INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Plan of the Confederate March North--General Lee hoped to draw Troops
from the South and develop Important Results North of the Potomac--He
wanted Beauregard sent to support the Movement--The Authorities in
Richmond failed to comprehend--The Value of the "Interior Lines" not
appreciated--Spirited Cavalry Fight at Brandy Station between Stuart's
and Pleasonton's Commands--Engagement of Ewell and Milroy at
Winchester--The Question of Authority for the Cavalry
Movements--Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards,
British Army, as a Guest and Observer--The Confederate Advance reaches
Pennsylvania Soil--General Lee issues Orders for a March on
Harrisburg--Municipal Authorities of York and Gettysburg surrender to
General John B. Gordon.
The absorbing study now was the projected campaign into Maryland and
Pennsylvania,--the invasion of the enemy's country. The plan of defensive
tactics gave some hope of success, and, in fact, I assured General Lee
that the First Corps would receive and defend the battle if he would guard
its flanks, leaving his other corps to gather the fruits of success. The
First Corps was as solid as a rock--a great rock. It was not to be broken
of good position by direct assault, and was steady enough to work and wait
for its chosen battle.
The Valley of the Shenandoah gave us firm, broad roads for the march
north, curtained by the solid range of the Blue Ridge and South Mountains.
There were some Federal troops occupying points in the Valley of Virginia,
but not more than enough to give healthful employment to our leading
columns as they advanced. The army as reorganized in three corps had three
divisions of each corps, with four brigades to the division, except R. H.
Anderson's, Pickett's, and Rodes's, each of which had five. J. E. B.
Stuart's cavalry consisted of the brigades of Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee,
W. H. F. Lee, Beverly Robertson, and W. E. Jones. The cavalry of Jenkins
and Imboden, operating in the Valley and West Virginia near our route, was
to move, the former with Ewell, the latter on his left. Six batteries of
horse artillery under Major R. F. Beckham were of Stuart's command, and to
each army corps were attached five battalions of artillery of four guns to
a battery, and four batteries to a battalion, making of the whole
artillery organization, including batteries of reserve and the thirty guns
of horse artillery, two hundred and eighty-seven guns. In the three army
corps there were thirty-nine brigades, proper, of infantry.
In the Army of the Potomac were fifty-one brigades of infantry, eight
brigades of cavalry, and three hundred and seventy guns of artillery. The
artillery appointments were so superior that our officers sometimes felt
humiliated when posted to unequal combat with their better metal and
munitions. In small-arms also the Union troops had the most improved
styles.
Notwithstanding, we were prepared to march forward and cheerfully accept
the gage, hoping to overbalance these advantages through the morale
afforded by brave hearts and the strategic skill to throw the onus of
battle upon the enemy.
The plan of campaign as projected was by the march of the Second Corps
through the Valley of the Shenandoah to drive off or capture the Federal
forces stationed along the Valley, and continue the march to Pennsylvania
until further orders, meanwhile collecting supplies for the advance and
for those who were to follow, Jenkins's brigade of cavalry working with
the advance, and Imboden's on its left; the First Corps and main force of
cavalry to march near the east base of the Blue Ridge, threatening towards
the rear line of the Army of the Potomac, and occupy the Blue Ridge, while
the trains and other troops passed behind the mountains to follow the
advance march. Stuart's cavalry brigades were to observe between the First
Corps and the Union army. When the Third Corps had passed behind the
First, the latter and the cavalry were to withdraw and follow the general
march. Stuart, whose movements were to correspond to those of the First
Corps, was to follow its withdrawal and cross the Potomac on our right
flank at Shepherdstown. The brigades of Generals M. Jenkins and M. D.
Corse of Pickett's division, left in Virginia near Petersburg and Hanover
Junction, were to follow and join their division, as will soon appear.
General Beauregard was to be called from his post, in the South, with such
brigades as could be pulled away temporarily from their Southern service,
and thrown forward, with the two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins's
and Corse's) and such others as could be got together, along the Orange
and Alexandria Railroad in threatening attitude towards Washington City,
and he was to suddenly forward Pickett's brigades through the Valley to
the division, and at his pleasure march on, or back towards Richmond.
As the season of fevers along the coast of the Carolinas was approaching,
General Lee thought that active operations in the far South, especially
along the seaboard, would be suspended, that his move northward might draw
most of them towards him, and possibly troops operating in the Southwest,
the latter being really a prominent part of the object of his northern
march. He thought that Beauregard's appearance in Northern Virginia would
increase the known anxiety of the Washington authorities and cause them to
draw troops from the South, when in the progress of events other similar
movements might follow on both sides until important results could be
developed north of the Potomac.
His early experience with the Richmond authorities taught him to deal
cautiously with them in disclosing his views, and to leave for them the
privilege and credit of approving, step by step, his apparently hesitant
policy, so that his plans were disclosed little at a time; and, finding
them slow in approving them, still slower in advancing the brigades of
Pickett's division, and utterly oblivious of the effect of a grand swing
north on our interior lines, he did not mention the part left open for
Beauregard until he had their approval of the march of the part of his
command as he held it in hand. The part assigned for Beauregard became the
subject for correspondence between the authorities and the officers who
knew nothing of the general ideas and plans. The latter failed to see any
benefit to accrue by taking troops from their commands, and naturally
offered objections to their going. The authorities, not comprehending the
vast strength to be gathered by utilizing our interior lines, failed to
bring about their execution, and the great possibility was not fully
tested.
In pursuance of the plan for the northern campaign our march was taken up
on Wednesday, the 3d of June, McLaws's division of the First Corps
marching on that date from Fredericksburg, and Hood's from near Orange
Court-House on the 4th; Rodes's division of the Second Corps followed, and
on the 5th Johnson's and Early's of the Second. Pickett of the First, with
three of his brigades, followed the course of Hood's division. All were to
assemble at Culpeper Court-House, near our cavalry head-quarters. The
Third Corps, General A. P. Hill, was left in observation of the enemy at
Fredericksburg.
When General Hooker discovered the thinning of our camps in rear of
Fredericksburg, he put a bridge across the Rappahannock at Deep Run,
crossed a considerable force of artillery and infantry, and constructed a
line of rifle-pits along the river bank. At the report of these movements,
General Lee thought to delay the movements of the Second Corps, though he
hurried those of the First to draw off the Federals from action against
Hill, but holding the Second ready to go back to him should there be need.
Hill made a similar demonstration against Hooker, threatening on the river
below, though not so far as to cross it, which caused the Federals to draw
their troops from the south side. The Second Corps was then hurried on to
Culpeper Court-House.
The First and Second Corps waited at the court-house to know if
indications about Fredericksburg were such as to warrant the onward march.
General Hooker, not convinced that General Lee had left him, ordered his
cavalry under General Pleasonton, supported by two brigades of infantry,
to cross the Rappahannock in search of Stuart's cavalry, and to secure
information of the Confederate plans. Pleasonton's force, including
infantry, was eleven thousand. He divided his command, sending one half by
Beverley's, the other by Kelly's Ford, to march on converging roads to
Brandy Station, near Fleetwood, the latter point the head-quarters of our
cavalry chief, five miles west of Rappahannock Bridge.
Happily for the Confederates, the cavalry brigades had been drawn together
on the 8th for review by General Lee, and rested that night not remote
from cavalry head-quarters. On the 9th, Pleasonton's columns made an
unlooked-for advance and engaged the Confederates, before notice could be
sent to the columns at their camps. The march resulted in a very severe
and strongly disputed cavalry fight, ending in heavy losses on both sides.
General Stuart called for infantry supports before the close of the
conflict, but succeeded in recovering his position before the infantry
reached him,--not, however, until some important despatches were taken by
the enemy, which gave the information they were seeking. Stuart reported
485 officers and men lost; Pleasonton, 907, and three pieces of artillery.
On the 10th, Ewell took up his march for the Valley by Chester Gap. Now,
General Milroy had a division of nine thousand Federals at Winchester, and
sought to hold it contrary to his orders to retire to the command at
Harper's Ferry. He had a brigade on outpost at Berryville under
McReynolds. General Kelly had ten thousand men at Harper's Ferry, with a
strong detachment of infantry and a battery at Martinsburg, under Colonel
B. F. Smith.
Upon entering the Valley, General Ewell detached Rodes's division and
Jenkins's cavalry to cut off and capture the force at Berryville, but
McReynolds withdrew in time to join the forces at Winchester. This
Confederate column then marched for Martinsburg, and got possession there
on the 14th, the garrison marching out and joining the troops on Maryland
Heights. The artillery trying to escape north towards Williamsport was
followed so closely that they lost some three or four guns. With his
divisions under Johnson and Early, General Ewell marched to Winchester and
attacked and carried the outworks of Milroy's fortified position, when the
latter, after calling a council, decided to retreat, leaving his artillery
and wagon-trains. Ewell had anticipated this, and sent a part of Johnson's
division, one brigade, to intercept him on the Martinsburg road. The
commands met about daylight, and there ensued a severe engagement,
successful to the Federals till reinforcements came to the Confederates,
when Milroy's command was broken up, part of his troops escaping to
Harper's Ferry and part getting over the Potomac at Hancock. The Federals
at Harper's Ferry abandoned their position in Virginia, seeking shelter on
the heights on the Maryland side.
On his march through the Valley, General Ewell took 4000 prisoners and
small-arms, 25 cannon, 11 standards, 250 wagons, 400 horses, and large
quantities of subsistence and quartermaster's stores, with a loss of 269
of all arms. He crossed the Potomac on the 15th, occupying Hagerstown and
Sharpsburg, on the Maryland side, and sent the cavalry brigade, under
Jenkins, north towards Chambersburg.
By the plan of march from the Valley of Virginia the leading corps
(Second) was to divide and cross the Potomac River at Williamsport and
Shepherdstown, the column through Williamsport to march through Hagerstown
and Chambersburg towards Harrisburg, collecting produce and supplies for
the army, Imboden's cavalry on its left flank. The eastern column was to
march through Sharpsburg, Emmitsburg, and Gettysburg towards the bridge
over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, Jenkins's cavalry brigade
working with the two columns. The Third Corps, passing behind the Blue
Ridge, was to cross at Shepherdstown and follow the march of the eastern
column. The First Corps was to draw back from the Blue Ridge and cross the
Potomac at Williamsport, to be followed by the cavalry, which was to cross
at Shepherdstown and ride severely towards Baltimore, to force the enemy
to eastern concentration.
The object of the march of the eastern columns, besides opening a wide
field for foraging, was to draw the enemy from the route of travel of the
supply trains, and to press him off east to give opportunity for the
western columns to file in between him and Washington.
The reconnoissance and cavalry fight made against Stuart at Fleetwood gave
General Hooker conclusive evidence of the march of the Army of Northern
Virginia, and he drew off from Stafford Heights on the 13th, and marched
towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Potomac River. The
First Corps was ordered north along the east base of the Blue Ridge to
guard our line of march and cover, in a measure, the Confederate plans,
Stuart's cavalry to ride between the First Corps and the Union army. On
the 19th the divisions of the First Corps were posted along the Blue Ridge
from Ashby's Gap on the right to Snicker's Gap on the left, McLaws at the
former, Hood at the latter, Pickett's three brigades between the others.
Under the impression that the cavalry was to operate with the First Corps,
in the general plan, the commander was ordered to follow its withdrawal
west of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac on its right at
Shepherdstown, and make his ride towards Baltimore. He claimed that
General Lee had given him authority to cross east of the Blue Ridge.
After the First Corps was in position on the Blue Ridge, and while the
Third was passing our rear down the Valley, it seems that General Lee so
far modified the plan of march north as to authorize his cavalry chief to
cross the Potomac with part of his command east of the Blue Ridge, and to
change the march of the Third Corps by Hagerstown and Chambersburg. The
point at which the cavalry force should cross the river was not determined
between the Confederate commander and his chief of cavalry, there being
doubt whether the crossing could better be made at Point of Rocks, between
the Union army and the Blue Ridge, or between that army and Washington
City. That question was left open, and I was ordered to choose between the
two points named at the moment that my command took up its line of march.
The First Corps was withdrawn from the Blue Ridge on the 20th, forded the
Shenandoah, and camped on its left bank. On the 21st, Pleasonton came, in
full force, supported by infantry, against Stuart's cavalry brigades. The
severe part of the fight came from Upperville, and succeeded in driving
Stuart back into Ashby's Gap. Part of McLaws's division was sent back in
time to support Stuart, and in the morning McLaws ordered Wofford's
brigade down upon the plain, but Pleasonton had withdrawn. The infantry
was recalled after an exchange of a few shots at great range.
Connected with the cavalry raid and orders authorizing it are matters of
more than usual interest. On the 22d the Confederate commander sent
unsealed instructions to his cavalry chief, through head-quarters of the
First Corps, to be forwarded, provided the cavalry could be spared from my
front and could make the ride without disclosing our plans, expressing his
preference for the ride through Hopewell Gap east of the Union army. As
previously stated, I was to decide at the last moment between the two
points that had been named. As my front was changed to the rear for the
march north, the cavalry could be of no service there. The extent of
authority with me, therefore, was to decide whether the crossing should be
made at the Point of Rocks or around through Hopewell Gap east of the
Union army. The crossing at Point of Rocks was not only hazardous, but
more likely to indicate our plans than any move that could be made,
leaving the ride through Hopewell Gap the only route for the raiding
party. In my note to General Stuart enclosing General Lee's instructions
was this item:
"P.S.--I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present
moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not
leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the
enemy."
This has been put in italics and published as evidence that the raid was
made by my orders, as well as by General Lee's. In the postscript three
points are indicated:
First, the move along my rear to the crossing at Point of Rocks.
Second, my preferred march on my flank to the Shepherdstown crossing.
Third, the route indicated by General Lee.
[Illustration: Arthur Lyon Fremantle. Lieutenant-Colonel Coldstream
Guards, Her Majesty's Service.]
All of which General Stuart understood as well as I did. Especially did he
know that _my orders were that he should ride on the right of my column,
as originally designed_, to the Shepherdstown crossing. In the body of
my note were orders that he should report to me of affairs along the
cavalry line before leaving; that he should assign General Hampton to
command of the cavalry to be left with us, with orders to report at my
head-quarters. These orders, emanating properly from the commander of the
rear column of the army, should not have been questioned, but they were
treated with contumely. He assigned General Robertson to command the
cavalry that was left on the mountain, without orders to report at my
head-quarters; and though left there to guard passes of the Blue Ridge, he
rode on a raid, so that when the cavalry was most needed it was far away
from the army. The raid and the absence of the cavalry at the critical
moment were severely criticised through the army and the country. If
General Stuart could have claimed authority of my orders for his action,
he could not have failed to do so in his official account. He offered no
such excuse, but claimed to act under the orders of his chief, and
reported that General Lee gave consent to his application for leave to
make the march. So our plans, adopted after deep study, were suddenly
given over to gratify the youthful cavalryman's wish for a nomadic ride.
About this time we entertained a distinguished visitor. An officer of the
British service, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur J. L. Fremantle, of the
Coldstream Guards, brought letters from the Secretary of War to General
Lee and myself. He was seeking opportunity to observe the campaign as a
non-combatant; he travelled with us, divided his time between general
head-quarters and head-quarters of the First Corps, cheerfully adapted his
tastes to the rough ways of Confederate soldiers, and proved to be an
interesting companion. To avoid the blockade he came to the Confederacy
through Mexico. He gave a graphic account of his experience in Texas and
travel after crossing the Rio Grande to the interior in a two-horse hack.
The drivers of his conveyance were Mr. Sargeant and Judge Hyde, two
characters whom I had met years before while in army service on the Texas
frontier. They called their team Grant and Sherman, and enjoyed their
glorious rides down the smooth slopes of the prairie roads, as they
rattled their heels upon the box of the hack and plied their team, Grant
and Sherman, with whips and oaths. But the great novelty to him was the
position of the judge. In England there are few judges comparatively, and
those of high estate. To find an American judge playing assistant to a
hack-driver was refreshing, and Colonel Fremantle thoroughly enjoyed it. I
now have the pleasure to salute our genial war-time visitor as governor at
Malta and Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, K.C.M.,
G.C.B., and to offer congratulations to Her Most Noble Majesty upon her
worthy subject.
On the 23d of June the divisions of the Third Corps passed on towards the
Potomac, followed by those of the First, the former crossing at
Shepherdstown, the latter at Williamsport. The corps came together at
Hagerstown, in Maryland, continued their march till the 27th, and rested
two days at Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania. The cavalry under General
Imboden, ordered on General Ewell's left, was due as far north as
McConnellsburg, but had halted at Hancock.
On the 28th, General Lee issued orders for the march upon Harrisburg.
General Ewell had marched his main column through Chambersburg to
Carlisle. His column, intending to move east of the mountains through
Emmitsburg and Gettysburg, had marched parallel to the main column as far
as Greenwood, when orders were renewed for it to march east through
Gettysburg. General Early, commanding, ordered Gordon's brigade and a
detachment of cavalry through Gettysburg; but his other troops marched
north through Mummasburg. The failure of the Imboden cavalry on his left
caused General Ewell to send General George H. Steuart through
McConnellsburg as guard of that flank. Steuart's command rejoined him at
Carlisle. As General Ewell marched he sent us three thousand head of beef
cattle and information of five thousand barrels of flour. He halted at
Carlisle on the 27th. The municipal authorities of Gettysburg and York
surrendered to General Gordon, who took some prisoners of the State
militia, and marched to the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville,
where he had other prisoners, but the bridge was burned before him. His
brigade returned to the vicinity of York, where the division had marched
and bivouacked on the night of the 28th.