"Theoretically, a well conducted battle is a decisive attack
successfully carried out."--MARSHAL FOCH.
"The Art of War, in order to arrive at its aim (which is to impose its
will upon the enemy), knows but one means, the destruction of the
adversary's organised forces. So we arrive at the battle, the only
argument of war, the only proper end that may be given to strategical
operations, and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish
the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive. The results of a
defensive battle are exclusively negative; it may check the enemy in
his march; it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim; but it
never leads to his destruction, and so is powerless to achieve the
wished-for victory. Therefore, every defensive battle must terminate
with an offensive action or there will be no result" (Marshal Foch).
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLE.--No two battles are precisely similar,
but there are certain characteristics common to every battle.
In the first place, the issue is almost always uncertain, for events
which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the
wisest plans. The best chances, therefore, are on the side of the
commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object,
who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity, and executes them with
the greatest ability. Decisive success has followed the combinations
of great commanders, and in the long run victory pays homage to
knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war. {25}
In the second place, the human factor always plays its part in battle.
Troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden
disaster, and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if
their flank is gained.
In the third place, a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown
into action at the right moment against greater numbers, if the latter
are exhausted by fighting, may achieve a success out of all proportion
to their numbers. For this reason a prudent commander will endeavour
to retain under his control some portion of his reserves, to be thrown
in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power.
To be superior at the point of attack is the Art of Warfare in a
nutshell, and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position
must be properly synchronised to be effective. The unbeaten enemy will
otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened
points. The attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal
or fails to reach the point mainly threatened.
McClellan's position with the Army of the Potomac on _Malvern Hill_
(July 1, 1862) was a desperate position to attack in front, but it
could have been turned on the right. The hill dominated the ground to
the north, and also the road on which Lee's Army of Northern Virginia
was approaching, and was crowned with numerous heavy guns, against
which Lee's artillery was powerless. It was Lee's intention to open
with an attack by a division, supported by two brigades, on the right
of the position, and when this force was at grips with the Army of the
Potomac, to assault the centre with a bayonet charge. About 5 p.m. the
sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position, and
mistaking this for the signal, General D. H. Hill launched the attack
on the centre. The first line of defence was carried, but the Northern
Army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line, and reinforcements
quickly {26} beat off the attack with heavy loss. After this attack
had failed, Magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on
the right flank was delivered with similar results. Both attacks were
carried out with superb courage, but partial blows of this nature are
without the first elements of success, and McClellan's movements were
not again molested.
PHASES OF THE BATTLE.--There are three principal phases of every
battle. Information must be obtained by observation and by fighting;
advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the
blow or blows will be most effective; success obtained by fighting must
be developed until the enemy is annihilated.
_Information and the Initiative_.--Much work requires to be done in the
air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face.
Aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast
tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain
whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are
being concentrated by the enemy. From information so obtained the
Headquarters Staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of
the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have
been perceived by the enemy. After the enemy is encountered this
information is at the service of the Commander of the troops, but it
will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. On each side
the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose
his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative
is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary,
instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to
his own purposes. Each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of
manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval
commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter.
The initiative won by the Strategy of one commander {27} is sometimes
wrested from him by the Tactics of his adversary. This was exemplified
at the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22, 1812). Wellington, the
generalissimo of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw
behind the River Tormes to the stronghold Ciudad Rodrigo, and had
dispatched his train to that centre. The French Commander (Marmont),
in his eagerness to intercept Wellington's line of retreat, moved part
of his force to the Heights of Miranda, thus threatening Wellington's
right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached
force and his main army. Wellington noted the fresh disposition of
Marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "That will do!"
he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him
by Marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against
the detached body (which was defeated before Marmont could send
assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army,
which was forced to leave the field. Wellington afterwards declared,
"I never saw an army receive such a beating." If the Spanish General
in alliance with Wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit
instructions, evacuated the Castle of Alba de Tormes (which commanded
the fords over which the French retreated), "not one-third of Marmont's
army would have escaped" (Napier).
As at Salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by
the Strategy of Marmont was wrested from him by the Tactics of
Wellington, so at the final phase of the _First Battle of the Marne_
(September, 1914), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
an inexhaustible supply of troops. To obtain a quick decision the
Germans went to every length. Of the main routes for the invasion of
France chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories
of Luxemburg and Belgium, and only one through France, and their
advance there broke {28} down, almost at the first, at the only point
where it was legitimately conducted, for the German armies failed to
pierce the French Front at the Gap of Charmes (Vosges), and their
defeat at the _Battle of Baccarat_ (August 25, 1914) led to the
decisive defeat at the First Battle of the Marne. They then abandoned,
for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and
retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the Aisne, relied upon
methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and
upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of
close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege
warfare, which endured until the collapse of Russia in 1917 freed for
an offensive movement on the requisite scale in 1918 upwards of
1,500,000 men. At the _First Battle of the Marne_, the five German
armies, which were following up the Franco-British left and centre,
were extended from Amiens to Verdun, but on September 8, 1914, the
German I. Army (General von Kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of
the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the German
forces. To the north-west of Paris a new French Army, collected from
the Metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been
assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and
intelligence of the Military Governor of Paris (General Gallieni); and
to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to
regain touch with the other German armies, one of which (under the
Crown Prince) was unsuccessfully engaged in battle, General von Kluck
adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march, across the
front of the Franco-British left wing. Upon receiving intelligence of
this manoeuvre from the Air Service in Paris, General Joffre, seeing
the opportunity of gaining the initiative, ordered an advance to the
attack on September 6, and the First Battle of the Marne, which
resulted from this order, changed the character of the fighting on the
{29} Western Front. The decisive blow was strategical rather than
tactical. It was delivered on a battlefield of 6,000 square miles, and
involved, throughout that area, a struggle of six great armies,
numbering in all 700,000 troops, against a similar number of armies of
at least equal strength. No counter-attack on such a scale had
previously been delivered in any campaign, and the scarcely interrupted
advance of the German armies received a permanent check, while the
strategic aim of the German Staff, namely, the speedy annihilation in
the field of the Franco-British armies, had to be definitely abandoned.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLE.--The "atmosphere" of battle is thus depicted
in "The Science of War": "When two armies are face to face and one is
superior in numbers to the other, the commander of the smaller army is
confronted by two problems. If the superior army is not yet
concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot
readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. If the
superior army is already concentrated, its commander may be induced, by
one means or another, to make detachments, and thus to be weak
everywhere. The first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre,
surprise marches, secrecy, feints to bewilder the adversary in his
concentration, and action on unexpected lines. The second, by skilful
threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will
detach forces; by concealment of his dispositions; and by drawing the
adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be
employed." "The power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of
the greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all
the great strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those
to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to
outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected. To what
Federal soldier did it occur on the {30} morning of _Chancellorsville_
(May 2-8, 1863) that Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would
detach Stonewall Jackson with more than half his own force of 43,000 to
attack his adversary in the rear" ("The Science of War"). Surprise was
the chief cause of success in the _First Battle of Cambrai_ (November
20, 1917) when General Sir Julian Byng launched the III. Army at dawn
against the highly organised defensive position known as the
"Hindenburg Line." The wire entanglements in front of this position
were exceptionally deep, and had not been broken by gun-fire. Behind
them the Germans were resting in apparent security and such information
as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not
corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which
was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in
force. The advance was preceded by battalions of Tanks, with Infantry
in close support, and was followed by Cavalry, to round up fugitives
and disorganise reinforcements. The artillery had previously been
strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines, to
prevent the Germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up
their formations. Aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the
battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action.
An advance was made into the strongest part of the German defensive
system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles, and secured
upwards of 11,000 prisoners, 150 guns, and considerable quantities of
stores and materials, and although after-events neutralised the initial
successes, the advance of November 20, 1917, will ever remain an
example of the value of surprise in war. "Surprise strikes with terror
even those who are by far the stronger. A new weapon of war may ensure
it, or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's, or a
concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not
ready instantaneously to parry the blow. But if the methods {31} be
various, the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the
enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected
and incontestably powerful means, the sentiment of impotence, the
conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say, that he is
conquered. And this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be
directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. For an army is an animate
and organised being, a collection of organs, of which the loss even of
a single one leads to death" (Marshal Foch). At almost any period of
the battle, and in almost every phase of fighting, surprise can be
brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine
gun or other form of fire. "A sudden effective fire will have a
particularly demoralising effect on the enemy; it is often
advantageous, therefore, to seek for surprise effects of this sort by
temporarily withholding fire" ("Infantry Training, 1921").
THE DECISIVE BLOW.--The preparatory action and the development usually
take the form of a converging movement of separated forces, so timed as
to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously, in order to
threaten the enemy's line of communications, for the line of supply is
as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a
human being. "Perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a
commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications. He
sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish
them" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). The decisive blow will be delivered
by the General Reserve, which will be secretly concentrated and
launched as secretly as possible; and the commander of the whole force
will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can
be kept in hand for this decisive blow, on a part of the enemy's front
if sufficient penetration has been effected, or on a flank. The point
chosen becomes the vital {32} point, and success there means success at
all points. Once routed, the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and
prevented from regaining order and moral.
A battle was fought in the year B.C. 331, nearly 2,300 years ago, at
Arbela,[1] in Mesopotamia, the Eastern theatre of operations in the
Great War of 1914-18, and it deserves study to show the eternal nature
of the main principles which underlie the Art of War. Alexander the
Great invaded the territories of Darius, King of the Medes and
Persians, with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main
armies in a decisive battle. The Macedonian forces were preceded by an
Advanced Guard of Cavalry, and from information obtained by the
Vanguard, Alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the
Persian forces. By a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company
with his Corps Commanders, Alexander was able to forestall a projected
movement, and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that
his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed
with spears, which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry, he
found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground, which afforded no
protection to either of his flanks. After advancing in these two lines
Alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx, or wedge-shaped figure,
and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings
asunder. In spite of local reverses in parts of the field, the depth
and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces:
the survivors were captured or dispersed, and the victory was complete.
[1] The site of this battle was probably Gaugamela, about 60 miles from
the present Arbil, which is 40 miles from Mosul, on the Baghdad road.
{33}