-Attack."--MARSHAL FOCH.
Defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field, or it
may be imposed upon him by the enemy, and a commander may rely upon
fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy, or he may employ
manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision.
A commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified
position, garrisoned by a portion only of his force, while he detaches
another (and probably greater) portion to attack the enemy from an
unexpected quarter. An outstanding example of this form of action is
exhibited in the _Battle of Chancellorsville_ (May 2-3, 1863), where
Lee kept at bay Hooker's army of 90,000 with one-third of his force and
detached Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men to attack the Federal rear.
Action of this kind is peculiarly effective, but it requires a secrecy
which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil, and if the
manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in
disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops.
A different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the
Defensive-Offensive battle, with examples of which the history of
Warfare is amply supplied--Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo being
typical battles of this nature. In this form of defensive action a
commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position, and after
exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault, the
commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms {77} the
exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all
the means at his disposal.
A position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity, sometimes
merely as a matter of tactical prudence. At _Nachod_ (June 27, 1866)
the Prussian Advanced Guard hurriedly established a defensive position
and kept at bay the whole Austrian Army, while the Prussian Army
emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array.
The _Pass of Thermopylae_ was occupied in B.C. 480 by 1,400 Greeks
under Leonidas, King of Sparta, to withstand the Persian hosts of
Xerxes, and although the Greek force was destroyed by an attack from
the rear (through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the
Persian service), the resistance offered to the "invincible" Persians
emboldened the Greeks in their future encounters, and led to the
ultimate defeat of the invaders. According to the legendary history of
Rome, Horatius Cocles and two companions defended the _Sublician
Bridge_ over the Tiber against Lars Porsena and the whole army of the
Etruscans. This legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the
_Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918). "The bridges across the
Crozat and Somme Canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with
entire success, it being probable that certain of them were still
practicable for infantry. Instances of great bravery occurred in the
destruction of these bridges. In one case, when the electrical
connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer
responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the
instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. By extraordinary good
fortune he was not killed" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). At _Rorke's
Drift_ (January 22, 1879) a force of 80 other ranks of the 24th
Regiment, under Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead, with about 40 hospital
cases, drove off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus, part of
Cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison {78}
at _Isandhlwana_ earlier the same day. An astounding feat of arms was
performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the
British Army in face of the overwhelming German attack at the _Second
Battle of the Somme_. A detachment of about 100 officers and men of
the 61st Brigade, 20th Division, was detailed to cover the withdrawal
of their division at _Le Quesnoy_ (March 27,1918). Under the command
of their Brigade-Major (Captain E. P. Combe, M.C.) the detachment
successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until 6 p.m.,
when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having accomplished
their task.
There are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or
potential tactical purpose. Before the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22,
1812) a Spanish force had been detached by Wellington to cover a ford
of the River Tormes by occupying the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the
force was withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge, and Marmont's
defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of
Valladolid. In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon placed a garrison of
1,200 in the _Fortress of Soissons_, but on March 3,1814, the garrison
capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the
regulations of War ordain, and the bridge at Soissons enabled Blücher
and Bülow to unite their forces across the River Aisne. In the
Waterloo campaign, Wellington stationed 17,000 men at _Hal_ and
_Tubize_, 8 miles from his right on the field of battle at Waterloo, to
repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his
centre was broken, and with 67,000 men took up a position astride the
Nivelle-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels roads which met at Mont St.
Jean. He was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern
criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces. It
is, however, permissible to suggest that the security of his right
flank, and the possession of a rallying point, inspired him with the
confidence which enabled him to {79} withstand the sustained attacks of
Napoleon until the arrival of Blücher's corps permitted him to
overwhelm his adversary.
A further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of
extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series
before the actual assault of the enemy, resistance being combined with
manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding
up his pursuit. Delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in
rearguard fighting, when the object to be gained is time rather than
position, and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local
counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments. But the guiding
principle in all defensive operations, including delaying action, must
be that "when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre, the passive occupation
of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always
involves the risk of crushing defeat" ("Field Service Regulations,"
vol. ii. (1920)).
THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT.--Although there are many forms of defensive
action the soul of the Defence in every case is a vigorous offensive
spirit. In the Active Defence, the Decisive Counter-Attack, ending in
the overthrow of the enemy, is the manoeuvre originally in view when
the defensive _rôle_ is adopted. In the Passive Defence against
superior numbers. Local Counter-Attacks end with the recapture of a
tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault, and in the
Delaying Action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached
force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders,
without undue risk, to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body.
Whatever the tactical situation, it is by the vigour of the offensive
spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined
enemy.
MODERN WARFARE.--In modern warfare the defensive position plays a part
of increasing importance, owing {80} to the great power conferred on
the defence by modern armaments. "Machine guns and barbed wire permit
the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be
disputed. In particular, they have given to a trench, or to a natural
obstacle, a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner
unsuspected before this war; they permit the prompt consolidation of a
large system that is easy to hold" (Marshal Foch). "The modern rifle
and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the Defence as
against the Attack. It has thus become a practical operation to place
the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting
line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but
also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got
away no longer exists" (Marshal French). It is thus possible to hold
the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a
minimum of exposure to loss, the extra strength of the position
counterbalancing the reduction in numbers, but a preference for
defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission
that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the
time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed. "It is of
paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations
where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be
allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is
possible. Position warfare can never of itself achieve victory"
("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). However strong
entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies,
nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and
well-armed enemy. It is scarcely even probable that an army behind
entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its
assailants as will enable the initiative, or liberty of manoeuvre, to
be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated. The
operations on both sides {81} are in the nature of a siege, and however
prolonged the siege, the advantage will be gained in the long run by
superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the
ground. In addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand
offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive
action in Position Warfare and the defence in a War of Manoeuvre. The
first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed, as
the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea
to sea, or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory.
Mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important
sphere, until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to
retreat, and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are
meanwhile confined to the infantry, and will be due to irregularities
in the alignment of the strong points, upon which enfilade fire may be
brought to bear. The second point of difference is the abundance of
time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing
elaborate systems of attack and defence, and for obtaining detailed
plans of the hostile works, through continuous reconnaissance by the
Air Service. In most countries there must be, of necessity, a
prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a Position War, owing
to the severity of winter conditions, or to the occurrence of the rainy
season, and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate
the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand
offensive. But this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather
than in fact, for no defensive system is ever perfect, no strong point
but needs further consolidation, new trenches are constantly
constructed or improved, and fresh areas are covered with wire
entanglements. Guns of all calibres, underground mines and light
mortars are ever at work, demolishing, wounding, and killing, while
lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all
times. On a smaller scale, snipers on both sides have a daily bag, and
{82} observers are ever at their posts noting every change, however
insignificant, and every new piece of work; "listening posts" are
detecting hostile plans, while patrols are collecting information and
raiding parties are reconnoitring, destroying defences, and inflicting
losses, it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in
greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out.
ENTRENCHMENTS.--Entrenchments have been employed in the defence from
the earliest times. The Roman walls in Britain, the Great Wall of
China, the earthworks in the Russian War of 1854-1855, in the American
Civil War of 1861-1864, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, and the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are notable examples. But in no war
previous to that of 1914-1918 have they played so important a part.
One of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were
those constructed in 1810 by Colonel R. Fletcher, of the Royal
Engineers, at _Torres Vedras_. These fortifications extended for 50
miles and contained 126 closed works, mounting 247 guns, and behind
these lines Wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the
retreat of Masséna enabled him to resume the initiative. In front of
these lines everything that could support the French armies had been
removed; behind them Wellington's forces were well provided in every
respect. On October 10, 1810, Masséna was confronted by the
entrenchments, the existence of which had been kept a profound secret,
while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault.
Before the end of October a Portuguese spy wrote to Wellington: "Heaven
forgive me if I wrong the French in believing they have eaten my cat"
(Napier). During the night of November 14-15, Masséna broke up his
camp and withdrew. But it was not the lines of Torres Vedras which won
back the Peninsula. Spain and Portugal were saved by the bold march
northwards {83} to Vittoria. "In six weeks Wellington marched, with
100,000 men, 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive
battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran French
troops from Spain" (Napier).
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.--"Whether it is the intention of the commander to
resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the
defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period, the
principles on which the construction of all defences should be
undertaken are the same. All defensive systems should be planned from
the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the
requirements of a prolonged defence. The ground must be thoroughly
reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of
tactical posts and defended localities. These posts should be
self-supporting, but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually
support each other by fire. The gaps between the posts must be covered
by the fire of the garrison of the posts, and machine guns may also be
sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks"
("Infantry Training, 1921"). This principle must govern the choice of
the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position
for defence, and troops detailed for the defence of an area must
continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such
time as the offensive is resumed.
CHOOSING A POSITION.--The framework of the modern defence consists of
artillery and machine guns; into this framework are fitted the defence
posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry, who are
responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting
the greatest possible loss on the enemy. A commander will require a
position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the
attackers penetrate the defences, and depth will thus be essential. He
will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front
being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the {84} enemy's forces
while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered; and in a War
of Manoeuvre he will require facilities for the Decisive Counter-Attack.
The depth of the position will develop automatically in a War of
Position, but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble
in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to
troops when withdrawn from the front line. The width of the position
will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force, the
guiding principle being to keep about half the force in General
Reserve; if, therefore, the remainder of the force is insufficient for
the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the
tactical requirements of the Active Defence. In Position Warfare,
however, a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the
limits that are practicable in the Active Defence, and the numbers
available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the
attack by means of obstacles, the removal of which is prevented by
machine-gun and rifle fire.
THE OUTPOST ZONE.--For the Active Defence of a position the defensive
system will consist of an Outpost Zone and a Battle Position. The
Outpost Zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant
watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack, watch
being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the Line of
Observation, supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive
posts, while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained,
mutually supporting defence posts on the Outpost Line of Resistance.
THE BATTLE POSITION.--The Battle Position will be established in the
area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break
the enemy's attack. It therefore forms the keystone of the whole
defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity
for defensive action. "In principle, in order to protect {85} the
battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment, it
should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars" ("Field
Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
THE SEMI-PERMANENT SYSTEM.--When a campaign is prolonged in any area
without decisive results a War of Position may be developed by one or
both of the combatants. In such cases the Outpost Zone is developed
into an intricate trench system, with protective avenues leading from
front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from
artillery fire. The Battle Position will probably coincide with the
Outpost Zone, the trenches being used for the purposes of observation
until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault.
In parts of the line on the Western Front of the Great War, "Pill-box"
forts, constructed of concrete, took the place of continuous lines of
trenches. These machine-gun forts were garrisoned, according to size,
by groups from 5 to 50 strong, and were echeloned in plan, to sweep all
approaches, and together to command with their mutually supporting fire
the whole area over which they were spread, the intervening ground
being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into
places where flanking fire may be poured into them. The advantages of
the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are
principally defensive. Fewer men are required for them than for the
trench systems, and there is less liability of loss from artillery
fire. But there are certain grave disadvantages. Well-directed
artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes, and a
direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of
action, thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the
whole scheme depends. Supports and reserves are necessarily far in
rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful
attacks, while a defensive scheme {86} composed entirely on the
pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than
entrenchments, there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior
to the attack.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.--Whatever the system of defence or phase of
warfare, every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with
neighbouring units. He must always be ready to assist a neighbouring
commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack; or to
throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being
captured by the enemy. Each post, occupied for the Defence (except in
Delaying Actions, where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled
resistance), forms a self-contained centre of resistance, capable of
all-round fire, and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area
allotted to it to the last man and the last round.
THE ACTIVE DEFENCE.--The Active Defence may be considered according to
the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the
position. It may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the
enemy must attack, and in the hope of delivering during that attack a
crushing and decisive counter-blow; or it may have been chosen of
necessity, to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the
encounter, with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke
when the opportunity arrives.
There is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander,
as in the first case a General Reserve is specially detailed for the
counter-stroke; and in the second, the position will be held with as
few troops as the tactical situation permits, in order to provide as
large a General Reserve as possible for the Grand Offensive. A
commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a
defensive position:--
(i) _The position must suit the plan of operations_; it must be "in the
enemy's way," and this the commander must be able to judge from the
map. It is {87} to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not
always essential to get astride his lines of advance, as a position on
parallel lines, threatening his flank and rear, cannot be ignored by
the enemy, unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to
mask the defender's position, while he proceeds to his objective with
his main army. "It was a mistake to assume that in order to cover
Turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town; the
armies united at Dego would have covered Turin, because they would have
stood on the flank of the road leading to that town" (Napoleon).
(ii) _The position must not be too extensive_ for the troops at the
disposal of the commander, and this will be governed by the extent of
the line to be actually held. It will consist of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points, which can be held as "pivots on which to
hinge the defence of the position," and the object must be to obtain
the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can
advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire. A rough-and-ready
rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be
supplied by the "troops to hold the position" (which should not exceed
one-half the available force) then the position is too extensive and
should be narrowed. On the other hand, too narrow a front may enable
the enemy to develop, early in the engagement, strong flank attacks,
which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the
assumption of the offensive. The _Condé-Mons-Binche_ line held on
August 22-23, 1914, by Sir J. French's army (I. Corps, General Sir D.
Haig; II. Corps, General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien) had a total width of
25 miles, and the troops at disposal, including General Sir E. H. H.
Allenby's Cavalry Division, consisted of about 75,000 all arms. The
frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of
one rifle per yard, and a position in rear had also been selected,
between Jerlain and Maubeuge, with a frontage of 15 miles. The
_Retreat from Mons_ was {88} due not to the excessive width of
frontage, but to the success of the German attack on the French V.
Corps at Charleroi (August 23, 1914), which left the right flank of the
British Army "in the air," while two German Corps were working round
the left flank. The British III. Corps (General Sir W. P. Pulteney)
did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing. At the _First
Battle of Ypres_ (October 31, 1914) many parts of the line were held
with one rifle for 17 yards, and there were no Supports or Local or
General Reserves. Yet the line was not only maintained but a
counter-attack at Gheluvelt thrust the attacking Germans behind their
entrenchments.
(iii) _There must be a clear field of fire_ to prevent the enemy
approaching unmolested within effective range, and particularly within
close range, from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an
ascendency in the fire-fight.
(iv) _The flanks must be secure_, or at least as strong as possible. A
flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure, and
a flank extending to the sea, or to the boundary of a neutral State. A
flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means
of distant observation may be called strong. It is a great advantage
if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make
his main attack on the other, as this will enable the defender to
forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his
General Reserve to meet and overwhelm it.
(v) _There should be facilities for cover_ on the position and
concealed avenues of approach from the rear. A crest affords cover on
the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment, while time enables
artificial means to be adopted. Tactical cover can be provided by
cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle,
and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to
lure the enemy on {89} to a false position. They can also induce
premature deployments by the enemy, and movements across the front of
the real position.
(vi) _There should be good artillery positions_ to provide effective
fire on all hostile avenues of approach, and counter-battery work on
hostile artillery positions. There should also be firm ground and good
roads for the movement of guns, and an absence of landmarks for the
enemy to range on. Guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all
modern battles, their disposition being settled in conference with the
artillery commander. A battery of field artillery requires 100 yards
frontage for its six guns, and there is usually an interval of 25 yards
between batteries.
(vii) _There must be depth_ to allow for the disposal and movement of
the Supports and Reserves, and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward
defences, or to issue to the counter-attack.
(viii) _There must be good lateral and frontal communication_ in order
that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced. A position
astride an unfordable stream, or high ridge or deep ravine should
therefore be avoided. At the _Battle of Dresden_ (August 26, 1813) the
Allies were encamped on the left bank of the Elbe. Their forces were
posted on the heights, but the position was cut transversely by a deep
ravine, so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right.
This vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of
Napoleon, who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and
routed it completely, with the capture of 10,000 prisoners, before any
assistance could arrive. The task of creating lateral communications,
if none exist, is of the utmost importance, as they enable a commander
to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre, to meet the
enemy with superior forces at the desired point.
(ix) _There should be good lines of withdrawal_, and these should be
horizontal, or only slightly oblique, to {90} the main position, and
not parallel with the general alignment. This is a point of the first
importance, for if the Lines of Communication lead straight to the rear
a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected
positions and towards its base, if it can keep the line intact and
prevent its flanks being turned. A wide base, with alternative lines
of approach, is of the greatest value, and when there is undue risk of
the Lines of Communication to a base being intercepted, an alternative
base, with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank, is an
acceptable safeguard, as the defence can be protracted while the
withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base. Such a change of
base was effected by Marshal French during the _Retreat from Mons_, and
amongst many historical examples may be quoted General McClellan's
transfer of the _Army of the Potomac_ from the York to the James River
in July, 1862, during the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_.
General Grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the
_Campaign in the Wilderness_ (May, 1864), from Washington to Orange and
Alexandria Railroad, then to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock, then
to Port Royal, further east on that river, then to White House on the
Pamunkey (a branch of the York River), and finally to the James River.
"His army was always well supplied, even his enormous numbers of
wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to
Washington, without any difficulty, and he had no obstacles whatever to
fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the
supply of ammunition" (Henderson). In withdrawing a defeated wing it
may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from
the field of battle, and to cause the pursuer, uncertain as to the
direction of the retreat, to make detachments which can be overthrown
by sudden counter-attacks, or to lure a pursuer from the field where
their presence is required, as Grouchy was lured after Napoleon's
defeat of the Prussians at Ligny {91} (June 16, 1815). The object of
Napoleon's attack on the Allies was the separation of Wellington's
Anglo-Belgian force from the Prussian Army under Blücher, and after the
defeat of the latter at Ligny the Emperor directed Marshal Grouchy to
pursue the Prussians and to drive them eastwards. Grouchy conducted a
leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the Prussian
Army (_The Battle of Wavre_, June 18-19, 1815), while the main body of
the Prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of Napoleon
at Waterloo.
(x) _There should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for
the Decisive Counter-Attack_. In order, therefore, to overthrow the
enemy, a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature
which neither side can cross. At _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), one wing
of the enemy was posted behind a marsh, where it was both unassailable
and unable to attack. Marlborough, therefore, ignored that wing
entirely, and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing, won
easily a decisive victory. The only occasions when an impassable
feature is welcome are in the Passive Defence of a small force against
overwhelming odds (as was seen in August, 1914, when the Belgians
occupied a position behind the _River Gette_), and in the Delaying
Action of a Rear-guard fighting for time for the Main Body to get away.
In such cases a Decisive Counter-Attack is not contemplated.
OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.--The framework of the _defence_ is
provided by artillery and machine-gun fire; the backbone of the
_offence_ is the infantry. The Commander will _divide the troops_ into
(a) _Troops to hold the position_, and (b) _General Reserve_, the
golden rule being to make (a) as small as the tactical situation
permits in order that (b) may be as large as possible, and its work
absolutely decisive. Under no circumstances {92} should the General
Reserve be much below half the available force.
Of these two portions, the _Troops to hold the position_ consist of
infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong
points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to
cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy
can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points.
This line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in
the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local
reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks
on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened
points by relieving the pressure on the front line. Their work
completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve,
and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control,
or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the
attacking force. At _Talavera_ (July 27, 1809) a portion of the
British force followed up the repulsed French columns too far, and
being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy
and retired in disorder to the position. At the battle of
_Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) two brigades emerged from the
Confederate position and drove Meade's division of the Army of the
Potomac out of their lines. But they rushed on with reckless
impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. Local
counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders,
exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus
prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local
reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the
flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined
counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.
_The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack_ and is held
for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force,
in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main
attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only
when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the
decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute
counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success.
But the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to
the General Reserve alone_. Commanders of sections of the defence who
are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the
decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have
been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for
the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This
opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it.
Every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the
opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "To
initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for
preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure,
with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
That the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the
battle of _Spottsylvania_ (May 12, 1864). General Hancock's Corps
(from Grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of Lee's
entrenchments in the Wilderness of Virginia; 20,000 men had assaulted
and captured the Salient, taking 4,000 prisoners; they then pressed
forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into
the Confederate position. "But Lee, recognising the weakness of the
Salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed
about half a mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were
suddenly brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had
intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could
neither make their orders {94} heard nor form their men for another
rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tremendous counter-attack.
Every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the
vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these 20,000 men were
driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the
Confederates recaptured their first position" (Henderson).
_He will select positions for the Artillery_, in consultation with the
commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of
approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy
early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to
combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to
support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by
counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the Decisive
Counter-Attack. The increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre
owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the
protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close
behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture.
_He will divide the position into sectors_, each garrisoned by a
distinct unit, under a definite commander. The mutually supporting
tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.)
will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite
subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control
the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the
units in times of need. The units from which such groups are formed
will usually be complete sections.
_He will decide the position of the General Reserve_. This will be the
locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if
it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the
enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the
General Reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main {95} attack
while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. As
surprise is essential to success, the position of the General Reserve
should be concealed as long as possible. The position of the General
Reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. At
the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918) the intentions of the
German commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "As
by this time (_i.e._ the evening of March 21) it had become clear that
practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed
to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting
reserves from other parts of the British front were put into immediate
execution. By drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front
not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight
divisions before the end of the month" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
_He must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the
Cavalry. Before defensive action in a War of Manoeuvre the cavalry
have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have
endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. During the
battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will
protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted
fire action. After the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in
pursuit. In case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious
advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the
withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. A
position near a flank will usually be occupied.
There have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that
has been worsted. After the _Combat of Roliça_ (August 17, 1808)
General Delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his
movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. At _Chancellorsville_
(May 3, 1863), and on the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863), a
handful of United States {96} cavalry held up the pursuit and staved
off disaster. At _Königgratz_ (_Sadowa_), (July 3, 1866), the charges
of the Austrian cavalry drove back the Prussian Horse and enabled
Benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. At _Rezonville_
(August 16, 1870) von Bredow's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge
the French batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some
breathing time for the hard-pressed Prussian infantry. The charge was
successful and the time was gained, but as at _Balaclava_ (October 26,
1854) there were few survivors from "Von Bredow's Todtenritt" (death
ride). After the battle of _Le Cateau_ (August 26, 1918) and during
the _Retreat from Mons_, the British cavalry, under General Allenby,
effectively held off the enemy and enabled the British troops to move
unmolested. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918
the withdrawal of the troops at _Cugny_ (March 24, 1918) was made
possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the 16th
Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking over 100
prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. During the retreat
in that area units of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions proved so
effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed
during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of
cavalry. "Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled
and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from
breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded
ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . .
The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of
the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or
three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven
between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have
failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D.
Haig's Dispatches).
{97}
_He must select a rallying place_ in rear of the main position from
which to recapture the front line, as General Lee recovered the
"Salient" in the Wilderness of Virginia.
_He must arrange for the reorganisation_ of his victorious forces and
for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy.
{98}