GETTYSBURG--FIRST DAY.
Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout
Harrison--General Lee declines to credit it--General Longstreet
suggests a Change of Direction in Conformance with the
Revelation--General Meade had succeeded Hooker in Command Five Days
before Battle--Positions on the Eve of the First Day--Confederate
Cavalry "not in sight"--"The Eyes of the Army" sadly needed--A
Description of the Famous Battle-field--Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill
engage the Federals--Death of General John F. Reynolds--The Fight on
Seminary Ridge--General Hancock in Federal Command on the
Field--Concerning the Absent Cavalry and Information given by the
Scout--Conditions at the Close of the First Day's Fight.
The eve of the great battle was crowded with events. Movements for the
concentration of the two vast armies went on in mighty force, but with a
silence in strong contrast to the swift-coming commotion of their shock in
conflict. It was the pent quiet of the gathering storm whose bursting was
to shake the continent and suddenly command the startled attention of the
world.
After due preparation for our march of the 29th, all hands turned in early
for a good night's rest. My mind had hardly turned away from the cares and
labors of the day, when I was aroused by some one beating on the pole of
my tent. It proved to be Assistant Inspector-General Fairfax. A young man
had been arrested by our outlying pickets under suspicious circumstances.
He was looking for General Longstreet's head-quarters, but his comfortable
apparel and well-to-do, though travel-stained, appearance caused doubt in
the minds of the guards of his being a genuine Confederate who could be
trusted about head-quarters. So he was sent up under a file of men to be
identified. He proved to be Harrison, the valued scout. He had walked
through the lines of the Union army during the night of the 27th and
the 28th, secured a mount at dark of the latter day to get in as soon as
possible, and brought information of the location of two corps of Federals
at night of the 27th, and approximate positions of others. General Hooker
had crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th of June. On the 27th he had
posted two army corps at Frederick, and the scout reported another near
them, and two others near South Mountain, as he escaped their lines a
little after dark of the 28th. He was sent under care of Colonel Fairfax
to make report of his information at general head-quarters. General Lee
declined, however, to see him, though he asked Colonel Fairfax as to the
information that he brought, and, on hearing it, expressed want of faith
in reports of scouts, in which Fairfax generally agreed, but suggested
that in this case the information was so near General Longstreet's ideas
of the probable movements of the enemy that he gave credit to it. I also
sent up a note suggesting a change of direction of the head of our column
east. This I thought to be the first and necessary step towards bringing
the two armies to such concentration east as would enable us to find a way
to draw the enemy into battle, in keeping with the general plan of
campaign, and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our trains.
[Illustration: HARRISON. The Confederate scout who brought to General Lee
the first news of Meade's assignment to command, and the positions of the
Corps of the Army of the Potomac.]
There were seven corps of the Army of the Potomac afield. We were informed
on the 28th of the approximate positions of five of them,--three near
Frederick and two near the base of South Mountain. The others, of which we
had no definite information, we now know were the Sixth (Sedgwick's),
south of Frederick and east of the Monocacy, and the Twelfth, towards
Harper's Ferry.
On the 26th, General Hooker thought to use the Twelfth Corps and the
garrison of Harper's Ferry to strike the line of our communication, but
General Halleck forbade the use of the troops of that post, when General
Hooker asked to be relieved of the responsibility of command, and was
succeeded by General Meade on the night of the 27th.
If General Hooker had been granted the authority for which he applied, he
would have struck our trains, exposed from Chambersburg to the Potomac
without a cavalryman to ride and report the trouble. General Stuart was
riding around Hooker's army, General Robertson was in Virginia, General
Imboden at Hancock, and Jenkins's cavalry was at our front with General
Ewell.
By the report of the scout we found that the march of Ewell's east wing
had failed of execution and of the effect designed, and that heavy columns
of the enemy were hovering along the east base of the mountain. To remove
this pressure towards our rear, General Lee concluded to make a more
serious demonstration and force the enemy to look eastward. With this view
he changed direction of the proposed march north, by counter-orders on the
night of the 28th, calling concentration east of the mountains at
Cashtown, and his troops began their march under the last orders on the
29th.
It seems that General Hill misconstrued the orders of the day, or was
confused by the change of orders, and was under the impression that he was
to march by York and cross the Susquehanna towards Philadelphia or
Harrisburg. He ordered his leading division under Heth to Cashtown,
however, and followed with Pender's division on the 30th, leaving orders
for the division of R. H. Anderson to follow on the 1st. The purpose of
General Lee's march east was only preliminary,--a concentration about
Cashtown.
General Ewell was ready to march for Harrisburg on the 29th, when orders
reached him of the intended concentration at Cashtown. He was at Carlisle
with Rodes's and E. Johnson's divisions and the reserve artillery; his
other division under Early was at York. On the 30th, Rodes was at
Heidlersburg, Early near by, and Johnson, with the reserve artillery, near
Green Village.
Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, advancing towards Gettysburg on
the 30th, encountered Buford's cavalry and returned to Cashtown.
On the 29th, General Meade wired General Halleck,--
"If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army
and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon
General Couch, with his force, holding him, until I can fall upon his
rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do.... My endeavor
will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the
hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail."[123]
As the change of orders made Gettysburg prominent as the point of impact,
the positions of the commands relative thereto and their distances
therefrom are items of importance in considering the culmination of
events.
POSITIONS OF ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, NIGHT OF JUNE 30.
General Lee's head-quarters, Greenwood.
First Corps, Chambersburg, twenty-four miles to Gettysburg; part at
Greenwood, sixteen miles.
Second Corps and Jenkins's cavalry, Heidlersburg, ten miles; part near
Green Village, twenty-three miles (Johnson's division and trains).
Third Corps, near Greenwood, sixteen miles, and Cashtown, eight miles.
Stuart's cavalry, circling between York and Carlisle, out of sight.
Robertson's cavalry, in Virginia, beyond reach.
Imboden's cavalry, at Hancock, out of sight.
The Confederates not intending to precipitate battle.
POSITIONS OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
General Meade's head-quarters, Taneytown, fourteen miles.
General Hunt, artillery reserve, Taneytown.
First Corps, Marsh Run, six miles.
Second Corps, Uniontown, twenty-two miles.
Third Corps, Bridgeport, twelve miles.
Fifth Corps, Union Mills, fifteen miles.
Sixth Corps, Manchester, twenty-two miles.
Eleventh Corps, Emmitsburg, twelve miles.
Twelfth Corps, Littletown, nine miles.
Kilpatrick's cavalry, Hanover, thirteen miles.
Gregg's cavalry, Manchester, twenty-two miles.
Buford's cavalry, Gettysburg.
It should be borne in mind that the field of contention was south and east
of Gettysburg, so that the Union troops were from two to four miles nearer
their formation for battle than were the Confederates, who had to march
from two to four miles _beyond the town_.
Referring to the map, it may be seen that the Confederate corps had two
routes by which to march for concentration,--viz., from Heidlersburg to
Cashtown, part of the Second Corps; on the road from Chambersburg, the
First, Third, and part of the Second Corps (with all of the trains of the
latter), with but a single track, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg turnpike.
Some of their distances were greater than any of the columns of the enemy,
while the Army of the Potomac had almost as many routes of march as
commands, and was marching from day to day anticipating a general
engagement, which they were especially cautioned on the 30th was imminent.
General Hill decided to go beyond Cashtown on the 1st to ascertain as to
the enemy reported at Gettysburg. He gave notice of his intentions to
General Ewell, and sent back to the commanding general to have Anderson's
division sent forward. He was at Cashtown with Heth's and Pender's
divisions and their batteries; his reserve artillery with Anderson's
division at Fayetteville.
The armies on the night of June 30 stood thus:
The Confederate: First Corps, two divisions at Greenwood (except one
brigade detached under orders from head-quarters at New Guilford);
Pickett's three brigades at Chambersburg, left under orders from
head-quarters to guard trains; the Second Corps, two divisions near
Heidlersburg, one near and north of Chambersburg; the Third Corps at
Cashtown and Fayetteville; cavalry not in sight or hearing, except
Jenkins's brigade and a small detachment.
The Union army: the First Corps on Marsh Run, the Second at Uniontown, the
Third at Bridgeport, the Fifth at Union Mills, the Sixth at Manchester,
the Eleventh at Emmitsburg, the Twelfth at Littlestown, Fitzpatrick's
cavalry at Hanover, Buford's at Gettysburg (except one brigade, detached,
guarding his trains). General Meade's head-quarters and reserve artillery
were at Taneytown. His army, including cavalry, in hand.
General Lee's orders called his troops on converging lines towards
Cashtown, but he found that part of his infantry must be left at
Chambersburg to await the Imboden cavalry, not up, and one of Hood's
brigades must be detached on his right at New Guilford to guard on that
side in place of Robertson's cavalry (in Virginia). So that as he advanced
towards his adversary, the eyes and ears of his army were turned afar off,
looking towards the homes of non-combatants. It is bootless to this
writing to restate whence came this mishap. There is no doubt it greatly
disturbed General Lee's mind, and he would have called a halt under
ordinary circumstances, but his orders did not contemplate immediate
movements beyond Cashtown. In that he felt safe, depending upon his
cavalry coming up in time to meet him there.
He was in his usual cheerful spirits on the morning of the 1st, and called
me to ride with him. My column was not well stretched on the road before
it encountered the division of E. Johnson (Second Corps) cutting in on our
front, with all of Ewell's reserve and supply trains. He ordered the First
Corps halted, and directed that Johnson's division and train should pass
on to its corps, the First to wait. During the wait I dismounted to give
Hero a little respite. (The Irish groom had christened my favorite horse
"_Haro_.")
After a little time General Lee proposed that we should ride on, and soon
we heard reports of cannon. The fire seemed to be beyond Cashtown, and as
it increased he left me and rode faster for the front.
The brigades of Gamble and Devin of Buford's cavalry were the force that
met Pettigrew's brigade on the afternoon of the 30th, when the latter
retired to the post of the divisions at Cashtown.
From Gettysburg roads diverge to the passes of the mountains, the borders
of the Potomac and Susquehanna, and the cities of Baltimore and
Washington; so that it was something of a strategic point. From the west
side two broad roads run, one northwest to Chambersburg _via_ Cashtown,
the other southwest through Fairfield to Hagerstown. They cross an
elevated ridge, a mile out north, and south of the Lutheran Seminary,
known to the Confederates as Seminary Ridge, covered by open forests. At
the northward, about two miles from the town, the ridge divides, a lesser
ridge putting out west, and presently taking a parallel course with the
greater. This was known as McPherson's Ridge, and was about five hundred
yards from the first, where the road crosses it. Nearly parallel with the
Chambersburg pike and about two hundred yards distant was the cut of an
unfinished railroad. Willoughby's Run flows south in a course nearly
parallel to and west of the ridge, and is bordered by timbered lands.
North of Gettysburg the grounds are open and in fair fields. Directly
south of it a bold ridge rises with rough and steep slopes. The prominent
point of the south ridge is Cemetery Hill, and east of this is Culp's
Hill, from which the ridge turns sharply south half a mile, and drops off
into low grounds. It was well wooded and its eastern ascent steep. East of
it and flowing south is Rock Creek. From Cemetery Hill the ground is
elevated, the ridge sloping south to the cropping out of Little Round Top,
Devil's Den, and the bolder Round Top, the latter about three miles south
of the town. Cemetery Hill is nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, and is
more elevated.
At five o'clock on the morning of July 1, General A. P. Hill marched
towards Gettysburg with the divisions of Heth and Pender, and the
battalions of artillery under Pegram and McIntosh, Heth's division and
Pegram's artillery in advance. R. H. Anderson's division, with the reserve
artillery left at Fayetteville, was ordered to march and halt at Cashtown.
About ten o'clock Heth encountered Buford's cavalry. Archer's brigade,
leading, engaged, and Davis's brigade came up on his left with part of
Pegram's artillery. The cavalry was forced back till it passed
Willoughby's Run.
On the 30th of June, General John F. Reynolds had been directed to resume
command of the right wing of the Union army,--First, Third, and Eleventh
Corps. He was advised that day of the threatening movements of the
Confederates on the Cashtown and Mummasburg roads. At the same time the
indications from General Meade's head-quarters pointed to Pipe Creek as
the probable line in case of battle. Reynolds, however, prepared to
support Buford's line of cavalry, and marched at eight o'clock on the 1st
of July with Wadsworth's division and Hall's battery, leaving the other
divisions of Doubleday and Robinson with the artillery to follow under
General Doubleday, who became commander of the corps upon the assignment
of Reynolds to command of the wing.
As Reynolds approached Gettysburg, in hearing of the cavalry fight, he
turned the head of his column to the left and marched through the fields
towards the engagement. As the cavalry skirmish line retired and passed
Willoughby's Run, he approached with his reinforcements,
Brigadier-General Cutter in advance, and was put in on the north of the
Cashtown road, followed by Hall's battery. Brigadier-General Meredith
following, his brigade was put into line on the left. As fast as the
troops got into line they became severely engaged. Doubleday, in advance
of the divisions under him, put Meredith's brigade in formidable position
on a strip of woodland on the left.
As the Confederate left advanced through the railroad cut they came upon
Hall's battery, and were about to get it, when it was saved by speedy
withdrawal, which caused the Union right to retire, while Archer's brigade
of the Confederate right, in pushing to the front, came in open space
before Meredith's brigade, which in turn made a gallant advance, drove
Archer back, followed across the run, and captured General Archer and one
thousand of his men. The other two brigades of Pender's division,
Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's, were put in on the right of Archer's men.
During the severe engagement on his right the advance of the Confederate
infantry got in so close along the railroad cut that General Reynolds, in
efforts to extricate his right, was shot, when the right, still under
severe pressure, was forced to retire towards Seminary Ridge. Hall's
battery, severely crippled, succeeded in getting away as the right
retired.
Doubleday's other divisions came up about the moment General Reynolds was
killed. The Second (Robinson's) and Third (Rowley's) Divisions deployed on
the right and left. Cooper's battery of four three-inch guns followed the
left division. At the same time Hill reinforced by his division under
Pender, Thomas's brigade on his left, Lane, Scales, and Perrin to the
right. These restored the Confederate right, overlapping the Federal left;
at the same time Thomas's brigade made successful battle on the left,
pushing off Wadsworth's right and Hall's battery, when the two brigades of
the Second Division (Robinson's) were sent to their support, but were, in
turn, forced back towards Seminary Ridge. The Confederate sharp-shooters
cut down the horses of one of Hall's guns and forced him to drop it. Hill
advanced Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery to McPherson's Ridge, forcing
the entire Union line back to Seminary Ridge. General Doubleday,
anticipating such contingency, had ordered trenches made about Seminary
Ridge, and sent his three other batteries under Colonel Wainwright to that
point. He formed his line along the ridge and occupied the trenches by
part of his infantry. At this period Ewell's divisions under Rodes
approached against Doubleday's right.
General Howard, upon his first approach to the battle, marched the
Eleventh Corps to Cemetery Hill, and there posted it until called upon by
General Doubleday for assistance. To meet the call he ordered his
divisions under Generals Barlow and Schurz to Doubleday's right, to occupy
a prominent point at the north end of Seminary Ridge, reserving his
division under Steinwehr and part of his artillery on Cemetery Hill.
As the divisions of the Eleventh Corps approached the Confederate left,
Rodes's division of Ewell's corps advanced. The Federals then stood across
the Cashtown road, their left in advance of the Seminary, their right
thrown or standing more to the rear. Rodes was in season to sweep the
field of approach to the high point intended to be occupied by the
divisions sent by Howard, and came in good position to enfilade Robinson's
division of the First Corps. As Rodes approached he was threatened by
Buford's cavalry, but, finding cover under woodland, he made advance by
three brigades in line till he came to the point of view which gave him
command of that end of the field in elevated position, and in plunging
fire down Robinson's line and in advance of the divisions sent by General
Howard to occupy that point. While posting his infantry, Rodes ordered
Carter's battery of artillery into action against Robinson's lines
stretched out and engaged against Hill's corps. At that moment the
divisions of the Eleventh Corps were not in full front of Rodes, so that
his fire upon Robinson's line was something of a surprise, as well as most
discomfiting. The divisions and artillery of the Eleventh came to the
front, however, almost simultaneously with Robinson's necessitated change
of right front rearward towards Rodes.
These changes and dispositions gave Hill opportunity to press on by his
front, when Doubleday was obliged to call for help, and Schurz called for
support on his right. Coster's brigade was sent from Steinwehr's reserve,
and Buford's cavalry was ordered to brace as far as practicable the centre
of the First Corps, and another battery was sent to Schurz's division. At
2.45 another call for help by the First Corps was received, and General
Schurz was asked to answer it if he could by a regiment or more. Calls
were sent to hurry Slocum's (Twelfth) corps, some miles away, but then
Ewell was swinging his division under Early into line nearer to
Gettysburg, Gordon's brigade and Jones's battery coming in in good time to
make strong Rodes's left, and Hill's corps had overlapped the left of the
First Corps, so that General Howard found himself forced to command a
steady, orderly retreat to Cemetery Hill.
The Confederates pushed rapidly on, particularly the fresher troops of
Ewell, cleared the field, and followed on through the streets of
Gettysburg at four o'clock. The retreat began and continued in good order
till they passed Gettysburg, when the ranks became so scattered that the
final march was little better than "_Sauve qui peut_."
As the troops retreated through Gettysburg, General Hancock rode upon the
field, and under special assignment assumed command at three o'clock. As
the retreating troops arrived, Wadsworth's division on the right, the
Eleventh Corps across the Baltimore pike, the balance of the First under
Doubleday on the left of the Eleventh, General Howard and others assisted
in forming the new line.
The total effectives of the First and Eleventh Corps, according to the
consolidated moving report of June 30, was 19,982. From the latest returns
of General Lee's army, an average estimate of his four divisions gave his
total as 25,252. Part of the reserve division of the Eleventh Corps was
not engaged, but Buford had two brigades of cavalry, and so the foregoing
may be a fair estimate of the forces engaged, less the reserve on Cemetery
Hill.
At Cashtown, General Lee found that General Hill had halted his division
under R. H. Anderson and his reserve artillery. He had General Anderson
called, who subsequently wrote me of the interview as follows:
"About twelve o'clock I received a message notifying me that General
Lee desired to see me. I found General Lee intently listening to the
fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he
said, more to himself than to me, 'I cannot think what has become of
Stuart. I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have
met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him,
I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be
the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the
whole Federal force, we must fight a battle here. If we do not gain a
victory, those defiles and gorges which we passed this morning will
shelter us from disaster.'"
He ordered Anderson forward, and rode on to Seminary Ridge in time to view
the closing operations of the engagement. The Union troops were in
disorder, climbing Cemetery Heights, the Confederates following through
the streets of Gettysburg. Two other divisions of Confederates were up
soon after, E. Johnson's of the Second and R. H. Anderson's of the Third
Corps.
After a long wait I left orders for the troops to follow the trains of
the Second Corps, and rode to find General Lee. His head-quarters were on
Seminary Ridge at the crossing of the Cashtown road. Anderson's division
was then filed off along the ridge, resting. Johnson's had marched to
report to the corps commander. Dismounting and passing the usual
salutation, I drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon
which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land
surrounding. General Lee was engaged at the moment. He had announced
beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the enemy's
country. After the survey and in consideration of his plans,--noting
movements of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg road, the relative
positions for manoeuvre, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes
from it, all marking the position clearly defensive,--I said, "We could
not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we
have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him
and his capital." This, when said, was thought to be the opinion of my
commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at
his impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he said, "If he
is there to-morrow I will attack him."
In his official account, General Lee reported,--
"It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our
base unless attacked. But coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal
army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains
would have been difficult and dangerous."
When he rode away from me in the forenoon he made no mention of his absent
cavalry, nor did he indicate that it was not within call. So I was at a
loss to understand his nervous condition, and supported the suggestion so
far as to say, "If he is there to-morrow it will be because he wants you
to attack," and queried, "If that height has become the objective, why not
take it at once? We have forty thousand men, less the casualties of the
day; he cannot have more than twenty thousand." Then it was that I heard
of the wanderings of the cavalry and the cause of his uneven temper. So
vexed was he at the halt of the Imboden cavalry at Hancock, _in the
opening of the campaign_, that he was losing sight of Pickett's brigades
as a known quantity for battle. His manner suggested to me that a little
reflection would be better than further discussion, and right soon he
suggested to the commander of the Second Corps to take Cemetery Hill if he
thought it practicable, but the subordinate did not care to take upon
himself a fight that his chief would not venture to order.[124]
The following circular orders were sent the commanders of columns of the
First Corps:
"HEAD-QUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
"NEAR GETTYSBURG, July 1, 5.30 P.M.
"COLONEL,--The commanding general desires you to come on to-night as
fast as you can without distressing your men and animals. Hill and
Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy, and you will be needed for
to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop to-night.
"Respectfully,
"G. M. SORREL,
"_A. A. General_.
"COLONEL WALTON,
"_Chief of Artillery_."
At 12.15 of the afternoon of the 1st, General Halleck sent a cipher
despatch to General Meade approving his tactics, but asking, as to his
strategy, "Are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your
left and cut you off from Frederick?"
In this connection may be noted the plan that General Meade had mapped in
his own mind and given to some of his generals for battle to be formed
behind Pipe Creek, a position that would have met the views of General
Halleck, as well as his own, covering Washington and Baltimore under close
lines that could not be turned. At Gettysburg the Confederates had
comparatively an open field.
Reports coming in to head-quarters about six o'clock that the enemy was in
some force off our right towards Fairfield, General Lee ordered General
Anderson to put one of his brigades out on the right as picket-guard.
Wilcox's brigade and Boss's battery were marched and posted near Black
Horse Tavern.
Nothing coming from the _centre troops_ about Cemetery Hill, General Lee
ordered the Second Corps, _after night, from his left to his right_, for
work in that direction, but General Ewell rode over and reported that
another point--Culp's Hill--had been found on his left, which had
commanding elevation over Cemetery Hill, from which the troops on the
latter could be dislodged, by artillery, and was under the impression that
his troops were in possession there. That was accredited as reported and
approved, and the corps commander returned, and ordered the hill occupied
if it had not been done. But the officer in charge had waited for specific
orders, and when they were received he had made another reconnoissance. It
was then twelve o'clock. By the reconnoissance it was found that the enemy
was there, and it was thought that this should be reported, and further
orders waited.
General Ewell's troops and trains passed the junction of the roads at
four o'clock. The train was fourteen miles long. It was followed by the
troops of the First Corps that had been waiting all day. After night the
Washington Artillery and McLaws's division camped at Marsh Run, four miles
from Gettysburg. Here is Hood's account of his march:
"While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was received that
Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near
Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws's division, were at once
put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we
reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on July 2. So
imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible
speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only
about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July."
When I left General Lee, about seven o'clock in the evening, he had formed
no plans beyond that of seizing Culp's Hill as his point from which to
engage, nor given any orders for the next day, though his desperate mood
was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehensions. He had
heard nothing of the movements of the enemy since his crossing the
Potomac, except the report of the scout. His own force on the field was
the Second Corps, Rodes's, Early's, and E. Johnson's divisions from right
to left through the streets of Gettysburg around towards Culp's Hill; on
Rodes's right, Pender's division of the Third; on Seminary Ridge, R. H.
Anderson's division of the Third (except Wilcox's brigade at Black Horse
Tavern); behind Seminary Ridge, Heth's division of the Third; on the march
between Cashtown and Greenwood, the First Corps.