DEFINITIONS.--Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by
non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the
soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined
it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered.
The theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of
Tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it
so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of
operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to
striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy,
and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_
combinations. "Strategy must ever be striving for Tactical success;
Tactics must ever keep in mind the Strategical situation and must
constantly aim at creating fresh Strategical opportunities. Tactics
without Strategy resembles a man without legs; Strategy without Tactics
is like a man without arms" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out
the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to
beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the
direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest
way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. No Strategy can
henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring Tactical results,
victory by fighting" (Marshal Foch).
Local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are
felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. Lord Roberts's advance on
Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on
Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles
apart. _The {7} First Battle of the Somme_ (July 1, 1916) not only
relieved the pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces
which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the
East. General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917)
was followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November
30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20 to
25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the
Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable
that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was
suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our
Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches).
A tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. In
June, 1864, General Hunter was operating with a Federal army in the
Shenandoah Valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall
back. In so doing he uncovered the National Capital, and General Early
was sent by the Confederate Commander-in-Chief to capture Washington.
General Grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the
dispatch of troops, and to further this end, General Lew Wallace,[1] on
his own initiative, confronted Early's corps at the _Monocacy_ on July
8, 1864. He met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed Early's
corps until the troops sent by Grant were in position. "If Early had
been but one day _earlier_ he might have entered the capital before the
arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. General Wallace contributed
on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater
benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an
equal force to render by means of a victory" (Grant's "Memoirs"). A
tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if
it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. On the
morning of June 18, 1815, Marshal Grouchy was in {8} pursuit of the
Prussians whom Napoleon had defeated on June 16 at Ligny. Although
urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at Waterloo), Grouchy
pushed on eastwards, where he found Thielmann's Prussian Corps of
16,000 men holding the passage across the Dyle at Wavre. The _Battle
of Wavre_ was begun at 4 p.m. on June 18, and by 11 a.m. on the next
day Grouchy was victorious. But his victory was barren. His tactical
achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own
force to considerable danger. As he sat down to pen a vainglorious
dispatch to the Emperor, he received the news that Napoleon was a
fugitive and the Imperial Army defeated and scattered. Grouchy's
feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted Blücher to join forces with
Wellington. To the Emperor's dismay it was the Prussians who came from
the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "C'est les Prussiens qui
viennent!"
MORAL.--It is seen that Strategy may be defined as the art of
concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at
the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main
armies; while Tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and
handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy
when encountered. But although Strategy may be considered as the art
of bringing an opponent to battle, and Tactics as the art of defeating
him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many
considerations which influence a commander in the field.
The art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from
the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what
locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated.
From information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed
be determined; but "in war (said Napoleon) moral force is to the
physical (that is, to numbers and {9} armament) as three to one," and
upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been
expressed. "To understand war you must go beyond its instruments and
materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously
analysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs,
their passions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. That
is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a
reasonable study of the art of war" (Marshal Foch). And while dealing
with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing
leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the
nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human
intelligences rather than between masses of men. "There have been
soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("The Science of
War"). "It was not the Roman legions which conquered Gaul, it was
Caesar. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the
Inn, it was Turenne" (Napoleon). A commander must, therefore, take
into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and
the means at the disposal of his adversary. He must project his mind
to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place
must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will
act under the given circumstances.
History supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[2]
Napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the Russian left wing against
his right at _Austerlitz_, Dec. 2, 1805, because he knew the
temperament of the Tsar Alexander. At Austerlitz, the most brilliant
of all his battles, Napoleon had 70,000 troops and was confronted by
80,000 Austrians and Russians drawn up on the Heights of Pratzen. His
plan was to draw the weight of the Russian attack against his
right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and {10}
self-confident Tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to
Napoleon"--and then to launch a superior attack against the Heights,
which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and
finally to hurl his General Reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the
Russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. When
the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right
was engaged, Napoleon launched Murat, Bernadotte, and Soult against the
allied centre; when Soult was master of the village and the knoll, and
as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the
reverse slopes of the Pratzen Ridge, the French centre wheeled round to
the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the Russians, who
were still heavily engaged in their original attack. These operations
were completely successful and over 40,000 of the opposing armies were
accounted for. Wellington defeated Soult at Sauroren in the Pyrenees
(July 28, 1813) by taking advantage of a minor incident. He had ridden
forward to see the disposition of the French forces, and as his men
cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said, "Soult
is a very cautious commander. He will delay his attack to find out
what those cheers mean; that will give time for the Sixth Division to
arrive and I shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he
had predicted. Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson frequently played
upon the nervousness of President Lincoln for the safety of Washington,
and by threatening to cross the Potomac induced him to withdraw troops
that were advancing against Richmond.
NATIONAL MORAL.--The moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must
also be taken into consideration. "The common theory that, in order to
win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better bases,
more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. For it leaves out of
account the most important part of the {11} problem, that which
animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and
physical qualities" (Marshal Foch).
DISCIPLINE AND MORALITY.--The discipline, courage, and endurance of the
troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting, are at least
of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "If their
discipline and leading be defective, Providence seldom sides with the
big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy
auxiliaries" ("The Science of War"). "An army which cannot march well
is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. A general whose strategy is
based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the
breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of
disaster. It is therefore necessary that the question of marching
should be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by
regimental officers and men. It is on the latter that the hardships
and exertions fall, and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by
teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move
faster and further than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred
by an army which allows itself to be out-marched. . . . Superior
mobility alone enabled Frederick the Great to move 'like a panther
round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank. The
discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of
combination" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "Nothing compensates for
absence of discipline; and the constant watchfulness that is necessary
in war, even when danger seems remote, can only be secured by
discipline, which makes of duty a habit" (General R. Taylor, C.S.
Army). At the _Battle of Hastings_ (Oct. 14, 1066) lack of discipline
and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the English nation and
brought about the Norman Conquest. Harold, the English king, had
defeated the forces of Harold Hadraade, {12} King of Norway, at
Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire (Sept. 25, 1066). Four days later, Duke
William of Normandy landed in Pevensey Bay, with 60,000 horse and foot.
Harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and
marching. After halting six days in London to collect reinforcements,
the English force entrenched itself on the hill of Sautlache and
awaited attack. The Normans were unable to penetrate the abattis, but
they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the English
race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat. Harold's undisciplined
auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were obeyed by the
"regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the palisades in
pursuit of the fleeing Normans, who suddenly turned about and
penetrated the English lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries.
Had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as the
"regulars" there had been no Norman Conquest.
With regard to marching, General T. J. Jackson once observed, in reply
to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one
man in marching than five in fighting." Acting on this principle he
invariably surprised his enemy, the most notable instances being his
surprise of Milroy at McDowell, of Banks and Fremont in the Valley, of
McClellan's right at Gaines's Mill, of Pope at the Second Manassas, and
his last and greatest of Hooker at Chancellorsville.
TIME.--Time is often a supreme factor in warfare, and the superior
mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical
advantage. Reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated
at the right spot at the right moment, and steamships, railways, and
mechanical transport thus play an important part in war. The mobility
of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle, and campaigns have
been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms.
{13}
WEATHER.--The weather is an important factor in war, and its influence
appears to have increased in modern times. Mists and fogs militate
against observation by aircraft, and poor visibility interferes with
the work of artillery. Roads are broken up by the weight of modern
traffic, and in a shelled area the craters become impassable after a
few days rain, making the supply of food, stores and ammunition a
serious problem. Such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack,
as the ground of the encounter consists principally of hastily dug
trenches which become running streams of mud; and they assist the
defence, as the pursuit is delayed, while the ground behind the
defending force is less liable to be churned up by shell fire. The bad
weather of September, 1916, caused a delay in the Allied advance
against Sailly-Saillesel and Le Transloy and made it necessary to
abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have
brought it within the grasp of the commanders. As the season advanced
and the bad weather continued the plans of the Allies had to be
reduced, and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some
indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather
permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended.
HEALTH.--"Wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral
of the opposing forces. Moral depends to a very large extent upon the
feeding and general well-being of the troops. Badly supplied troops
will invariably be low in moral, and an army ravaged by disease ceases
to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the fighting forces
are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that
with the rearward services rests victory or defeat" (Marshal Haig).
HUMAN NATURE.--Human nature is affected by discipline, fear, hunger,
confidence in or distrust of leaders, and by a variety of other
influences, and human {14} nature is more important than armament and
numbers. "No great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which
the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting" (General
Sir E. B. Hamley), and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its
leaders is also a factor of supreme importance. Time occupied in
preparation for battle, or in manoeuvring for the "weather gauge," is
seldom wasted; but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive
yielding to popular clamour. Against the strategical and tactical
genius of Hannibal, Quintus Fabius Maximus invoked the aid of time to
afford him opportunities to strike. His "Fabian Tactics" have become
proverbial, and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet
"Cunctator," which the epigram[3] of Ennius has immortalised in his
honour. Popular clamour led to a division of authority with Varro, and
to the disaster of _Cannae_ (B.C. 216). General G. B. McClellan was
recalled from the Army of the Potomac on account of his failure to
convert the drawn battle of the _Antietam_ (Sept. 17, 1862) into a
victory, and the army was handed over to General Burnside, who suffered
defeat at _Fredericksburg_ (Dec. 13, 1862) with terrible slaughter.
"But the stout heart of the American nation quickly rallied, and
inspired by the loyal determination of Abraham Lincoln the United
States turned once more to their apparently hopeless task" (Colonel G.
F. R. Henderson). McClellan's forte was organisation, and although at
first slow in the field, he had assembled and trained a magnificent
fighting force, with which he was "feeling his way to victory." He
suffered defeat indeed at _Gaines's Mill_ (June 27, 1862), the first
act in the drama of the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_. Day
after day he fell back through swamp and forest, battling with Lee's
victorious troops. But there was no further disaster. Under the most
adverse and dispiriting circumstances the Army of the Potomac fairly
held their own until {15} they reached the impregnable position of
Malvern Hill. There McClellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy
slaughter the disjointed attacks of the Army of Northern Virginia. He
had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base,
unknown to the Confederate General Staff, from the York River to the
James. This proved his strategic power, as did the dispositions at
_Malvern Hill_ (July 1, 1862) his tactical ability, and his work was
accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the
opposition of the executive, and in face of the military genius of
Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson. At the Antietam he forced the
Confederates to give battle, and although tactically indecisive, the
engagement caused the withdrawal of Lee's army into Virginia.
McClellan's successors were far less competent, and the magnificent
Army of the Potomac met with frequent disasters, until it formed the
solid nucleus of the forces of General Meade, which inflicted upon Lee
his first defeat and saved the Union at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863),
and finally under Grant, in conjunction with the Armies of the West,
crushed the life out of the Confederacy at _Appomattox_.
General G. H. Thomas, in command of the U.S. Army of the Cumberland,
refused battle with the Confederates in Nashville until he had prepared
cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit. Constancy of
purpose was the salient feature of Thomas's military character. He
would not fight until he was ready. The civil authorities urgently
demanded that he should advance. So great was the tension that Grant
finally sent General J. A. Logan to supersede Thomas; but before Logan
arrived Thomas had won the _Battle of Nashville_ (Dec. 15-16, 1864),
the most crushing victory of the war.
Lord Roberts landed in Cape Town on Jan. 10, 1900, and popular
expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated
advance of French's cavalry and the Sixth and Ninth Infantry Divisions
{16} resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field
of battle, and in the surrender on the field of Cronje's force at
_Paardeberg_ (Feb. 27, 1900), on the anniversary of Majuba.
THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE.--In all calculations on which a declaration of
war is based the moral fibre of the actual and potential enemy nations
is fully considered. It is difficult to imagine that the Headquarters
Staff of the German and Austrian Armies failed to bring under review
the moral of the nations against whom their armies were to be launched
in July, 1914. The Spirit of France had shown no signs of
deterioration, but was to be quelled by a rapid advance through neutral
territories, to bring about a bewildered collapse, as in 1870, before
the Russian mobilisation was complete, and "Nous sommes trahis" was
again to be heard from the disheartened troops. But the calm
determination of the commander and his generals in the dark days of
August, 1914, prevented the bewildered collapse, and the _Defence of
Verdun_ from February to August, 1916, and the cheers of the _poilus_,
as they recaptured the _Chemin des Dames_ in April-July, 1917, replaced
the capitulation of Sedan and of Metz and the "Nous sommes trahis" of
1870.
GREAT BRITAIN.--Britain was not expected to take an active part in the
struggle, and if she did the affairs of Ireland, the Suffragette
movement, and the general decadence of the nation would prevent a
whole-hearted prosecution of the war. A small force only could be sent
to Europe; it would be swallowed up in the "bewildered collapse," and
no reinforcements could be spared. The extent of the miscalculation is
shown in Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on July 3,
1919, in which the Prime Minister stated that the British Empire had
put 7,700,000 men under arms, had raised 9,500,000,000 pounds in taxes
and loans, and had suffered upwards of 8,000,000 casualties on land and
{17} sea. It was also shown that during the last two years of the war
the British armies had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting on the
Western Front in France and at the same time had destroyed the armed
forces of the Turkish Empire in the East. The risk of compelling
Britain to take part was undertaken, and the first great strategical
blunder of the war was committed.
AMERICA.--In the third year of the War America had gradually been
brought into the arena, and a further miscalculation arrayed the
hundred millions of a free and united nation against the autocracies of
Central Europe.
LORD ROBERTS.--Other brains than German had considered the possibility
of an armed conflict in Europe. For many years Lord Roberts had
advocated universal military service in the United Kingdom, as a
procedure beneficial in itself, and imperative on account of the clear
intentions of the Headquarters Staff of the German Army. "Germany
strikes when Germany's hour has struck," was his warning note, and
although apparently unheeded by the nation, his warning was not without
effect upon the training of the Regular Army.
COLONEL HENDERSON.--Military writers in the United Kingdom had also
considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of
Germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed
under review. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in "The Science of War," had
even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of Britain and
the Overseas Dominions but those of the United States would take part,
and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the
Atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of
the War. Colonel Henderson found in the race something more than
toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "Tactical ability is the
birthright of {18} our race. . . . In a conflict on the vastest scale
(the American Civil War) the tactics of the American troops, at a very
early period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866. In
Strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments
and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the
field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. Nor were the
larger tactical manoeuvres even of 1870 an improvement on those of the
American campaigns. . . . But in 1878, Skobeleff, the first of
European generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the
American War 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the Turkish
redoubts he followed the plan of the American generals on both sides,
when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting
columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be
repulsed." After the Civil War, General Forrest, a cavalry leader of
the Confederate States Army, was asked to what he attributed his
success in so many actions. He replied: "Well, I reckon I got there
first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the
Art of War. "At Nachod, the Austrian commander had numbers on his
side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by
numbers that he was beaten" (Marshal Foch). With regard to the moral
of the race Colonel Henderson makes this emphatic statement: "In the
last nine months of the American Civil War, time and again, according
to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but
it declined to be anything of the sort. The losses show this. This
was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both
sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the Duke
of Wellington. Never to know when they were beaten was a
characteristic of both North and South."
THE CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY.--In place of the general decadence of the
British race, upon which the German Staff appear to have relied, this
characteristic {19} quality of endurance was exhibited by French's
"Contemptible Little Army" during the _Retreat from Mons_ in August,
1914, at the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October 20, 1914), and at the
_Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22, 1915). Of his "Contemptible Little
Army" Marshal French writes in his book, "1914": "The British Army had
indeed suffered severely, and had performed a herculean task in
reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its _moral_
had withstood the ordeal. I think the Germans were probably justified
in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the
nation from which we spring."
THE NEW ARMIES.--From 1915 to 1918 the New Armies, raised, equipped,
and trained during the War, and representing the Empire in arms,
displayed the same inherent quality, and disproved for ever the charge
of decadence that had been brought against the British race. "That
these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions,
and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years
had been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history
of our nation records no equal. . . . Troops from every part of the
British Isles and from every Dominion and quarter of the Empire,
whether Regulars, Territorials, or men of the New Armies, have borne a
share in the battle. . . . Among all the long roll of victories borne
on the colours of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of
the endurance and resolution of our Infantry. They have shown
themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and of the
proud records of former wars" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 23,
1916).
"Our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are
capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under
conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the
greatest endurance, determination, and heroism to {20} overcome" (Sir
D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25, 1917). "It is no disparagement of the
gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn
struggle for the line of hills which stretches from Wytschaete to
Passchendaele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden
of our Empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in
October and November of 1914, made Ypres take rank for ever amongst the
most glorious of British battles" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25,
1917). "The British infantryman has always had the reputation of
fighting his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the
history of our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose,
has won victory from a numerically superior foe. Thrown once more upon
the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control, but which
will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full measure the
traditional qualities of his race" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, July 20,
1918). "Throughout this long period of incessant fighting against
greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the British
forces engaged was magnificent. What they achieved is best described
in the words of the French General (Maistre) under whose orders they
came, who wrote of them: 'They have enabled us to establish a barrier
against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves.
Cela aucun des témoins français ne l'oubliera'" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatch, December 21, 1918).
After four years of fighting, at the close of a defensive campaign of
the utmost severity, protracted by the efforts of the enemy from March
21-July 17, 1918, the New Armies passed from the guard to the thrust.
They were everywhere victorious, and in nine pitched battles they
captured upwards of 175,000 prisoners and 2,600 guns.
"In order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during
this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and importance
of the main events--
{21}
"_Battle of Amiens_ (Aug. 8-13) in which the IV. Army took 22,000
prisoners and more than 400 guns.
"_Battle of Bapaume_ (Aug. 21-Sept. 1) III. Army and Left Wing of IV.
Army: 34,000 prisoners, 270 guns.
"_Battle of the Scarpe_ (Aug. 26-Sept. 3) I. Army: 16,000 prisoners,
200 guns.
"_Battle of Haerincourt and Epéhy_ (Sept. 12-18) IV. and III. Armies:
12,000 prisoners, 100 guns.
"_Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line_ (Sept. 27-Oct. 5) IV.,
III., and I. Armies. Ended in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line and
in the capture of 35,000 prisoners and 380 guns.
"_Battle of Flanders_ (Sept. 28-Oct. 14) II. Army: 5,000 prisoners, 100
guns.
"_Battle of Le Cateau_ (Oct. 6-12) IV., III., and I. Armies: 12,000
prisoners, 250 guns.
"_Battle of the Selle_ (Oct. 17-25) IV. and III. Armies: 20,000
prisoners, 475 guns.
"_Battle of the Sambre_ (Nov. 1-11) IV., III., and I. Armies: 19,000
prisoners, 450 guns."
(Marshal Foch.)
CHANGES IN METHOD.--The principles which underlie the Art of War would
thus appear to be based on constant factors, but the methods of their
application are susceptible to change, for in their application the
principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions.
Gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour; the
bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike; the rifle outranged
the musket; the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively
increased the rate of fire; smokeless powder rendered a firing line
almost invisible; the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet
increased the danger-zone in an advance; the increased power, mobility,
and accuracy of the field gun[4] rendered certain {22} formations
obsolete in the attack; the general advance in the rate and accuracy of
fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery made attack on a strongly
organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of
the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence, or when an
overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and
smothers the enemy's resistance. The advent of a third service, by the
addition of the Air to the Sea and Land Services, increased the
facilities for reconnaissance[5] and added to the difficulties of
concealing movement during the hours of daylight. These and similar
influences have brought about changes in certain respects, amongst
which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments,
and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the
case, or modified to suit the new requirements.[6]
But no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the
infantryman. "Despite the enormous development of mechanical invention
in every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always
held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure
to-day as in any period of history. The infantryman remains the
backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. At no time has
the reputation of the British infantryman been higher, or his
achievement more worthy of his renown. . . . Immense as the
influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves
decide a campaign. Their true _rôle_ is that of assisting the
infantryman. . . . They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and
bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won" (Sir D.
Haig's Dispatches).
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THE TEXT-BOOKS.--Changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to
time in circulars issued by the General Staff, to be embodied
eventually in the official text-books. These text-books ("Infantry
Training" and "Field Service Regulations") are the foundation upon
which the study of Infantry Tactics should be based, and of these books
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson has left behind him the following opinion:
"That portion of our own text-books which refers to Infantry in Attack
and Defence is merely the essence of Tactics. There is no single
sentence that is not of primary importance, no single principle laid
down that can be violated with impunity, no single instruction that
should not be practised over and over again." After four years of
warfare, in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been
put to the most searching of all tests (_i.e._ practical application in
War), the General Staff of the Army was able to preface a list of its
recent publications with the following exhortation: "It must be
remembered that the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations
and in Infantry Training are still the basis of all sound knowledge."
At the close of the final victorious campaign, Marshal Haig emphasised
the truth of this claim: "The longer the war lasted the more
emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and
training were based on correct principles. The danger of altering them
too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the
risk of adjusting them too little. . . . The experience gained in this
war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other
campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics
which have characterised the fighting. There was required also the
sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our Training Manuals and
Staff Colleges."
[1] Author of "Ben Hur."
[2] For an example in military fiction, see _The Second Degree_ in "The
Green Curve."
[3] "Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem."
[4] The term "field gun" was limited to the 18-pounder until the _Boer
War_, when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery. In the Great War,
mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the
largest calibre. Quick-firing field guns were first used by the
Abyssinians against the Italians at the Battle of Adowa (February 29,
1896).
[5] Reconnoitring balloons were first used by the Army of the Potomac
at the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 12, 1862). Aeroplanes were
used in warfare for the first time in 1911, during the Italo-Turkish
campaign in Tripoli, North Africa.
[6] Heavily armoured cars, known as "Tanks," were introduced during the
First Battle of the Somme, September 15, 1916.
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