PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63.
Burnside's Abortive Moves--The "Mud March"--General Hooker supersedes
Burnside--The Confederates strengthen their Position for the
Winter--Longstreet ordered to Petersburg--Secretary of War Seddon and
the Author talk of General Grant and the Confederate Situation on the
Mississippi and in the West--Longstreet makes a Radical Proposition
for Confederate Concentration in Tennessee, thus to compel Grant to
abandon Vicksburg--The Skilful Use of Interior Lines the Only Way of
equalizing the Contest--Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's Brilliant
Achievement--Criticism--Death of "Stonewall" Jackson--The Resolve to
march Northward--The Army reorganized in Three Corps--Ewell and A. P.
Hill appointed Lieutenant-Generals.
Before we were fully settled in our winter quarters, and when just
beginning to enjoy our camp theatricals, we heard that General Burnside
was looking for another crossing by the lower Rappahannock. We were not
greatly concerned about that, however, as we thought the quicksands along
the flats, made especially protective by the winter rains, would so delay
his march as to allow us ample time to prepare for him. But the Washington
authorities having received reports of it through some of the superior
officers of the Army of the Potomac, the march was arrested by orders of
the War Department.
Another move was set on foot a few weeks later, at a time when General Lee
happened to be in Richmond. The information was forwarded to him and the
army ordered under arms, prepared to take the field. A few weeks before,
General Burnside had ordered material to be hauled to the point below,
which he had chosen when preparing for his crossing that had been arrested
by the War Department. When we found that his army was in motion, General
Jackson insisted that the crossing would be made below, and proposed to
march his corps down to meet it. He was told that the neck of land between
the Potomac and the Rappahannock was so interlaced with wet-weather
streams and ravines that the route leading below was not practicable at
that season; that the quicksands on the flats of the west side were
formidable obstacles to the march of an army; that the only possible route
for crossing the river was by the fords of the highlands, and that he must
hold his troops ready to move accordingly. He was not satisfied with the
refusal to accept his construction of the enemy's purpose, and demurred
against authority less than General Lee's, but found that the order must
be obeyed.
Not many hours after the report came, the noise of the army working
through the mud was distinctly heard by my picket guards along the upper
river. Some of the guards called out derisively, offering help to get the
batteries through the mud if they could only be assured that the army
would cross. The bottomless roads and severe weather broke up the
campaign, and the move back to camp was reported to me before the
Confederates marched from their camps. This effort, called by Burnside's
soldiers "The Mud March," was followed by the assignment of General Hooker
to command of the Army of the Potomac.
Long and close study of the field from the Potomac to the James River, and
the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the Army of the
Potomac had been drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that
there were but two moves left open for its spring campaign,--first, by
crossing the upper fords of the Rappahannock; secondly, by detaching
forces to the south side of the James, and by that route moving against
Richmond.
To guard against the former I laid out lines for field-works and
rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper fords as far as the road
leading from United States Ford. From that point the line broke to the
rear, crossing the Plank road and extending back half a mile to command
the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court-House. When the
lines for these works were well marked, I was ordered, with the divisions
of Hood and Pickett and Dearing's and Henry's artillery battalions, to the
south side near Petersburg, to be in position to meet the latter move,
leaving the divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson to finish the work on
the lines of defence.
After passing to the south side of James River, assigning the troops to
points of observation near Blackwater River, and establishing
head-quarters at Petersburg, I learned that there was a goodly supply of
produce along the east coast of Virginia and North Carolina, inside the
military lines of the Federal forces. To collect and transport this to
accessible points for the Confederates, it was necessary to advance our
divisions so as to cover the country, and to hold the Federal forces in
and about their fortified positions while our trains were at work. To that
end I moved with the troops in Virginia across the Blackwater to close
lines about the forts around Suffolk, and ordered the troops along our
line in North Carolina to a like advance. The movements were executed
without serious trouble, and the work was prosecuted up to the time of my
recall by General Lee.
While lying near Suffolk a couple of young men dressed as citizens entered
my tent one night with letters from Secretary of War Seddon, recommending
them as trustworthy and efficient scouts. They were sent off through the
swamp to find their way to Norfolk and southward to report of roads or
routes for our troops in case we should wish to make a detour for the
capture of Suffolk. One of them, Harrison, proved to be an active,
intelligent, enterprising scout, and was retained in service.
The accounts that we gained indicated that Suffolk could be turned and
captured with little loss, but as we had given it up the year before as
untenable, and were liable to be called upon at any moment to give it up
again, it appeared that the "cost of the whistle" would be too high.
The only occurrence of serious moment while we had our forces about
Suffolk was the loss of Captain Stribling's battery, which had been
inadvertently posted by the officer in charge of the artillery on a neck
running out into a bend of the Nansemond River. The Federal gun-boats,
seeing the opportunity, came into the river and took positions commanding
the ground in rear of the battery so as to sweep the field against all
succoring parties, while a direct attack was made upon the battery,
resulting in its capture.
About this time the soldiers on both sides had considerable amusement over
a Federal signal station that was inside our lines as we had laid them.
The Union troops had some time previously trimmed up a tall pine-tree and
built near the top a platform for use as a signal station, and, coming
upon this, to gratify his curiosity a Confederate soldier climbed to the
staging and seated himself for a leisurely view of the Federal forces
inside their works. An artillerist of the other side, after allowing
sufficient time to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, trained one of his
rifle guns upon the platform, and sent a shell screaming and bursting too
near for the comfort of the "man up a tree." As he did not care to be seen
in precipitate retreat, he thought to wait a little, but a second shot
admonished him that hurry, if less graceful, might be more wise than
deliberate retreat. Acting under pressure of the situation, his legs, to
the amusement of the men on both sides, soon brought him to safe cover.
When night closed in over the belligerents this soldier went to work on a
scheme by which he hoped to get even with the Yankees. He carefully
constructed and equipped a full-sized man, dressed in a new suit of
improved "butternut"[119] dry-goods, and, in due form christening him
"Julius Caesar," took him to the platform, adjusted him to graceful
position, and made him secure to the framework by strong cords. A little
after sunrise "Julius Caesar" was discovered by some of the Federal battery
officers, who prepared for the target,--so inviting to skilful practice.
The new soldier sat under the hot fire with irritating indifference until
the Confederates, not able to restrain their hilarity, exposed the joke by
calling for "three cheers for Julius Caesar." The other side quickly
recognized the situation, and good-naturedly added to ours their cheers
for the old hero.
About the 28th day of April the Army of the Potomac, under General Hooker,
took up its march for the fords of the upper Rappahannock to cross against
General Lee at Fredericksburg. At the same time General Grant crossed the
Mississippi below Vicksburg, marched against General Pemberton's army in
Mississippi, and was driving it back upon its fortifications about
Vicksburg.
When General Hooker's movements were so developed as to make sure of his
purpose, repeated calls came to me over the wires to pull away from
Suffolk and return to General Lee with all speed. These came from General
Lee, and also from the Richmond authorities. In reply I despatched that
our trains were at the front along the coast collecting supplies; that
they would be hurried to our rear, and as soon as safe we would march. The
calls became so frequent and urgent, however, that I inquired if we should
abandon our trains. To this no answer came; and I was left to the exercise
of my own judgment.
As soon as the trains were safely back, we drew off, marched back to the
Blackwater, and thence _en route_ for Richmond and Fredericksburg. Before
we reached the former place a telegram came announcing the great battle
and victory of Chancellorsville.
Passing through Richmond, I called to report to Secretary of War Seddon,
who referred to affairs in Mississippi, stating that the department was
trying to collect an army at Jackson, under General Joseph E. Johnston,
sufficient to push Grant away from his circling lines about Vicksburg. He
spoke of the difficulty of feeding as well as collecting an army of that
magnitude in Mississippi, and asked my views.
The Union army under General Rosecrans was then facing the Confederate
army under General Bragg in Tennessee, at Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville.
I thought that General Grant had better facilities for collecting supplies
and reinforcements on his new lines, and suggested that the only prospect
of relieving Vicksburg that occurred to me was to send General Johnston
and his troops about Jackson to reinforce General Bragg's army; at the
same time the two divisions of my command, then marching to join General
Lee, to the same point; that the commands moving on converging lines could
have rapid transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on Rosecrans
before he could have help, break up his army, and march for Cincinnati and
the Ohio River; that Grant's was the only army that could be drawn to meet
this move, and that the move must, therefore, relieve Vicksburg.
It was manifest before the war was accepted that the only way to equalize
the contest was by skilful use of our interior lines, and this was so
impressed by two years' experience that it seemed time to force it upon
the Richmond authorities. But foreign intervention was the ruling idea
with the President, and he preferred that as the easiest solution of all
problems.
The only objection offered by the Secretary was that Grant was such an
obstinate fellow that he could only be induced to quit Vicksburg by
terribly hard knocks.
On the contrary, I claimed that _he was a soldier_, and would obey the
calls of his government, but was not lightly to be driven from his
purpose.
My march was continued, and we joined General Lee at Fredericksburg, where
I found him in sadness, notwithstanding that he was contemplating his
great achievement and brilliant victory of Chancellorsville, for he had
met with great loss as well as great gains. The battle had cost heavily of
his army, but his grief was over the severe wounding of his great
lieutenant, General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, the head of the Second Corps
of the Army of Northern Virginia; cut off, too, at a moment so much needed
to finish his work in the battle so handsomely begun. With a brave heart,
however, General Lee was getting his ranks together, and putting them in
condition for other useful work.
At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of the Potomac,
according to its return of a few days before, consisted of officers and
men actually available for line of battle, 113,838, with 404 pieces of
artillery.[120] The return of casualties showed the enormous loss of
17,287. Returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for March, 1863, showed
an effective aggregate of 59,681;[121] batteries in action, about 160
guns. To this may possibly be added one thousand of troops returning
during April in time for the battle. The casualties reported by the
medical director numbered 10,281, but reports of the commanders showed
over 12,000, not including artillery or cavalry, or slightly wounded and
missing, which would probably add another thousand.
Chancellorsville is usually accepted as General Lee's most brilliant
achievement, and, considered as an independent affair, it was certainly
grand. As I had no part in its active conduct, it is only apropos to this
writing to consider the plan of battle as projected some four months
previous,--_i.e._, to stand behind our intrenched lines and await the
return of my troops from Suffolk.
[Illustration: STRATEGIC AND SOUTHERN RAILROAD MAP, 1863. Showing
positions of forces in the field May 4th, 1863, when the concentration
against Rosecrans' Army was first proposed.]
Under that plan General Lee would have had time to strengthen and improve
his trenches, while Hooker was intrenching at Chancellorsville. He could
have held his army solid behind his lines, where his men would have done
more work on the unfinished lines in a day than in months of idle camp
life.
General Hooker had split his army in two, and was virtually in the
condition which President Lincoln afterwards so graphically described in
his letter addressed to him June 5 following,--viz.:
"I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an
ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and
rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other."
My impression was, and is, that General Lee, standing under his trenches,
would have been stronger against Hooker than he was in December against
Burnside, and that he would have grown stronger every hour of delay, while
Hooker would have grown weaker in morale and in confidence of his plan and
the confidence of his troops. He had interior lines for defence, while his
adversary was divided by two crossings of the river, which made Lee's
sixty thousand for defence about equal to the one hundred and thirteen
thousand under General Hooker. By the time that the divisions of Pickett
and Hood could have joined General Lee, General Hooker would have found
that he must march to attack or make a retreat without battle. It seems
probable that under the original plan the battle would have given fruits
worthy of a general engagement. The Confederates would then have had
opportunity, and have been in condition to so follow Hooker as to have
compelled his retirement to Washington, and that advantage might have
drawn Grant from Vicksburg; whereas General Lee was actually so crippled
by his victory that he was a full month restoring his army to condition to
take the field. In defensive warfare he was perfect. When the hunt was up,
his combativeness was overruling.
It was probably a mistake to draw McLaws away from his position at Marye's
Hill, where he and Ransom had successfully held against six or seven
severe attacks of the Burnside battle, with three brigades, two of his own
and one of Ransom's. General Early was assigned to that position with five
brigades. He was attacked by about one-fourth the number of McLaws's
assailants, the position was carried, and Early was driven off in
confusion, losing, besides large numbers as prisoners, many pieces of
artillery. His especial assignment was to defend the Plank road against
the enemy's march to attack General Lee's rear. Instead, he retreated by
the Telegraph road, leaving the Plank road free for the enemy. After
driving Early off, the enemy marched by the Plank road, and Early marched
back to his late position at Marye's Hill. So General Lee was obliged to
take McLaws and Anderson from his battle at Chancellorsville to drive back
the force threatening his rear.
The battle as pitched and as an independent affair was brilliant, and if
the war was for glory could be called successful, but, besides putting the
cause upon the hazard of a die, it was crippling in resources and of
future progress, while the wait of a few days would have given time for
concentration and opportunities against Hooker more effective than we
experienced with Burnside at Fredericksburg. This was one of the occasions
where success was not a just criterion.
After reporting to General Lee, I offered the suggestions made to
Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means that should be adopted for the
relief of Vicksburg. I thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity
called us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with the War
Department, and reinforcements from his army for the West, to that end. I
suggested that General Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army
against General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg, then
standing against the Union forces under General Rosecrans in Middle
Tennessee; that at the same time he should send my divisions, just up from
Suffolk, to join Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army; that the
combination once made should strike immediately in overwhelming force upon
Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio River and Cincinnati.
He recognized the suggestion as of good combination, and giving strong
assurance of success, but he was averse to having a part of his army so
far beyond his reach. He reflected over the matter one or two days, and
then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening
Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result. To that end he
bent his energies.
His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer
suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that
the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we
should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position
as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to that
purpose,--which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily
assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan. His
confidence in making moves threatening Washington and the invasion of
Maryland and Pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety of the Washington
authorities as to the safety of their capital and of quiet within the
Union lines.
In the midst of his work of preparation came the announcement that
General Jackson's trouble had taken an unfortunate turn, that he was
thought to be sinking, and not many hours after that the news came that he
had gone to rest. But the full realization of all that this meant was
delayed until, at the railroad station, the train that was to bear his
remains to their final resting-place started upon its sad journey. Then
officers and soldiers gathered to do last honors to their dead comrade and
chieftain seemed suddenly to realize that they were to see "Stonewall"
Jackson no more forever, and fully to measure the great misfortune that
had come upon them. And as we turned away, we seemed to face a future
bereft of much of its hopefulness.
General Jackson's death suggested to General Lee a reorganization of his
army into three corps, and R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, appointed
lieutenant-generals, were assigned to the Second and Third respectively.
As the senior major-general of the army, and by reason of distinguished
services and ability, General Ewell was entitled to the command of the
Second Corps, but there were other major-generals of rank next below Ewell
whose services were such as to give them claims next after Ewell's, so
that when they found themselves neglected there was no little discontent,
and the fact that both the new lieutenant-generals were Virginians made
the trouble more grievous.[122] Afterwards, when Early, noted as the
weakest general officer of the Army of Northern Virginia, was appointed
lieutenant-general over those who held higher rank than he, there was a
more serious feeling of "too much Virginia." Longstreet and Jackson had
been assigned by General Johnston.
In our anxious hours and hopeful anticipations the little quarrel was
soon lost sight of,--displaced by affairs of greater moment. Reaction
began to show the effect of General Lee's strong hand and hard work. Hope
and confidence impaired by the failure of the Maryland campaign were
restored, and we prepared to abandon all uncomfortable thoughts with the
graves of our fallen comrades.
As soon as affairs took such shape as to assure me that the advance
northward was inevitable, I sent a requisition down to Richmond for gold
coin for my scout Harrison, gave him what he thought he would need to get
along in Washington, and sent him off with secret orders, telling him that
I did not care to see him till he could bring information of
importance,--that he should be the judge of that. He wanted to know where
he would find us, and was told that the head-quarters of the First Corps
were large enough for any intelligent man to find. With these orders he
left us, and after about three weeks was arrested in Pennsylvania and
brought under guard to my head-quarters.