FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS.
Longstreet differs with General Bragg as to Movements of Pursuit--The
Confederates on Lookout Mountain--Federals gain Comfortable Positions
around it--Superior Officers of Bragg's Command call for his
Removal--Bragg seeks Scapegoats--President Davis visits the
Army--Tests the Temper of the Officers towards Bragg--He offers the
Command to Longstreet--He declines--His Reasons--General Bragg ignores
Signal-Service Reports and is surprised--General Joe Hooker's
Advance--Night Attack beyond Lookout Mountain--Colonel Bratton's
Clever Work--Review of the Western Movement and Combination--It should
have been effected in May instead of September--Inference as to
Results had the First Proposition been promptly acted upon.
About sunrise of the next morning, General Bragg rode to my bivouac, when
report was made to him of orders of the night before, to replenish
supplies and prepare to take up pursuit at daylight. He asked my views of
the next step to be taken, explaining that there were some defensive works
about Chattanooga to cover the enemy in that position.
I knew nothing of the country except of its general geographical features,
but the hunt was up and on the go, when any move towards his rear was
safe, and a speedy one encouraging of great results. I suggested that we
cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga and march against the line
of the enemy's rear; that if, after so threatening as to throw General
Rosecrans to full retreat, we found it inconvenient to pursue him, we turn
back with part of the army and capture or disperse the Union army in East
Tennessee under General Burnside. He stated that he would follow that
course, ordered the right wing to march,[182] and the left wing to follow
as soon as the way was clear,--the left to care for the dead and wounded
during the wait. As it was night when the rear of the right wing stretched
out on the road, my march was not taken up until the morning of the 22d.
General McLaws joined me on the 21st with his other brigades, and General
Jenkins joined Hood's division. Afterwards G. T. Anderson's brigade joined
the latter. When our march reached General Bragg's head-quarters and
reported on the 22d, he gave me orders to direct a division from the line
of march to follow the enemy towards Chattanooga.
When asked if he had abandoned the course upon which his march was
ordered, he said the people would be greatly gratified to know that his
army was marching through the streets of Chattanooga with bands of music
and salutations of the soldiers. I thought, and did not fail to say, that
it would give them greater pleasure to know that he had passed the
Tennessee River, turned the enemy out of Chattanooga in eager flight, to
save his rearward lines, whilst we marched hammering against the broken
flanks of his columns. But the cavalry had reported that the enemy was in
hurried and confused retreat, his trains crossing the river and passing
over the nose of Lookout Mountain in disorder.
The praise of the inhabitants of a city so recently abandoned to the
enemy, and a parade through its streets with bands of music and flaunting
banners, were more alluring to a spirit eager for applause than was the
tedious march for fruition of our heavy labors.
General Rosecrans prepared, no doubt, to continue his retreat,
anticipating our march towards his rear, but finding that we preferred
to lay our lines in front of him, concluded that it would be more
comfortable to rest at Chattanooga, reinforce, repair damages, and come to
meet us when ready for a new trial.
[Illustration: CONFEDERATES AROUND CHATTANOOGA 1863]
When General Bragg found that the enemy had changed his mind, and was not
inclined to continue his rearward march, he stretched his army in a
semicircle of six miles along the southeast front of Chattanooga, from the
base of Lookout Mountain on his left, to his right resting on the
Tennessee River, and ordered Alexander's batteries to the top of the
mountain, my command, McLaws's, Hood's, and Walker's divisions, occupying
the left of his line of investment. His plan was to shell the enemy from
his works by field batteries, but the works grew stronger from day to day
on all sides of the city. Our infantry was posted along the line, as
supports for the batteries, with orders not to assault unless especially
ordered.
The northern point of Lookout Mountain, upon which Alexander's batteries
were posted, abuts upon the Tennessee River. The city lies east of the
abutment and nestles close under it. The base of the mountain has a steep,
rugged grade of five hundred feet above the plateau, and from its height
the mountain crops out into palisades of seven hundred feet. General
Alexander managed to drop an occasional shell or shot about the enemy's
lines by lifting the trails of his guns, but the fire of other batteries
was not effective.
At the end of a week's practice the Confederate commander found the enemy
getting more comfortable in his works, and thought to break him up by a
grand cavalry raid. On the 30th he ordered General Wheeler to organize a
force of his effective mounts, cross the river, and ride against the
railway and such depots and supply-trains as he could reach. The cavalry
destroyed some wagon-trains and supplies, and gave the enemy more trouble
than the artillery practice, yet failed to convince him that it was time
to abandon his position, but, on the contrary, satisfied him that he was
safe from further serious trouble.
At that time the shortest line of the enemy's haul of provisions from the
depot at Stevenson was along the road on the north bank of the river. The
Confederate chief conceived, as our cavalry ride had failed of effect,
that a line of sharp-shooters along the river on our side could break up
that line of travel, and ordered, on the 8th of October, a detail from my
command for that purpose. As the line was over the mountain about seven
miles beyond support, by a rugged road not practicable for artillery, I
ordered a brigade of infantry detailed to go over and protect the
sharp-shooters from surprise or capture. The detail fell upon Law's
brigade. The line for this practice extended from the east side of Lookout
Creek some ten miles down the river. The effect of the fire was about like
that of the cavalry raid. It simply put the enemy on shorter rations until
he could open another route for his trains.
But more to be deplored than these novel modes of investment was the
condition of the Confederate army. After moving from Virginia to try to
relieve our comrades of the Army of Tennessee, we thought that we had
cause to complain that the fruits of our labor had been lost, but it soon
became manifest that the superior officers of that army themselves felt as
much aggrieved as we at the halting policy of their chief, and were
calling in letters and petitions for his removal. A number of them came to
have me write the President for them. As he had not called for my opinion
on military affairs since the Johnston conference of 1862, I could not
take that liberty, but promised to write to the Secretary of War and to
General Lee, who I thought could excuse me under the strained condition of
affairs. About the same time they framed and forwarded to the President a
petition praying for relief.[183] It was written by General D. H. Hill (as
he informed me since the war).
While the superior officers were asking for relief, the Confederate
commander was busy looking along his lines for victims. Lieutenant-General
Polk was put under charges for failing to open the battle of the 20th at
daylight; Major-General Hindman was relieved under charges for conduct
before the battle, when his conduct of the battle with other commanders
would have relieved him of any previous misconduct, according to the
customs of war, and pursuit of others was getting warm.
On the Union side the Washington authorities thought vindication
important, and Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden, of the Twentieth and
Twenty-first Corps, were relieved and went before a Court of Inquiry; also
one of the generals of division of the Fourteenth Corps.
The President came to us on the 9th of October and called the commanders
of the army to meet him at General Bragg's office. After some talk, in the
presence of General Bragg, he made known the object of the call, and asked
the generals, in turn, their opinion of their commanding officer,
beginning with myself. It seemed rather a stretch of authority, even with
a President, and I gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the
channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and got back to his
question. The condition of the army was briefly referred to, and the
failure to make an effort to get the fruits of our success, when the
opinion was given, in substance, that our commander could be of greater
service elsewhere than at the head of the Army of Tennessee. Major-General
Buckner was called, and gave opinion somewhat similar. So did
Major-General Cheatham, who was then commanding the corps recently
commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and General D. H. Hill, who was
called last, agreed with emphasis to the views expressed by others.
The next morning the President called me to private conference, and had an
all day talk. He thought to assign me to command, but the time had passed
for handling that army as an independent force. Regarding this question,
as considered in Virginia, it was understood that the assignment would be
made at once, and in time for opportunity to handle the army sufficiently
to gain the confidence of the officers and soldiers before offering or
accepting battle. The action was not taken, a battle had been made and
won, the army was then seriously entangled in a _quasi_ siege, the
officers and soldiers were disappointed, and disaffected in _morale_.
General Grant was moving his army to reinforce against us, and an
important part of the Union army of Virginia was moving to the same
purpose.
In my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the
success at Chickamauga, and capture or disperse the Union army, and it
could not be just to the service or myself to call me to a position of
such responsibility. The army was part of General Joseph E. Johnston's
department, and could only be used in strong organization by him in
combining its operations with his other forces in Alabama and Mississippi.
I said that under him I could cheerfully work in any position.[184] The
suggestion of that name only served to increase his displeasure, and his
severe rebuke.
I recognized the authority of his high position, but called to his mind
that neither his words nor his manner were so impressive as the dissolving
scenes that foreshadowed the dreadful end. He referred to his worry and
troubles with politicians and non-combatants. In that connection, I
suggested that all that the people asked for was success; with that the
talk of politicians would be as spiders' webs before him. And when
restored to his usual gracious calm I asked to have my resignation
accepted, to make place for some one who could better meet his ideas of
the important service. He objected that my troops would not be satisfied
with the change. I suggested a leave of absence, as winter was near, when
I would go to the Trans-Mississippi Department, and after the troops were
accustomed to their new commander, send in my written resignation, from
Texas, but he was not minded to accept that solution of the premises.
Finally, I asked his aid in putting the divisions that were with me in
more efficient working order, by assigning a major-general to command
Hood's division. He had been so seriously crippled that he could not be in
condition to take the field again even if he recovered, and a commander
for the division was essential to its proper service. As he had no one, or
failed to name any one, for the place, I suggested the promotion of the
senior brigadier then in command of it, General M. Jenkins, who was a
bright, gallant, and efficient officer of more than two years' experience
in active warfare, loved by his troops, and all acquaintances as well. He
had been transferred, recently, by the War Department to the division,
upon application of General Hood, and in consequence there was some
feeling of rivalry between him and Brigadier-General Law, the next in
rank, who had served with the division since its organization, and had
commanded it at Gettysburg after General Hood was wounded, and after his
taking off in the battle of Chickamauga. The President referred to the
services of General Law with the division, but failed to indicate a
preference. I thought it unwise and not military to choose a junior for
assignment to command over his senior officers, and prejudicial to the
_esprit de corps_ and _morale_ of any army, except under most eminent
services, and in this instance where service, high military character, and
equipment were on the side of the senior it was more objectionable, but
consented that it would be better to have General Law promoted, and the
feeling of rivalry put at rest; General Jenkins's heart was in the
service, and could submit to anything that seemed best for its interests;
but the President was pleased to remain negative, and failed to assign a
commander.
The interview was exciting, at times warm, but continued until Lookout
Mountain lifted above the sun to excuse my taking leave. The President
walked as far as the gate, gave his hand in his usual warm grasp, and
dismissed me with his gracious smile; but a bitter look lurking about its
margin, and the ground-swell, admonished me that clouds were gathering
about head-quarters of the First Corps even faster than those that told
the doom of the Southern cause.
A day or two after this interview the President called the commanders to
meet him again at General Bragg's head-quarters. He expressed desire to
have the army pulled away from the lines around Chattanooga and put to
active work in the field, and called for suggestions and plans by which
that could be done, directing his appeal, apparently, to me as first to
reply.
I suggested a change of base to Rome, Georgia, a march of the army to the
railway bridge of the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and the crossing of
the river as an easy move,--one that would cut the enemy's rearward line,
interrupt his supply train, put us between his army at Chattanooga and the
reinforcements moving to join him, and force him to precipitate battle or
retreat.
General Bragg proposed that we march up and cross the river and swing
around towards the enemy's rear and force him out by that means. No other
plans were offered, nor did other officers express preference for either
of the plans that were submitted.
Maps were called for and demonstrations given of the two plans, when the
President ordered the move to be made by the change of base to Rome, and
in a day or two took leave of us. He had brought General Pemberton with
him to assign to the corps left by General Polk, but changed his mind.
General D. H. Hill was relieved of duty; after a time General Buckner took
a leave of absence, and General Hardee relieved General Cheatham of
command of the corps left to him by General Polk.
About this time General Lee wrote me, alluding to the presence of the
President, the questions under consideration, my proposition for him to
leave the army in Virginia in other hands and come West to grander, more
important fields, to his purpose in sending me West to be assigned to
command them, and expressing anticipation of my return to Virginia.[185]
The President left the army more despondent than he found it. General
Pemberton's misfortune at Vicksburg gave rise to severe prejudice of the
people and the army, and when the troops heard of the purpose of the
President to assign him to command of Polk's corps, parts of the army were
so near to mutiny that he concluded to call General Hardee to that
command. A few days after he left us a severe season of rain set in, and
our commander used the muddy roads to excuse his failure to execute the
campaign that the President had ordered.
Late on the 20th of September and during the 21st, General Rosecrans
reported his condition deplorable, and expressed doubt of his holding at
Chattanooga, and called to General Burnside in East Tennessee, to whom he
looked for aid; but finding only feeble efforts to follow our success he
recovered hope, prepared defensive works, and was looking to renewal of
his aggressive work when he was relieved.
From accounts made public since the war it appears that his animals were
so reduced from want of forage at the time of the October rains that
General Rosecrans could not move his artillery over the muddy roads, which
suggests mention that the campaign ordered by the President for the change
of base could have forced him from his works in his crippled condition,
and given us comfortable operations between him and his reinforcements
coming from Virginia and Mississippi.
In his official account, General Bragg said that the road on the south
side was left under my command, which is misleading. My command--three
divisions--was on his line of investment, east of the city and of the
mountain; the road was west of the mountain from six to twenty miles from
the command. We were in support of his batteries, to be ready for action
at the moment his artillery practice called for it. We held nearly as much
of his line as the other eight divisions. None of the commanders had
authority to move a man from the lines until the 8th of October, when he
gave orders for posting the sharp-shooters west of the mountain. The
exposure of this detachment was so serious that I took the liberty to send
a brigade as a rallying force for it, and the exposure of these led me to
inquire as to the assistance they could have from our cavalry force
operating on the line from the mountain to Bridgeport, some eight or ten
miles behind them. The cavalry was not found as watchful as the eyes of an
army should be, and I reported them to the general, but he thought
otherwise, assured me that his reports were regular, daily and sometimes
oftener.
Nevertheless, prudence suggested more careful guard, and I ordered Captain
Manning, who brought from Virginia part of my signal force, to establish a
station in observation of Bridgeport and open its communication with my
head-quarters. General Bragg denied all reports sent him of the enemy from
my signal party, treated them with contempt, then reported that the road
was under my command.
His report is remarkable in that he failed to notice the conduct of his
officers, except of the killed and wounded and one division commander whom
he found at daylight of the 21st advancing his line of skirmishers in
careful search of the enemy who had retreated at early twilight the
evening before under shouts from the Confederate army that made the heavy
wood reverberate with resounding shouts of victory. That officer he
commended as the "ever vigilant." He gave due credit to his brave soldiers
for their gallant execution of his orders to charge and continue to charge
against the enemy's strongholds, as he knew that they would under his
orders until their efforts were successful, but the conduct of the battle
in all of its phases discredits this claim. When the right wing of his
army stepped into the Lafayette-Rossville road the enemy's forces were in
full retreat through McFarland Gap, and all fighting and charging had
ceased, except the parting blows of Preston's division with Granger's
reserve corps. A peculiar feature of the battle was the early ride of both
commanders from the field, leaving the battle to their troops. General
Rosecrans was generous enough to acknowledge that he left his battle in
other hands. General Bragg claimed everything for himself, failing to
mention that other hands were there.
While General Rosecrans was opening a route beyond reach of our
sharp-shooters, his chief engineer, General W. F. Smith, was busy upon a
plan for opening the line of railway on the south side, and his first step
was to break up the line of sharp-shooters. On the 19th he made a survey
of the river below Chattanooga. On the same day General Rosecrans was
superseded in command by General George H. Thomas. A day or two after that
my signal party reported some stir about the enemy's camps near
Bridgeport, and the cavalry reported a working force at Nicojack Cave.
The cavalry was put under my orders for a reconnoissance, and I was
ordered to send a brigade of infantry scouting for the working party.
Nothing was found at the Cave or by the reconnoissance, and the cavalry
objected to my authority. On the 25th orders came to me to hold the
mountain by a brigade of infantry. After ordering the brigade, I reported
a division necessary to make possession secure, suggesting that the
enemy's best move was from Bridgeport and along the mountain crest; that
we should assume that he would be wise enough to adopt it, unless we
prepared against it. But our commander was disturbed by suggestions from
subordinates, and thought them presumptuous when they ventured to report
of the probable movements of the enemy.
On the night of the 27th of October, General Smith moved to the execution
of his plan against our line of sharp-shooters. He put fifty pontoon-boats
and two flat-boats in the river at Chattanooga, the former to take
twenty-five men each, the latter from forty to seventy-five,--the boats to
float quietly down the river eight miles to Brown's Ferry, cross and land
the troops. At the same time a sufficient force was to march by the
highway to the same point, to be in readiness for the boats to carry them
over to their comrades. The sharp-shooters had been posted for the sole
purpose of breaking up the haul along the other bank, and not with a view
of defending the line, nor was it defensible, while the enemy had every
convenience for making a forced crossing and lodgement.
The vigilant foe knew his opportunity, and only waited for its timely
execution. It is needless to say that General Smith had little trouble in
establishing his point. He manned his boats, floated them down to the
crossing, landed his men, and soon had the boats cross back for his other
men, pushed them over, and put them at work intrenching the strong ground
selected for their holding. By daylight he was comfortably intrenched, and
had his artillery on the other side in position to sweep along the front.
The Confederate commander did not think well enough of his line when he
had it to prepare to hold it, but when he found that the enemy proposed to
use it, he thought to order his infantry down to recover the ground just
demonstrated as indefensible, and ordered me to meet him on the mountain
next morning to learn his plans and receive his instructions for the work.
That afternoon the signal party reported the enemy advancing from
Bridgeport in force,--artillery and infantry. This despatch was forwarded
to head-quarters, but was discredited. It was repeated about dark, and
again forwarded and denied.
On the morning of the 28th I reported as ordered. The general complained
of my party sending up false alarms. The only answer that I could make was
that they had been about two years in that service, and had not made such
mistakes before.
While laying his plans, sitting on the point of Lookout rock, the enemy
threw some shells at us, and succeeded in bursting one about two hundred
feet below us. That angered the general a little, and he ordered Alexander
to drop some of his shells about their heads. As this little practice went
on, a despatch messenger came bursting through the brushwood, asking for
General Longstreet, and reported the enemy marching from Bridgeport along
the base of the mountain,--artillery and infantry. General Bragg denied
the report, and rebuked the soldier for sensational alarms, but the
soldier said, "General, if you will ride to a point on the west side of
the mountain I will show them to you." We rode and saw the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps under General Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac, marching
quietly along the valley towards Brown's Ferry. The general was surprised.
So was I. But my surprise was that he did not march along the mountain
top, instead of the valley. It could have been occupied with as little
loss as he afterwards had and less danger. He had marched by our line of
cavalry without their knowing, and General Bragg had but a brigade of
infantry to meet him if he had chosen to march down along the top of the
mountain, and that was posted twenty miles from support.
My estimate of the force was five thousand. General Bragg thought it not
so strong, and appearance from the elevation seemed to justify his
estimate. Presently the rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac
immediately in front of the point upon which we stood. The latter force
was estimated at fifteen hundred, and halted about three miles in rear of
the main body.
A plan was laid to capture the rear-guard by night attack. He proposed to
send me McLaws's and Jenkins's divisions for the work, and ordered that it
should be done in time for the divisions to withdraw to the point of the
mountain before daylight, left me to arrange details for attack, and rode
to give orders for the divisions, but changed his mind without giving me
notice, and only ordered Jenkins's division. After marching his command,
General Jenkins rode to the top of the mountain and reported.
The route over which the enemy had marched was along the western base of a
series of lesser heights, offering strong points for our troops to find
positions of defence between his main force and his rear-guard. After
giving instructions to General Jenkins, he was asked to explain the plan
of operations to General McLaws in case the latter was not in time to view
the position from the mountain before night. A point had been selected and
ordered to be held by one of Jenkins's brigades supported by McLaws's
division, while General Jenkins was to use his other brigades against the
rear-guard, which rested in the edge of a woodland of fair field of
approach. The point at which Law's brigade rested after being forced from
its guard of the line of sharp-shooters was near the northern base of the
mountain about a mile east of the route of the enemy's line of march. As
General Law's detached service had given him opportunity to learn
something of the country, his brigade was chosen as the brigade of
position between the parts of the enemy's forces. General Law was to move
first, get into position by crossing the bridge over Lookout Creek, to be
followed by Jenkins's other brigades, when McLaws's division was to
advance to position in support of Law's brigade.
I waited on the mountain, the only point from which the operations could
be seen, until near midnight, when, seeing no indications of the
movements, I rode to the point that had been assigned for their assembly,
found the officers in wait discussing the movements, and, upon inquiry,
learned that McLaws's division had not been ordered. Under the impression
that the other division commander understood that the move had miscarried,
I rode back to my head-quarters, failing to give countermanding orders.
The gallant Jenkins, however, decided that the plan should not be
abandoned, and went to work in its execution by his single division. To
quiet the apprehensions of General Law he gave him Robertson's brigade to
be posted with his own, and Benning's brigade as their support, and
ordered his own brigade under Colonel Bratton to move cautiously against
the rear-guard, and make the attack if the opportunity was encouraging.
As soon as Colonel Bratton engaged, the alarm spread, the enemy hastened
to the relief of his rear, encountered the troops posted to receive them,
and made swift, severe battle. General Law claimed that he drove off their
fight, and, under the impression that Colonel Bratton had finished his
work and recrossed the bridge, withdrew his command, leaving Colonel
Bratton at the tide of his engagement. General Jenkins and Colonel Bratton
were left to their own cool and gallant skill to extricate the brigade
from the swoop of numbers accumulating against them, and, with the
assistance of brave Benning's Rock brigade, brought the command safely
over, Benning's brigade crossing as Bratton reached the bridge.
The conduct of Bratton's forces was one of the cleverest pieces of work of
the war, and the skill of its handling softened the blow that took so many
of our gallant officers and soldiers.
Colonel Bratton made clever disposition of his regiments, and handled them
well. He met gallant resistance, and in one instance had part of his
command forced back, but renewed the attack, making his line stronger, and
forced the enemy into crowded ranks and had him under converging circular
fire, with fair prospects, when recalled under orders to hasten to the
bridge. So urgent was the order that he left the dead and some of the
wounded on the field.
General Law lost of his own brigade (aggregate) 43
General Robertson (1 wounded and 8 missing) 9
Colonel Bratton lost (aggregate) 356
---
Confederate loss 408
Union loss (aggregate) 420
It was an oversight of mine not to give definite orders for the troops to
return to their camps before leaving them.
General Jenkins was ordered to inquire into the conduct of the brigades of
position, and reported evidence that General Law had said that he did not
care to win General Jenkins's spurs as a major-general. He was ordered to
prepare charges, but presently when we were ordered into active campaign
in East Tennessee he asked to have the matter put off to more convenient
time.
We may pause here to reflect upon the result of the combination against
Rosecrans's army in September, after our lines of transit were seriously
disturbed, and after the severe losses in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and
Tennessee; and to consider in contrast the probable result of the
combination if effected in the early days of May, when it was first
proposed (see strategic map).
At that time General Grant was marching to lay siege upon Vicksburg. The
campaign in Virginia had been settled, for the time, by the battle of
Chancellorsville. Our railways were open and free from Virginia through
East Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, to Central Mississippi. The armies of
Rosecrans and Bragg were standing near Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville,
Tennessee. The Richmond authorities were trying to collect a force at
Jackson, Mississippi, to drive Grant's army from the siege. Two divisions
of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia were marching from
Suffolk to join General Lee at Fredericksburg. Under these circumstances,
positions, and conditions, I proposed to Secretary Seddon, and afterwards
to General Lee, as the only means of relief for Vicksburg, that Johnston
should be ordered with his troops to join Bragg's army; that the divisions
marching for Fredericksburg should be ordered to meet Johnston's, the
transit over converging lines would give speedy combination, and Johnston
should be ordered to strike Rosecrans in overwhelming numbers and march on
to the Ohio River.
As the combination of September and battle of Chickamauga drew General
Grant's army from its work in Mississippi to protect the line through
Tennessee and Kentucky, and two Federal corps from the Army of the
Potomac, the inference is fair that the earlier, more powerful combination
would have opened ways for grand results for the South, saved the eight
thousand lost in defending the march for Vicksburg, the thirty-one
thousand surrendered there, Port Hudson and its garrison of six thousand,
and the splendid Army of Northern Virginia the twenty thousand lost at
Gettysburg. And who can say that with these sixty-five thousand soldiers
saved, and in the ranks, the Southern cause would not have been on a grand
ascending grade with its bayonets and batteries bristling on the banks of
the Ohio River on the 4th day of July, 1863!
The elections of 1862 were not in support of the Emancipation
Proclamation. With the Mississippi River still closed, and the Southern
army along the banks of the Ohio, the elections of 1864 would have been
still more pronounced against the Federal policy, and a new administration
could have found a solution of the political imbroglio. "Blood is thicker
than water."