the king's troops in New Jersey, from the 26th of December, 1776, to
the 3d January, 1777, by William Faden_. London, 15th April, 1777.
This map also makes part of the _American Atlas_, and the original
MS. draft is among the Faden maps in the library of Congress. The map
(the roads being represented by broken lines) bears legends to the
following purport: Washington from his headquarters at Newtown moved
his men on the evening of December 25th to 1, and by 4 o'clock on the
morning of the 26th he had crossed to 2, where he divided his army into
two divisions. The left, composed of 1,200 men with ten field-pieces
under Greene, but accompanied by Washington himself, proceeded through
3 towards Trenton; the right, under Sullivan, consisting of 1,500
men with ten field-pieces, went through 4. Meanwhile "Erwin's" and
Cadwallader's forces came to 5, hoping to cross the ferry, but the ice
in the river prevented. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, Rahl
at Trenton was surprised, and the entire force of Hessians with him
were captured except 200 men, who, with some chasseurs and dragoons,
escaped to "Burdenton", where they net Count Donop, who now, joined
by these fugitives, proceeded with his command to Crosswicks, thence
to Allenstown and Princeton. Washington, after his victory, encamped
at 6, where he was reinforced by troops from Virginia, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania. On January 2d the position was this: Washington had been
confronted at 7 by the advance of Cornwallis at 8. The second brigade
of the British under Leslie was at Maidenhead, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Mawhood, with the 17th, 40th, and 55th British regiments, was on the
road at 10,—all these troops having moved forward from Princeton
after Washington's attack at Trenton. During the night of January 2d,
Washington having withdrawn his detachments over the bridge, left fires
along the southern bank of the Assumpink Creek to deceive the British,
and marched from his camp at 6 to Allenstown, then turned towards
Princeton, but his force in part left the road, and by the dotted line
proceeded to 9, and on the morning of Jan. 3d attacked Mawhood at 10.
Of the three British regiments here, the 17th was driven upon Leslie
at Maidenhead, while the 40th and 55th retreated through Princeton and
Kingstown towards Brunswick, beyond 12. Washington followed them to
Kingstown and encamped there on Jan. 3, after having broken down the
bridge over the Millstone to interfere with Cornwallis's overtaking
him. On Jan. 4 Washington took the road through 11 to the passes in the
hills, while Cornwallis, reaching Kingstown the same day, proceeded
through 12 towards Brunswick.]
[Illustration: TRENTON.
Wiederhold's plan from the archives at Marburg, sketched from a
fac-simile furnished by Mr. E. J. Lowell. (Cf. his _Hessians_, 92.)
_A_ marks the centre of the village. The Hessian outposts were at
_B_, one officer and 24 men; _C_, Captain Altenbocum's company of the
Lossberg regiment, quartered in the neighborhood, which formed in
front of the captain's quarters, while the picket at _B_ occupied the
enemy; _D_, one captain, one officer, and 75 men; _E_, one officer and
50 Jägers, who retreated over the bridge on Sullivan's approach; _F_,
one officer and 30 men, who joined Donop over the Bordentown road. The
two columns of Washington and Sullivan emerged from the woods at _G
G_. The broken lines (— — — —) indicate their line of march and
successive positions, till they surrounded the Hessians. The beginning
of the dotted lines (. . . . .) in the village shows where the Hessians
attempted to form; but Rahl and Lossberg were driven back to _H_,
and Knyphausen to _J_, and surrounded they surrendered. Knyphausen
endeavored to reach the bridge, having with him the Lossberg cannon,
which got stuck in the marsh at _K_, and the delay in extricating
them was sufficient for Sullivan to occupy the bridge and cut off
Knyphausen's retreat. His own cannon were at _M_, and were not used.
Rahl's cannon were at _N_, and early dismounted. The Americans used
cannon at _s s s_, etc. There is also among the Rochambeau maps (no.
18) a map done in faint colors, with an elaborate key, which is marked
_Engagement de Trenton_, by Wiederhold, measuring about eight inches
wide by ten high. A French plan is given in _Mag. of Amer. Hist._,
1880, p. 369. Cf. map in Raum's _Trenton_; Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 228 (with Rahl's headquarters, p. 228, and a view, p. 222).
Carrington's special map of Trenton (p. 278) gives more detail than the
contemporary plans.]
Bancroft (ix. 217; cf. Irving, ii. 466) notes the Hessian journals
which he had used.[900]
The affair at Princeton has special treatment in the Washington papers
(Sparks, iv. 259; Dawson, i. 204), and is necessarily covered by the
general historians.[901] On the English side Howe's letter (Jan. 5,
1777) to Germain is the principal source, and it will be found in
_Gent. Mag._, Feb., 1777; C. C. Haven's _Thirty days_, 60; Dawson, i.
210. Cf. Mahon, vi. 132.[902]
[Illustration: FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.
Sullivan delayed at F to give Washington a chance to make his longer
detour by A before he (Sullivan) advanced by D. Washington attacked
at B, and threw out riflemen at G and H. Rahl, deserted by a part of
his force, who fled to Donop at Bordentown, surrendered at I, when he
became aware of Sullivan's approach behind him.
Wilkinson also gives a map showing the movements between Dec. 25, 1776,
and Jan. 3, 1777, and this is the basis of the map in C. C. Haven's
_New Historic Manual concerning the battles of Trenton and Princeton_
(Trenton, 1871).]
[Illustration: FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.
The advance, with which Wilkinson was, came by G to the vicinity of
the wood A and Quaker meeting-house B. The main column turned off and
followed the line _b_. Gen. Mercer proceeded to _f_. A detachment of
the British at _d_, with officers reconnoitring at _a a_, discovered
the American line on the route _h_; but coming to _g_, they also
discovered Mercer at _f_, who wheeled by the line _c_, and gaining
the orchard of Wm. Clark's house (5) confronted at 1—2 the British
detachment now formed at 3—4. The Americans retreated when the British
advanced to the slope (_o o o_), where they saw Moulder's battery,
X, near Thomas Clark's house (7), which Washington had sent from his
main line at _h_, together with other troops by the line _r r_, which
induced the British to retreat on the line _e e_, while Mawhood,
their commander, fled with a few infantry by the line, _s s_. At this
juncture another British regiment, which had advanced from Princeton to
C, fell back, and joining other troops took post at K and C, where they
confronted Washington's main body, which now deployed at _i i_; and as
the Americans attacked, the British fled to the college building (P),
and then beyond by the route _t t_. Cf. plan in Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 235. Carrington's plan of Princeton (p. 278) gives further details
from later study.]
[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF 1777.
A map in Captain Hall's _Hist. of the Civil War in America_ (London,
1780), vol. i.]
Howe's campaign of 1777 was the ruin of his military reputation.[903]
Jones, in his severe criticism upon Howe, unjustly charges Galloway
with making the suggestion of the expedition to the Head of Elk.[904]
It is certain that Galloway threw himself upon Howe's protection not
far from the time when Howe committed himself to a plan of capturing
Philadelphia. About the same time it has been charged that General Lee,
by a treasonable project, aided Howe's purposes in the same direction.
[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF 1777.
From Galloway's _Letters to a Nobleman_, London, 1779. KEY: _A_, the
British army before the battle of Brandywine. _B_, Gen. Knyphausen's
advance to the attack. _C_, Lord Cornwallis having turned the right
wing of the rebel army. _D_, Sullivan advanced to oppose him. _E_,
position of the rebel army. _F_, General Howe's quarters, in which
he remained five days after the rebel defeat. _a a a_, Washington's
retreat to Chester and Philadelphia. _G_, his camp at Chester, where
he remained fourteen hours after the battle. The roads with the zigzag
mark show those by which the rebels might have been intercepted after
the battle. _H_, Washington's flight after the skirmish at Goshen.
_I_, Washington's retreat when Sir Wm. Howe crossed the Schuylkill.
_K_, Washington's camp, whence he marched to surprise the British
army at Germantown, and to which he retreated after the battle. _L_,
Washington's camp at Whitemarsh. (For his headquarters see Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 321, and his _Mary and Martha Washington_, p. 162.)
_M_, the first position of the British. _N_, the second. _O, O, O_,
where Washington's camp might have been attacked with advantage. _P_,
British camp at Germantown. The line ——— denotes marches of the
British army; the line of dots . . . . . . . . the marches of the rebel
army. _Q_, Washington's lines at Valley Forge in the winter 1777.
_R, R, R, R, R_, positions which might have been taken to besiege
or assault the rebel quarters. _S_, the bridge. This map is also
reproduced in _The Evelyns in America_, p. 252.
The principal contemporary engraved maps of this part of the country
were the 1770 edition of Scull's _Map of Pennsylvania_ (see Vol. V. p.
240), which was at this time included in the _American Atlas_ (London,
1776), and the _Atlas Amériquain_ (Paris, 1777), and Pownall's edition,
1776, of Evans's _Map of the Middle Colonies_ (see Vol. V. p. 85), as
well as Jefferys' edition, 1775, of the same, not so accurate. To these
might be added Montresor's _Province of New York and Pennsylvania,
1777_; Mellish and Tanner's _Seat of War in America_; Faden's map of
July 1, 1778, given in fac-simile in the _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i.
285; the maps in the _Gentleman's Mag._, 1776 and 1777; Almon's _Seat
of War in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 1777_. A modern
map, covering the same field to illustrate the campaign, is given in
Theodore W. Bean's _Washington at Valley Forge one hundred years ago_,
and is repeated, with a few changes, in _Proceedings at the Dedication
of the Paoli Monument_ (Westchester, 1877). The contemporary French
maps are Du Chesnoy's _Théâtre de la Guerre_, 1775-1778, Beaurain's
_Carte pour servir à l'intelligence de la guerre_ (Paris, 1777), Brion
de la Tour's _Théâtre de la Guerre_ (Paris, 1777), with another by
Phelippeaux "pour servir de suite", and Bourgoin's _Théâtre de la
Guerre_ (Paris). There is a German map in the _Geschichte der Kriege in
und ausser Europa_. There is in the Maryland Hist. Soc. library a map
of stage routes between Baltimore and New York, showing the operations
of the British from Elk River (1777) to Neversink (1778). (Lewis
Mayer's _Catal. of MSS. etc., in Maryland Hist. Soc._, 1854.)
Cf. also the maps in Sparks's _Washington_, v. 66; Moore's _Diary of
the Revolution_, orig. ed., 495; _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser. vol. iii.;
Moorsom's _Fifty-second Regiment_; Hamilton's _Coldstream Guards_;
Carrington's _Battles_, p. 398.]
George H. Moore laid before the N. Y. Hist. Soc., in June, 1859, the
document in Lee's handwriting, dated March 29, 1777, while he was a
prisoner in New York, in which he sketches a plan for Howe's guidance
in the coming campaign. The "plan" in fac-simile, together with an
elucidation of it, was printed in Moore's _Treason of Charles Lee_,
New York, 1860. The "plan" is also in _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._,
1872, p. 361. Lee was at that time trying to induce Congress to send
commissioners to New York to confer with him (Bancroft, ix. ch. 19),
but Congress was not ensnared. Moore contends (p. 84) that the "plan"
is responsible for Howe turning towards Philadelphia, instead of going
north to help Burgoyne. Bancroft (ix. 333; also see p. 211) asserts
that it could have had no influence on Howe's movements.[905]
Lecky quotes Galloway's testimony, that of the 66,000 men voted by
Congress for this campaign, hardly 16,000 were in the field. Bancroft
admits that no one better than Marshall (iii. ch. 3) has described the
part of Washington in this campaign.[906]
At the opening of the campaign Washington was kept long in suspense
as to the purpose of Howe. The eastern people feared his object
was Boston.[907] Alexander Hamilton early in the season had become
Washington's aide, and his letters at once begin to contain
speculations on Howe's purpose (_Works_, Lodge's ed., vii. 481,
496, 500). On May 28th, Washington moved his headquarters from
Morristown[908] to Middlebrook, and it was thought Howe would attempt
to march direct for Philadelphia. On June 12th, Sullivan writes to
Weare that Howe was to be confronted the next day (_N. H. State
Papers_, viii. 584); and when it was known that Howe was retiring
towards New York, Washington, June 23d, little credited a report, then
prevalent, that the British army was panic-struck (_Mass. Hist. Soc.
Coll._, vii. 138).[909] Cf., for all these movements, Montresor's
_Journal_.
[Illustration: GENERAL HOWE.
From _The Impartial Hist. of the War in America_.]
In July, when news came of the fall of Ticonderoga, there were no
signs that Howe was preparing to coöperate with Burgoyne, and Hamilton
wondered (_Works_, vii. 507, 515). When Howe sailed from New York,
Washington was in suspense.[910] On July 31st, it was learned that
Howe's fleet was at the capes of Delaware, and the next day the
vessels had disappeared.[911] It was now supposed that Howe had gone
to Charleston, S. C., and that Washington might safely reinforce the
Northern army (_Hamilton's Works_, vii. 517). Lafayette first took
his seat at a council of war called to consider the propriety of this
(Sparks's _Washington_, v. 445).
In August, 1777, Gen. Sullivan conducted a raid into Staten Island to
seize Tories. He captured some papers which implicated the Philadelphia
Quakers in inimical movements. (Cf. _Journals of Congress_, ii.
246, 253.) In other respects the incursion was unfortunate, and
his movements were examined by a court of inquiry, which acquitted
him.[912]
Howe had been six weeks at sea, with three weeks' provisions, when he
landed at the Head of Elk.[913]
Upon Washington's march to confront Howe, see, for the preliminary
movements, William J. Buck's paper on "Washington's Head Quarters on
the Neshaminy", in the _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i. 275.[914]
[Illustration: GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE.
From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. i. It is
reëngraved in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U.S._, iii. 412. Cf. engraving in
Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed., New York, 1857, ii. Sargent gives a
clever presentation of the character of Howe in his _André_, p. 136.]
Upon the battle on the Brandywine the main American source is the
letters of Washington. With Washington's aid, R. H. Harrison wrote
to Congress from Chad's Ford, Sept. 11th, at 5 P. M., a letter which
was at once circulated in broadside (Sabin, iii. p. 463; Hildeburn,
no. 3,533). Pickering drafted for the commander-in-chief the report
(_Life of T. Pickering_, i. 157) written at Chester, at midnight,
September 11th (Sparks, i. 251; v. 58; Dawson, i. 278). Hamilton was
on Washington's staff (J. C. Hamilton's _Life of Hamilton_). C. C.
Pinckney, also on the staff, wrote a letter in 1820 (_Hist. Mag._,
July, 1866, x. 202). Marshall, as a participant, drew somewhat upon
personal experience in his account in the _Life of Washington_.
Lafayette's narrative, as given to Sparks, is in the _Sparks MSS._ (no.
xxxii. Cf. also Lafayette's _Mémoires_). There is a journal of Capt.
William Beatty, of the Maryland line, in the _Hist. Mag._, 2d. ser., i.
79. Sparks examines some of the disputed points of the battle.[915]
There are contemporary records and opinions in the _Penna. Archives_,
2d ser., x. 316; the letter of the N. H. delegates in Congress in _N.
H. State Papers_, viii. 678; current reports in Moore's _Diary_, 495;
gossip in Adams's _Familiar Letters_, 296, etc.; Knox's account (Sept.
13th) in Drake's _Knox_, 48.[916]
On the British side, we find Howe's report, Oct. 10th, to Germain in
Almon, v. 409; Dawson, i. 281. Cf. the evidence before Parliament in
the _Conduct of the War_ and the narrative in Stedman.[917]
The Hessian participancy is examined in Lowell's _Hessians_, 197.
Bancroft quotes Ewald's _Beyspiele grosser Helden_ as the testimony of
an eye-witness of Washington's well-conducted retreat.[918]
A portion of the British troops used breech-loaders.[919]
The movements of the opposing armies toward Philadelphia can be
followed in the main in the authorities cited for the battle. Some
local details are in Pennypacker's _Phœnixville_, and an account of the
damage done by the British on the march is in Smith's _Delaware County_
(p. 544).
For the Paoli attack, we have Wayne's defence at the court-martial in
Dawson, i. 315, and in the _One hundredth anniversary of the Paoli
massacre_, p. 52, which last contains also, beside sundry contemporary
records, the addresses of J. S. Futhey (also in _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i.
285) and Wayne McVeagh. The report of Howe to Germain is in Dawson, i.
317.[920]
On Sept. 26th, Washington described the state of the army, then at
Potsgrove (_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461). He was foiled by
a rain in an effort to hold the British once more at bay, and Howe
entered Philadelphia.[921]
[Illustration:
NOTE TO THE OPPOSITE MAP.—Washington's map of the Brandywine campaign,
on the opposite page, is reduced from a tracing of the original in the
possession of the Pennsylvania Historical Society. The legends upon it
in Washington's handwriting are noted in the following key by letters,
while those of the surveyor are given by figures. At one end of the
map is the following inscription: "Laid down at 200 p^s in an Inch,
the 27^{th} day of August, An. Dom^i 1777. P^r Jais. Broom, Surv^r. N.
Castle Co^y." At the other end is the following table:—
"_m._ _q._ _p^s._
From Chester County to Brandywine 7 0 21
From Brandywine to New Castle 6 1 19
From New Castle to Red Lyon 7 1 0
From Red Lyon to St. George 3 2 46
From St. George to Cantwell's Bridge 7 0 60
From Cantwell's to Blackbird 5 2 70
—— — ——
37 0 56
From Chester County to Brandywine 7 0 21
From Brandywine to Newport 4 0 79
From Newport to Bridgetown 5 0 12
From Bridgetown to Red Lyon 4 0 19
From Red Lyon to Harris Inn 5 2 51
From Harris Inn to Witherspoon's 6 1 44
From Witherspoon's to Blackbird 6 1 42
—— — ——
38 3 28
From New Castle to Christiana Bridge 4 3 45"
KEY: A, Chandler Ford, very good, but very broken ground and narrow
defiles on the Et. side. B, Fording place by Thomas Gibson's. C, To
Gibson's Ford. D, Road leading to Kennet's Square. E, Road leading
towards Red Clay Creek. F, Hendrickson's Tavern. G, Richland fording
place. H, Tavern. I, Smith's Store. J, James Walker. K, Mill Town. L,
Rising Sun Tavern.
1, The Bottom Road, passing Brandywine at Chad's Ford (18). 2,
Newlin's. 3, The line dividing the counties of Chester and Newcastle.
[This is the curved northern boundary of Delaware.] 4, Gibson's Mill.
5, Gibson's Ford. The Center Road [runs to F]. 6, Kennet Meeting-house.
7, Clark's Inn. 8 [to 7 and beyond], The Road leading from Wilmington
to Kennet's. 9, Naaman's Creek. 10, Grubb's Inn. Grubb's Road [leads
from 10 to 5]. 11, The Road leading from Wilmington to Chester. 12,
Shelpot Creek. 13, Foulk's Road. 14, The Concord Road. 15, Brandywine
Creek. This creek, except the fording place, impassable. 16, Bridge.
17, M'Kim's [?] Mill. 18, Chad's Ford. 19, 20, Delaware River. 21,
Wm. Miller's Mill. 22, Red Clay Creek. 23, Christiana River. 24, The
Borough of Wilmington. 25, The Road leading from Wilmington towards
Lancaster. 26, Mill Creek. 27, Bridge. 28, The Road leading from
Wilmington to Newcastle. 29, Ferry. 30, Newport. 31, The Road leading
from Newport towards Lancaster with bridge at 32. 33, The Lancaster
Road. 34, Mill creek. 35, Bridge. 36 [to 46], White Clay Creek. 37, New
Castle. 38, The Road leading from N. Castle to Christiana Bridge. 39,
Bridge [Christiana]. 40, Hamburgh. 41, [The Road] to the Red Lyon. 42,
The Road leading from New Castle to the Elk River. 43, The Road leading
from Christiana Bridge to Elk River. 44, Ogle Town. 45, The Road
leading from Ogletown to the Head of Elk. 46, Mill of Capt. Black's.
47, 48, [Shaded space showing where the original is worn through].
49, Newark. 50, The Road to Johnson Ferry on Susquehanna. 51, [Road
to Nottingham]. 52, Iron Hill. 53, The Road leading from Red Lyon to
Black Bird Creek. 54, St. George's Creek. 55, Mill Pond. 56, Trap [?]
57, Drawyer's Creek. 58, Appoquinimink Creek. 59, Cantwell's Bridge.
60, Witherspoon's. 61, Part of Bohemia. 62, The upper Road leading from
Red Lyon to Blackbird Creek. 63, Clemon Mill. 64, Elk. 65, Part of
Elk River. 66, Joseph Gilpin's. 67, Harris Inn. 68, The Road leading
towards Bohemia.]
Sullivan, with the charge of inefficiency for Brandywine still hanging
over him, was the first to encounter the outposts of the British at
Chestnut Hill, when he opened the day of Germantown. His letter (Oct.
25th) addressed to the president of New Hampshire was first printed by
Sparks.[922]
Washington's letters to Congress and others are of the first
importance.[923]
In Timothy Pickering's _Life_ (i. 166) there is an account of the
battle from his journal, which sustains the positions taken by
Pickering in 1826,—though he does not refer to it at that time,—in
the controversy which was waged by him and Sparks with Johnson, the
author of the _Life of Greene_.[924]
[Illustration: BRANDYWINE.
Sketched from a large MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, _Plan
générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles_,
etc. KEY: "19, Marche de l'armée pour New Gardens. 22, Marche du
général Knyphausen pour Kennet Square, 9 Sept. 24, Camp que l'armée
occupa aux environs de Kennet Square. 26, Marche du général Cornwallis
vers le Brandywine. 30, Première position du Gen. Cornwallis. 31,
2me position de ce général. 32, Attaque de ce général. 33, Position
des enemis. 34, Retraite des enemis. 38, Marche du corps detaché à
Wilmington. 57, Marche du corps detaché à Wilmington pour Philadelphia
le 16 Oct." The lines (·–·–) represent roads.
The published plans of Brandywine are the following: In the
_Examination of Joseph Galloway and letters on the Conduct of the war_.
In Sparks's _Washington_, v. 58. Cf. also Duer's _Stirling_, ii.;
Irving's _Washington_, iii. 190. In Marshall's _Washington_, vol. v.
Sketch by J. S. Bowen and J. S. Futhey in _Penna. Hist. Soc. Bull._,
i. no. 7 (1846). In _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., x. 316; Carrington's
_Battles_, p. 382; Hamilton's _Grenadier Guards_, ii.; Lowell's
_Hessians_, 198; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 377 (with views of the
ground, 378, 379).
There are among the Faden maps (nos. 78, 79) in the library of Congress
a careful topographical drawing of the battle of Brandywine, and a
corrected proof of the map as published by Faden in 1778. There are
among the Faden maps (nos. 80, 80½) plans, by the Hessian Wangenheim,
of the camp at Wilmington to cover the British hospitals after the
fight at Brandywine, and a map of the positions of the army in the
action of Sept. 19th, as well as Cornwallis's march in November to
Philadelphia.]
Of the writers near the event, Gordon drew from original sources;
Marshall was an actor in the scenes; and there are accounts in
Wilkinson, i. 353, 359, 361. G. W. P. Custis's _Recollections_, ch. 4,
and the later writers need to be consulted.[925]
On the English side, Howe's despatch to Germain is in Dawson (i. 330).
The letter of a British officer, dated Philadelphia, Oct. 19, 1777
(London Chronicle, Jan. 3-6, 1778), is reprinted in _Penna. Mag. of
Hist._, April, 1887, p. 112.[926]
[Illustration: TRUDRUFFRIN, OR PAOLI.
Sketched from a portion of a MS. Hessian map in the library of
Congress, called _Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique
contre les Rebelles_, etc. The lines ·–·– represent roads.
KEY: "41, marche du général Knyphausen et son camp le 18^{me}; 42,
marche du général Cornwallis le même jour; 43, camp du corps près de
Valley Forge; 44, corps des Rebelles surpris par le général Grey le
21^{me}; 45, camp et marche du général Knyphausen le 21^{me}; 46,
marche de l'armée par le Schuylkill près de Valley Forge, et le camp
qu'elle occupa le 23^{me} près de Norris Town House." The British are
shown in solid black blocks, the Americans in black and white.]
[Illustration:
NOTE.—This map is a fac-simile from one of Faden's maps. There is
among the copies of the Lafayette maps in the Sparks collection at
Cornell University one of the _British Camp at Trudruffrin, from the
13th to the 21st of September, with the attack made by Major-General
Grey against the Rebels near White Horse tavern on the 20th of
September_. This is merely a transcript of the Faden map, of which
there is a fac-simile in _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 285. Cf. _Penna.
Archives_, 2d ser., x. 316. The MS. of Faden's maps is among the Faden
maps in the library of Congress (no. 81). There is a view of the Paoli
monument in Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 349, and in Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 372.]
[Illustration: From _Pennsylvania Archives_ (2d ser., vol. xi. p. 191).
Cf. the maps in Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 353, and in
_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 375.]
The seaward defence of Philadelphia depended on the forts Mercer
and Mifflin, on the _chevaux-de-frise_ in the river, and on the
Pennsylvania navy. Howe's first attempt, in October, to get his
shipping up to support his army failed.[927]
[Illustration: MONTRESOR'S PLAN OF GERMANTOWN.
NOTE.—This map is sketched after an original in Harvard College
library. There is a duplicate, evidently made by the same hand, among
the Peter Force maps, in the library of Congress. The map was engraved
and published in London. There is a map published by Faden in London,
March 12, 1784, which is not trustworthy, however, as to roads, which
was called _Sketch of the Surprise of Germantown by the American forces
commanded by General Washington, Oct. 4, 1777, by J_[ohn] _Hills, Lt.
23d Reg._
Other published maps are the following: in Johnson's _Greene_, i. 80
(showing three stages); Sparks's _Washington_, v. 86 (also in Duer's
_Stirling_, ii. 177; Irving's illustrated _Washington_, iii. 286;
Guizot's _Atlas_); Carrington's _Battles_, 392; Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 314; Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 354; _Penna. Archives_, 2d
ser., xi. 188; _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 368.
For views of the Chew House, see Day's _Hist. Coll. of Penna._,
492; Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 356; Egle's _Penna._, 178;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 514; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (March, 1880),
iv. 192.
The following are the main portions of Howe's despatch to Lord George
Germain, dated at Germantown, Oct. 10, 1777: "The enemy marched at
six o'clock in the evening of the third from their camp near Skippach
Creek, about sixteen miles from Germantown. This village forms one
continued street for two miles, which the line of the encampment, in
the position the army then occupied, crossed at right angles, near a
mile from the head of it, where the second battalion of light infantry
and the fortieth regiment were posted. At three o'clock in the morning
of the fourth, the patrols discovered the enemy's approach, and the
army was immediately ordered under arms. Soon after the break of day
the enemy began their attack upon the second light infantry, which
they sustained for a considerable time, supported by the fortieth
regiment; but at length being overpowered by increasing numbers, the
light infantry and a part of the fortieth retired into the village,
when Lieutenant-Colonel Mulgrave with six companies of the latter corps
threw themselves into a large stone house [Chew's], which, though
surrounded by a brigade, and attacked by four pieces of cannon, he most
gallantly defended, until Major-General Grey, at the head of three
battalions of the third brigade, turning his front to the village, and
Brigadier-General Agnew, who covered Major-General Grey's left with
the fourth brigade, by a vigorous attack repulsed the enemy with great
slaughter. The fifth and fifty-fifth regiments from the right, engaging
them at the same on the other side of the village, completed the defeat
of the enemy in this quarter. The regiments of Du Corps and Donop being
formed to support the left of the fourth brigade and one battalion of
the Hessian grenadiers in the rear of the Chasseurs, were not engaged.
The precipitate flight of the enemy preventing the two first corps from
entering into action, and the success of the Chasseurs in repelling all
efforts against them on that side, did not call for the support of the
latter. The first light infantry and the pickets of the line in front
of the right wing were engaged soon after the attack began upon the
head of the village. The pickets were obliged to fall back, but the
light infantry, being well supported by the fourth regiment, sustained
the enemy's attack with such determined bravery that they could not
make the least impression on them.
"Two columns of the enemy were opposite to the guards, twenty-seventh
and twenty-eighth regiments, who formed the right of the line.
Major-General Grant, who was upon the right, moved up the forty-ninth
regiment about the time that Major-General Grey had forced the enemy in
the village, and then advancing with the right wing, the enemy's left
gave way, and was pursued through a strong country between four and
five miles.
"Lord Cornwallis, being early apprised, at Philadelphia, of the enemy's
approach, put in motion the two battalions of the British and one of
the Hessian grenadiers, with a squadron of dragoons, and his lordship
getting to Germantown just as the enemy had been forced out of the
village, he joined Major-General Grey, when, placing himself at the
head of the troops, he followed the enemy eight miles on the Skippach
road; but such was the expedition with which they fled, he was not able
to overtake them. The grenadiers from Philadelphia, who, full of ardor,
had run most of the way to Germantown, could not arrive in time to join
in the action."]
[Illustration: GERMANTOWN AND VICINITY.
Sketched from a part of a large map in the library of Congress,
evidently of Hessian origin,—_Plan générale des opérations de l'armée
Britannique contre les Rebelles_, etc. (August, 1776 to 1779). From
the Renvoy the interpretation of the following numbers is taken: "40,
marche du général Cornwallis le 16^{me}; 47, marche du général de
Knyphausen vers Germantown et le camp qu'il occupa le 23^{me} près
de ce village; 48, marche du général Cornwallis vers Germantown et
son camp près de village; 50, campment de l'armée aux environs de
Germantown; 51, emplacement des enemies et leur attaque; 52, la maison
deffendue par le Colonel Musgrave avec un partie du 40^{me} regiment;
54, retraite de l'enemie." The lines (·–·–) mark the roads.]
The _chevaux-de-frise_ at Billingsport was laid by Robert Whyte, who
went subsequently over the enemy, and he is charged with placing it
purposely in a defective manner. Wallace (p. 228, with plans, p.
134), who examines the evidence, seems to think the charge is proved.
Respecting the share of the navy in the defence of the river, the
principal sources are the minutes of the naval board, etc., in _2
Penna. Archives_, vol. i., and other papers in iv. 748. An examination
of this defence is made in Wallace, p. 130, etc.[928]
[Illustration: STENTON (JAMES LOGAN'S HOUSE).
This view of the house occupied by Howe and Washington as headquarters
is taken from a painting in the Penna. Hist. Society. It is a rear view
of the building. There is in the same collection a pen-and-ink sketch
by Joseph Pennell. The position of the house can be seen in the map on
another page, called "Approaches to Germantown." Howe occupied it at
the time of the battle of Germantown. Cf. Scharf and Westcott, p. 871.]
[Illustration: FADEN'S MAP OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE.
Sketched from an adaptation of Faden's _Course of the Delaware river
from Philadelphia to Chester, exhibiting the several works erected by
the rebels to defend its passage, with the attacks made upon them by
his majesty's land and sea forces, engraved by Wm. Faden, 1778_, which
is given in Wallace's _Col. Wm. Bradford_, p. 228.
KEY: 1, Lord Howe in the "Eagle", with the "Apollo" and transports; 2,
the "Camille" and "Zebra;" 3, the "Vigilant" and "Fury", which moved
up by the dotted line to a position in the channel between Mud Island
and Carpenter's Island, to attack Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island; 4, the
"Experiment" and transports, below the "lower stackadoes" (shown by the
zigzag line) through which there was a passage of seventeen feet near
the fort at "Billingport", which was abandoned to Lt.-Col. Stirling,
Oct. 1st; 5, camp on Nov. 18th; 6, wreck of "Merlin;" 7, the "Augusta"
blown up; at these points (6 and 7) were the other British vessels,
"Somerset", "Isis", "Roebuck", "Pearl", "Liverpool", "Cornwallis's
galley",—some attacking Fort Mifflin, others engaging the American
fleet at 8, others the battery of two 18-pounders and two 9-pounders
at 10; the house of Tench Frances is between this battery and Manto
Creek; 8, between the American fleet at this point and Mud Island is
the "upper stackadoes" (shown by the zigzags); 9, the nearer of the
two islands off Fort Mercer is Woodberry Island, and the other is Red
Bank Island. These two islands have since disappeared. The rest of
the American fleet was at this point. Beside the shore batteries on
Carpenter's Island, there was a redoubt further inland, and another
redoubt protected Webb's Ferry and the road to Philadelphia.]
Upon the attack of Donop on Fort Mercer, at Red Bank (Oct. 22), the
letter received by Washington from Major Ward, written at the desire of
the commander of the fort, Col. Christopher Greene (cf. Greene's _Nath.
Greene_, i. 489), is in Sparks's _Washington_, v. 112, and Dawson, i.
355, as is also Commodore Hazlewood's description of the naval part of
the attack.[929]
[Illustration: LAFAYETTE'S VICTORY NEAR GLOUCESTER, N.J.
This sketch follows a colored map among the Lafayette maps in the
Sparks collection at Cornell University, entitled _Carte de l'action de
Gloucester entre un parti Américain, sous le G^l. Lafayette et un parti
des Troupes de Lord Cornwallis, commandé par ce G^l. après son fourage
dans le Jersey, le 25 9^{bre}, 1777_. While Lafayette's forces were at
Haddonfield, the enemy at Gloucester were reconnoitred from Sand Point
(1), and when the troops moved along the Haddonfield road the American
riflemen (6), supported by the militia, attacked the Hessian outposts
(9), when detachments were stationed on the cross-roads (7, 7) to
protect the American right flank, while some chasseurs (8) threatened
the Hessians' right flank. The enemy were driven back (10) till
Cornwallis supported them with some English. They were still further
pushed back till within a mile of Gloucester (11), when night closed
the conflict. The legend on the map puts the English and Hessians (2,
3, 9) at 5,000 men, the boats (4) representing the withdrawal of part
of them with their baggage across the river.
Lafayette's narrative, as given by him to Sparks, is in the _Sparks
MSS._, no. xxxii.]
Lafayette talked with Sparks of Donop (_Sparks MSS._, xxxii.).
Knyphausen's report is in the archives at Marburg, and is used by
Lowell (_Hessians_, 206). The despatches of the Howes are in Almon (v.
499), and Dawson (i. 356, 357).
[Illustration: (From a large map in the library of Congress.)]
Of the attack (Nov. 10-16) on Fort Mifflin (Mud Island) and its
evacuation, with the opening of the river to the British fleet, the
best garner of contemporary accounts with comment, is in Wallace's
_Bradford_ (p. 194, etc.), but some of this material is found also
elsewhere.[930]
There has been some dispute over the respective claims of Col. Samuel
Smith[931] and Commodore Hazlewood for the defence of the fort
(Wallace, App. 10).
[Illustration: FLEURY'S PLAN OF FORT MIFFLIN.
NOTE.—The annexed plan is a fac-simile, somewhat reduced, of a
pen-and-ink sketch among the Sparks maps in the library of Cornell
University. It is endorsed "Maj. Fleury's Plan of Fort Mifflin", and it
bears also on the back in the author's hand these words:
"The engineer author of this imperfect draugh begg endulgence for it;
considering that he has not paper, pen, rule, neither circel, and being
disturbed by good many shells or cannon balls flying in the fort. LEWIS
FLEUR."
The reverse also bears an "Explanation" in French in Fleury's hand, and
beneath an English translation in another hand, seemingly made at the
time. This last is as follows:—
"Explanation—All marked A are new works. A 1, 2, 3. Traverses to
defend the battery from ricochet shot. A 4, 5. Ditches to close the
left of the battery, which was open. A 6. A double iron chain which
encloses the right of the battery. A 7. Pits with sharp upright stakes
to defend the approaches to our enclosure. A 8. Banquet raised round
the wall. A 9. Ditches and parapet of reunion between our barracks,
which will make a second inclosure and be furnished with loop-holes. A
10. Last retreat in the middle of the Fort, made when we had only 120
men in garrison. A 11. Demilunes to flank the front, substituted to
[_sic_] the block house, which was blown up. A 12, 13, 14. Fraisework.
"15. Enemy's battery of 2 mortars. 16. [Ditto] 5 pieces large cannon, 1
mortar. 17. [Ditto] 2 pieces cannon, 1 mortar. 18. Unfinished Redoubt
at a mile and a third from the fort, near the road. 19. A pretty
extensive work at about the same distance. 20. Epaulements for the
guards."]
[Illustration: ATTACK ON FORT MIFFLIN.
NOTE.—This map is reduced in fac-simile from one of Fleury's
pen-and-ink sketches among the Sparks maps at Cornell University.
It is endorsed "Mudd Island", but not by Washington, as the _Sparks
Catalogue_ (p. 207) says. There are noted in the same catalogue (p.
207) two other pen-and-ink drafts of the fort and its vicinity, both
apparently the work of Fleury, also. One is smaller, covering much the
same ground as the present fac-simile except that it does not show
the ships and Hog Island. It is entitled: "Figuré aproximatif de fort
island et des ouvrages des assiégeans. 16 octobre, 1777." It has an
"Explanation" in French on the reverse, accompanied by a statement
that it had been scrawled on a gun-carriage, without compasses, rule,
or scale, and under difficulties arising from the bursting of one bomb
which carried away his inkstand, and of another which ploughed the
ground where he sat.
The other plan is larger, and has been folded like a letter, and
is addressed on the outside, "His Excellency General Washington,
Headquarters." It shows only the west edge of Mud Island, but marks
particularly the distance, range, and armament of the attacking
batteries, and is called, "Figuré aproximatif des ouvrages des
assiégeans 14 9^{bre,} 1777." It marks the distance from the redoubt
on the highland to Fort Mifflin as "1 mile 1-4 5 p." The wharf on the
island is described as "où l'enemie déscendra, quoi que nous l'ayons
detruite."
Other published maps of Mud Island (Fort Mifflin) are in Scharf and
Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 363; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 296;
Wallace's _William Bradford_, p. 229.
Scharf and Westcott (p. 361) also give a plan made before the attack,
by Col. Downman, of the British army.
Red Bank is particularly delineated in Smith's _Delaware Co._, 321;
_Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., vol. v.; and Lossing, ii. 290, with views,
etc.]
On the British side we have the despatches of the Howes (Dawson, i.
364, 366), the journal of Montresor (_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, 1882, v.
393; vi. 34); the letters in Scull's _Evelyns in America_, 246, 253;
and the account in Rivington's _Gazette_, cited by Wallace.
In addition to the references already made for the two attacks, the
entire movements on the river are illustrated more generally in the
letters of Washington, copied from the Penna. Archives, as well as in
the diary of the Council of War in the _Sparks MSS._, no. 2. There are
other contemporary accounts.[932]
Lafayette's attack on Gloucester soon followed. See plan on page 430.
The contrasts between the hilarities of the British in Philadelphia
and the trials of the Americans at Valley Forge during the winter are
abundantly illustrated.
The publication of the _Penna. Evening Post_ was resumed in
Philadelphia, Oct. 11, 1777, and continued during the British
occupation of Philadelphia.[933]
Various diaries kept in and near Philadelphia have been preserved,[934]
and the details of the life in the town have been worked up by modern
writers.[935]
The complimentary festival given to General Howe on his departure,
known as the Mischianza, took place May 18th, at the Wharton house.[936]
On the condition of Washington's camp at Valley Forge we have first the
testimony of his own letters and those of his corespondents,[937] as
well as that of sundry diaries and journals.[938]
The question of supplies as affecting the camp is considered in
Stuart's _Trumbull_ and Greene's _Greene_ (ii. 48), this general being
made quartermaster-general in March.
[Illustration: ATTACK ON MUD ISLAND.
From Galloway's _Letters to a Nobleman_, London, 1779. The leading
published map of Delaware Bay and River at this time was one surveyed
by Joshua Fisher, and published in London by Sayer and Bennett, 1775
and 1776. It was reproduced in _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., vol. iii.;
and maps based on them are in the _Gent. Mag._, July, 1779. There was
a French edition issued in Paris by Le Rouge in 1777, which also made
part of the _Atlas Amériquain_. Other charts are in the _No. Amer.
Pilot_, 1776, and in the _Neptune Américo-Septentrional_, 1778.
There are plans for obstructing the river, in _Penna. Archives_,
2d ser., i. 749. Other maps of the river defences will be found in
Sparks's _Washington_, v. 156; Irving's _Washington_ (quarto), iii.
278; Smith's _Delaware County_, p. 321; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii.
298; Carrington's _Battles_, p. 396.]
There are preserved various orderly-books of the camp.[939]
There were efforts to reorganize the army during the winter. Congress
had created a board of war in November, 1777 (Pickering, i. 187;
Lossing, ii. 867). On Jan. 10, 1778, a committee of Congress was
appointed to visit the camp and concert plans for the reorganization
(_Journals_, ii. 401). A plan was drawn up by conference, and later
adopted by Congress (Sparks, v. 525). Francis Dana wrote from the
camp, Feb. 12th, to Congress, and the draft, found among the papers of
Laurens, was printed in the _Polit. Mag._ (vol. i.,—1780), by which it
was thought to appear that Howe could have destroyed the American army
if he had had enterprise.[940]
A few days after the taking of Philadelphia, the Rev. Jacob Duché,
of that city, who had been an approved supporter of the Americans,
transmitted a letter to Washington, tempting him to desert the cause.
Washington sent the letter to Congress; but Sparks could not find
it in the Archives at Washington, and prints it from _Rivington's
Gazette_ (_Corresp. of the Rev._, i. 448). The letters which grew out
of this act, including one of expostulation from Francis Hopkinson, the
brother-in-law of Duché, and that of repentance sent to Washington by
Duché in 1783, can be found in Sparks, v. 94, 476.[941]
[Illustration: MUD ISLAND, 1777-1778.
Sketched from a corner map of the large MS. map, called on another
page, "The Defences of Philadelphia, 1777-1778."]
The military movements during the autumn of 1777 were mainly to try the
temper of the opposing forces and to secure forage, and the incessant
watching of each other's motions made Pickering write to Elbridge
Gerry (Nov. 2d,—_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461) that "since
Brandywine we have been in a constant state of hurry."[942]
[Illustration: ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE, 1777-1778.
A sketch made by combining two in the Sparks collection at Cornell
University. One is a French plan, from the Lafayette maps, which
gives the main features of the topography to the present sketch. The
other is one transmitted by General Armstrong to Mr. Sparks in 1833,
embodying the recollections of a Mr. William Davis, "a remarkably
active and intelligent man, who resided within the limits of the camp
during its continuance there." General Armstrong cites the testimony
of a son of General Wayne, that the recollections of Davis "of the
most minute occurrences of the period were entirety unaffected by
age." Upon this dependence has been put for the positions of the
troops and the quarters of the general officers. The plan given by
Sparks (_Washington_, v. 196) seems to have been made by a similar
combination, though he omits the locations of the general's quarters.
The plan of Sparks is essentially followed in Guizot's _Washington_,
in Lossing's _Field-Book_ (vol. ii. 334,—also see _Harper's Monthly_,
xii. 307), and in Carrington's _Battles_, p. 402 (and in _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._, Feb., 1882).
There is a view of Washington's headquarters in Scharf and Westcott's
_Philadelphia_, i. 369; Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 182; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 332, and in his _Mary and Martha Washington_, p. 168;
and _Mag. Amer. Hist._, Feb., 1882.
The French alliance was celebrated in camp May 6, 1778 (Sparks, v. 355;
Moore's _Diary_, ii.).
For landmarks, etc., of Valley Forge, see Lossing's _Field-Book_;
Read's _Geo. Read_ (p. 326), from the _Ohio State Journal_; _Harper's
Mag._, lx., 660, April, 1880.
At the centennial celebration, June, 1878, there were addresses by
Henry Armitt Brown (in his _Memoir and Orations_, edited by J. M.
Hoppin), and one by Theodore W. Bean, printed in the _Daily Local
News_, Westchester, Pa., June 20, 1878.]
During this time, Oct.-Dec., Washington was kept informed of the
British movements through the letters of Maj. Clark (_Penna. Hist. Soc.
Bull._, vol. i.). There was in November a project discussed of taking
Philadelphia by storm (Drake's _Knox_, 136). Congress was urging the
States to renewed efforts (_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 728). Early in
December Howe had tried to allure Washington to a battle near Chestnut
Hill or Whitemarsh (Sparks, v. 180; Dawson, i. ch. 31). By the middle
of December the American army had gone into winter-quarters at Valley
Forge (Reed's _Reed_, i. 345), but not without having thought at the
same time of an attack on New York (_Ibid._, 344).
[Illustration
NOTE.—This plan of the British works between the Delaware and the
Schuylkill is sketched from the main portion of a drawing preserved in
the Penna. Hist. Society, which bears the following indorsement: "The
redoubts in the English lines are ten, beside two advanced ones. No.
1, which I took a plan of in the month of July, was then compleat, but
the excessive heat of the weather and many avocations prevented our
prosecuting the survey till October, by which time the wooden work of
the other redoubts, as well as the abaties, were carried away, which
rendered it uncertain how many platforms there were in each, but from
what traces remained [I] believe I am right in nos. 2 & ten: the other
seven [eight] varied so little from no. 2, that the plan of that may
serve for the rest: I am equally uncertain whether the abatis ran
in direct lines from redoubt to redoubt or formed angles, but know
that each part terminated at about 20 feet from the counter-scarps of
contiguous redoubts, these intervals being occasionally stopped up by
chevaux-de-frize. All the 10 redoubts were well faced both within and
without with strong planks, but the advanced redoubts and other small
pieces were only faced with fascines. On the right of the line where
small streams run through swampy ground an inundation was formed by
sloping the arches of the bridges, and making dams were necessary, each
furnished with a tumbling dam, well planked on the top and slopes of
the main dam, to carry off superfluous water.
LEWIS NICOLA."
Enlarged plans and cross-sections of redoubts nos. 1, 2, and 10 are
given in the margin, as well as of the western advanced redoubt, and
other small works, including the "Barriers across Kensington and
Germantown roads with a cremaillered work between them cut out of the
bank between the roads." The stars near the lines denote the places of
"houses destroyed by the English." Cf. description in _Penna. Mag. of
Hist._, iv. 181.]
[Illustration: DEFENCES OF PHILADELPHIA, 1777-1778.
Sketched from a large MS. map by John Montresor in the library of
Congress, dedicated to Sir William Howe, and called _Plan of the City
of Philadelphia and its environs, shewing the defences during the years
1777-1778, together with the Siege of Mud Island_. A similar map by
Montresor is among the King's maps in the British Museum (_Catal._, ii.
176).]
[Illustration: VICINITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress,
called _Plan générale des opérations de l'Armée Britannique contre
les Rebelles, etc._ The lines (·—·—) are roads. KEY: "59, Attaque
de mudden island le 15 Novembre. 60, Position du général Howe le 4
Dec. pour forcer le général Washington à quitter sa position sur les
hauteurs de White Marsh. 61, Marche du général Howe pour fourages
entre Derby et Chester. 62, Camp de l'armée près de Philadelphia. 63,
Camp de l'armée après avoir evacué Philadelphia le 26^{me} Juin, 1778.
64, Corps detaché à Gloucester. 65, Marche du général Knyphausen le
18^{me} Juin et son camp à Haddenfield. 66, Marche et camp du général
Cornwallis le 18^{me} Juin. 67, Marche du général Knyphausen le 20^{me}
Juin et son camp à Moorfield."
The published maps of Philadelphia and its vicinity at this time are
the following: N. Scull and G. Heap's, originally in 1750 (cf. Vol. V.
240), and reproduced by Faden in 1777, and reduced in the _Gent. Mag._,
Dec., 1777. Kitchin's _Philadelphia and Environs_, in _London Mag._,
Dec., 1777, and reproduced in the _Penna. Archives_, 2d series, vol.
iii. A map surveyed by Eastburn in 1776, Philad., 1777; one surveyed
by Hill, Philadelphia, 1777. Plan of Philadelphia in the _Atlantic
Neptune_ (1777), vol. i. Plan in the _American Atlas_ (1777). _Gegend
und Stadt von Philadelphia_, in _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser
Europa_, Nürnberg, 1778, Zehnter Theil. There was published by John
Reed, in 1774, _An Explanation of the Map of the City and Liberties
of Philadelphia_. A folding plan showing the British works is in
Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 360. Various MS. plans of
Philadelphia and its neighborhood, with the river defences, are among
the Faden maps (nos. 82-86) in the library of Congress. Among the Penn
papers in the Hist. Soc. of Penna. is a MS. map showing the positions
of the British at Germantown before the battle.]
In January an attempt by the Americans to destroy the shipping at
Philadelphia, by floating combustibles down the river from above,
failed; but it gave rise to Hopkinson's humorous verses on the "Battle
of the Kegs."[943]
In March Congress was urging young men of spirit and property to raise
light cavalry troops (_Journals_, ii. 463), for Simcoe's British
horsemen were raiding about the country for forage, meeting, however,
now and then with resistance, as at Quintin's Bridge (March 18th) and
Hancock's Bridge (March 21st).[944] At the beginning of May there was
another conflict at Crooked Billet.[945] Three weeks later (May 20th)
Lafayette skilfully extricated himself from an advanced position at
Barren Hill, whither Washington had sent him towards the enemy, and
Where the British commander sought to cut him off.[946]
[Illustration: BARREN HILL.
This map is sketched and reduced from a MS. map preserved in the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, signed "Major Capitaine, A. D. C.
du Gen^l. Lafayette", and called _Plan de la retraite de Barrenhill
en Pensilvanie, où un detachement de 2,200 hommes sous le Général
la Fayette, etoit entourré par l'armée Anglaise sous les G^x. Howe,
Clinton, et Grant, le 28 May, 1778_. It bears the following KEY:
(_translation_) _a._ Position of the American detachment on Barren
Hill, eleven miles from Philadelphia and twelve miles from Valley
Forge, on the right bank of the Schuylkill. _b._ Pickets of the
Americans, which retired on the approach of the enemy. _c._ A French
company under Captain M'Clean, with fifty Indians. _e._ Place where
the militia were ordered to gather, but they failed to do so. _f._
March of Maj.-Gen. Grant at the head of grenadiers and chasseurs, and
two brigades, making in all 8,000 men, with 15 pieces of cannon. _g._
Where the enemy were first discovered. _h._ Americans occupying the
meeting-house and burial-ground, deploying to defend their left flank.
_i._ March of the detachment on the second warning to reach Matson's
Ford. _k._ Chasseurs detached to confront Gen. Grant. _l._ Body of
English cavalry, followed by a body of grenadiers and chasseurs. _m._
March of Gen. Grant, always following the Americans. _n._ Matson's
Ford, which the Americans gained and passed, when they occupied the
highlands, _o_, while a small force was sent to Swede's Ford. _p._ Rich
road by which Howe and Clinton advanced with the rest of the British
army. _q._ Point where Howe and Grant formed, whence, seeing that their
attempt had failed, they returned to Philadelphia. _r._ Road from
Swede's Ford, by which the American detachment returned the next day to
occupy Barren Hill.
There is among the Sparks maps at Cornell University a duplicate copy
of this map, made from Lafayette's original. Cf. maps in Sparks, v.
378; Carrington's _Battles_, p. 408; Lossing, ii. 329; and the view of
the church (p. 322).]
Clinton, on relieving Howe from the command in Philadelphia, was
instructed to evacuate the city (Sparks, v. 548). This materially
changed the plans for the campaign, which had been determined upon
prior to the announcement of the French alliance (_Sparks MSS._, xlv.
and lviii.). Washington meanwhile was considering an alternative of
plans, and getting the opinions of his general officers;[947] but
the movements of the British to evacuate Philadelphia soon changed
all.[948]
[Illustration: PLAN OF MONMOUTH BATTLE.
From a plan in Hilliard d'Auberteuil's _Essais_, i. p. 270. KEY: The
English had passed the night at _a_. Lee's advance showed itself at 3,
when the British debouched from their position at 1, while their guns
at 2 fired on the Americans. The Americans at 3 retired into the wood,
and joined Lee's main body, which debouched from the wood at 4, their
guns taking position at 6 and 7, while the British guns were at 5. The
Americans (4, 8, and 10) retired and took position at 11; and while
still further retreating, the British attacked at 12, and the Americans
made a stand at 13, and before all could retire still farther the
British again attacked at 14. The Americans again formed at 15, when
Washington, coming up by way of the new Baptist meeting-house with the
main body, formed at 16, Stirling and Greene in front, and Lafayette in
the rear, while Lee's men at 15 passed to Washington's rear, a British
reconnoitring force appearing meanwhile at 17, and Plessis-Mauduit's
battery, supported by 500 men, taking position at 18. The British at 14
and 17, being repulsed, united at 19, whence they were further repulsed
and took position at 20. They formed again at 21 after Washington's
attack. They passed the night at 22.
This map was apparently engraved from an original, followed in two
plans, differently drawn, but in effect the same, which are among the
maps in the Sparks collection at Cornell University, and which were
copied from Lafayette's own plan at Lagrange. It is called _Carte de
l'affaire de Montmouth, où le général Washington commandait l'armée
Américaine et le général Clinton commandait l'armée Anglaise, le 28
Juin, 1778_. The "legende" shows references from 1 to 22, with extra
ones _a_ and _b_, the latter (_b_) being at the junction of the two
dotted lines in the rear of 16, and is explained as the "movement of
the second line, commanded by General Lafayette, which, as soon as the
column at 17 was perceived, was detached to occupy the wood west of
the meeting-house, which the column 17 was approaching; but when this
column 17 was repulsed the line was restored."
There is also among the Sparks maps (Lafayette copies) a pen-and-ink
sketch-plan,—differing somewhat, giving more detail,—made on the
American side, and this more nearly resembles the plan given by Sparks
in his _Washington_ (v. p. 430,—repeated in Duer's _Stirling_, ii.
196; and in Guizot's _Washington_. Cf. Irving's _Washington_, quarto
ed.). The plan in Lossing's _Field-Book_ (ii. 356) is based on the one
here engraved, and he also gives a view of the Freehold meeting-house
(p. 359) and of the field (p. 362). Carrington (ch. 56) gives an
eclectic plan with more detail than any other.
A view of the monument commemorating the battle is in the _U. S. Art
Directory_ (1884).]
[Illustration: MONMOUTH AND VICINITY.
Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress,
called _Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les
Rebelles_, etc. The lines (·—·—) represent roads. KEY: "79, Marche du
général de Knyphausen de son camp devant Englishtown le 24 Juin. 80,
Marche du général Cornwallis. 83, Retraite des enemis."
There is a copy of the map of the region of the march by Clinton's
engineer in the library of the N. Y. Hist. Soc. (_Mag. of Amer. Hist._,
Sept., 1878, p. 759).]
The battle of Monmouth, though in the end a victory for Washington,
secured for the British what they fought for, a further unimpeded march
toward New York. Washington's letters are of the first importance.[949]
We have also accounts by Hamilton;[950] by Lafayette,[951] as given to
Sparks; and statements by several other witnesses.[952]
The trial of Lee, and the papers produced by it, furnish abundant
contemporary evidence. The trial was published at Philadelphia, 1778,
as _Proceedings of Court-Martial held at Brunswick in New Jersey, July
4, 1778_.[953]
On the British side, Clinton's despatch is in _Lee Papers_, (1872), p.
461; Dawson, i. 415. A British journal kept during the march is in the
_N. J. Hist. Soc. Proc._, i. 15; an orderly-book picked up on the field
is in a transcript in the Penna. Hist. Society.[954]
The British retreat is commended in Baron von Ochs's _Betrachtungen
über die neuere Kriegskunst_ (Cassel, 1817). Cf. Lowell's _Hessians_,
p. 209.
Respecting the Conway Cabal, the best gathering of the documentary
evidence is in an appendix to Sparks's _Washington_.[955] Sparks's
conclusion is that the plot never developed into "a clear and fixed
purpose", and that no one section of the country more than another
specially promoted it. Mahon (vi. 243) thinks that Sparks glides over
too gently the participation of the New Englanders, who have been
defended from the charge of participation by Austin in his _Life of
Elbridge Gerry_ (ch. 16). Gordon implicates Samuel Adams, and J. C.
Hamilton is severe on the Adamses (_Repub. U. S._, i. ch. 13, 14).
Mrs. Warren found no cause to connect Sam. Adams with the plot, and
Wells (_Sam. Adams_, ii. ch. 46) naturally dismisses the charge. It
is not to be denied that among the New England members of Congress
there were strong partisans of Gates, and the action of Congress for
good in military matters was impaired by an unsettled estimate of the
wisdom of keeping Washington at the head of the army, though it did
not always manifest itself in assertion (Greene's _Greene_, i. 287,
403, 411). Nothing could be worse than John Adams's proposition to have
Congress annually elect the generals (_Works_, i. 263); and he was not
chary of his disgust with what was called Washington's Fabian policy.
Sullivan, in one of his oily, fussy letters to Washington (_Corresp.
of the Rev._, ii. 366) finds expression of a purpose to revive the
plot in William Tudor's massacre oration in Boston in March, 1779. The
expressions of Charles Lee, that "a certain great man is most damnably
deficient" (Moore's _Treason of Lee_, p. 68), like utterances of
others, are rather indicative of ordinary revulsions of feeling under
misfortunes than of a purpose of combination among the disaffected.
Gates's refusal to reinforce Washington, and Hamilton's vain efforts to
persuade him, naturally fall among the indicative signs;[956] and this
apathy of Gates very likely conduced immediately to the loss of Fort
Mifflin at the time it was abandoned (Wallace's _Bradford_, App. 12).
The attempt to gain over Lafayette by the attractions of a command in
invading Canada, can be followed in Sparks's _Washington_.[957]
THE TREASON OF ARNOLD.
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE AUTHORITIES BY THE EDITOR.
JUST when and by what act Arnold was put in treasonable correspondence
with the British is not clearly established. Bancroft[958] says it was
towards the end of February, 1779,[959] but he gives no authority.
[Illustration: ARNOLD.
After the medallion, engraved by Adam, of a picture by Du Simitière,
painted in Philadelphia from life. The original is in Marbois'
_Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry Clinton_ (Paris, 1816), where it is
inscribed "Le Général Arnold, déserté de l'armée des Etats Unis, le 25
Sept^{bre}, 1780." The copy of Marbois in the Brinley sale (no. 3,961)
had also the sepia drawing from which the engraver worked. The Du
Simitière head had already appeared in the _European Magazine_ (1783),
vol. iii. 83, and in his _Thirteen Heads_, etc.
A familiar profile likeness, looking to the right, was engraved by H.
B. Hall for the illustrated edition of Irving's _Washington_, and is
also to be found in H. W. Smith's _Andreana_. Another profile, similar,
but facing to the left, is in Arnold's _Arnold_, and was etched by H.
B. Hall in 1879. Cf. Harris and Allyn's _Battle of Groton Heights_.
Lossing has given us views of Arnold's birthplace in Norwich (_Harper's
Mag._, xxiii. 722; _Field-Book_, ii. 36), and of his house in New
Haven (_Harper_, xvii. 13; _Field-Book_, i. 421), and of his Willow
(_Harper_, xxiv. 735).]
[Illustration: BENEDICT ARNOLD.
From the _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa, Eilfter Theil_,
Nürnberg, 1778.]
Clinton, in Oct., 1780,[960] says it was eighteen months before, which
would place it about April, 1779, and this is the period adopted
by Sparks[961] and Sargent.[962] The latter writer thinks Arnold
made the advances; the former believes them to have come from the
British.[963] It has also been believed that the mutual recognition
was effected in some way through a Lieutenant Hele, a British spy, who
was in Philadelphia after Arnold took command. There might arise a
suspicion that the understanding was induced through the Tory family
of Miss Peggy Shippen, whom Arnold had married in April, 1779. There
are stories of her maintaining correspondence with her British friends
in New York, but we do not know of any letters remaining as proof of
it, except one from André to that lady after her marriage to Arnold,
and after the British correspondence with him under feigned names had
begun, in which letter the gambolling Major André commiserated his fair
friend of the previous winter on the difficulty she might experience in
buying gewgaws in Philadelphia, and offering to find them for her in
New York. Whether this language, like the commercial phrases in which
Arnold was at this time conducting his correspondence under the name
of "Gustavus" with one "John Anderson", a British merchant in that
city, was likewise a blind is not probably to be discovered, and it
might or might not involve a doubt as to the privity of Peggy Arnold
in the rather lagging negotiations;[964] but the probability is that
André wrote the letter in his own name in order that Arnold might, by
the similarity of the handwriting, identify his _pseudo_ Anderson; for
by this time the nature of information which inured to the advantage
of the British, and which Gustavus communicated to Anderson from time
to time, had pretty well convinced Clinton that the person with whom
he was dealing was high in rank, and probably near headquarters in
Philadelphia.
[Illustration: ARNOLD.
From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, ii. p. 48.]
Arnold had warm admirers; and those who trusted him for certain
brilliant merits in the field included, among others, Washington
himself; but Congress did not confide in him with so unquestioning a
spirit. That body had raised over him in rank several of his juniors,
much to Arnold's chagrin[965] and Washington's annoyance; and it was
only after a renewed exhibition of his intrepidity at Danbury that it
had tardily raised him to a major-generalship. Though his commission
of May, 1777, gave him equal rank, it made him still, by its later
date, the junior of those who had been his inferiors.[966] The Burgoyne
campaign had been fought by him under a consequent vexation of mind,
and his spirits chafed, not unreasonably, at the slight. The wound he
then received incapacitating him for the field, had induced Washington,
as has been shown, to put him in command of Philadelphia after the
British evacuated it. It was now observed that he more willingly
consorted with the Tory friends of his wife than with the tried
adherents of the cause. His arrogance and impetuosity of manner always
made him enemies. The Council of Pennsylvania by a resolution (_Hist.
Mag._, Dec., 1870), as we have seen, brought Congress to the point of
ordering a court-martial to decide upon the charges preferred against
the general, and to Arnold's revulsion of feelings at this time has
been traced, by some, the beginning of his defection.[967] Certain it
is that he was kept in suspense too long to render him better proof
against insidious thought, for it was not till December, 1779, that
the trial came on. Meanwhile his debts pressed, his scrutinizers were
vigilant, and there seems some reason to believe that he sought to get
relief by selling himself to the French minister,—a project which, if
we may believe the account, was repelled by that ambassador. To add
to his irritation, Congress did not find the accounts which he had
rendered of his expenditures in the Canada expedition well vouched, and
Arnold resented their inquiries as an imputation upon his honesty.[968]
[Illustration: ARNOLD'S COMMISSION AS MAJOR-GENERAL.
Reduced from the fac-simile given in Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit.
Curios._, 1st series, plate xlii.]
[Illustration: WEST POINT.
Sketched from a colored drawing in the _Moses Greenleaf Papers_ (Mass.
Hist. Soc.).]
The trial at last resulted in his acquittal on two of the more serious
charges; but being judged censurable on two others, he was sentenced to
a public reprimand from the commander-in-chief.[969]
[Illustration
A profile cut by himself for Miss Rebecca Redman, in 1778, and given in
Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit. Curiosities_, 1st series, pl. xxv.]
The burden of a public reproof, no matter how delicately imposed, was
not calculated to arrest the defection of man already too far committed
to retreat. If we may believe Marbois, not the best of guides, there
was found among Arnold's papers, after his flight, a letter, undated
and unsigned, in which he was urged to emulate the example of Gen.
Monk, and save his country by an opportune desertion of what was no
longer a prospering cause.[970] It soon became evident to Arnold that
of himself, destitute of representative value, he was not a commodity
that Clinton was eager to buy. Accordingly the recusant soldier
sought to offer a better bargain to the purchaser by the makeweight
of something that Clinton particularly longed for, and this was the
possession of the Hudson Valley through its chief military posts.[971]
To get a hold upon this, the time was opportune, for there was a
change to be made in its commander. Arnold, however, did not get the
coveted prize without some intrigue, for Washington, when he found
that the wounded soldier professed eagerness for hotter work, proposed
his taking the command of one of the wings of the main army. Arnold
met the compliment by referring to his wounds as precluding work in
the saddle, and induced Schuyler and R. R. Livingston to importune
Washington to assign him to West Point.[972] The device succeeded,
and Arnold reached West Point, as its commander, in the first week of
August, and established his headquarters in the confiscated house which
had belonged to Beverley Robinson, and which was situated on the east
bank of the river, a little below West Point.[973] Clinton could have
no longer any doubt of the identity of his correspondent, now that
"Gustavus" wrote from the Robinson house.
The conspirators' first effort was to establish communications through
Robinson, on business ostensibly having relations to this confiscated
property; but Washington, to whom, for appearances, Arnold showed
Robinson's application for an interview, told him that the civil, and
not the military, powers should meet such proposals. Arnold could find
at this time little difficulty in transmitting his clandestine letters,
for there was constant occasion for the passage of flags from his
own headquarters. To cover his proceedings from the officers of the
American outposts, he only had to pretend that the expected messages or
messengers were from his own spies in New York.[974]
[Illustration
From the _Political Magazine_, March, 1781, ii. 171. There is a modern
reproduction of this engraving in the _Minutes of a Court of Inquiry_,
etc., Albany, 1865. and in H. W. Smith's _Andreana_, Phila., 1865, who
gives a full-length, of the origin of which we are left uninformed.]
Clinton was apparently not willing to commit himself to any bargain,
unless Arnold would give a personal interview as an evidence of his
sincerity; while Arnold, in according, on his part insisted that
his interviewer should be the convenient Anderson. André, since he
had become the adjutant-general of the British army, was now fully
understood to represent that fictitious New York merchant. Arnold
named Robinson's house for the meeting, and would make arrangements by
which any flag should pass the outposts. This was objected to, and the
neutral ground near Dobbs Ferry was settled upon. Here Arnold went in
his barge; but the officers of the British guard-boats were not in
the secret, and the meeting failed by reason of their chasing Arnold's
barge up the river. Another attempt was planned, but this failed
in the beginning, apparently by André's going up to the "Vulture",
sloop-of-war, which was lying in the river, instead of landing lower
down, as was expected. André was provided with full instructions, which
if obeyed would have saved him the ignominy of a felon's death. He was
not to put off his uniform, was not to go within the American lines,
and was not to receive any papers. His bargain with Arnold was to have
no written expression, and it involved on Sir Henry's part the dispatch
of an ample force in a flotilla from Sir George Rodney's fleet, then
in New York, where the men were already embarked, ostensibly for the
Chesapeake, and the attack was to be made on the 25th of September,
when it was supposed that Washington would have left the Hudson to go
to Connecticut for an interview with Rochambeau. There was further to
be made by André a promise that Arnold should have a commission in the
British army and a sum of money. The American general, on his part, was
so to dispose the forces in the works about West Point that the attack
would, beyond doubt, end in a surprise and a mastery that would give
color to the necessity of a surrender, which he was promptly to make.
[Illustration: ANDRE.
This picture of André, by himself, was originally engraved in 1784
by J. K. Sherwin, and was reëngraved by Hopwood for J. H. Smith's
_Authentic Narrative_, London, 1808, and from this second engraving
the present cut is taken. It has of late years been engraved by H. B.
Hall in Sparks's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iv.; H. W. Smith's
_Andreana_; Sargent's _André_; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1879, p. 745
(etched by H. B. Hall). What seems to be the same, but extended to
include the thighs, is given in Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 197; _Two
Spies_, 36. A picture by Reynolds (given in Harper's, lii. 822, and
_Cyclop. U. S. Hist._, i. 46) is said to be preserved at Tunbridge
Wells. A pen-and-ink sketch by himself, made during his confinement,
is now preserved in the Trumbull gallery at New Haven. Sparks first
engraved it, and it has since been reproduced by Lossing, in _Harper's
Mag._, xxi. 4, in Smith's _Andreana_, and elsewhere.]
It now became necessary that some device should be practised to let
Arnold know that André had reached the "Vulture." There had just
happened some firing upon a boat of the "Vulture", in going to meet
what the British captain supposed or pretended to suppose a white flag
displayed on the shore. This gave the opportunity of dispatching a flag
to the commander in the Highlands, to remonstrate against such perfidy.
The British captain accordingly sent such a message, and André wrote
the letter in a hand which he knew Arnold would recognize, and moreover
countersigned it with "John Anderson, Secretary."
Arnold at once bent to the occasion. He engaged one Joshua Hett Smith,
who lived in the neighborhood, to go by night to the "Vulture" in a
boat, and bring to the adjacent shore a gentleman whom he would find
on board, from whom Arnold expected to get information. How far Smith
was a dupe or a knave has never been satisfactorily determined. The
business would seem to have had a plain significance to a quick-witted
man; but a court was not able later to convict Smith of knowing
precisely what it all meant. Smith had also with him two oarsmen, and
it was not apparently believed that they were in a position to know
enough to render their patriotism doubtful. It was then by night, in
a boat steered by Smith, that André, dressed in his uniform, but with
an overcoat wrapped about him, was rowed ashore. According to Smith,
the darkness and the outer garment so concealed Andre's dress that
his steersman never suspected him to be an officer. Arnold was found
waiting in the bushes, a little remote from the landing. Here Smith
left the two conspirators alone and returned to his boat; but when the
signs of dawn began to appear he returned to warn them. Arnold, who had
brought along with him an extra horse, mounted André on it, and the two
started to go to Smith's house,[975] which was two or three miles away
on the hill, and within the American lines.
[Illustration: HUDSON RIVER.
Reduced from a rough pen-and-ink sketch, three feet and eight inches
long, preserved among the Sparks MS. maps in Cornell University
library, and inscribed "To his Excellency George Clinton, Esq^r,
Governor of the State of New York, this map of Hudson's River through
the Highlands is humbly dedicated by his Excellency's most humble
servant THOMAS MACHIN, iv. January, MDCCLXXVIII."]
If André is to be believed, he was not told that he was to go within
the American outposts, and indeed there is no conclusive evidence
to show why they went to Smith's house at all. Perhaps Smith or the
boatmen refused, in the growing light, to take the risk of the return
to the vessel. The general opinion has been that the conspirators had
not concluded their negotiations, and needed more time. That Arnold had
had a predetermined purpose to go to the house, if necessary, seems
to be made clear from the fact that he had induced Smith to move his
family away from their home temporarily, and on some pretext which
Smith did not object to. André says that he first discovered Arnold's
plan to get him within the American lines when, as they rode on their
way, Arnold gave the countersign at the outposts. This was the first
departure from Clinton's instructions. After they had reached the house
the day broadened, and, the sound of cannon being heard, André went to
a window, whence he could see the "Vulture" in the distance,[976] and
saw that the Americans had dragged some cannon to a neighboring point,
whence their fire became so annoying that the vessel raised her anchor
and fell down the river. André became anxious lest this incident should
preclude his return by water. The day had not far advanced when the
bargain was completed, and Arnold prepared to leave for West Point to
perfect the dispositions expected of him. He left behind sundry papers,
mostly in his own handwriting, which André was to take to Clinton. Why
another injunction of his superior was evaded by André in accepting the
papers is not clear. They conveyed no information about the condition
of the post which Clinton did not already possess or André could repeat
to him. Possibly it was thought that, being in Arnold's autograph, the
documents might serve as a pledge for what André was verbally to report
to him.
Arnold seems to have made no certain provision for his
fellow-conspirator's return to the "Vulture", but he left passes, which
could be used either on the water or land passage, as circumstance
might determine. André spent an anxious day after Arnold left. He was
finally cheered by observing that the "Vulture", as if mindful of him,
had returned to her previous moorings; but his hopes were futile. As
night came on Smith showed no signs of arranging for a water passage to
the ship, and made excuses.
[Illustration: HUDSON RIVER.
After the original draft by Major Villefranche (1780) as reproduced in
Boynton's _West Point_, p. 45. Sargent, in his _André_, gives a map
"engraved from a number of original drawings by Villefranche and other
engineers, and preserved by Major Sargent, of the American army, who
was stationed at West Point as aide to General [Robert] Howe until that
officer was relieved by Arnold."]
The fact probably was, that, after the cannonading of the morning,
Smith had no desire to risk himself on the river in a boat. It was
accordingly agreed that André should undertake to return to New York by
land, and that Smith should accompany him beyond the American outposts,
under the protection of Arnold's pass and of his own acquaintance with
the officers of the lower posts. It now became necessary for André to
disregard another of Clinton's directions, and exchange his uniform
for common clothes.[977] This done, he put the papers which Arnold
had given him under his soles and within his stockings. Thus arrayed,
about dusk the two started, accompanied by Smith's negro servant. They
crossed King's Ferry, and proceeding on their way were stopped once,
but suffered to advance on showing Arnold's pass. After spending the
night at a house, they had gone on some distance the next morning when
Smith parted with André, and, going to Robinson's house, reported to
Arnold that André had been conducted beyond the lines. André went on in
better spirits than before, feeling sure now that he could encounter
nothing more serious than some wandering cowboys, as the British
marauders who infested the Neutral Ground between the two armies were
called, and with whom he could easily parley to their satisfaction.
The natural foes of the "Cowboys" were the "Skinners", who harried the
unfortunate adherents of the British along the same roads, and wrestled
with the Cowboys as opportunity offered.[978] As it happened, a party
of the American prowlers were out to intercept some British marauders,
and three of the number were ensconced close by a stream not far from
Tarrytown, on the upper side. They were by name John Paulding, David
Williams, and Isaac Van Wart. Paulding was by force of character the
leader, and was dressed in a refugee's suit, which not many days before
had been put upon him in exchange for his own better garments, when
he had come out from confinement within the British lines. This suit,
as well as Paulding's profession that he was "of the lower party",
given to André's inquiry when, as he came along, he was stopped by the
men, led to André's revealing himself as a British officer. When the
traveller found he had made a mistake, he showed Arnold's pass, and
tried to enforce it by threats of the American commander's displeasure
if the captors dared to disregard it. This failing, he tried bribes,
and it was André's opinion that if he could have made the payment sure
he might have got off, as money seemed to be their object. The men,
on the other hand, said that they could have resisted any offer of
money when, on searching their prisoner, they found the papers in his
boots.[979] Paulding, who alone could read, saw the purport of the
documents, and pronounced André a spy.
[Illustration: COLONEL BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.
After a sketch taken by Colonel Trumbull, at the close of the war, and
engraved in the _Memoir of Col. Benjamin Tallmadge, prepared by himself
at the request of his children_, New York, 1858. A portrait in his
later years, painted by E. Ames and engraved by G. Parker, is in the
_National Portrait Gallery_, Philadelphia, 1836, vol. iii.]
André was remounted and led under their combined guidance to the
quarters[980] of Colonel Jameson, who commanded some dragoons at
Northcastle. That officer recognized Arnold's handwriting in the
papers found on the prisoner, but he seems to have been bewildered
by the discovery, though it was afterwards urged that he thought
the transaction was a plot of "John Anderson", whoever he might be,
to implicate Arnold in some mischief. How far the prisoner himself
may have prompted Jameson is not known, for it was clear enough to
André that Arnold only could now extricate him from the gathering
toils. Accordingly, events took a promising turn for him when Jameson
dispatched the prisoner, under escort, to Arnold's headquarters, with
a letter which informed his superior of what was apparent enough, that
some dangerous papers had been found on Anderson, and that he had sent
them to Washington. Major Benjamin Tallmadge, one of his officers, who
was absent on a scout, returned before André had long been gone, and
learning the particulars from Jameson saw at once the blunder, and
persuaded Jameson to send a messenger to recall André and his escort.
Jameson did so, but insisted that the letter to Arnold should go on, as
it did.
The messenger with the papers sought to intercept Washington on the
lower road from Hartford, which the commander-in-chief was supposed
at that time to be traversing on his return from the interview with
Rochambeau.
The next morning André was sent, for better security, in the charge of
Tallmadge to Colonel Sheldon's quarters at New Salem. Here, getting
permission to walk in the door-yard in the custody of an officer named
King, André revealed his name and station, and being allowed pen and
paper, he made the same avowal in a letter to Washington, which, when
written, he handed to Tallmadge. Its contents confirmed that officer's
suspicion that the prisoner was a military man, for he had shown a
soldier's habit of turning on his heel as he paced his room.
Washington, returning by the upper road, had missed Jameson's
messenger, who, retracing his steps, passed through New Salem, where
he was entrusted also with the letter which André had just written,
and then went on towards the Robinson house, where Washington was then
supposed to be.
It was now the 25th, the very day when Rodney was to come up the river
with his flotilla, and Arnold sat at breakfast at this same Robinson
house,[981] not knowing what the day would develop. There were with him
Mrs. Arnold, who had not long before (Sept. 15) come from Philadelphia,
and two of Washington's aides, who had arrived a little in advance of
their chief.
It was two days earlier than Washington had been expected back, and
this was a serious perplexity in the mind of the conspirator. The
suspense was soon ended, for Jameson's messenger to him shortly
arrived, and the letter was put in Arnold's hands before the company.
He read it, showed, as was remembered afterwards, a little agitation,
but only a little, and in a few minutes left the table, saying that it
was necessary for him to go to West Point. It seemed natural enough
to his guests; but Mrs. Arnold observed his agitation more keenly,
and followed him to their chamber, where all was revealed to her. She
swooned; he kissed the infant lying there; descended the stairs;[982]
stopped an instant to say to the breakfast party that Mrs. Arnold
was not feeling well and would not come down again; mounted a horse
which he had already ordered; hurried down the steep road to the
river; entered his barge and seated himself in its prow; directed
his men to row to mid-stream; and then priming his pistols, which he
had taken from his holster, he ordered them to hurry down the river,
as he had to go with a flag to the "Vulture", and must hasten back
to meet Washington, who was shortly to reach his quarters. He tied a
white handkerchief to a cane, and waved it as he passed Livingston's
batteries at Verplanck's Point, and that officer recognizing the
barge allowed it to pass on. In a few minutes more he was under the
"Vulture's" guns, and then under her flag. His boatmen resisted his
offers of recompense for desertion, and were not allowed to return to
shore to spread the intelligence, which they now comprehended.[983]
[Illustration: WEST POINT.
Reproduced from the plan in Marbois' _Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry
Clinton_, Paris, 1816. A plate in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist_., 1879,
p. 756, showing the route of André, is a portion of a map among the
Simeon de Witt's maps (i. no. 66) in the library of the New York Hist.
Society, and was made by Robert Erskine, the topographical engineer
of the army, 1778-1780, and was for the whole length of it, from
Staten Island to Newburgh, engraved for the first time in Irving's
_Washington_, quarto ed., ii. 276.
There are other maps of the scene of the conspiracy and its attendant
events in Sparks's _Washington_, vii. 216; Guizot's Atlas to his
_Washington_; Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iv.; Carrington's
_Battles_, 512; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 148; and Boynton's _West
Point_, 104.]
Not long after Arnold left the Robinson house, Washington arrived,
and, learning that Arnold had gone to West Point, he passed over
unsuspicious to that post, where he was surprised not to find
Arnold.[984] While Washington was gone, Jameson's messenger with the
captured papers and André's letter arrived, and Hamilton, left behind
by Washington, opened them as his confidential aide.[985] As soon as
Washington's boat approached on his return from West Point, Hamilton
went towards the dock to meet his chief, whispered a word, and both
later entered the house and were closeted. The plot was revealed.
Hamilton was dispatched to Livingston to head off Arnold in his escape
if possible, but on reaching that officer's post it was found that
Arnold's boat had already passed. Before Hamilton was ready to set out
on his return, a flag from the "Vulture" brought ashore a letter from
Arnold, addressed to Washington, framed in lofty expressions of his own
rectitude, and avowing the innocence of Smith, of his own wife, and his
aides.[986] Before Hamilton's return, Washington had dined with his
officers without revealing the secret, but he shortly took Knox and
Lafayette into his confidence. There was naturally great uncertainty
as respects the extent of the conspiracy, and of what preparations
the enemy had made for an immediate onset. The anxiety of the moment
was soon evinced by the great activity of aides and orderlies. Word
was sent in every direction for arrangements to be made for any
emergency.[987]
André was brought to West Point, and Smith was arrested and held for
examination. Special precautions were taken to keep them apart and to
prevent escape. André was then conveyed down the river, still under
Tallmadge's care, to headquarters at Tappan, where he was closely
guarded in an old stone house, still standing.[988]
A board of general officers was at once summoned to consider the case
and recommend what action should be taken. The papers taken from André
were laid before them.[989] André himself was brought into their
presence, when he made a written statement, and answered questions.
He acknowledged everything, but said nothing to implicate others. He
affirmed that he did not consider himself under the protection of a
flag when he landed from the "Vulture." The report of the board was
that André was a spy, and merited the death of a spy. Washington
ordered the execution, and sent a record of the proceedings to Congress
and recommended its publication. Congress printed the record.[990]
Clinton was meanwhile informed of what had happened by the return of
the "Vulture" to New York, and wrote to Washington that Arnold's
flag and pass should save André from the character of a spy. Beverley
Robinson wrote to a similar purport, and so did Arnold; but the latter
added a threat of retaliation in case André was executed, which was not
calculated to further the purpose of André's friends, and it is rather
surprising they allowed the letter to proceed. Washington replied
in effect that a flag must be used in good faith to preserve its
character, and that the concealment of dress and papers was the action
of a spy.
Gen. Robertson was sent by Clinton to make further representations, and
Washington put off the execution till Greene could confer with that
general at an outpost. A repetition of the arguments on the British
side made no change in the aspects of the case; and when Robertson
quoted Arnold as saying André was under a flag, Greene told him they
believed André rather than Arnold. Robertson wrote again to Washington,
who had now definitely fixed mid-day of Oct. 2d for the execution.
Washington thought it also best to leave unanswered a note of André
requesting to be shot rather than hanged. Further letters, amplifying
the British arguments, were prepared,[991] but before they could be
sent to Washington word came that the execution had taken place.
During his confinement in Tappan, and after he became aware of his
fate, André conducted himself with a cheerful dignity that much
endeared him to the gentlemen who came in contact with him. His
servant had brought from New York fresh linen and his uniform, which
André put on with evident satisfaction. He practised his ready skill
in pen-and-ink drawing, and made several sketches, which he gave
to his attendants as souvenirs.[992] As his hour approached, he
said graciously to his escort, "I am ready", and went to the place
appointed, surrounded by guards and through a large concourse of
people. Of the general officers of the army at the post only the
commander-in-chief and staff were absent; and as the sad procession
passed headquarters the blinds were drawn, and no one was seen.
When the gibbet came in sight, André shrank a moment, but instantly
recovered, for he had nourished hopes that his request as to the manner
of his death would not be denied. He bandaged his eyes himself; lifted
the cloth a moment to say that he wished all to bear witness to the
firmness with which he met his death; and when the cart was withdrawn
died instantly.[993] When his uniform was removed and placed in his
servant's hands, the coffin which contained the body was buried near
the spot.
His remains were disinterred in 1821 and taken to England,[994] where
they were deposited in Westminster Abbey, beside the monument which
had been erected there to his memory shortly after his death.[995]
Many years after the removal, a rude boulder,[996] on which a simple
record was chiselled, was placed on the spot of his burial; but this
had disappeared when a few years since a plain monument, with an
inscription by Dean Stanley of the Abbey, was made to perpetuate the
record of his grave.[997]
[Illustration:
NOTE.—A reduced sketch is placed opposite from a plan by Villefranche,
made in 1780, and given in fac-simile in Boynton's _West Point_, p.
86. He also (p. 79) gives Villefranche's plan (1780) of Fort Arnold,
built 1778 on the eastern limits of West Point. On Villefranche see
_Ibid._, p. 160. Boynton also gives a long folding panoramic view of
West Point in 1780 from the eastern bank of the river, which shows the
batteries and camps on both banks. Cf. illustrated paper, by Lossing,
in _Scribner's Mag._, v. 4.]
Arnold received the price of his desertion,[998] was made a general
in the British service, and turned his sword, both in Connecticut
and Virginia, against his countrymen. Afterwards he went to England,
was treated with an enforced respect in some places, and scorned in
others.[999] He lived for a while in New Brunswick, but he never
escaped the torments which the presence of honorable men inflicted upon
him. His descendants live to-day in England and in Canada, and some of
them have attained high rank in the British army; and no one of them,
as far as known, has disgraced the good name of the old Rhode Island
family, whence Benedict Arnold descended.[1000]
The report of the court respecting André, with its appendix (already
referred to), and the trial of Smith were the first public sifting of
the evidence about the conspiracy. Smith was acquitted by the military
tribunal,[1001] and was then turned over to the civil authorities for
a further trial; but, succeeding in escaping in women's clothes, he
reached New York, and England, where several years later he published a
narrative, which it is not easy to reconcile with all his evidence in
his trial,—the supposition[1002] being that he was addressing injured
Americans in the one case and disappointed Britons in the other.[1003]
Marbois, the secretary of the French legation at Philadelphia at the
time, wrote a _Complot d'Arnold et Clinton_, which was not published
till 1816 at Paris. Sparks says, that what came under Marbois' personal
observation is valuable; but otherwise the book, as most students
think, should be used with caution.[1004]
The earliest comprehensive treatment of the subject—and it has hardly
been surpassed since—was in Sparks's _Life and Treason of Arnold_
(Boston), and he gives the principal documentary evidence in his
_Washington_, vol. vii. App.[1005]
The next special examination of the conspiracy was made in Winthrop
Sargent's[1006] _Life and Career of Major John André_ (Boston,
1861),—an excellent book.[1007]
In 1864 the story necessarily made a part of Edward C. Boynton's
_History of West Point_, who pointed out the military advantage of the
Highlands of the Hudson.[1008] Not long after this, Henry B. Dawson,
then editing the _Yonkers Gazette_, printed in its columns sixty-eight
contemporary documents or narratives, and these, subsequently printed
from the same type in book-form, constitute no. 1 of Dawson's
_Gazette Series_, under the title of _Papers concerning the capture
and detention of Major John André_ (1866). It is the most complete
gathering of authentic material which has been made.
The volume (x.) of Bancroft which contains his account of the
conspiracy appeared in 1875, and was constructed "by following
only contemporary documents, which are abundant and of the surest
character, and which, taken collectively, solve every question....
The reminiscences of men who wrote in later days are so mixed up with
errors of memory and fable that they offer no sure foothold."[1009]
The _Life of Arnold_, by Isaac N. Arnold, of Chicago, and the _Two
Spies_ of Benson J. Lossing, are the last considerable examinations of
the subject.[1010]
[Illustration]
The story of the culmination and collapse of the conspiracy is easily
told with the abundant testimony of those who were observers and
actors,—much of the record being made at the time, though some of it,
put upon paper at varying intervals later, may need to be scrutinized
closely, particularly as regards André's demeanor from the moment of
his arrest to his execution.[1011]
For the English side we must mainly depend on the letters and
statements of Clinton, which are elaborate, and may well be
supplemented by contemporary and later English historians.[1012]
As respects the justice of André's execution, the military authorities
were disagreed on the two sides at the time, and for a while the
alleged offence of Washington was considered in England a conspicuous
blot upon his character; but Lord Mahon has been the only prominent
instance of continued belief in this view among English writers, who
have generally conceded the right of the Americans to count André a
spy, however they might wish that Washington had been more clement.
The attractive manners and brilliant mental habit of André have
blinded even American writers to the atrocious nature of his mission,
and to the sinister purpose which a man of sensibility and elevated
character should never have grasped, even amid the license which a
state of war gives. The power to face death with a calm and graceful
courage may indeed be mated with the moral lightness that belongs to an
intellectual popinjay and a debased intriguer.[1013]