A battle must practically always be of the nature of Attack and
Defence, but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing
forces may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack
by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the
adversary on the defensive, while an assailant may fight a delaying
action in one part of the field, although in another part his action
may be essentially offensive. There are three distinct systems of
Battle Action: the entirely defensive; the entirely offensive; and the
combined, or defensive-offensive system.
THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE has seldom effected positive results, except,
perhaps, at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863), where Meade permitted Lee to
break his forces against a strong position, with the result that the
Army of Northern Virginia had to withdraw, and the invasion of the
North came to an end. It must, however, be borne in mind that General
Lee was badly served by his subordinate, and General Meade's success
was largely due to this factor. On the second day of Gettysburg (July
2, 1863), General J. B. Hood's 1st Division of General J. Longstreet's
I. Army Corps was deploying round the left of the Federal Army south of
the Round Tops. He saw a chance to strike and requested permission
from Longstreet. Hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable
chance of decisive victory with the troops available. Longstreet, in
obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit,
refused to sanction Hood's advance. Longstreet's failure to seize a
fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the Confederate cause.
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Burnside was defeated at _Fredericksburg_ (December 10-16, 1862) by
purely defensive tactics, but Lee had intended to follow up his victory
by a decisive counter-blow, which Burnside escaped by extricating the
Army of the Potomac before the blow fell. Success, even to the limited
degree achieved by Meade or Lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely
defensive tactics. "There is no such thing as an 'impregnable
position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is
bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (Marshal Foch).
THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Entirely Offensive system has been employed
by many of the greatest commanders, including Marlborough at _Blenheim_
(August 2, 1704), _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), and _Malplaquet_
(September 11, 1709); Frederick the Great, notably at _Leuthen_
(December 5, 1757); Napoleon, Wellington, and Grant, as also by the
Prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of 1866
and 1870-71. The disadvantage of the system is that lack of success
may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of
the whole army.
At the _Battle of Blenheim_ (August 2, 1704), Marlborough, "the
greatest captain of his age," had concentrated his forces with those of
Prince Eugene of Savoy the previous day and commanded an army of 56,000
men with 52 guns. He was confronted by the joint armies of Marshal
Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria, amounting to 60,000 men with 61
guns. It was necessary for Marlborough to attack before Villeroy
joined the enemy, or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity
presented itself. The right flank of his opponents rested on high
hills, which were protected by detached posts, and the left flank on
the Danube, while opposite the centre was the marshy valley of the
River Nebel, with several branches running through the swampy ground.
Marlborough decided that a battle {47} was absolutely necessary and he
attacked the next day. Like Hannibal, he relied principally on his
cavalry for achieving his decisive success, and this predilection was
known to the opposing commanders. He attacked the enemy's right and
left wings, and when heavily engaged with varying fortunes launched his
decisive attack against the centre, where the difficulties of the
ground caused it to be least expected. Marlborough lost 5,000 killed
and 8,000 wounded. The vanquished armies were almost destroyed, at
least 40,000 being accounted for, with 12,000 killed, 14,000 wounded
and missing, and 14,000 prisoners.
THE DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Defensive-Offensive system
consists in taking up a position which the enemy must attack, and in
delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the adversary has exhausted
his strength. This system has been employed in almost every campaign.
By such means Napoleon achieved his classic victories of _Marengo_
(June 14, 1800), _Austerlitz_ (December 2, 1805), and _Dresden_ (August
27, 1813); and Wellington his Peninsular victories at _Vittoria_ (June
21, 1813), _Orthez_ (February 27, 1814), and _Toulouse_ (April 10,
1814), in addition to his final triumph at _Waterloo_ (June 18, 1815);
and it was the method adopted by Marshal Foch in the decisive campaign
of 1918, which endured from March until the Armistice in November.
At the _Battle of Waterloo_ (June 18, 1815), the decisive
counter-stroke was delivered, in accordance with Wellington's
pre-arranged plan, by a force coming from a distance to the scene of
action. On the morning of June 17, when Wellington resolved to make a
stand at Waterloo, he was aware that the Prussians, who were mostly
young troops, had been beaten at Ligny; that Napoleon had, before that
battle, over 120,000 men, and that he himself had, all told, 68,000, of
whom 31,000, including the King's German Legion, were {48} British.
Yet he withdrew from Quatre Bras with the full determination of
standing at Waterloo and of fighting Napoleon's army, if Marshal
Blücher would come to his assistance with one Army Corps. Napoleon
attacked on June 18 with 72,000 men and 246 guns, against Wellington's
68,000 men with 156 guns, at 11 a.m., but he was unable to shift the
line or break through the squares. At 4.30 p.m. one of Blücher's corps
was delivering the promised counter-attack against Napoleon's line of
communications. Soon after 9 p.m. Wellington and Blücher met at La
Belle Alliance, Napoleon's headquarters before the battle, and the
pursuit was in full swing.
Opportunities for restoring the battle and for turning impending defeat
into a crushing victory are frequently offered during an engagement.
General Lee's thin lines at _Antietam_ or _Sharpsburg_ (September 17,
1862), slowly fed by men jaded by heavy marching, were sorely pressed,
but there was a lull in the Federal attack when Hooker's advance was
checked. Had General McClellan at that moment thrown in "his last man
and his last horse" in a vigorous reinforcing attack, _Antietam_ would
not have been a drawn battle, and Lee would not have retired at his
leisure into Virginia. Lee's great victory at _Chancellorsville_ (May
2-3, 1863), although marred by the accident which deprived him of
Stonewall Jackson, was a striking instance of the success of the
Defensive-Offensive system at the hands of a great commander, who
defeated 90,000 troops with less than half that number, by a containing
defence with 13,000 men and a decisive counter-stroke with the
remainder.
But while this combined system is regarded by most authorities as the
best, when circumstances warrant its adoption, it is the highest test
of generalship to seize the right moment to pass from the guard to the
thrust. This is the problem which confronted Marshal Foch, the
generalissimo of the Allied Forces, during the great {49} German
offensive movement on the Western Front in 1918. The defensive _rôle_
endured from March 21 until July 17, 1918, and although many local
counter-attacks were made along the whole battle front, the Allies did
not pass from the guard to the thrust until the decisive counter-stroke
was commenced in the _Second Battle of the Marne_ (July 18, 1918) on a
front of 27 miles from Fontenoy to Belleau, which drove the Germans
back across the Marne on July 20.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE (July 18, 1918).--The great German
offensive of March-June, 1918, was renewed on July 15, when the
artillery preparation opened shortly after midnight and troops were
poured across the Marne in small boats and over pontoon bridges. The
attack was not unexpected. Adequate reserves were ready and in place,
and a heavy counter-bombardment on the German troops in their positions
of assembly, close to their front-line trenches, caused heavy
casualties. The Germans succeeded in penetrating the French and
American positions in parts of the 50-mile front to a maximum depth of
4 miles south-west of Reims, but on the Plains of Champagne little
progress was made and the attack lost its momentum. During the attack
of March 21, 1918, the advance was not held up until it was within
striking distance of its ultimate objective, and the offensive on the
Aisne in May, 1918, secured an advance of 12 miles. Captured documents
showed that the attack of July east of Reims was intended to reach the
Marne at Eperney and Chalons, an advance of 21 miles. A feature of the
earlier days of the battle was a spirited counter-attack near Fossoy
(on the extreme left of the German forces) by a division of the
American Army which thrust the Germans behind their first line and
captured upwards of 1,000 prisoners, the ground regained in the river
bend being consolidated and held by the American division. The battle
continued for three days before the German {50} attack was brought to a
standstill, and at 4.80 a.m. on July 18 a counter-attack by the French,
American, and Italian forces changed the whole aspect of the campaign,
and led to the final triumph of the Allies and to the downfall of the
Central Powers.
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