BESIEGING KNOXVILLE.
Closing on the Enemy's Lines--A Gallant Dash--The Federal
Positions--Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders--Assault of the Fort
carefully planned--General McLaws advises Delay--The Order reiterated
and emphasized--Gallant Effort by the Brigades of Generals Wofford,
Humphreys, and Bryan at the Appointed Time--A Recall ordered, because
carrying the Works was reported impossible--General Longstreet is
ordered by the President to General Bragg's Relief--Losses during the
Assault and the Campaign.
The enemy's line of sharp-shooters and Fort Sanders stood in our direct
line of advance,--the fort manned by the heaviest and best field guns.
Benjamin's battery, an old familiar acquaintance who had given us many
hard knocks in our Eastern service, opened upon us as soon as we were in
its reach. It was not until night of the 17th that our line was well
established, and then only so as to enclose the enemy's front, leaving the
country across the river to be covered when the troops from Virginia
should join us.
When General McLaws advanced on the morning of the 18th he found the
enemy's line of skirmishers--cavalry dismounted--behind a line of heavy
rail defences. General Alexander was ordered to knock the rails about them
and drive them out, and was partially successful, but the enemy got back
before our infantry could reach them, so we had to carry the line by
assault. Part of our line drove up in fine style, and was measurably
successful, but other parts, smarting under the stiff musket fire,
hesitated and lay down under such slight shelter as they could find, but
close under fire,--so close that to remain inactive would endanger
repulse. Captain Winthrop, of Alexander's staff, appreciating the crisis,
dashed forward on his horse and led the halting lines successfully over
the works. In his gallant ride he received a very severe hurt. Neither
our numbers nor our condition were such as to warrant further aggressive
action at the moment, nor, in fact, until the column from Virginia joined
us. Our sharp-shooters were advanced from night to night and pitted before
daylight, each line being held by new forces as the advance was made. The
first line occupied was a little inside of the rail piles.
It seemed probable, upon first examination of the line along the
northwest, that we might break through, and preparations were made for
that effort, but, upon closer investigation, it was found to be too
hazardous, and that the better plan was to await the approach of the other
forces.
When within six hundred yards of the enemy's works, our lines well pitted,
it seemed safe to establish a battery on an elevated plateau on the east
(or south) side of the river. Some of our troops were sent over in
flat-boats, and the reconnoissance revealed an excellent point commanding
the city and the enemy's lines of works, though parts of his lines were
beyond our range. Some of our best guns were put in position, and our
captured pontoon bridges down at Lenoir's were sent for, to be hauled up
along the river, but impassable rapids were found, and we were obliged to
take part of our supply-train to haul them. They were brought up, and
communication between the detachment and main force was made easy. The
brigades of Law and Robertson were left on the east (or south) side as
guard for that battery.
The Union forces were posted from left to right,--the Ninth Corps, General
R. D. Potter commanding. General Ferrero's division extended from the
river to Second Creek; General Hartranft's along part of the line between
Second and First Creeks; Chapin's and Reilly's brigades over Temperance
Hill to near Bell's house, and the brigades of Hoskins and Casement to the
river. The interior line was held by regiments of loyal Tennesseeans
recently recruited. The positions on the south (or east) side of the river
were occupied by Cameron's brigade of Hascall's division and Shackelford's
cavalry (dismounted), Reilly's brigade in reserve,--two sections of
Wilder's battery and Konkle's battery of four three-inch rifle guns.
[Illustration: APPROACHES AND DEFENSES OF KNOXVILLE, E. TENNESSEE. SHOWING
THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE UNITED STATES AND CONFEDERATE FORCES DURING
THE SIEGE]
The batteries of the enemy's front before the city were Romer's four
three-inch rifles at the university, Benjamin's four twenty-pound Parrotts
and Beecher's six twelve-pound Napoleons (at the fort), Gittings's four
ten-pound Parrotts, Fifteenth Indiana Battery of six rifle guns
(three-inch), James's (Indiana) Battery of six rifle guns, Henshaw's
battery of two (James's) rifle guns and four six-pounders, Shields's
battery of six twelve-pound Napoleons, and one section of Wilder's
three-inch rifle guns, extending the line from the fort to the river on
the north.
In his official account, General Burnside reported "about twelve thousand
effective men, exclusive of the recruits and loyal Tennesseeans." He had
fifty-one guns of position, including eight on the southeast side.
Fort Loudon, afterwards called for the gallant Sanders, who fell defending
it, was a bastion earthwork, built upon an irregular quadrilateral. The
sides were, south front, one hundred and fourteen yards; west front,
ninety-five yards; north front, one hundred and twenty-five yards; east
front, eighty-five yards. The eastern front was open, intended to be
closed by a stockade. The south front was about half finished; the western
front finished, except cutting the embrasures, and the north front nearly
finished. The bastion attacked was the only one that was finished. The
ditch was twelve feet wide, and generally seven to eight feet deep. From
the fort the ground sloped in a heavy grade, from which the trees had been
cut and used as abatis, and wire net-work was stretched between the
stumps.
General Burnside reported,--
"Many citizens and persons who had been driven in by the enemy
volunteered to work on the trenches and did good service, while those
who were not inclined from disloyalty to volunteer were pressed into
service. The negroes were particularly efficient in their labors
during the siege. On the 20th of November our line was in such
condition as to inspire the entire command with confidence."
General Poe reported,--
"The citizens of the town and all contrabands within reach were
pressed into service and relieved the almost exhausted soldiers, who
had no rest for more than a hundred hours. Many of the citizens were
Confederates and worked with a very poor grace, which blistered hands
did not tend to improve."
On the 22d, General McLaws thought his advance near enough the works to
warrant assault. He was ordered to it with assaulting columns supported by
the division. General Jenkins was also ordered up, and General Wheeler was
ordered to push his troops and his horse artillery forward as McLaws's
attack opened, so that the entire line would engage and hold to steady
work till all the works were carried. After consulting his officers,
General McLaws reported that they preferred to have daylight for their
work. On the 23d reports came of a large force of the enemy at Kingston
advancing. General Wheeler was sent with his main force of cavalry to look
after them. He engaged the enemy on the 24th, and after a skirmish
withdrew. Soon afterwards, receiving orders from General Bragg to join
him, leaving his cavalry under command of Major-General Martin, he rode to
find his commander. General Martin brought the brigades back and resumed
position on our left. Colonel Hart, who was left at Kingston with his
brigade, reported that there were but three regiments of cavalry and a
field battery, that engaged General Wheeler on the 24th.
On the night of the 24th the enemy made a sortie against a point of
General Wofford's line which broke through, but was speedily driven back
with a loss of some prisoners and a number of killed and wounded. General
Wofford's loss was five wounded, two mortally.
Our cavalry, except a brigade left at Kingston, resumed its position on
the left of our line on the 26th. On the 23d a telegram came from General
Bragg to say that the enemy had moved out and attacked his troops at
Chattanooga. Later in the day he announced the enemy still in front of
him, but not engaging his forces.
On the 25th I had a telegram from General Bushrod R. Johnson at Loudon,
who was marching with two brigades to reinforce us, saying that the enemy
was throwing his cavalry forward towards Charleston. This, in connection
with the advance of the enemy towards General Bragg, reported by his
despatch of the 23d, I took to be an effort to prevent reinforcements
coming to us, or to cut in and delay their march.
That night General Leadbetter, chief engineer of General Bragg's army,
reported at head-quarters with orders from General Bragg that we should
attack at Knoxville, and very promptly. I asked him to make the
reconnoissance and designate the assailable points. At the same time he
was asked to consider that the troops from Virginia were on the march and
would join us in eight or ten days, when our investment could be made
complete; that the enemy was then on half rations, and would be obliged to
surrender in two weeks; also whether we should assault fortifications and
have the chance of repulse, rather than wait for a surrender. From his
first reconnoissance he pronounced Fort Sanders the assailable point, but,
after riding around the lines with General Jenkins and General Alexander,
he pronounced in favor of assault from our left at Mabry's Hill. On the
27th, after more thorough reconnoissance in company with my officers, he
came back to his conclusion in favor of assault at Fort Sanders. I agreed
with him that the field at Mabry's Hill was too wide, and the march under
fire too long, to warrant attack at that point. He admitted that the true
policy was to wait and reduce the place by complete investment, but
claimed that the crisis was on, the time imperative, and that the assault
must be tried.
Meanwhile, rumors reached us, through the telegraph operator, of a battle
at Chattanooga, but nothing official, though outside indications were
corroborative. In the afternoon Colonel Giltner, of the command from
Virginia, reported with his cavalry, and next day (28th) General W. E.
Jones, of that command, reported with his cavalry. The brigades from
Chattanooga under General B. R. Johnson were at hand, but not yet up. The
artillery and infantry coming from Virginia were five or six days' march
from us; but General Leadbetter was impatient.
General McLaws was ordered to double his force of sharp-shooters and their
reserve, advance during the night and occupy the line of the enemy's
pickets, and arrange for assault. The artillery was to open on the fort as
soon as the weather cleared the view. After ten minutes' practice the
assaulting column was to march, but the practice was to hold until the
near approach of the storming party to the Fort. The assault was to be
made by three of McLaws's brigades, his fourth, advancing on his right, to
carry the line of works in its front as soon as the fort was taken. Three
brigades of Jenkins's division were to follow in echelon on the left of
McLaws's column, G. T. Anderson's, of his right, leading at two hundred
yards' interval from McLaws's, Anderson to assault the line in his front,
and upon entering to wheel to his left and sweep up that line, followed by
Jenkins's and Benning's brigades; but, in case of delay in McLaws's
assault, Anderson was to wheel to his right and take the fort through its
rear opening, leaving the brigades of Jenkins and Benning to follow the
other move to their left.
The ditch and parapets about the fort were objects of careful observation
from the moment of placing our lines, and opinions coincided with those of
reconnoitring officers that the former could be passed without ladders.
General Alexander and I made frequent examinations of them within four
hundred yards.
After careful conference, General McLaws ordered,--
"_First._ Wofford's Georgia and Humphreys's Mississippi brigades to
make the assault, the first on the left, the second on the right, this
latter followed closely by three regiments of Bryan's brigade; the
Sixteenth Georgia Regiment to lead the first and the Thirteenth
Mississippi the second assaulting column.
"_Second._ The brigades to be formed for the attack in columns of
regiments.
"_Third._ The assault to be made with fixed bayonets, and without
firing a gun.
"_Fourth._ Should be made against the northwest angle of Fort Loudon
or Sanders.
"_Fifth._ The men should be urged to the work with a determination to
succeed, and should rush to it without hallooing.
"_Sixth._ The sharp-shooters to keep up a continuous fire into the
embrasures of the enemy's works and along the fort, so as to prevent
the use of the cannon, and distract, if not prevent, the fire of all
arms."
General B. R. Johnson was in time to follow the main attack by General
McLaws with his own and Gracie's brigades (two thousand six hundred and
twenty-five effectives).
The order was given for the 28th, but the weather became so heavy and
murky as to hide the fort from view of our artillery, so operations were
put off until the 29th.
On the 28th reports were brought of an advance of Union troops from the
direction of Cumberland Gap. The cavalry under General W. E. Jones was
sent to arrest their march pending operations ordered for the 29th, and
he was authorized to call the artillery and infantry marching from
Virginia to his assistance if the force proved formidable.
After arranging his command, General McLaws wrote me as follows:
"HEAD-QUARTERS DIVISION,
"November 28, 1863.
"GENERAL,--It seems to be a conceded fact that there has been a
serious engagement between General Bragg's forces and those of the
enemy; with what result is not known so far as I have heard. General
Bragg may have maintained his position, may have repulsed the enemy,
or may have been driven back. If the enemy has been beaten at
Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point? If we have been
defeated at Chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault
here? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, our communications must
be made with Virginia. We cannot combine again with General Bragg,
even if we should be successful in our assault on Knoxville. If we
should be defeated or unsuccessful here, and at the same time General
Bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in condition to
force our way to the army in Virginia? I present these considerations,
and with the force they have on my mind I beg leave to say that I
think we had better delay the assault until we hear the result of the
battle of Chattanooga. The enemy may have cut our communication to
prevent this army reinforcing General Bragg, as well as for the
opposite reason,--viz., to prevent General Bragg from reinforcing us,
and the attack at Chattanooga favors the first proposition.[190]
"Very respectfully,
"L. MCLAWS,
"_Major-General_."
In reply I wrote,--
"HEAD-QUARTERS, November 28, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MCLAWS:
"GENERAL,--Your letter is received. I am not at all confident that
General Bragg has had a serious battle at Chattanooga, but there is a
report that he has, and that he has fallen back to Tunnel Hill. Under
this report I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making
the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight, and it is
the more important that I should have the entire support and
co-operation of the officers in this connection; and I do hope and
trust that I may have your entire support and all the force you may be
possessed of in the execution of my views. It is a great mistake to
suppose that there is any safety for us in going to Virginia if
General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his
victors, and with his army destroyed our own had better be, for we
will be not only destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor
honor in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"JAMES LONGSTREET,
"_Lieutenant-General Commanding_.
"P.S.--The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be
made with a determination which will insure success."
After writing the letter it occurred to me to show it to General
Leadbetter, who was stopping at our head-quarters, when he suggested the
postscript which was added.
The assault was made by the brigades of Generals Wofford, Humphreys, and
Bryan at the appointed time and in admirable style. The orders were, that
not a musket should be discharged except by the sharp-shooters, who should
be vigilant and pick off every head that might appear above the parapets
until the fort was carried. The troops marched steadily and formed
regularly along the outside of the works around the ditch. I rode after
them with the brigades under General B. R. Johnson until within five
hundred yards of the fort, whence we could see our advance through the
gray of the morning. A few men were coming back wounded. Major Goggin, of
General McLaws's staff, who had been at the fort, rode back, met me, and
reported that it would be useless for us to go on; that the enemy had so
surrounded the fort with net-work of wire that it was impossible for the
men to get in without axes, and that there was not an axe in the command.
Without a second thought I ordered the recall, and ordered General Johnson
to march his brigades back to their camps. He begged to be allowed to go
on, but, giving full faith to the report, I forbade him. I had known
Major Goggin many years. He was a classmate at West Point, and had served
with us in the field in practical experience, so that I had confidence in
his judgment.
Recall was promptly sent General Jenkins and his advance brigade under
General Anderson, but the latter, seeing the delay at the fort, changed
his direction outside the enemy's works and marched along their front to
the ditch, and was there some little time before he received the order. In
his march and countermarch in front of the enemy's line he lost four
killed and thirty-three wounded.
As a diversion in favor of the assaulting columns, our troops on the south
side were ordered to a simultaneous attack, and to get in on that side if
the opportunity occurred. They were reinforced by Russell's brigade of
Morgan's division of cavalry, and Harrison's brigade of Armstrong's
division, dismounted, General Morgan commanding. This demonstration had
the effect anticipated in detaining troops to hold on that side that were
intended as reserve for the fort.
Just after the troops were ordered back it occurred to me that there must
be some mistake about the wire net-work, for some of our men had been seen
mounting and passing over the parapets, but it was too late to reorganize
and renew the attack, and I conceived that some of the regimental pioneers
should have been at hand prepared to cut the wires, but all had been armed
to help swell our ranks.
Since reading the accounts of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the
works, I am convinced that the wires were far from being the serious
obstacle reported, and that we could have gone in without the use of axes;
and from other accounts it appears that most of the troops had retired
from the fort, leaving about a hundred and fifty infantry with
Benjamin's battery. Our muskets from the outside of the parapet could have
kept the infantry down, and the artillery practice, except the few
hand-grenades, prepared at the time by the artillerists. Johnson's
brigades would have been at the ditch with me in ten minutes, when we
would have passed over the works. Hence it seems conclusive that the
failure was due to the order of recall. It is not a part of my nature to
listen to reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, but
confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and with it the tone and
spirit for battle further impaired by the efforts of those in authority to
damage, if not prevent, the success of work ordered in their own vital
interest: a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who presumes
to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than to look for ways to
shift the responsibility of a wavering spirit that sometimes comes
unawares.
[Illustration: THE ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS, KNOXVILLE.]
After the repulse, General Burnside was so considerate as to offer a "flag
of truce" for time to remove our killed and wounded about his lines.
About half an hour after the repulse, and while yet on the slope leading
up to the fort, Major Branch, of Major-General Ransom's staff, came with a
telegram from the President informing me that General Bragg had been
forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to proceed to co-operate
with his army.
Orders were issued at once for our trains to move south, and preparations
were begun for a move of the troops after nightfall. In the afternoon word
came from General Wheeler, authorized by General Bragg, that I should join
him, if practicable, at Ringgold. But our first step was to be relieved of
the threatening from the direction of Cumberland Gap. General Martin was
sent to reinforce General Jones, with orders to hurry his operations, and
return in time to cover anticipated movements. His brigades which had done
their clever work on the south side were withdrawn to go with him. When
he came up with Jones, the latter was severely engaged, but it was then
night, too late for other operations.
Their arrangements were made during the night and battle renewed at early
dawn and severely contested, the Union troops giving from point to point
until they crossed the ford at Walker's and were beyond further
threatening. They lost some fifty killed and wounded and one company
captured at Colonel Graham's camp.
Generals Martin and Jones joined us in good season after their affair of
the morning. Their loss was slight, but not detailed in separate reports.
Confederate loss in the assault 822
Union loss in the assault 673
Confederate losses during the campaign 1296
Union losses during the campaign 1481