"The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its
principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."--MARSHAL FOCH.
The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed
principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his
goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and
there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these
pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out,
that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap
and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the
alluring trap that Warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a
third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the
General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the
Subaltern Officer.
KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.--With regard to the first of these
difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of
Warfare may be consulted. "The cardinal principles on which the art of
war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of
morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the
genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed"
(General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). "Although the manifold inventions of
modern times have given to warfare {2} a wider scope and fresh
materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it
applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more
delicate" (Marshal Foch). "This war has given us no new principles;
but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid
improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense
numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast
quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous
expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor
transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity
concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and
services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new
devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already
working" (Marshal Haig).
The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but
their successful application on the field of battle requires that they
should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The
mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by
the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General
Sir E. B. Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and
thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of
troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War
into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to
speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to
think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must
present itself to the mind as perfectly _obvious_" (Marshal French).
The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest
victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "Generally
speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect.
It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in
order to make war or even to understand {3} war. No study is possible
on the battlefield; one does there simply what one _can_ in order to
apply what one knows. In order to _do_ even a little one has to know a
great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes
itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed
principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called
extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all"
(Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way
to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the
great captains."
THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.--The fallacy that warfare is "merely a
matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson,
in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865,
when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in
Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a
professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have
possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and
yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were
frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like
hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this
well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous.
"Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from
assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation
whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall
Jackson").
In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in
the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker,
commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed
to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission
was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to
keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.
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THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.--The same writer has also protested
vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field
is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a
detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being
has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is
constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and
success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend
upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of
War"). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations
of War Explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond
the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however
small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of
the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience,
seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with
marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in
every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements
of Jackson's forces in the _Shenandoah Valley Campaign_ of 1862 were
almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently
impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of
Jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of
Stonewall's couriers approached him. "I was always expecting him to
order me to assault the North Pole! But, if he _had_ ordered, we
should have done it!"
THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.--It is not pretended by any sane writer that
study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally
recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the
knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the
field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or
confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute
by nature. But "the quick, {5} the resolute, the daring, deciding and
acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to
decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art
they are called upon to practise" ("The Science of War"). Theory,
applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious
sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the
advice, or to take warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of
Wellington, of Foch, and of many of the most famous generals of
history. "A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's
warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's
communications his first objective; and if Wellington's tactical
methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if
he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . The
same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a
small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with
courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon
or an army corps" ("The Science of War").
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