THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN.
General Bragg's Infatuation--General Grant in Command of the Federal
Forces--Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee--His Plans for the
Campaign--Poorly supported by his Superior--Foraging for Daily
Rations--General Burnside's Forces--Advance upon Knoxville--Affairs at
Lenoir's and Campbell's Stations--Engagement near Knoxville an
Artillery Combat--Reprehensible Conduct of Officers--Allegement that
One was actuated by Jealousy--Federals retire behind their
Works--Laying the Confederate Lines about Knoxville.
About the 1st of November it was rumored about camp that I was to be
ordered into East Tennessee against General Burnside's army. At the moment
it seemed impossible that our commander, after rejecting a proposition for
a similar move made just after his battle, when flushed with victory and
the enemy discomfited, could now think of sending an important detachment
so far, when he knew that, in addition to the reinforcements that had
joined the Union army, another strong column was marching from Memphis
under General Sherman, and must reach Chattanooga in fifteen or twenty
days. But on second thoughts it occurred to me that it might, after all,
be in keeping with his peculiarities, and then it occurred to me that
there are many ways to compass a measure when the spirit leads. So I set
to work to try to help his plans in case the report proved true.
After a little reflection it seemed feasible that by withdrawing his army
from its lines about Chattanooga to strong concentration behind the
Chickamauga River, and recalling his detachment in East Tennessee (the
latter to give the impression of a westward move), and at the moment of
concentration sending a strong force for swift march against General
Burnside,--strong enough to crush him,--and returning to Chattanooga
before the army under General Sherman could reach there (or, if he thought
better, let the detachment strike into Kentucky against the enemy's
communications), something worth while could be effected.
Presently I was called, with Lieutenant-General Hardee and Major-General
Breckenridge, the other corps commanders, to learn his plans and receive
his orders. He announced his purpose in general terms to send me into East
Tennessee, then paused as if inviting the opinions of others, when I
stated that the move could be made, but it would be hazardous to make a
detachment strong enough for rapid work while his army was spread along a
semicircle of six miles, with the enemy concentrated at the centre, whence
he could move in two or three threatening columns, to hold his line to its
extension, and give his real attack such power that it must break through
by its weight. Then I suggested the operations herein just mentioned.
He ordered the move to be made by my two divisions, Alexander's and
Leydon's artillery, and Wheeler's cavalry and horse artillery. We had the
promise of a force, estimated from three to five thousand, that was to
come from Southwest Virginia and meet us, but that command was to start
from a point two hundred miles from our starting, march south as we
marched north, and meet us at Knoxville. General Bragg estimated General
Burnside's force south of Knoxville at fifteen thousand. I repeated the
warning that the move as ordered was not such as to give assurances of
rapid work, saying that my march and campaign against the enemy's
well-guarded positions must be made with care, and that would consume so
much time that General Grant's army would be up, when he would organize
attack that must break through the line before I could return to him. His
sardonic smile seemed to say that I knew little of his army or of himself
in assuming such a possibility. So confident was he of his position that I
ventured to ask that my column should be increased to twenty thousand
infantry and artillery, but he intimated that further talk was out of
order.
General Grant had in the mean time joined the army and assumed command on
the 22d of October, and it was known that General Sherman was marching to
join him.
On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter[186] to General
Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd
guns, but his returns for November show a force of twenty-five thousand
two hundred and ninety and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of his
men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.
To march, and capture or disperse this formidable force, fortified at
points, I had McLaws's and Hood's divisions of infantry, Colonel
Alexander's and Major Leydon's artillery, and four brigades of General
Wheeler's cavalry. Kershaw's, Humphreys's, Wofford's, and Bryan's brigades
constituted McLaws's division. Hood's division, which was commanded during
the campaign by Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, was made up of Jenkins's,
Anderson's, Benning's, Law's, and Robertson's brigades. General Wheeler's
cavalry was organized into two divisions of two brigades each,--General
John T. Morgan's Alabama and Colonel Cruse's Georgia brigades, under
Major-General W. T. Martin; Colonels G. G. Dibbrell's Tennessee and Thomas
Harrison's Texas brigades, under Brigadier-General Frank Armstrong. This
made about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging
parties. The remote contingent that was to come from Southwest Virginia
was an unknown quantity, not to be considered until it could report for
service.
As soon as the conference at head-quarters adjourned orders were issued
for Alexander's artillery to be withdrawn from Lookout Mountain, and
General McLaws was ordered to withdraw his division from the general line
after night. Both commands were ordered to Tyner's Station to take the
cars for Sweetwater on the 4th.
Control of the trains was under General Bragg's quartermaster, who had
orders for the cars to be ready to transport the troops on their arrival,
but the trains were not ready until the 5th. The brigades arrived at
Sweetwater on the 6th, 7th, and 8th. Alexander's batteries were shipped as
soon as cars were ready. To expedite matters, his horses and wagons were
ordered forward by the dirt road; the batteries found cars, the last
battery getting to Sweetwater on the 10th. Jenkins's division and Leydon's
batteries were drawn from the lines on the 5th and ordered to meet the
cars at the tunnel through Missionary Ridge. They reached the station in
due season, but the cars were not there. After waiting some days, the
battery horses and horses of mounted officers were ordered by the wagon
road. Tired of the wait, I advised the troops to march along the road and
find the cars where they might have the good fortune to meet them, the
officers, whose horses had been sent forward, marching with the soldiers.
General Bragg heard of the delay and its cause, but began to urge the
importance of more rapid movements. His effort to make his paper record at
my expense was not pleasing, but I tried to endure it with patience. He
knew that trains and conductors were under his exclusive control, but _he
wanted papers that would throw the responsibility of delay upon other
shoulders_.
On the 8th and 9th the infantry marched as far as Cleveland, about thirty
miles, where the train-masters gave notice that the trains could meet
them, but it was not until the 12th that the last of the brigades reached
Sweetwater.
While waiting for transportation, I wrote some of my friends to excuse my
failure to stop and say good-by. The letter written to General Buckner was
returned to me some months after, endorsed by him as having important
bearing upon events as they transpired,--viz.:
"WEDNESDAY, November 5, 1863.
"MY DEAR GENERAL,--I start to-day for Tyner's Station, and expect to
get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The weather is so bad,
and I find myself so much occupied, that I shall not be able to see
you to say good-by.
"When I heard the report around camp that I was to go into East
Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means for making
the move with security and the hope of great results. As every other
move had been proposed to the general and rejected or put off until
time had made them inconvenient, I came to the conclusion, as soon as
the report reached me, that it was to be the fate of our army to wait
until all good opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation,
seize upon the least favorable movement.
"As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the general, I
thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging
his own move, and proposed the following plan,--viz.: to withdraw from
our present lines and our forces in East Tennessee (the latter to be
done in order to give the impression to the enemy that we were
retiring from East Tennessee and concentrating near him for battle or
for some other movement) and place our army in a strong concentrated
position behind Chickamauga River. The moment the army was together,
to make a detachment of twenty thousand to move rapidly against
Burnside and destroy him; and by continued rapid movements to threaten
the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent that might be
necessary to draw him out from his present position. This, at best, is
but a tedious process, but I thought it gave promise of some results,
and was, therefore, better than being here destroying ourselves. The
move, as I proposed it, would have left this army in a strong position
and safe, and would have made sure the capture of Burnside,--that is,
the army could spare twenty thousand, if it were in the position that
I proposed, better than it can spare twelve, occupying the lines that
it now does. Twenty thousand men, well handled, could surely have
captured Burnside and his forces. Under present arrangements,
however, the lines are to be held as they now are and the detachment
is to be of twelve thousand. We thus expose both to failure, and
really take no chance to ourselves of great results. The only notice
my plan received was a remark that General Hardee was pleased to make,
'I don't think that that is a bad idea of Longstreet's.' I undertook
to explain the danger of having such a long line under fire of the
enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our
midst, and within twenty minutes' march of any portion of our line.
But I was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my ideas,
but they did not even receive notice. It was not till I had repeated
them, however, that General Hardee noticed me. Have you any maps that
you can give or lend me? I shall need everything of the kind. Do you
know any reliable people, living near and east of Knoxville, from whom
I might get information of the condition, strength, etc., of the
enemy? I have written in such hurry and confusion of packing and
striking camp (in the rain and on the head of an empty flour barrel)
that I doubt if I have made myself understood. I remain
"Sincerely your friend,
"J. LONGSTREET,
"_Lieutenant-General_.
"TO MAJOR-GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER,
"_Commanding Division_."
Three months thereafter General Buckner returned the letter with the
following:
(Endorsement.)
"MORRISTOWN, TENN., February 1, 1864.
"GENERAL,--It seems to me, after reading this letter again, that its
predictions are so full a vindication of your judgment of the
movements then ordered, that it should remain in your possession, with
a view that at some future day it may serve to 'vindicate the truth of
history.' I place it at your disposal with that view.
"Truly your friend,
"S. B. BUCKNER,
"_Major-General_.
"TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. LONGSTREET."
I asked at general head-quarters for maps and information of the country
through which I was to operate, for a quartermaster and commissary of
subsistence who knew of the resources of the country, and for an engineer
officer who had served with General Buckner when in command of that
department. Neither of the staff-officers was sent, nor a map, except one
of the topographical outlines of the country between the Hiawassee and
Tennessee Rivers, which was much in rear of the field of our proposed
operations. General Buckner was good enough to send me a plot of the roads
and streams between Loudon and Knoxville.
We were again disappointed at Sweetwater. We were started from Chattanooga
on short rations, but comforted by the assurance that produce was abundant
at that point, and so it proved to be; but General Stevenson, commanding
the outpost, reported his orders from the commanding general were to ship
all of his supplies to his army, and to retire with his own command and
join him upon our arrival. In this connection it should be borne in mind
that we were recently from Virginia,--coming at the heated season,--where
we left most of our clothing and blankets and all of our wagon
transportation; and by this time, too, it was understood through the
command that the Richmond authorities were holding thunder-clouds over the
head of the commander, and that General Bragg was disposed to make them
more portentous by his pressing calls for urgency.
Thus we found ourselves in a strange country, not as much as a day's
rations on hand, with hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp
equipage, the enemy in front to be captured, and our friends in rear
putting in their paper bullets. This sounds more like romance than war,
but I appeal to the records for the facts, including reports of my chiefs
of quartermaster and subsistence departments and General Alexander's
account of the condition of some of the battery horses and ammunition.
Our foraging parties were lively, and we lost but a day and part of
another in gathering in rations for a start. Anticipating proper land
transportation, plans were laid for march across the Little Tennessee
above its confluence with the greater river, through Marysville to the
heights above Knoxville on the east bank, by forced march. This would have
brought the city close under fire of our field batteries and forced the
enemy into open grounds. A guide had been secured who claimed to be
familiar with the country, and was useful in laying our plans. But when
our pontoon bridge came up it was without a train for hauling. So our plan
must be changed.
Fortunately, we found a point in a bend of the river near the railroad at
which we could force a crossing. At dark the cars were rolled up to that
point by hand, and we learned that the Little Tennessee River above us was
fordable for cavalry. General Wheeler had been ordered to have vedettes
along the river from Loudon to some distance below Kingston, where a
considerable body of Union troops occupied the north bank. He was ordered
with his other troops to prepare for orders to cross the Little Tennessee
at its fords, ride to Marysville, capture the enemy's cavalry outpost at
that point, ride up the east side of the river to Knoxville, and seize the
heights overlooking the city; or, finding that not feasible, to endeavor
to so threaten as to hold the enemy's forces there to their works, while
we marched against the troops of the west side; but when he found his
service on that side ceased to be effective or co-operative with our
movements, to cross the river and join the main column.
As just now explained, the failure of wagons for our pontoon bridge forced
us to cross at Loudon, and to make direct march upon Knoxville by that
route.
Weary of the continual calls of General Bragg for hurried movements, it
seemed well to make cause for him to assign another commander or to move
him to discontinue his work at a paper record; so I wired to remind him
that he assured me before sending me away that he was safe in his
position, and that he was told before my leaving that the command was not
strong enough to excuse any but a careful, proper campaign; that he had
since been informed that all delays of our movements were due to his
inefficient staff corps, and that we were dependent upon foraging for our
daily rations for men and animals. It began to look more like a campaign
against Longstreet than against Burnside.
As General Burnside's orders were to hold Knoxville, he decided to act on
the defensive. Leaving the troops in the northern district of his
department in observation of that field, he withdrew his division on the
south side of Tennessee River as we marched for Loudon, took up his
pontoon bridge, and broke up the railroad bridge.
Orders were issued on the 12th for the general move of my cavalry by
Marysville, the infantry and artillery along the railroad route. Pains
were taken to have the bridge equipments carried by hand to the river, and
skirmishing parties put in the boats and drifted to the opposite bank. The
troops in rear were marched during the night to the vicinity of Loudon and
held in readiness in case the enemy came to oppose our crossing. The
bridge was laid under the supervision of General Alexander and Major
Clark, our chief engineer, at Huff's Ferry, without serious resistance.
A few miles east of Loudon the Holston[187] and Little Tennessee Rivers
come together, making the Tennessee River, which flows from the confluence
west to Kingston, where it resumes its general flow southwest. The Holston
rises in the mountains north and flows south to the junction. The Little
Tennessee rises in the mountains east and flows west to the junction. The
railroad crosses the main river at Loudon, thirty miles from Knoxville,
and runs about parallel to the Holston River, and near its west bank.
West of the railroad and parallel is a broken spur of the Clinch Mountain
range, with occasional gaps or passes for vehicles, and some other blind
wagon-roads and cattle-trails. West of this spur, and near its base, is
the main wagon-road to Knoxville, as far as Campbell Station, about
seventeen miles, where it joins the Kingston road, passes a gap, and
unites with the wagon-road that runs with the railroad east of the
mountain spur at Campbell Station. South of this gap, about eleven miles,
is another pass at Lenoir's Mill, and three miles south of that another
pass, not used.
A detail of sharp-shooters under Captain Foster, of Jenkins's brigade,
manned the first boats and made a successful lodging, after an exchange of
a few shots with the enemy's picket-guard on the north bank. They intended
to surprise and capture the picket and thus secure quick and quiet
passage, but in that they were not successful. The north bank was secured,
however, without loss, and troops were passed rapidly over to hold it,
putting out a good skirmish line in advance of the bridge-head. As we
advanced towards Loudon, the part of General White's Union division that
had been on the opposite bank of the river was withdrawn to Lenoir's
Station.
During the 13th and 14th the command was engaged in making substantial
fastenings for the bridge and constructing its defences. General Vaughn's
regiments and a battery of Major Leydon's (with broken-down horses) were
assigned to guard the bridge.
On the afternoon of the 14th the enemy appeared on our front in strong
force, drove our skirmish line back, and seemed prepared to give battle.
As we were then waiting the return of our foraging wagons, we could only
prepare to receive him. Some of the provisions looked for came in during
the night, and we advanced on the 15th, finding that the enemy had
retired. The force that came back to meet us on the 15th was part of
White's division (Chapin's brigade) sent by General Burnside, and General
Potter, commanding the Ninth Corps, sent General Ferrero with his
division. The move was intended probably to delay our march. It was
Chapin's brigade that made the advance against our skirmishers, and it
probably suffered some in the affair. We lost not a single man.
General Wheeler crossed the Little Tennessee River at Motley's Ford at
nightfall on the 13th, and marched to cut off the force at Marysville. He
came upon the command, only one regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry,
that was advised in time to prepare for him. He attacked as soon as they
came under fire, dispersed them into small parties that made good their
escape, except one hundred and fifty taken by Dibbrell's brigade. Colonel
Wolford brought up the balance of his brigade and made strong efforts to
support his broken regiment, but was eventually forced back, and was
followed by the Eighth, and Eleventh Texas and Third Arkansas Cavalry and
General John T. Morgan's brigade. The next day he encountered Sanders's
division of cavalry and a battery, and, after a clean cavalry engagement
of skilful manoeuvres on both sides, succeeded in reaching the vicinity of
the city of Knoxville, but found it too well guarded to admit of any very
advantageous work.
On the 15th our advance was cautiously made by Hood's division and
Alexander's artillery leading; McLaws's division and Leydon's artillery
following. All along the route of the railroad the valley between the
mountain and the river is so narrow and rough that a few thousand men can
find many points at which they can make successful stands against great
odds. Our course was taken to turn all of those points by marching up the
road on the west side of the mountain. A few miles out from our bridge we
encountered a skirmishing party near the lower gap of the mountain, which,
when pressed back, passed through the gap. General Jenkins continued his
march--leaving a guard at the gap till it could be relieved by General
McLaws--to Lenoir's Station.
The enemy was looking for us to follow through the lower gaps and attack
his strong front, and was a little surprised to find us close on his right
flank. He was well guarded there, however, against precipitate battle by
the mountain range and narrow pass and the heavy, muddy roads through
which our men and animals had to pull. Arrangements were made for a good
day's work from early morning.
Our guide promised to lead part of our men through a blind route during
the night by which we could cut off the enemy's retreat, so that they
would be securely hemmed in. Generals Jenkins and McLaws came up during
the night. The former was ordered to advance part of his command to
eligible points at midnight and hold them ready for use at daylight. The
guide was sent with a brigade to the point which was to intercept the
enemy's retreat. McLaws was held on the road, ready for use east or west
of the ridge. Jenkins was ordered to have parties out during the night to
watch that the enemy did not move, and report. As no report came from
them, all things were thought to be properly adjusted, when we advanced
before daylight. In feeling our way through the weird gray of the morning,
stumps seen on the roadside were taken to be sharp-shooters, but we were
surprised that no one shot at us, when, behold! before it was yet quite
light, we came upon a park of eighty wagons, well loaded with food, camp
equipage, and ammunition, with the ground well strewn with spades, picks,
and axes.[188] The animals had been taken from the wagons to double their
teams through the mud. General Potter had sent the division under General
Hartranft back to the Campbell Station Pass to occupy the junction of his
line of retreat with the Kingston road and the road upon which we were
marching, and was well on the march with the balance of the Ninth Corps,
Ferrero's division and his cavalry, before we knew that there was an
opening by which he could escape.
Our guide, who promised to post the brigade so as to command the road in
rear of the enemy, so far missed his route as to lead the brigade out of
hearing of the enemy's march during the night.
Hart's cavalry brigade that was left in observation near Kingston had been
called up, and with McLaws's division advanced on the roads to Campbell
Station, while General Jenkins followed the direct line of retreat on
double time, and right royally did his skirmishers move. He brought the
rear to an occasional stand, but only leaving enough to require him to
form line for advance, when the enemy again sped away on their rearward
march at double time. General Jenkins made the march before noon, but the
enemy had passed the gap and the junction of the roads, and was well
posted in battle array in rear of them. General McLaws was not up. He was
not ordered on double time, as it was thought to first bring the enemy to
bay on the east road, when some of his infantry could be called over the
mountain on the enemy's flank. General Ferrero, who covered the retreat,
reported that it was necessary to attach from sixteen to twenty animals to
a piece to make the haul through the mud.
The retreat was very cleverly conducted, and was in time to cover the
roads into Campbell's Station, forming into line of battle to meet us.
Jenkins's division, being in advance, was deployed on the right with
Alexander's battalion. As soon as the line was organized the batteries
opened practice in deliberate, well-timed combat, but General Alexander
had the sympathy of his audience. His shells often exploded before they
reached the game, and at times as they passed from the muzzles of his
guns, and no remedy could be applied that improved their fire.
As General McLaws came up his division was put upon our left with the
other batteries, and Hart's brigade of cavalry was assigned in that part
to observe the enemy's, farther off. It was not yet past meridian. We had
ample time to make a battle with confident hope of success, by direct
advance and the pressing in on the enemy's right by McLaws's left, but our
severe travel and labor after leaving Virginia were not to find an
opportunity to make a simply successful battle. As the rear of the enemy
was open and could be covered, success would have been a simple victory,
and the enemy could have escaped to his trenches at Knoxville, leaving us
crippled and delayed: whereas as he stood he was ours. How we failed to
make good our claim we shall presently see.
McLaws was ordered to use one of his brigades well out on his left as a
diversion threatening the enemy's right, and to use Hart's cavalry for the
same purpose, while General Jenkins was ordered to send two of his
brigades through a well-covered way off our right to march out well past
the enemy's left and strike down against that flank and rear. General Law,
being his officer next in rank, was ordered in charge of his own and
Anderson's brigades. General Jenkins rode with the command, and put it in
such position that the left of this line would strike the left of the
enemy's, thus throwing the weight of the two brigades past the enemy's
rear. I rode near the brigades, to see that there could be no mismove or
misconception of orders. After adjusting the line of the brigades, and
giving their march the points of direction, General Jenkins rode to his
brigades on the front to handle them in direct attack. I remained near
the front of the flanking brigades for complete assurance of the
adjustment of their march, and waited until they were so near that it was
necessary to ride at speed, close under the enemy's line, to reach our
main front, to time its advance with the flanking move. The ride was made
alone, as less likely to draw the enemy's fire, the staff riding around.
As I approached the front, the men sprang forward without orders to open
the charge, but were called to await the appearance of the flanking move
of our right. But General Law had so changed direction as to bring his
entire force in front instead of in the rear of the enemy's left. This
gave him opportunity to change position to strong ground in rear, which
made other movements necessary in view of the objective of the battle.
There was yet time for successful battle, but it would have been a
fruitless victory. Before other combinations suited to our purpose could
be made it was night, and the enemy was away on his march to the fortified
grounds about Knoxville.
The demonstration of our left under General McLaws was successful in
drawing the enemy's attention, and in causing him to change front of part
of his command to meet the threatening.
In his official account General Jenkins reported,--
"In a few minutes, greatly to my surprise, I received a message from
General Law that in advancing his brigades he had obliqued so much to
the left as to have gotten out of its line of attack. This careless
and inexcusable movement lost us the few moments in which success from
this point could be attained."[189]
Apropos of this the following memorandum of a staff-officer is interesting
and informative:
"I know at the time it was currently reported that General Law said he
might have made the attack successfully, but that Jenkins would have
reaped the credit of it, and hence he delayed until the enemy got out
of the way."
This has been called a battle, by the other side, but it was only an
artillery combat, little, very little, musket ammunition being burnt. The
next day the enemy was safely behind his works about Knoxville, except his
cavalry under General Sanders and his horse artillery left to delay our
march. McLaws's division reached the suburbs of the city a little after
noon, and was deployed from near the mouth of Third Creek as his right,
the enemy holding a line of dismounted cavalry skirmishers about a
thousand yards in advance of his line of works. Alexander's artillery was
disposed near McLaws's deployment. Jenkins got up before night and was
ordered to deploy on McLaws's left as far as the Tazewell road, preceded
by Hart's cavalry, which was to extend the line north to the Holston
River. General Wheeler came up later and was assigned to line with Colonel
Hart.
The city stands on the right bank of the Holston River, on a plateau about
one and a half miles in width and extending some miles down south. At
Knoxville the plateau is one hundred and twenty feet above the river, and
there are little streams called First, Second, and Third Creeks, from the
upper to the lower suburbs of the city,--First Creek between the city and
East Knoxville, or Temperance Hill; Second Creek between the city and
College Hill; Third Creek below and outside the enemy's lines of defence.
The plateau slopes down to the valley through which the railway passes,
and west of the valley it rises to the usual elevation. The Confederates
were posted on the second plateau, with their batteries of position. The
line of the enemy's works, starting at its lower point on the west bank of
the river, was just above the mouth of Second Creek, lying at right
angles to the river. It ran to a fort constructed by the Confederates,
when occupied by them years before, called Fort Loudon, above the Kingston
road, and about a thousand yards in front of the college. East from that
point it was about parallel with the river, reaching to Temperance Hill,
to Mabry's Hill, and to the Holston, below the glass-works. An interior
line extended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill on the east, and another
on the west, between the outer line and Second Creek. Dams were built
across First and Second Creeks, flooding and forming formidable wet
ditches over extensive parts of the line. Abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and
wire entanglements were placed where thought to be advantageous for the
defenders.
The heights on the northeast across the river are much more elevated than
the plateaux of the city side, and command all points of the west bank.
These were defended at some points by earthworks well manned. From the
lower point of the enemy's line the Confederates extended to his right at
the river, conforming to his defensive lines. The part of our line
occupied by the cavalry was a mere watch-guard.
Our move was hurried, and our transportation so limited that we had only a
few tools in the hands of small pioneer parties, and our wagons were so
engaged in collecting daily rations that we found it necessary to send our
cavalry down to Lenoir's for the tools captured there for use in making
rifle-pits for our sharp-shooters.
When General Burnside rode to the front to meet us at Lenoir's he left
General Parke in command at Knoxville, and he and Captain Poe, of the
engineers, gave attention to his partially-constructed works.
Upon laying our lines about Knoxville, the enemy's forces in the northeast
of his department were withdrawn towards Cumberland Gap, but we had no
information of the troops ordered to meet us from Southwest Virginia.