Once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends
upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear, upon the
co-operation of his subordinate commanders, and upon the moral and
training of the troops engaged.
THE COMMANDER'S INFLUENCE is shown, first in his orders for the
operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces
retained in his hand for the decisive blow. Personal control, by the
commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but
should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of
his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions
and must be trusted to carry them into execution. Other, and more
important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is
essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from
his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his
subordinates to deal with. "A sound system of command is based upon
three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders
from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the
situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than
mechanical obedience" ("The Science of War"). A campaign resolves
itself into a struggle between human intelligences. Each commander
will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal
weapon is his General Reserve. If he can exhaust the reserve power of
his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to
victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile
reserves by causing {34} them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance
of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. During the campaign on
the Western Front in 1918 the Allies were able to conserve their
strength throughout the attacks from March 21 to July 15, and when they
passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack
from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension
would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would
cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal.
"The subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at
their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must,
above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use
best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only
judge. . . . The Commander-in-Chief cannot take the place of his
subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. In order to think
straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see
through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they
actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (Marshal Foch).
Students of military history will remember that the Prussian
Commander-in-Chief and his Chief Staff Officer, during the highly
successful campaign of 1870-71, did not come within sound of the guns
until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate
commanders. Outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests
and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[1]
and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. News of
the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the
accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses
and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part
of his reserves as reinforcements, {35} if he must, or to husband them
with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes
for him to launch them for the final blow.
INFORMATION.--In order that the commander's influence may be exerted to
the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should
reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without
delay. Subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders
of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the
battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur.
Runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order,
are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. Higher
units than battalions can usually depend on the Signal Service for
intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and
mounted orderlies must be available for their use. This ensures
co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. Information
received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and
orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to
commanders of all units affected.
CO-OPERATION.--"Co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy
matter to bring about. There are, however, three means of overcoming
the difficulty: constant communication between the units; thorough
reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made;
clear and well-considered orders" ("The Science of War"). Each
commander who issues orders for Attack or Defence should assemble his
subordinate commanders, if possible in view of the ground over which
the troops are to operate, explain his orders, and satisfy himself that
each subordinate understands his respective task. "Combination depends
on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the
commander through all grades down to the {36} corporal's squad; on the
intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the
commander's plans; on the discipline which ensures intelligent
obedience to the directing will; and on the mobility which gives rapid
effect to that will, and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting
opportunities. Every fresh development in the means of transmitting
orders and information rapidly, permits of an extension of the
commander's influence, and makes more perfect combination possible and
over wider areas" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). Even when, and
particularly when, forces are engaged in battle, reconnaissance must be
carried on and information gained must be communicated at once. It
will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack,
or decisive counter-stroke, will be found only after long and severe
fighting. Systematic arrangements for obtaining, sifting, and
transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the
highest importance. Information must be gained not only by troops and
aircraft actually engaged, but by supports and reserves, who will often
be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops. In such cases,
more than in any other, information must be communicated at once. By
intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with
one another, can anticipate situations as they develop, and decide at
the time what steps will be necessary to meet them. A general
reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by
observers in aircraft and in observation balloons. In addition, local
reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an
opening that might otherwise be lost, and may warn a commander of an
intended movement against him, which might otherwise develop into a
disagreeable surprise.
Co-operation and Mutual Support were developed in their highest form by
the Allied Corps Commanders in the _First Battle of the Marne_
(August-September, 1914). {37} In this campaign close on 1,500,000
troops were engaged on both sides, and the Corps Commanders,
particularly those of the French VI. Army (Manoury), III. Army
(Sarrail), and the Military Governor of Paris (Gallieni), were
continuously in touch with one another, and frequently rendered
assistance, unasked, by fire and by movement. Co-operation of a novel
kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the First Battle of the
Somme. An attack was launched on _Gueudecourt_ (September 26, 1916) by
the 21st Division, and a protecting trench was captured as a
preliminary to the larger movement. A tank, followed up by infantry
bombers, proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine
guns, while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its Lewis guns.
The survivors in the trench surrendered, and the garrison was collected
by supporting infantry, who advanced in response to signals from the
aeroplane.
FIRE TACTICS.--It has already been noted that the battle is the only
argument of war; it is also the final test of training, and on the
battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that
devoted to _musketry_. The fire tactics of an army, its combination of
fire and movement, the direction and control by the leaders and the
fire discipline of the rank and file, make for success or failure on
the field of battle. The fire must be directed by the fire unit
commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately
defined; it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander, who must be
able to recognise the objectives indicated, to regulate the rate of
fire, and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply. Fire
discipline must be maintained, so that there is the strictest
compliance with verbal orders and signals, and application on the
battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period. The
time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the
fire-unit commander, but, generally speaking, fire should be opened by
an {38} attacking force only when a further advance without opening
fire is impossible; and even in defence, when access to the ammunition
reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack, withholding fire
until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening
at a longer range. The tactical value of a withering fire at close
range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved
in battle. On the _Heights of Abraham_ (September 13, 1759) General
Wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited Montcalm's attack. Not a
shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within
forty paces, and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken
foe swept the French helplessly before it. At the _Battle of Bunker
Hill_ (June 17, 1775) the American colonists inflicted a loss of 46 per
cent. on the assaulting British force, by reserving their fire "until
the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified." At
the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) General Meagher's
Irish Brigade of the U.S. Army of the Potomac assaulted Marye's Hill,
1,200 strong. The defending Confederates reserved their fire until the
assailants were 100 yards from their position and drove them off with a
loss of 937 out of the 1,200. In August, 1914, the British Regular
Army, during the _Retreat from Mons_, reserved their fire until the
Germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory,
and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded.
Throughout the Great War, troops fully trained in the British system of
musketry and using the short magazine Lee Enfield rifle, proved beyond
dispute the values of the system and of the weapon. In a review of the
methods adopted to check the great German offensive in the spring of
1918, a circular issued by the General Staff states: "Rapid rifle fire
was the decisive factor in these operations. The men had confidence in
their rifles and knew how to use them."
Superiority of fire can only be gained by the close {39} co-operation
of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle, and unless
infantry co-operate, the artillery is not likely to produce any
decisive effect. Long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary
to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking
infantry. Enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily
brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective
range and in the rate of fire. Supports and local reserves will
usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing
fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding
up a movement by frontal fire. During the counter-attack for the
recapture of _The Bluff_, in the Ypres Salient (March 2, 1916) by
troops of the 3rd and 17th Divisions, the right and centre gained their
objectives. The left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to
reach the German trenches, but those who had penetrated to the German
line on the right realised the situation and brought a Lewis gun to
bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his
trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal.
MOVEMENT.--The influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire,
as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full
effects of fire; while it is often possible to move one unit only in
conjunction with the fire of another. It can also be used to relieve
one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving
another unit against the enemy. A steady and rapid advance of troops
has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency
in the fire-fight can be secured, and also of reducing the losses of
the advancing force, for if the troops remained stationary in the open
under heavy fire, at a known range, the losses would clearly be greater
than if they advanced, and would be suffered without gaining ground
towards the objective, while the closer the {40} assaulting line gets
to the objective, and the steadier its advance, the less confidence
will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance, and the fewer
casualties will be suffered in consequence. No "sealed pattern" is
laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire, but
certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books. Where
security is the first need, as in the case of protecting forces
(advanced, flank, or rear guards), movement should be effected by
bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from
supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration,
security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective.
Against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation
recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a
narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged
on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each
is different. Troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid
casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way
rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a
position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy.
Against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or
into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is
preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it
is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control.
In retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in
maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by
supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. The enemy is
generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against
retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire.
Retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate
bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in
their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected.
{41} Such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics,
but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the
withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held
against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault,
for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. It is
often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular
point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's
grit in holding on at all costs. In the campaign of 1814,
Brigadier-General Moreau was sent to the _Fortress of Soissons_, with
instructions to hold the town. His garrison consisted of about 1,200
all arms, with 20 guns. At 10.30 a.m. on March 2, the fortress was
bombarded by Winzingerode's Russians and Bülow's Prussians, and at 8
p.m. an assault was delivered. This was easily repulsed and a
counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines. The
bombardment was resumed until 10 p.m., when the garrison had a total
loss of 23 killed and 123 wounded. During the night the besiegers sent
a flag of truce to Moreau, and on March 3 that general capitulated with
all the honours of war "in order to preserve 1,000 fighting men for the
Emperor." His action cost Napoleon his throne, for had Moreau held out
the Emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe, Blücher (who
escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed, _viâ_ the bridge at
Soissons), and the campaign would have been at an end. If Moreau had
exhausted all the means of defence, as the regulations of war ordain,
he could certainly have held out for another 48 hours, and as heavy
firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him
that help was at hand. At the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October
20-November 20, 1914) the Regular Army of the United Kingdom, at the
outset, was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line, that in
many parts there was but one rifle for 17 yards of front, and there
were neither local nor general reserves. The {42} assaulting German
forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns
and artillery in overpowering strength. The British artillery was not
only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that Marshal French
was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds. But the line was
held, and a counter-attack, headed by the 2nd Battalion of the
Worcestershire Regiment, on October 31, with the bayonet, restored the
line at _Gheluvelt_, at the most critical moment of the battle, and the
Germans did not get through the defences. This stubborn resistance
threw the Germans behind their entrenchments, and the "Advance to
Calais" was stemmed by French's "Contemptible Little Army." At the
_Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22-May 18, 1915) surprise in the time
and nature of the attack, by the secret concentration of forces and the
introduction of poison gas, gained an initial advantage for the Germans
and left the British flank uncovered. A Canadian division
counter-attacked on the German flank, and by May 18 the Allies had
regained many of the captured positions. During the First Battle of
the Somme troops of the Royal West Kent and the Queen's Regiments
effected a lodgment in _Trônes Wood_ (July 14, 1916). They maintained
their position all night in the northern corner of the wood, although
completely surrounded by the enemy, and assisted in the final capture
and clearance of the wood at 8 a.m. the next day. Similar instances
occurred in _Bourlon Village_ (November 25-27, 1917) when parties of
the 13th East Surrey Regiment held out in the south-east corner of the
village, during a German counter-attack, and maintained their position
until touch was re-established with them 48 hours later; and in a group
of fortified farms south of _Polygon Wood_ (September 26, 1917) during
the Third Battle of Ypres, when two companies of the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders held out all night, although isolated from the
rest of the 33rd and 39th Divisions, until a renewed attack {43}
cleared the district of hostile forces. On April 9, 1918, during the
Germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing Allies'
lines, the ruins of _Givenchy_ were held by the 55th West Lancashire
(Territorial) Division, and the right edge of the neck through which
von Arnim and von Quast hoped to extend, in order to widen the wedge
into the Valley of the Lys, was firmly held, while the left edge (the
Messines Ridge) was recaptured by a counter-attack by the 9th Division.
The centre of the line was also stoutly held by the Guards' and other
divisions, many of which had suffered heavy losses in the V. Army
during the German attack in the last week of March. After 21 days of
the most stubborn fighting (March 21-April 11, 1918) of which the
_Attack on the Lys_ had formed part, Marshal Sir D. Haig issued an
order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all
costs. "Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no
retirement. . . . The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind
depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical
moment. . . . Victory will belong to the side which holds out
longest." Sir D. Haig's after-order, on April 23, 1918 (St. George's
Day), awarded special praise to the troops under his command. The
number of divisions employed by the Germans from March 21 to April 23,
1918, against the British alone was 102 (approximately 1,500,000
troops), and many of them were thrown in twice or three times. "In
resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has
enabled the enemy to direct against the British Army, all ranks, arms,
and services have behaved with a gallantry, courage, and resolution for
which no praise can be too high" (Haig's Dispatch).
COVERING FIRE.--The energetic and determined support of the infantry by
fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course
of the battle. In the attack, machine-gun platoons, Lewis gun
sections, {44} or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire, must
take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is
chiefly checking the advance. Machine-gun platoons are sometimes
brigaded, and at others left to battalion commanders, and their action
after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon
their tactical distribution at the time. Infantry platoons detailed to
give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire
ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops, unless definite
orders to the contrary have been received.
FIRE AND MOVEMENT.--It is thus seen that Fire and Movement are
inseparably associated, and judiciously employed in combination they
enable infantry to achieve its object in battle, to bring such a
superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters
possible, so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be
overwhelmed by a bayonet assault; and to prepare by similar means for
further advances, until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely
routed.
[1] In fiction, this point (that the generalissimo must not allow his
sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses) is
clearly brought out in _The Point of View_, a story in "The Green
Curve" by Ole-Luk-Oie (General Swinton).
{45}