THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT.
BY EDWARD CHANNING,
_Instructor in History in Harvard College_.
IN the autumn of 1778 the British commander-in-chief, Sir Henry
Clinton, determined to attempt for the second time the subjugation of
the Southern colonies, and Savannah was selected as the first point of
attack. On November 27, 1778, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell,
with thirty-five hundred men of all arms, sailed from Sandy Hook, and
anchored off Tybee Entrance December 23d. Meantime a deserter from an
advance transport had given the Americans warning. Their commander was
General Robert Howe, a good but unsuccessful officer, who had not been
fortunate in securing the confidence of the authorities of Georgia.
Ascertaining these facts, Campbell pressed on without awaiting the
arrival of Brigadier-General Augustine Prevost with a reinforcement
from Florida. On the 28th, late in the afternoon, the British fleet
assembled in the Savannah River, off Giradeau's house on Brewton Hill,
which is about two miles from Savannah in a straight line, though
double that distance by road. A causeway, nearly half a mile in length,
ran from the river to the bluff through a rice-field which in ordinary
times could have been flooded, but over which the bluff was now
accessible from all points.
On the morning of the 29th the Highlanders carried the position with
trifling loss, when Campbell, advancing toward Savannah, found the
Americans most advantageously posted across the highroad. Through no
fault of Howe, his rear was attained, while he awaited an attack in
front. The Americans suffered a severe loss, and only a small part of
them succeeded in joining Lincoln beyond the Savannah River. Campbell
pushed up the Savannah, and in ten days the frontier of Georgia was
secured, and this was the condition when Prevost arrived and took
command.
Although Lincoln had arrived at Charleston on December 6th, he was not
able to reach Purisburgh before the 5th of January, 1779. His army,
composed almost entirely of militia, refused under him, as it had under
Howe, to be governed by the Continental rules of war.[1014]
At first it seemed to the enemy that the occupation of Georgia could be
easily maintained, but the neighboring militia rallied under Pickens,
and drove the British back. The American success, however, was brief,
for Colonel Prevost, a brother of the general, turned upon General
Ashe, who with a detachment from Lincoln's army was following the
British retreat. The Americans were surprised and suffered a defeat,
which cost Lincoln one third of his army and restored to Prevost his
superiority in Georgia.[1015]
The scale again turned. Lincoln, reinforced, once more severed the
British communications with the up-country Tories, when Prevost, to
disconcert his adversary, at first sought to get between him and
Charleston, and then suddenly advanced on the city itself. Here
Moultrie, who had been watching the British advance, threw up some
defences. Negotiations for a surrender followed, and Governor Rutledge,
who was in the town, even proposed a scheme of neutrality for the State
during the war, to which Prevost would not listen. The British now
intercepted a messenger from Lincoln, and finding that general closing
in upon him, Prevost suddenly decamped and marched toward Savannah.
The summer was uneventful; but in the early autumn D'Estaing, who
after leaving Newport had been cruising with some success in the West
Indies, now turned northerly, and on September 3 (1779) his advance
ships arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River. A landing, however,
was not effected until the 12th, when the troops landed at Beaulieu, on
Ossabaw Sound, fourteen to sixteen miles from Savannah. They did not
reach that town until the 16th, so that Prevost had time to call in
his scattered detachments, and all but those from Beaufort had arrived
when, on the evening of that day, D'Estaing, in the name of the king of
France, summoned him to surrender. A correspondence followed, which was
prolonged till the defences were strengthened and Maitland got up from
Beaufort with eight hundred men, when Prevost refused to surrender.
D'Estaing had been all the more willing to grant the truce as Lincoln,
who was looked for from Charleston, had not arrived on the 16th. By
the 23d a considerable part of the Americans had joined the French,
and siege operations were begun. Guns were brought up from the French
ships and trenches pushed to within three hundred yards of the besieged
lines. On September 24th a sortie was made by the garrison for the
purpose of developing the strength of the besiegers. The sortie was
repulsed with ease, but the French, following the assailants back to
their lines, were exposed to a murderous fire, and incurred a heavy
loss in killed and wounded. The bombardment was then begun with vigor,
but with little effect. At last, on October 8th, D'Estaing declared
that he could not keep his vessels longer exposed to the Atlantic
gales. An assault was determined on. In the night the sergeant-major of
one of the Charleston militia regiments deserted to the enemy and gave
full information of the intended movement, and further declared that
the attack on the British left would be only a feint, the real attack
being directed against the Spring Hill redoubt, on the right.[1016]
The assault took place, and failed as much by a lack of coöperation
between the columns as by the treachery. This disaster so dispirited
the allies that Lincoln crossed the river on the 19th, and when he was
safe on the other side the French withdrew to their ships and sailed
away,—their last frigate leaving the river on the 2d of November.
[Illustration: VIEW OF CHARLESTOWN, S. C.
Sketched from a marginal view on a chart of _The Harbour of
Charlestown, from the surveys of Sir Jas. Wallace, Captain in his
Majesty's navy and others_, published in London by Des Barres, Nov. 1,
1777, and making part of the _Atlantic Neptune_. Cf. _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._ (1883), p. 830. _The Catal. of the king's maps_ (Brit. Mus.)
shows an engraved view of 1739, and other early views are noted in
Vol. V., p. 331. There is a view by Leitch, in 1776. In a paper, "Up
the Ashley and Cooper", by C. F. Woolson, in _Harper's Magazine_, lii.
p. 1, there is a view of Drayton house, occupied by Cornwallis as
headquarters.—ED.]
[Illustration: GENERAL MOULTRIE'S ORDER, MARCH 25, 1780.
From the Commodore Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.—ED.]
The sailing of the French left the coast again exposed, and Clinton,
coming from New York, now prepared to attack Charleston. On the 11th
of February, 1780, a landing was made on Simmons' Island, just to the
north of the North Edisto River. Thence by John's Island, Stono Ferry,
Wappoo Cut and River, the Ashley was reached, and a lodgment was
effected on the neck of land at the seaward end of which Charleston
stands. Clinton advanced with caution. On the 1st of April the first
parallel was opened about eight hundred yards from the American works.
[Illustration: From the Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.]
On the 21st of March the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Mariot
Arbuthnot in person, had crossed the bar unopposed. Some time was spent
in taking on board their provisions and guns. Then on the afternoon of
the 7th, 8th, or 9th of April—for there is a hopeless confusion as
to the exact date—in the midst of a furious thunder-shower the fleet
ran by Fort Moultrie without material damage, except to the store-ship
"Eolus", which was abandoned. The greater portion of the garrison of
Moultrie, commanded by Colonel C. C. Pinckney, was then withdrawn,—the
feeble remnant surrendering on the 6th of May, with scarcely a show of
resistance.
On the 8th of April guns were mounted in battery in the first British
parallel. On the 11th, Lincoln having refused to surrender, fire was
opened. The second parallel was completed on the 19th, bringing the
British to within four hundred and fifty yards of the opposing line.
[Illustration:
After a picture by Col. Sargent, owned by the Mass. Hist. Society
(_Proc._, Jan., 1807, vol. i. p. 192; _Catal. Cabinet_, no. 13). A copy
by Herring was engraved by T. Illman. Cf. Jones's _Georgia_, vol. ii.
(bust only); Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iii.; _Harper's
Mag._, lxiii. 341. A rude contemporary copperplate print, by Norman,
appeared in the Boston ed. of _An Impartial Hist. of the War_ (1784),
vol. iii. 64.—ED.]
On the morning of the 13th Tarleton and Ferguson, by a sudden push,
dispersed the force at Monk's Corner, which had guarded Lincoln's
supplies. On the 18th a reinforcement of three thousand men arrived
from New York, and enabled Clinton to complete the investment of
the town, the command on the eastern side of the Cooper being
given to Cornwallis. There was during the next few days a sortie,
some desultory fighting, and an unsuccessful correspondence for a
surrender. On May 8th the third parallel was completed, bringing the
besiegers to within forty yards of the works, while the canal in
front of the lines was partly drained and the batteries were ready
to open fire. Clinton again summoned the garrison, but again Lincoln
declined to surrender,—this time because Clinton refused to regard the
citizens as anything but prisoners on parole. On the 11th the British
reached the ditch and advanced to within twenty-five yards of the
works. Resistance was no longer to be thought of, especially as the
citizens themselves now petitioned to have the terms offered by Clinton
accepted. The articles were accordingly drawn up and signed on the
12th, and the English took possession.
[Illustration: CORNWALLIS.
From Andrews' _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. ii. There is an
engraving after an original drawing by T. Prattent in the _European
Mag._, Aug., 1786. There are engravings of him later in life in Lee's
_Memoir of the War in the Southern Department_ (Philadelphia, 1872),
vol. ii., and in the _Cornwallis Correspondence_. Cf. _Harper's Mag._,
lxiii. p. 325; Irving's _Washington_, ii. 282; Boyle's _Official
Baronage_, i. 459. Reynolds painted him in 1780, having already painted
him in 1761. The former picture was engraved by Chas. Knight in 1780.
Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 19, 169. There is a
mezzotint by D. Gardiner. Cf. John C. Smith's _Brit. Mez. Port._, ii.
745; and in _Ibid._, iv. 1,444, an engraving by Ward after a picture by
Buckley is noted. There is a contemporary account of Cornwallis in the
_Polit. Mag._, ii. 450.—ED.]
On that day the Continentals to the number of perhaps fifteen
hundred—there were about five hundred in the hospital at the
time—marched out, with colors cased and drums beating the "Turk's
March", and laid down their arms. By regarding every adult capable of
bearing arms as a militiaman, Clinton reckoned his prisoners at five
thousand. Lincoln has been severely censured for this defence, but
if the Carolinians had rallied as expected, he might have held out
until the heats of the summer and the arrival of De Ternay would have
compelled Clinton's retirement.
Clinton now sent out three expeditions to the up-country, the most
important of which was destined to secure the region north of the
Santee and Wateree.[1017] Cornwallis, commanding this expedition,
detached Tarleton against Buford, who had with him the remnants of the
American cavalry and some Continentals from Virginia. Tarleton overtook
him at Waxhaw Creek on the 29th of May. Of the five hundred Americans
who entered the fight, one hundred and thirteen were killed, while
one hundred and fifty were wounded. The slaughter was vindictive, and
"Tarleton's Quarters" will never be forgotten in the upper regions of
South Carolina.
Clinton and Arbuthnot, judging their conquest of the province
permanent, now proclaimed as rebels all who refused the oath of
allegiance, and then sailed for New York, leaving Cornwallis in
command.
[Illustration: CORNWALLIS.
From the _London Mag._, June, 1781 (p. 251).—ED.]
The new commander's proclamations, following upon those of Clinton and
Arbuthnot, were enough at variance with them to create discontent among
those inclined toward the British side. The spirits of the patriots
began to revive, especially in the back regions, where Colonels Locke
and Williams and Generals Rutherford and Sumter gathered strong bands
around their standards. The fights at Ramsour Mills, Rocky Mount,
Hanging Rock, and Musgrove Mills, which these partisans conducted,
were in the main successful, but all were lost to sight in the great
disaster which soon overtook the American arms near Camden.
Early in the spring of 1780, it had been decided to send a
reinforcement under De Kalb to Lincoln, at Charleston. With about
fourteen hundred men of the Maryland and Delaware lines, that general
left Morristown on the 16th of April, 1780, and on the 1st of June, in
Petersburg, he learned of the fall of Charleston. He decided to push on
with the utmost speed, in the hope that his coming might still save the
interior of the State. But delay after delay occurred, and De Kalb did
not reach the Deep River before the 6th of July, when he found nothing
prepared for his reception; and what was still more inexcusable, the
North Carolina militia, under Caswell, were holding aloof. On the 25th
a new commander of the Southern armies arrived in Horatio Gates, the
popular hero of Saratoga. His appointment had been made by Congress
against the wishes of Washington, but in obedience to a general popular
consent. De Kalb received Gates with genuine pleasure, and took his
place at the head of the regulars, then forming the whole army.
Against the advice of his ablest officer, Otho H. Williams, Gates
determined to join the North Carolinians in their camp near Lynch's
Creek, since they would not join him, and with them he hoped to seize
Camden. Two days after his arrival, on July 27th, the march began, and
after the most acute suffering from hunger the regulars joined the
militia. So lax was the discipline among Caswell's men, that Williams
and a party of officers rode through their lines and camp without being
once challenged. Approaching the general's tent, they were informed
that it was an unseasonable hour for gentlemen to call. Yet Caswell
was within striking distance of a disciplined army, commanded by an
enterprising general, Lord Rawdon. Marching a little farther, the
British were found in a strong position on the southern bank of Little
Lynch's Creek.
[Illustration: HORATIO GATES.
From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (London, 1783).—ED.]
By a march up the creek, Gates might have placed his superior force on
Rawdon's flank and rear. This was what Rawdon feared, and what De Kalb
is said to have advised. Instead he passed two days in idleness, and
then, inclining to the right, marched to Clermont or Rugeley's Mill,
on the road from Charlotte to Camden, and not more than thirteen miles
from the latter. There, seven hundred militia from Virginia joined
him. From that place, too, he sent four hundred men, including some
regulars, to assist Sumter in a contemplated attack on the enemy's
communications. It was now determined to seek a more defensible
position on the banks of a creek seven miles nearer Camden. This
position could be turned only by marching a considerable distance
either up or down the creek. Exactly what Gates had in view by this
movement can not now be ascertained.[1018]
Cornwallis arrived at the front on the morning of August 14th, and
decided to surprise Gates; but the two armies started on respective
marches at precisely the same hour, ten o'clock of the evening of
August 15, 1780. Their advanced guards met at about half past two the
next morning. Armand, a French adventurer, with his "legion" forming
the American van, retired panic-stricken, and the two armies deployed
across the road. The position in which the opposing generals now found
themselves was singularly favorable to the smaller numbers of the
British, as the front was necessarily very short, owing to a marsh
which protected while limiting either flank. This advantage Cornwallis
was not slow to perceive. A hurried council was held on the American
side, and it was decided that there was no alternative but to fight. At
dawn the enemy was observed getting into position on the extreme left.
Stevens, with the Virginia militia, already in line, was ordered to
charge before the enemy's formation was complete. It so happened that
Cornwallis, thinking the Virginians were making some change in their
dispositions, ordered his right forward. Led by the gallant Webster,
the British came on with such a rush that the men of Virginia threw
down their loaded guns with bayonets set, broke and dispersed to the
rear. Nor did the North Carolinians do better. Seeing the Virginians
break, they did not await the onset, but threw away their arms and
fled. One regiment indeed, inspired by the example of the regulars,
fired several rounds before it broke. Deserted by those whom they had
marched so many weary miles to succor, the men of Maryland and Delaware
fought till to fight longer was criminal. Then the under-officers,
on their own responsibility, brought off all they could, for their
commander, De Kalb, overwhelmed by eleven wounds, had fallen into
the hands of the enemy,—"a fate", says Williams, "which probably
was avoided by other generals only by an opportune retreat." That
night Gates found himself at Charlotte, sixty miles from the scene of
conflict. Caswell was with him, and they were soon joined by Smallwood
and Gist. In fact, excepting the one order issued to the Virginians at
the outset, the leaders seem to have left the conduct of the fight to
De Kalb and the subordinate officers. From Charlotte Gates retired to
Hillsborough, where the legislature was then sitting.
Cornwallis seems to have been satisfied with the havoc wrought on
the field of battle, for he pursued without vigor, and soon returned
to Camden and gave his attention to Sumter. That enterprising but
negligent chieftain had captured the redoubt at the ferry over the
Wateree, and had ensnared a convoy destined for Cornwallis. On the
night of the 17th, hearing of Gates's overthrow, Sumter left his camp,
and moved with such celerity that a corps which Cornwallis sent
against him failed to strike him. Shortly after, Tarleton found him
less vigilant, and came upon him so unexpectedly that resistance was
hardly attempted, and Sumter escaped with scarcely half his force.
Gates has been severely blamed for this defeat; too severely, it seems
to me. The march of the regulars from Buffalo Ford to Lynch's Creek was
undoubtedly full of hardship, but it was well planned and executed. Nor
do the troops who made it seem to have been demoralized by it. On the
contrary, seldom have men fought more gallantly than De Kalb's division
fought on the morning of August 16, 1780. The Virginians, whose flight
made defeat probable, followed the Continentals in the march across the
"desert", and did not suffer nearly as much as the leading division.
The North Carolina militia, whose panic turned a probable defeat into
a rout, had no part whatever in that painful march. The disaster was
due to the over-confidence which Gates felt in his men. Had the militia
stood firm, the event of the campaign might have been different.
There was no defect in Gates as a strategist or tactician. He had a
larger number of men in line than his opponent. His dispositions were
as perfect as the time and place permitted. The defeat Was "brought
on", to use the emphatic words of Stevens, the gallant leader of the
Virginians, "by the damned cowardly behavior of the militia."
From Camden Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte, overcoming all obstacles
which the militia under Davie interposed. Other militia, meanwhile,
under Clarke, advanced on Augusta, but British reinforcements from
Ninety-Six, under Cruger, forced Clarke to abandon the attack, and,
burdened with the families of some leading Whigs, he retired towards
the mountains. Cornwallis, hearing of this, ordered Ferguson, who
had been beating up recruits in the upper country, to endeavor to
cut Clarke off. Now it happened that at this very time the sturdy
frontiersmen, under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Colonel
Isaac Shelby, Lieutenant-Colonel John Sevier, and Colonel Charles
McDowell, had assembled at Watauga, bent on the destruction of Ferguson
and his little army.[1019] To the number of one thousand and forty
they left their place of meeting on September 26th and marched for
Gilberton, where Ferguson was supposed to be. On the 30th they were
joined by Colonel Cleveland, with three hundred and fifty men from
North Carolina. The senior officer was McDowell, but from his slowness
he was not deemed the best man to conduct such an arduous enterprise,
and while he was sent to Gates to name a leader they chose Campbell
for their chief. Pressing on, they reached the Cowpens, where they
were joined by Williams and Lacy, with about four hundred men from the
Carolinas.
Meantime Ferguson, not ignorant of the approach of this formidable
force, which appeared to have sprung from the earth, had begun his
retreat towards Charlotte. Anxious to intercept Clarke, he had delayed
his march longer than was prudent, and had taken post on the top of
a spur of King's Mountain, where he probably hoped to be reinforced
before the enemy should come up with him. While at the Cowpens, on
October 6th, the Americans received certain information of Ferguson's
position. They resolved to select the best mounted of their little
army, and, leaving the poorly mounted and the footmen to follow, to go
in pursuit of Ferguson and fight him wherever found. In the evening,
therefore, they broke up from the Cowpens, and, marching all night,
reached, without being discovered, the foot of King's Mountain on
the afternoon of the next day. The spot on which the British were
found was singularly well suited to the mode of fighting in which the
backwoodsmen were adepts. King's Mountain proper is sixteen miles long,
and in some places is high and steep. The southern end, however, where
Ferguson was encamped, rises only about sixty feet. It was wooded,
except on the summit, which partook of the nature of a plateau. The
Americans, under their respective leaders, so timed their movements
that Ferguson was surrounded almost before he knew it. The band led
by Campbell seems to have made the first attack from the south. It
was speedily driven back at the point of the bayonet, but re-formed
at the foot of the hill and returned to the charge. Meantime Shelby
was pressing on from the north. He, too, was driven back, when,
re-forming his men, he also returned to the fight. These charges and
countercharges were three times repeated. Cleveland, Sevier, and the
rest did their work splendidly in their respective positions. The
British, inspired by the example of their heroic leader, fought bravely
and well; but their position was so perilous that their loss was double
that of the assailants. Ferguson, while leading a charge, or perhaps
while endeavoring to cut his way out, was killed. De Peyster, the
second in command, showed the white flag, as was his duty, resistance
being useless, but the firing did not cease for some time, even though
the beaten Tories were suing for quarter. At that moment an attack
was made from the rear by another band of British, who were probably
returning from a foraging expedition. This new and sudden attack led to
a renewal of the slaughter of the unresisting foe on the hill.
The neighborhood was bare of provisions, and the next morning the
now half famished victors, with their no less hungry prisoners, made
a hurried retreat towards the mountains. On the 13th the Americans
arrived at a place then called Bickerstaff's Old Fields, about nine
miles from the present hamlet of Rutherfordton. There they improvised a
court, and sentenced thirty to forty of their prisoners to death. But
after nine had been hanged, the remainder were reprieved or pardoned.
Such was the famous battle of King's Mountain in South Carolina. It
changed to a great extent the whole course of the war in the Southern
department, as it deprived Cornwallis of the only corps that he could
afford to hazard for a long time out of supporting distance. As for
Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the disaster, instead of sending
Tarleton in pursuit, he broke up from Charlotte, and retired as fast
as he could to Wynnesborough, in South Carolina, midway between Camden
and Ninety-Six, where he would be within supporting distance of either
in case they were attacked. He was followed by Gates, who encamped at
Charlotte, his light parties advancing even to Rugeley's.
Not long after his arrival at Wynnesborough, Cornwallis detached
Tarleton, with a portion of the Legion, to disperse the band with
which Marion awed the country between the Santee and Pedee rivers.
Tarleton had now to deal with a soldier both bold and discreet. All his
artifices were unavailing to entrap Marion, and he was recalled to go
in pursuit of Sumter, who had encamped at Fishdam Ford, not far from
the British headquarters. Meanwhile, Major Wemyss had attacked Sumter
just before daybreak on the morning of November 11th. He approached
the camp unchallenged at first, but he soon encountered a picket,
which fired five shots before retiring. Two shots disabled Wemyss. His
second in command, continuing the attack without a proper knowledge of
the ground, was repulsed. Sumter, hearing of the approach of Tarleton,
prudently withdrew from such a dangerous neighborhood, and had reached
the ford of the Tyger, near Blackstocks, when Tarleton appeared. Unable
to cross, he drew up his men on the side of a hill. Tarleton, rashly
attacking with his advance, was beaten off with great loss. The British
leader withdrew to his main body, and prepared to storm the hill the
following morning; but in the night Sumter crossed the river, and once
over his men dispersed in every direction. The American loss at these
two actions was small, though a wound received at the Blackstocks kept
Sumter from the field for several months.
From this time on the war in the Southern department assumed a new and
brighter aspect, for on December 2, 1780, less than a month after the
affair at the Blackstocks, Nathanael Greene arrived at Charlotte, and
took command of the remnants of the gallant Continentals who had fought
so splendidly at Camden. He was respectfully received by Gates, who
retired to his Virginia farm.[1020]
The task that Greene had before him might well have appalled the
boldest. Without food, without money or credit, almost without an army,
he was expected to face the most enterprising commanders—Cornwallis,
Rawdon, and Tarleton—that the British had on this continent, while
they were at the head of a large and well-appointed army. But Greene
was not the man to be easily disheartened. With the possible exception
of Washington, the best soldier of high rank in the American army, he
resembled his chief in being a careful observer of men. His judgment,
too, with regard to all matters connected with war was excellent, and
has seldom been surpassed. As a strategist he had no equal in the
opposing army, while he possessed the rare power of being able to
adapt his tactics to the army and to the country, although it has been
claimed that credit has been given him for what really was the product
of another mind.
Gates handed over to his successor an army which numbered on paper
twenty-three hundred and seven men, including nine hundred and
forty-nine Continentals. But so many were insufficiently clad and
equipped that, to use the new commander's own words, "not more than
eight hundred were present and fit for duty." Food was scarce, and the
_morale_ of the army was low. Greene sought a new camp on the eastern
bank of the Pedee, opposite Cheraw Hill, where food was more abundant.
There he subjected his men to a discipline to which they had long
been strangers, while Morgan, with a strong detachment, threatened
Cornwallis's other flank.
Morgan took with him four hundred of the Maryland line, under
Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Howard, two companies of Virginia militia, and
about one hundred dragoons led by William Washington. To these were
afterwards added more than five hundred militia from the Carolinas.
Morgan advanced to Grindall's Ford on the Pacolet, near its confluence
with Broad River. In this position he seriously menaced Ninety-Six and
even Augusta itself. Cornwallis needed to dislodge him before he could
advance far in his projected invasion of North Carolina. He therefore
detached Tarleton, with his Legion and a strong infantry support,
against Morgan, while he himself advanced with the main body along the
upper road to North Carolina, thus placing himself on Morgan's line
of retreat whenever that commander should be driven back. Learning of
these movements, Morgan retired from Grindall's Ford, and moving with
commendable speed on the night of January 16, 1781, encamped at the
Cowpens. Tarleton was now close upon him, and, marching the greater
part of the night, he discovered the Americans drawn up in line of
battle on the morning of the 17th. The position which Morgan had chosen
was in many respects a weak one. The country was well fitted for the
use of cavalry, in which the British excelled, while the Broad River,
flowing parallel to his rear, made retreat difficult if not impossible.
Nor were the flanks protected in any manner.[1021] Hardly waiting
for his line to be formed, and with his reserve too far in the rear,
Tarleton dashed forward.[1022] A militia skirmish line was easily
brushed aside, and the main body of militia, after firing a few rounds
with terrible precision, also retreated. The Continentals, however,
under their gallant leader, stood firm. But Howard's flank soon became
enveloped. He ordered his flank company to change its front. Mistaking
the order, the company fell back, and the whole line was ordered to
retire upon the cavalry. The British, who had been joined by the
reserve, thinking that the Americans were retreating, came on like a
mob. Seeing this, Howard ordered the 1st Maryland to face about. They
obeyed, and poured such an unexpected and murderous fire into the
advancing foe that the British line paused, became panic-stricken,
turned, and fled. In vain did Tarleton call upon his dragoons for
a charge. His order was either not delivered or was misunderstood.
Colonel Washington, on the other hand, advanced with a rush, and the
day was won. Almost to a man the British infantry was either killed
or captured. But they had fought well, and their loss, especially in
officers, bears testimony to their splendid conduct on the field.[1023]
King's Mountain lost to Cornwallis his best corps of scouts. This
disaster deprived him of his light infantry, whose presence during the
forced marches now to come would have been of incalculable service. For
this reason the affair at the Cowpens, while in reality only a fight
between two small bodies of troops, in importance of results deserves
to be ranked among the most important conflicts of the war. It was
indeed, as has so often been said, "the Bennington of the South."
Cornwallis, when he had detached Tarleton to the defence of Ninety-Six,
and later, when he had ordered him to push Morgan to the utmost, had
expected to be able to get on Morgan's line of retreat, and thus drive
him into the mountains, or at least prevent his rejoining Greene. But
with Greene on his flank at the Cheraws, he had been afraid to move
far from Camden before Leslie with the reinforcements could get out
of Greene's reach. He was, therefore, no further advanced than Turkey
Creek, twenty-five miles away, when the news of the disaster at the
Cowpens reached him. On the 18th, Leslie, with two battalions of the
Guards under O'Hara and the Hessian regiment of Bose, arrived. On the
19th the pursuit was begun, and on the 24th Cornwallis reached the
crossing of the Little Catawba at Ramsour's Mill, only to learn that
Morgan had crossed at the same place two days before. In fact, that
enterprising leader, instead of being dazzled by the victory at the
Cowpens, passed the Broad River on the evening of the day of action,
and, pursuing his route toward the mountains, passed Ramsour's Mill on
the 21st. With the bulk of his detachment he then sought a junction
with the main body under Greene. Turning to the east, he crossed the
Catawba at Sherrald's Ford on the 23d, and took post on the eastern
bank. At this place he finally rid himself of his prisoners, sending
them to Virginia under an escort of militia.
There can be little doubt of the chagrin Cornwallis experienced at
the escape of Morgan. It prompted him to destroy what he thought
was useless baggage, and to make another attempt to overtake the
Americans. This burning of his train occupied two days, and, necessary
as it may have seemed, the consequent lack of supplies led to the
fearful suffering of his army after Guilford, and made his retreat to
Wilmington a necessity. It was his first grave error in his struggle
with Greene. On the 27th he put his troops in motion for the Catawba,
but before he reached the fords a sudden rise of the river made the
crossing an impossibility, and gave Morgan two days' respite. The delay
was still more important in giving Greene time to reach the post of
danger and take command of the detachment. The news of the victory
at Cowpens had not reached the camp at the Cheraws until the 25th.
Instantly divining the course that Cornwallis would pursue, Greene sent
an express to Lee, who, as soon as he had joined, had been dispatched
to coöperate with Marion in an attack on Georgetown, next to Charleston
then the most important seaport in South Carolina. The attack failed
for some reason that is not quite apparent; but Lee brought off
his troops in safety, and rejoined Greene in time to render most
important service. On the 29th, the main army, under command of General
Huger, left the camp for Salisbury, where Greene hoped to be able to
concentrate his entire force. On the 31st the Catawba began to subside.
Putting their troops in motion, Greene and Morgan directed their steps
toward Salisbury, where they arrived on February 2d. The Yadkin was
crossed in safety the next day, though rising rapidly all the time;
then sending orders to Huger to join him at Guilford Court-House, and
not at Salisbury as formerly ordered, Greene once more breathed freely.
On the afternoon of the 1st, Cornwallis had also put his troops in
motion. His design was to make a feint of crossing at Beattie's Ford
while with the Guards he should pass the river at the less known
Cowan's Ford. By some means, Davidson, who commanded the militia in
that region, became cognizant of the design, and stationed himself
at Cowan's with about four hundred men, where he expected to hold
Cornwallis in check long enough to be of real service to the retiring
Americans.
Shortly before daybreak Cornwallis reached the river, and saw the
watch-fires on the opposite bank. Without a moment's hesitation the
Guards rushed into the rapid stream. When about halfway across they
were discovered, and a fire was opened upon them by the militia. But
now occurred one of those accidents that so often in war defeat the
best-laid plans. The ford, turning in mid-stream at an angle with
the direct line, ran under a bank where the militia were waiting for
the British; but when they arrived at the turning-point, instead of
inclining to the right, the Guards—their guide having deserted through
fear—kept straight on, and gained the bank with a loss of only sixty
in killed, wounded, and missing. The militia retired, and although
Tarleton was sent after them, they made good their retreat with a loss
which would have been trifling but for a mortal wound under which the
gallant Davidson fell. There were many hair-breadth escapes during this
splendid charge. Cornwallis's horse was shot under him, but reached the
bank before he fell. Leslie was carried down stream, and O'Hara's horse
rolled over with his rider while in the water.
Pushing on with all speed possible in the wretched condition of the
roads, Cornwallis's van, under O'Hara, reached the Yadkin at the
Trading Ford a few hours after the Americans had crossed; but O'Hara,
though he missed the soldiers, captured a train of wagons belonging to
the country people who were flying with the army. Here again the forces
of nature came to the assistance of the Americans, for the Yadkin
rose so rapidly that it could not be forded, and Greene had carefully
secured all the boats on the eastern bank.
Cornwallis now gave up all idea of preventing the union of the two
wings of the opposing army, which, indeed, was effected soon after at
Martinsville, near Guilford. The British commander decided to place
himself between his opponents and the fords of the Dan, hoping thereby
to prevent the Americans taking refuge in Virginia. Accordingly, on the
7th he crossed the Yadkin at the Shallow Ford. It was now a serious
question with Greene to escape the new danger. The militia failing to
come to his aid, he was obliged to protect his Continentals by a flight
into Virginia. He determined to cross the Dan at Irwin's Ferry, and
sent orders to have boats ready at that point. On the 10th the march
was renewed. The light troops, united in one division, were placed
under the command of O. H. Williams, with orders to delay the enemy as
much as possible. By rapid marching the main army reached Irwin's Ferry
and crossed on the 13th and 14th, before Williams and the rear-guard
came in sight. The experience of this light division has been well
told by Lee, whose Legion first measured sabres with Tarleton's men on
the 12th. From that time the rear of the Americans and the advance of
O'Hara were almost constantly in sight of each other. At every crossing
or other suitable place Williams would draw his men out and thus compel
the British to deploy; then, his object being accomplished, and the
British delayed for a few minutes, the march would be resumed, and the
two armies would soon be marching as one again. Cornwallis, conscious
finally that his prey had escaped, turned back to Hillsborough, and,
erecting the Royal Standard, called upon all loyal North Carolinians to
rally to the aid of their royal master.
On the 18th, only four days after his escape, recruits had come in so
rapidly that Greene detached Lee across the Dan to seek information,
and to show the Tories that the Americans were by no means beaten. Lee
had, in addition to his legion, two companies of the Maryland line.
He was joined on the southern side of the river by Pickens with a
considerable body of Carolina militia.
On the 23d Greene himself crossed the Dan with the main army, and
sought the difficult country on the head-waters of the Haw, as the
Cape Fear River is called in its upper course. Here again, as during
the retreat, the light troops were put into the hands of Williams. The
two divisions manœuvred with such precision that Cornwallis was held
at arm's length, while militia and Continentals came into the American
camp from all directions. The American commander saw that the time had
now come to give way no more. He stationed himself on a hillside near
Guilford, and awaited the approach of the British. The position which
had attracted his attention during the retreat possessed a combination
of rising ground, cleared spaces, and woods which could hardly be
surpassed for the irregular formation that Greene, following the
example set by Morgan at the Cowpens, deemed best suited to his troops.
To Cornwallis, the presence of Greene had been most disastrous.
Strategy had failed to annihilate his opponent, and the offered battle,
even on ground of the American general's own selection, was welcome to
the British commander; and on the morning of the 15th of March, 1781,
the trial came.
In his front line Greene put the North Carolina militia, their flanks
resting in the woods, the centre being protected in some measure by
a rail fence. Three hundred yards behind were posted the Virginia
militia under Stevens and Lawson. Though militia in name, some of those
under Stevens were veterans in reality. But, taught by his bitter
experience at Camden, Stevens posted riflemen behind his line, with
orders to shoot any who should run. The Virginians were entirely in
the woods. Three to four hundred yards behind them, on the brow of a
declivity, with open fields in their front, were the regulars. On the
right was the Virginia brigade under Huger. Then, after an interval for
the artillery under Singleton, came the Maryland brigade, commanded
by Williams. The first regiment was led by Gunby, with Howard as
lieutenant-colonel. This was the regiment which had aroused universal
admiration by its splendid conduct at Camden and its wonderful
subordination at the Cowpens, when a gallant charge converted a bloody
check into a crushing disaster. The second Maryland regiment, commanded
by Ford, was new to the service. It held the extreme left of the line.
The regulars presented a convex front. Lee with the "Legion" and
Campbell's riflemen from the backwoods acted as a corps of observation
on the left, while Washington, with the regular cavalry and the
remnant of the Delaware regiment under the heroic Kirkwood and Lynch's
riflemen, protected the right flank.
As soon as Cornwallis found himself in the presence of his enemy, he
deployed without reserves, except the British dragoons under Tarleton.
The "Hessian" regiment of Bose and the 71st under Leslie, with the
1st battalion of the Guards in support, held the right; next came the
23d and 33d regiments under Webster, with the Grenadiers and the 2d
battalion of the Guards under O'Hara in support; while the extreme
left was occupied by the light infantry of the Guards and the Jägers.
The artillery was on the road with Tarleton. As the line moved forward
it first encountered the North Carolinians, who fired a volley, and
perhaps more, before they broke. On the extreme right, however, Lee
with his light troops held the regiment of Bose and the 1st battalion
of the Guards in check. But the defection of the North Carolinians
separated him from the rest of the army. The first line being broken,
Webster rushed upon the Virginians. But the woods were so thick, and
the defence of the Virginians so stout, that his loss at this point was
very considerable. At length, Stevens having been wounded in the thigh,
the Virginians retired and Webster advanced upon the Continentals. On
his right was Leslie with the 71st. When the advancing line reached the
front of the 1st Maryland, it was received with such a murderous fire
that it stopped. The Marylanders then advanced with the bayonet, and
the British gave way and retreated. It has been said by writers on both
sides, that had Greene thrown forward another regiment at this moment
the day would have been won. But this is by no means certain, as the
events of the next few minutes were to show. For Leslie with the 71st
and O'Hara with the Guards now came up and assailed the 2d Maryland
with such fierceness that it broke and fled. But the 1st Maryland was
not far off. Wheeling into line, it opposed the Guards until Washington
charged and broke the British line. J. E. Howard—now in command, Gunby
having been dismounted—then followed with the bayonet, and pressed
the enemy so hard that re-formation was for the moment impossible.
Cornwallis, seeing that the flight must be stopped at all hazards,
ordered his artillery—posted on an eminence in the centre of the
field—to open on the Marylanders through the ranks of his own men.
In this way the pursuit was checked, though at terrible loss to the
British.
Greene's hopes were soon dashed. The shattered lines of the enemy
re-formed and returned to the conflict. Pressing heavily on the
Virginia regulars, and reinforced by the 1st battalion of the Guards,
which had disengaged itself from Lee, the whole American line was
endangered. Greene, who wished to run no chances, and who probably
did not know that Lee had once more connected himself with the main
line, ordered a retreat. The artillery, the horses having been killed,
was left on the ground, but otherwise the withdrawal was easily and
skilfully effected.
Such was the battle of Guilford. Numerically, Greene was superior;
but of good troops he had only a handful. When the two leaders summed
up their losses, it became evident that a decisive blow had been
struck at Cornwallis. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and
one hundred and eighty-four wounded, together with one thousand and
forty-six missing. Of these last some may have been wounded, but by
far the greater part were militiamen, who had returned to their homes.
Cornwallis reported his own loss at ninety-three killed, and four
hundred and thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing—a most serious
diminution of his force.
Cornwallis in his proclamation and letters maintained, however, that
he had achieved a great triumph. It was his despatch to Germain which
occasioned the well-known assertion of Charles James Fox that "another
such victory would destroy the British army." Even before the fight it
had been almost a necessity to open communications with the sea, as
the army was suffering for want of the stores that had been destroyed
at Ramsour's Mill. Believing the Cape Fear River navigable as far as
Cross Creek, Cornwallis had sent Major Craig to seize Wilmington and to
open navigation as far as possible, which he succeeded in doing to a
point at a short distance above Wilmington. Leaving his wounded at the
New Garden Quaker Meeting-house, near the battlefield, Cornwallis set
out on the morning of the 18th for Wilmington, arriving there on April
7, 1781. Greene had pursued as soon as possible. But his ammunition,
never very abundant, was now almost exhausted. Besides, food was very
scarce in the district to be traversed, and Greene arrived at Ramsey's
Mill only to find that Cornwallis had built a bridge over Deep River
at that point and escaped, although Lee had pressed so hard on his
rear that the bridge could not be destroyed. Here the pursuit ended;
for the Virginia militia, now that their time was up, refused to serve
longer. Though Cornwallis escaped, and though Greene had lost one of
the best contested battles of the war, he had won the campaign. He was
free once more to turn his attention toward relieving South Carolina of
her military rulers. On April 6th, one day before Cornwallis arrived at
Wilmington, the southward march began, Lee being detached to operate on
the line of Rawdon's communications with Charleston.
Lee soon joined Marion, who was skulking in swamps between the Pedee
and Santee, and, uniting forces, the two captured a fortified depot of
Watson, the British officer scouring this region, and then endeavored
to prevent his rejoining Rawdon.
On the 7th of April Greene had broken up from Ramsey's, and, taking the
direct road, had encamped on Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden,
and about a mile and a half from the British works at that place. As
Rawdon did not come out from his intrenchments, Greene on the 23d moved
nearer. Anxious for Marion and Lee, and desirous of supporting some
artillery which he detached to them, Greene moved to a position south
of Camden. It appears, however, that on the 23d or 24th he decided to
fall back. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th he reëncamped
on Hobkirk's Hill. During that night a renegade drummer-boy informed
Rawdon of the position and number of the American force. He also said
that Greene had neither artillery nor trains near at hand, although
both were on the march to join him. It was a most propitious time to
strike, and Rawdon determined to attempt a surprise the next morning.
Making a considerable detour to the right, he struck the American left
almost unperceived. Greene had thrown out a strong picket in that
direction, but the superiority of the British was so great that they
drove in the guards and were upon the Americans before the formation
was complete. That the attack was not a disaster was due to the
prudence of Greene, who had encamped in order of battle. Perceiving
that Rawdon's line was very short, Greene ordered Ford with the 2d
Maryland to flank it on the right, and Campbell was told to do the
same on the left. Gunby with the 1st Maryland, and Hawes with the
Virginia regulars, were ordered to attack with the bayonet in front,
while Washington with the cavalry was to get into the rear and take
advantage of any opening that might offer. Unfortunately, neither Ford
nor Campbell were able to put in their men before Rawdon, seeing his
danger, brought up his reserves and extended his flank. This was owing
partly to Ford being struck down in the beginning of the movement.
The defeat of Greene, however, was due to one of those accidents
against which no foresight can provide. It seems that as the 1st
Maryland was getting into position to charge, or perhaps as it was
moving forward, Beattie, the captain of one of the leading companies,
was shot. His men began firing, and fell into confusion. Then Gunby,
instead of pushing his rear companies forward, as Greene always
declared he should have done, ordered the regiment to form on the rear
companies. The men retiring were seized with a panic, and the heroes of
three battles broke. They were rallied soon after, but it was then too
late. The whole line was compromised, and Greene ordered a retreat.
Though Greene was not surprised, the attack was most unexpected.
This was owing in a great measure to the woods in his front, which
permitted Rawdon to reach the picket line without discovery. Even
then Greene fully expected victory, and had his men done their duty,
as he had a perfect right to expect, this adventurous attempt of the
young British commander would have resulted in his complete overthrow.
Such was Greene's opinion, and such is the opinion of most American
writers.[1024] Retiring first to Sanders Creek or Gum Swamp, the very
spot Gates was trying to reach when he met Cornwallis, and later to
Rugeley's Mill, Greene brought up his provisions and recruited the
strength of his men. Though not beaten at Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was
greatly discouraged. Especially distressing was the non-arrival of
expected reinforcements. The terms of service of his best men were
expiring, and he could see no source from which to draw recruits. His
losses in the recent engagement had not been so great as those of
his opponent; but Marion and Lee had been unable to prevent Watson
from rejoining his chief. Still Greene did not lose heart. As soon as
his men had recovered from fatigue he crossed the Wateree and posted
himself at Twenty-five-Mile Creek, on the road from Camden to Fishing
Creek and the Catawba settlements.
Watson reached Camden on May 7th. On the evening of the same day Rawdon
moved out from his fortifications, and, crossing the Wateree, turned
on Greene, intending to pass his flank and attack him from the rear.
But Greene was too vigilant, for, learning of Rawdon's departure from
Camden, he retired still higher up the river, first to Sandy's Creek
and later to Colonel's Creek, the latter being nine miles from his
former position. The position on the further bank of Colonel's Creek
was very favorable to the party attacked. The light troops had been
left in the front, as at Hobkirk's Hill. Coming upon them at Sandy's
Creek, Rawdon mistook them for the main body, and their position
seemed so strong that he did not feel willing to risk an attack. It
was impossible for him to remain longer in Camden with Greene in such
threatening attitude, especially as his line of communication with
Charleston was in the hands of Lee and Marion. On the 10th, leaving his
wounded who were unable to be moved at Camden, Rawdon evacuated that
place, and marching to the east of the Santee, he crossed at Nelson's
Ferry and took post at Monk's Corner, not more than thirty miles from
Charleston.
[Illustration: RAWDON.
From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii. 151. The likeness by Reynolds
was painted in 1789, and is at Windsor Castle, and is engraved in the
_European Mag._, June, 1791; it was also engraved in mezzotint by
John Jones. Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 56, 183,
and J. C. Smith's _Brit. Mezzotint Portraits_, ii. 767. Cf. Irving's
_Washington_, 4^o ed., iv. 331.—ED.] There is an account of Rawdon's
career to date in _Pol. Mag._, ii. 339, and Lossing has given a sketch
of his life in _Harper's Monthly_, xlvii. 15. He is better known by his
later title of Marquis of Hastings, which he bore as governor-general
of India. Cf. note to p. 49 of _Cornwallis Corresp._ It is to be noted
that both he and his chief, Cornwallis, showed a humanity in after life
which did not grace their careers in America.]
One of the motives which had induced Rawdon to make this precipitate
retreat was the hope of saving the garrison of Fort Motte, an important
post on the Congaree, near its confluence with the Wateree. Lee and
Marion had appeared before the place on the 8th. They had pushed the
siege with vigor, but were so destitute of artillery and siege tools
that it seemed the siege might be prolonged until the coming of Rawdon
should enforce its abandonment. Happily it occurred to some one that
the roof of Mrs. Motte's house, which stood in the middle of the
inclosure, could be set on fire. It is related that Mrs. Motte herself
furnished the bow and arrows with which this was accomplished. At any
rate, soon after Rawdon's watch-fires were seen in the distance the
house was on fire, the stockade untenable, and the garrison prisoners
of war. Marion then separated from Lee, and, turning toward Charleston,
compelled the enemy to look well to his communications.
When Rawdon evacuated Camden he sent orders to the commander at Fort
Granby to retire to Charleston, and directed Cruger, at Ninety-Six, to
join Brown at Augusta. Neither of these orders reached its destination.
As soon as the post at Motte's had surrendered, Lee was ordered to
Fort Granby. Proceeding with his usual celerity, he arrived before the
place in the night of the 14th. His single piece of artillery opened
on the fort as soon as the morning fog had dispersed. The garrison was
completely taken by surprise. Time being of the utmost importance to
Lee, the besieged were promised their baggage—in reality the property
of plundered patriots—if they would immediately surrender. The terms
were accepted, and Lee joined Pickens at Augusta.[1025]
Lee reached this place on the evening of the 21st of May. On his way
he had captured a small stockade, containing, under a strong guard,
valuable stores for the Indians. Augusta is, or rather was, situated
on the southern bank of the Savannah River. Its defences consisted
of a strong work, Fort Cornwallis, in the centre of the town. It was
garrisoned by a force of regulars under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who
had already once successfully defended the place. Not far from Fort
Cornwallis was a smaller work, named after its defender Fort Grierson.
While Lee watched the garrison of the larger fort, Pickens and Clarke
advanced to the attack of Fort Grierson. Its defenders soon were
compelled to leave their stronghold for the main fort. Their attempt
to reach it was a vain one, as most of the garrison were captured or
killed.[1026]
The attack on Fort Cornwallis was now pressed with vigor. As at Fort
Watson, use was here made of an expedient, already tried in the
campaign, of advancing a log pen or Mahem tower, on the top of which
was mounted the besiegers' only piece of artillery, whence it was
used with great effect. The defence was most gallant, the garrison
often sallying, and even attempting to blow up a house in which a
covering party of riflemen were to have been placed; but the explosion
was premature. Everything being ready for an assault, the garrison
capitulated after one of the most splendid defences of the war. Lee
then went to the assistance of Greene, who was now conducting the siege
of Ninety-Six.
The village of Ninety-Six was then situated near the Saluda River,
about twenty-five miles from Augusta. For many years a post had been
established there as a protection against the Indians. When the British
overran the State, it was selected as a proper position for one of the
exterior line of posts of which Camden was the most important, though
the possession of Augusta gave to the British the command of upper
Georgia. When Camden was evacuated, Ninety-Six became useless and
should have been abandoned; but the messengers bearing Rawdon's orders
to that effect were stopped by the Americans. When, therefore, Greene
arrived before the place, on the 22d of May, he found it defended
by Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, with about 500 men, mainly New York
loyalists. A stockade protected the rivulet which supplied the garrison
with water, and their main fort, the "Star", had sixteen salient and
reëntering angles. Greene was not strong enough completely to invest
this fort, and he contented himself with an attempt to carry it by
regular approaches.
This was Greene's first siege, and, unfortunately, he had no engineer
of the requisite ability. Acting on the advice of Kosciusko, ground was
broken at a distance of seventy paces from the "Star." The besieged
soon sallied, destroyed the uncompleted works, and retired with
trifling loss, taking with them the intrenching tools. The British were
surprised at the temerity of the Americans in opening their trenches so
near. The sally taught Greene a lesson, for he next opened a trench at
a distance of four hundred paces, under the protection of a ravine. The
work was now pushed with vigor, and, notwithstanding numerous sallies
on the part of the garrison, by the morning of June 18th the third
parallel was completed. The assailants were now within six feet of the
ditch, while riflemen in a Mahem tower kept the besieged from their
guns during the day.
[Illustration: KOSCIUSZKO.
NOTE ON PORTRAIT OF KOSCIUSZKO.—After an engraving by Anton
Oleszeynski. Cf. Dr. Theodor Flathe's _Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_
(Berlin, 1887), i. p. 205. Cf. A. W. W. Evans's _Memoir of Kosciusko_,
privately printed for the Cincinnati Society, 1883. There was a model
made in wax from life by C. Andras, from which an engraving was made by
W. Sharp (W. S. Baker's _William Sharp, Engraver_, Philad., 1875, p.
66).
There are some notes on Kosciusko by Gen. Armstrong in the _Sparks
MSS._ Cf. Greene's _Hist. View_, 297, and B. P. Poore's _Index_, for
his claims on the United States (p. 131).—ED.]
Lee with the "Legion" had arrived from Augusta on the 3d, and had
conducted operations against the stockade covering the watering-place
with such vigor that it had been evacuated on the 17th. Four days more
would have placed the garrison in the power of the besiegers. But it
was not so to be. Rawdon, in Charleston, had received considerable
reinforcements direct from Ireland, and early in June he pushed forward
through the heat, and eluded Sumter.[1027] With Rawdon within a day's
march, Greene must either take the fort by storm or abandon the siege.
He decided on an assault,—probably more to satisfy the desires of his
men than because he thought it was the best thing to be done. On the
18th, at noon, the attack was made in two columns, Greene not being
willing to hazard his whole force in a general storm. On the extreme
right, Lee, with "Legion" infantry and the remains of the gallant
Delaware regiment, directed his efforts against the stockaded fort,
which had already been abandoned, according to the British account of
the siege. At all events, Lee had no trouble in carrying out his part
of the work. But on the other flank the assault was not so successful.
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, with his Virginia regiment and with the
1st Maryland, formed the storming column. They advanced with great
gallantry, but, though they gained the ditch, they could not effect a
lodgment on the parapet. They were driven back with considerable loss
by two parties of the besieged, which attacked them in the ditch on
both flanks in such a way that the artillery and riflemen in the tower
could not fire without injuring friend and foe alike. Greene called off
his men, and Rawdon being within a few miles, he retired on the next
morning to a safe place of retreat. In the end he retreated as far as
Timm's Ordinary, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. Rawdon, his men
worn down with their long march, could not overtake him, and finally
halting on the banks of the Enroree, he turned back to Ninety-Six. That
place being untenable with the means at his disposal, he divided his
men into two parties. With one he regained the low country, resigning
the command to Stuart on account of ill-health.[1028] Gathering the
Tories of the neighborhood, Cruger escorted them to Charleston, while
Greene led his army to the High Hills of the Santee, where he passed
the heats of the summer.
At length, toward the end of August, Greene learned that Stuart was
proposing to establish a fortified post at a strong and healthful
position called Eutaw Springs. Greene determined to prevent this,
and descending from his camp he made a wide detour to get across the
river which separated the two armies; for although he was distant from
Stuart only sixteen miles as a bird flies, the most practicable route
was nearly seventy miles long. He crossed the Wateree at Camden, and,
marching parallel to the river, crossed its affluent, the Congaree,
at Howell's Ferry on the 28th and 29th. Proceeding by slow and easy
marches, he reached Burden's plantation on the 7th of September.
At that place Marion joined him, and preparations were made for an
advance on the enemy the next day. Stuart at Eutaw seems to have been
singularly negligent. He sent out but one patrol, which was captured
by Lee. He would have been surprised had not two men deserted from the
North Carolina regiment and given him warning. As it was, he had barely
time to call in his foraging parties before Greene was upon him.
Stuart had with him about 2,300 men of all arms, Greene rather less.
The British commander ranged his men in one line, the right being
protected by Eutaw Creek, while the left was in the air, as the
military term is. Greene advanced in two lines, the militia, under
Marion, Pickens, and Malmady, being in the front. The right of the
second line was held by Sumner with the North Carolina regulars. In the
centre were the Virginia Continentals under Campbell, while on the left
J. E. Howard and Hardman led the two Maryland regiments. To Lee, who
had the advance during the march, was assigned the protection of the
right flank, Henderson with a South Carolina brigade covering the left.
The cavalry under Washington and the brave remnant of the Delaware
regiment brought up the rear, and acted as a reserve.
Here at last there was no wavering among the militia, excepting those
from North Carolina, who nevertheless fired several rounds before
breaking. Under Marion and Pickens the rest fought splendidly. It is
said that some of them fired no less than seventeen rounds before
giving way; then Sumner advanced with the North Carolina regulars. At
length they, too, were forced back; but the British following them
with too great impetuosity, their own line became deranged. This was
the opportunity for the men of Maryland and Virginia to retrieve
the reputation lost at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill, and splendidly
they responded to the call. Rushing forward,—the Virginians alone
disobeying orders so far as to fire,—the whole burst upon the enemy
in front and swept him from the field. Unfortunately, their course led
through the British camp, and they dispersed to plunder the abandoned
tents. Now it happened that when the British fell back a party threw
themselves into a strong brick house and an adjoining picketed garden;
thence they delivered a withering fire upon the victors of a moment
before. And more unfortunate still, when the "Legion" was ordered to
charge the retiring foe, Lee could not be found, and the charge, being
made without vigor, was a failure. On the right, too, the British had
not retreated: they still occupied a flanking position, from which
they could not be dislodged, even though Washington and all but two of
his officers were killed or wounded in the attempt. All these things,
coupled with the heat, compelled Greene to sound the retreat. Leaving
such of the wounded as were within range of the brick house on the
field, he retired to his camp at Burdell's, seven miles distant, that
being the nearest point where a supply of good water could be obtained.
Both commanders claimed the victory. It would be not unfair, perhaps,
to call it a drawn battle. Neither party can be said to have retained
possession of the field, as Stuart retreated with great precipitation
from the vicinity on the night of the next day. Greene acknowledged a
loss in Continentals alone of 408 in killed and wounded. The loss in
militia has never been stated. It must have been considerable, as a
portion of the militia fought with great obstinacy. According to the
American accounts, the enemy lost in prisoners 500 men, including 70
wounded. But Stuart reported only 257 missing; his killed and wounded
he gives at 433.
As soon as Greene ascertained the retreat of the enemy he followed
with all speed; but Marion and Lee were too weak to prevent Stuart's
receiving a reinforcement. Stuart finally halted at Monk's Corner,
while Greene passed the Santee at Nelson's Ferry and retired to the
High Hills.
* * * * *
Cornwallis at Wilmington had a difficult problem to solve. Should he
go south to the relief of Rawdon, or north to the conquest of Virginia?
Another campaign in North Carolina was plainly out of the question.
The distances were so great and the country was so sparsely settled
that it was a matter of great difficulty to move any considerable force
there, even when unopposed. The recent campaign had fully demonstrated
that a bold and enterprising leader with a handful of trained troops
could seriously impair the usefulness of a royal army, even though he
could not destroy it. The best base of operations for another campaign
in South Carolina was Charleston, and the best way to get there was
by water; but any such movement looked too much like a retreat to be
seriously considered. Besides, Cornwallis did not believe that he
could get to Camden in time to relieve Rawdon, as the place was not
provisioned for a siege. On the other hand, a movement into Virginia
offered many advantages. There the army would always be within easy
march of the sea, and reinforcements could be brought from New York or
sent thither with great ease. Then, too, it seemed to Cornwallis—and
his supposition was probably correct—that with Virginia, the great
storehouse of the Southern armies, once in his hands, the complete
conquest of the Carolinas would be easy and certain. So impressed
was he with this idea that he endeavored to induce Clinton to shift
the headquarters of the army from the Hudson to the Chesapeake; but
Clinton had other views, and New York remained the base of operations.
Clinton even went further, and avowed his dislike of the whole plan
of operations; but Cornwallis had the approval of Germain, and the
northern movement was undertaken.
Clinton, however, had always looked with favor on desultory expeditions
to Virginia, as they drew the attention of that State to her own
defence, and therefore away from the defence of the Carolinas. As
early as the spring of 1779, he had sent Matthews and Collier to the
Chesapeake, with instructions to do as much damage to the Americans as
possible; but beyond plundering Portsmouth and burning Suffolk they
accomplished little, and returned to New York. The next year Leslie
was detached in the same direction to effect a diversion in favor of
Cornwallis's invasion of North Carolina. King's Mountain not only put
an end to that invasion, but compelled Cornwallis to call Leslie to
his aid. Leaving Portsmouth, which he had fortified, Leslie sailed
for Charleston, and reached the front in season to take part in the
campaign against Greene. On Leslie's withdrawal Clinton sent another
expedition to Virginia to destroy military stores which had been
collected for the supply of Greene. The command this time was given to
Arnold, though, to guard against a new treason, dormant commissions
were given to his chief officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Dundas and
Simcoe. Arnold penetrated to Richmond without encountering much
opposition. He destroyed nearly everything of value at that place, and
then endeavored to seize some arms which had at one time been deposited
at Westham. Failing in this, he descended the river to Portsmouth. The
militia had now collected in considerable numbers. For this or for
some other reason, Arnold kept within the fortifications of that place.
About this time Rochambeau had sent a few vessels to annoy the British
in the Chesapeake; but, besides capturing the "Romulus",—a 44-gun
ship,—they did little, and returned to Newport. Washington now
proposed that the two armies should unite in an attempt to capture the
traitor. To this end he detached Lafayette with the light infantry,—a
picked corps of about twelve hundred men from the New England and New
Jersey lines,—to act in unison with a force of the same size which
Rochambeau detached from his army. Lafayette, for a time concealing his
destination by a feigned attack on Staten Island, reached Annapolis
in safety. Leaving his troops there, to be brought the rest of the
way by the French fleet when it should arrive, Lafayette proceeded to
Suffolk. He found Muhlenberg, with the militia, at that place, guarding
the approaches to Portsmouth. But the French were not fortunate, since
their departure from Newport was so long delayed that the fleet arrived
off the Capes of the Chesapeake only to find Arbuthnot guarding the
entrance. In the fight which followed, both sides claimed the victory.
But all the advantages of victory were on the side of the British, as
Destouches' ships were so badly cut up that he was obliged to return
to Newport. Success now being improbable, Lafayette returned to his
troops, and the march to the North was begun. At the Head of Elk new
orders were found, directing him to return to the South and place
himself under the orders of Greene. The cause of this radical change
in plan was the reinforcement of two thousand men under Phillips which
Clinton had sent to Virginia.
Phillips arrived on March 25, and took command. Towards the end of
April, the British to the number of twenty-five hundred landed at City
Point on the James River. Steuben, who was then at Petersburg, took
up a strong position at Blandford, where the enemy found him on the
morning of April 25. He was soon obliged to retreat. The enemy then
marched to Petersburg, and destroyed a large amount of tobacco and
other valuable property. The 27th saw them at Osborn's, where they
captured, after some show of resistance, a fleet of merchant vessels.
When Phillips and Arnold arrived at Richmond they found that Lafayette
was before them. The young Frenchman had reached Baltimore on the
17th of April. Purchasing on his own credit shoes and clothes suited
to a Virginia summer, he made a forced march, and threw himself into
Richmond twenty-four hours in advance of the British. Not wishing to
attack him in such a strong position, Phillips retired down the river,
followed by the Americans. On the 7th of the next month (May, 1781),
the British commander received word from Cornwallis that he would join
him at Petersburg. Suddenly ascending the river, he reoccupied that
town on the night of the 9th. On the 13th Phillips died, and a week
later Cornwallis arrived and assumed command, Arnold returning to New
York.
Then followed a series of marches, the design of the British commander
being to cut Lafayette off from Wayne, who was marching to his support.
But Lafayette moved with too great celerity. Early in June the desired
junction of the Americans was made near Raccoon Ford, on the Rapidan.
Meantime, while Lafayette was out of reach, Cornwallis sent out two
expeditions. The first, under Simcoe, operated against Steuben, at that
time guarding the stores at the Point of Fork. The Prussian veteran,
mistaking Simcoe's detachment for the main army, abandoned the stores
and retired with great precipitation. The second expedition, led by
Tarleton, was designed for the capture of the civil rulers of Virginia,
but a Virginia Paul Revere warned them of their danger in time, and
they made good their escape,—though it is said that Jefferson, then
resting from the fatigues of the session at Monticello, had but five
minutes to spare. But the raid, successful, or not, had no importance,
although popular writers are wont to dwell upon it.
[Illustration: STEUBEN.
From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_, London, 1783. Cf. _Harper's
Mag._, lxiii p. 336, and the lives of Steuben.—ED.]
With Wayne and his Pennsylvanians, in addition to his own Light
Infantry, Lafayette felt strong enough again to oppose the enemy
in the field. By a well-executed movement through an unknown and
long-disused road, the young marquis placed himself between Cornwallis
and Albemarle Old Court House, whither the stores had been removed
from Richmond. Cornwallis, instead of attacking him, retired down the
James, Lafayette following at a distance of about twenty miles. On the
25th of June the British were at Williamsburg, the Americans being
not far off, at Bottom's Bridge. While at Williamsburg, Cornwallis
sent Simcoe to destroy some boats and stores which had been collected
on the Chickahominy. Lafayette, on his part, detached Butler of
the Pennsylvania line, with orders to attack Simcoe on his return.
A partial engagement ensued at Spencer's Ordinary, which ended in
Simcoe's being able to continue his retreat.
It can hardly be said that this retrograde movement on the part of the
British was due to the presence of Lafayette, although his presence
undoubtedly contributed toward making Cornwallis desirous of getting
into communication with Clinton. It is probable, too, that Cornwallis
hoped to be so strongly reinforced that the conquest of the State
during the coming autumn would be assured. But Clinton, believing, from
intercepted despatches, and from the movements of the Americans, that
Washington was meditating an attack on New York, instead of complying
with Cornwallis's desires, ordered him to send a portion of his own
troops to New York.
[Illustration]
[Illustration:
After a sketch supposed to be by Fersen, aide of Rochambeau, and
following a reproduction given in Balch's _Les Français en Amérique_,
p. 174. Cf. Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., and E. M. Stone's _Our
French Allies_, p. 281; _Harper's Mag._, lxiii. 329.—ED.]
The latter, therefore, retired to Portsmouth, where the embarkation
could be easily effected. To Lafayette, the crossing of the James
seemed to offer the chance of at least picking off a rear guard; but
Cornwallis was attacked too soon, owing in part to the impetuosity of
Wayne, and the onset came near being a disaster. In the end, however,
Wayne succeeded in bringing off his men, though he lost two pieces of
artillery. Cornwallis, fearing an ambuscade, did not push the pursuit.
He then made his way to Portsmouth unmolested, while the Americans
sought a healthy summer camp on Malvern Hill. Just at this moment,
owing to the arrival of reinforcements in New York, Clinton decided
to leave Cornwallis's force intact. Furthermore, he determined to
establish a permanent base in the Chesapeake, and ordered Cornwallis
to fortify a place, mentioning Old Point Comfort, where the navy could
be sheltered. He also authorized him to take possession of some other
post, as Yorktown, if he thought it necessary. Now Cornwallis seems to
have regarded the fortifying of Yorktown as the only alternative, and
the engineers and naval officers declaring Old Point Comfort unsuitable
for a naval station, he seized York and Gloucester, and began the
erection of the proper works. Clinton always asserted that he had no
intention of ordering anything of the kind. But the weight of evidence
seems to be in favor of Cornwallis. At all events, he took possession
of Yorktown. As soon as his movements were discovered, Lafayette left
his summer camp, and, taking a strong position in the fork of the
Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers, sent out parties to watch the further
movements of the enemy, Wayne being ordered toward the south, as if
to the assistance of Greene. Such was the situation in Virginia when
the French came to the aid of the Americans, and began the operations
leading to the siege of Yorktown.
On the 1st and 2d of May, 1780, the Marquis of Rochambeau, with about
five thousand men, left the roadstead of Brest. The transports were
convoyed by a small fleet of seven ships of the line, under the command
of the Chevalier de Ternay. Their progress was slow, and it was not
until July 12th that the fleet anchored in Newport harbor.[1029]
Batteries were immediately erected on shore to protect the shipping
from the English fleet, which was under Arbuthnot. This admiral,
hastening from Charleston, in company with Clinton, now bent his whole
energy toward the destruction of the French fleet. But the British
commanders, always on bad terms, quarrelled, and Washington threatening
New York, while the New England militia rallied to the defence of their
newly arrived allies, the attempt on Newport was abandoned. A naval
blockade was kept up, however, and the French army was neutralized by a
few ships of war. Thus they passed the remainder of 1780 and the first
part of 1781.
On the 8th of May (1781) M. de Barras, successor to De Ternay, who
had died in the preceding year,[1030] arrived at Boston. He brought
news of the departure from Brest of a powerful fleet commanded by M.
de Grasse. This French admiral had with him a small convoy with six
hundred recruits for Rochambeau; but the bulk of his fleet was destined
primarily for the West Indies. De Grasse had been directed, however,
to come on the American coast in July or August, relieve the fleet at
Newport, and for a limited period act in conjunction with the American
and French armies. On May 21st a conference between Washington and
the French commanders was held at Weathersfield, in Connecticut. It
was there determined to make a united attack upon New York, provided
De Grasse could coöperate. This was Washington's plan, though an
expedition against the British in Virginia seems even then to have been
proposed. Later a note from De Grasse arrived, asking where he should
strike the American coast. Rochambeau replied that it would be best
for him to look into the Chesapeake, and then, should no employment
be found there, to proceed to New York. Rochambeau also inclosed the
articles of the Weathersfield conference, hinting at the same time that
De Grasse must be his own judge as to the practicability of crossing
the New York bar with his ships. Finally he asked him to borrow for
three months the brigade under St. Simon, which was destined to act in
conjunction with the Spaniards.
On the 18th the advance of the French left Providence for the Hudson.
Washington at this time was encamped at Peekskill. Ten days later,
on June 28th, he determined to seize by surprise, if possible, the
forts on the northern end of New York Island. The night of July 2d was
selected for the enterprise, and the command of the advance was given
to Lincoln; Lauzun, with the French Legion, making a forced march to
his aid. But the scheme failed. The enemy attacked Lincoln, and Lauzun
reached the scene of conflict too late to be of assistance. The troops
were drawn off in safety, however, and retired to Dobbs Ferry, where
they were joined by the French infantry on July 6th. While awaiting the
arrival of the fleet, nothing was attempted beyond a reconnoissance
in force of the northern defences of the island. It was this movement
which induced Clinton to send for the Virginia troops.
On August 14th a letter from De Grasse arrived which put a new face on
the whole war; for the French admiral announced that he should sail for
the Chesapeake, with a view to carry out the scheme of Rochambeau for
a united movement against Cornwallis. He added that his stay on the
American coast would be short, and that he hoped the land forces would
be ready to act with him.
[Illustration: FRENCH OFFICERS.]
There was now nothing to be done but to abandon the cherished project
against New York, and to move all of the allied armies that could
be spared from the vicinity of New York to the Chesapeake. Leaving
Heath with four thousand men to garrison the forts on the Hudson, and
suitable parties to guard against an irruption from Canada, Washington
set out with the rest of the land forces for Williamsburg, by the
way of Philadelphia, Head of Elk, and the Chesapeake. On the 19th
the army crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry, and moved as though to
attack Staten Island. This feint was so well managed that Clinton was
completely deceived. On September 2d the Americans marched through
Philadelphia, the French following on the 3d, 4th, and 5th. By the
8th the allied army was again united at the Head of Elk. The news of
the arrival of De Grasse at the Capes of the Chesapeake had reached
Washington on the 5th, and had been communicated to the troops on the
following morning.[1031]
De Grasse, on his arrival at Lynnhaven Bay, just inside Cape Henry, had
found an aide of Lafayette's, and soon the marquis arrived in person.
As soon as possible the troops under St. Simon were landed at Jamestown
Island, and Wayne was recalled from his southward march. These corps,
with the light infantry and the Virginia militia, took up a strong
position at Williamsburg, not more than twelve miles from Yorktown.
Cornwallis reconnoitred the lines; but they were too strong to be
attacked except at great risk. Confident in being relieved by Clinton
and Graves, he retired to his fortifications.
Had Rodney done his full duty he would have followed De Grasse in his
northward cruise. But pleading illness, he sent fourteen ships of the
line, under Hood, to the assistance of Graves, and sailed himself for
Europe.[1032] The event was most fortunate for the American cause,
as the control of the sea for a brief period passed away from the
British. It should be said that Rodney had written to Graves, warning
him of his danger; but through a fortunate accident the letter never
reached Graves, and the first he heard of the coming of De Grasse was
on the arrival of Hood. That admiral on August 25th had looked into
the Chesapeake on his way north; but the French had not yet arrived.
Graves had already discovered that Barras had sailed from Newport with
a siege train and tools, and the two admirals, conjecturing, therefore,
that the destination of Barras was the Chesapeake, determined to seek
him there and destroy him before the arrival of the main fleet. They
reached Cape Henry on the 5th of September, and there they found, not
Barras, as he had purposely taken a long, roundabout route to avoid
them, but De Grasse. The English fleet numbered nineteen sail of the
line, the French twenty-four, but fifteen hundred men were absent,
engaged in landing the troops of St. Simon. Nevertheless, De Grasse
slipped his cables and stood out to sea. The ensuing action was
indecisive, but De Grasse accomplished his purpose, as the British were
obliged to seek New York to refit. On his arrival back at Lynnhaven
Bay he found Barras. There was now abundant transportation, and by
the 26th of September the allied troops—Washington's, Rochambeau's,
Lafayette's, and St. Simon's—were concentrated at Williamsburg.
Two days later, on the 28th, the allied army marched to Yorktown, and
found Cornwallis occupying an intrenched camp outside the immediate
defences of the town. On the 29th the lines were extended so as to
envelop the place, the Americans taking the right, with their right
flank resting on Wormley Creek. Cornwallis, seeing that he would be
outflanked, withdrew to the inner defences, and on the morning of the
30th the besiegers took possession of the abandoned works.[1033]
[Illustration: COUNT DE GRASSE.
From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, Lond., 1785, vol. ii. Cf. _European
Mag._, ii. 83; Hennequin's _Biographie maritime_, iii. 297; E. M.
Stone's _French Allies_, 396, 398; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, vi. p. 1;
_Harper's Mag._, lxiii. 330.
[Illustration]
_The Operations of the French feet under the Count de Grasse in
1781-82, as described in two Contemporary Journals_ (New York, 1864,
for the Bradford Club, 150 copies), edited by John G. Shea, gives two
narratives, of which one purports to have been written by a certain
Chevalier de Goussencourt, who is hostile and cannot be identified,
while the other is anonymous and friendly. This last had been printed
at Amsterdam in 1782, and it is suspected was written by De Grasse
himself. A sketch of De Grasse's life, for which his family gave
material, is prefixed. It also contains (p. 192) the account, abridged
from the _Gazette de France_, Nov. 20th, in the _Remembrancer_, xiii.
46. A _Notice Biographique_ of De Grasse, by his son, was published in
Paris in 1840.—ED.]
[Illustration: COMTE DE GRASSE.
From the _London Mag._, Aug., 1782, p. 355. There is a profile head in
_The Operations of the French fleet under the Count De Grasse_ (N. Y.
1864).—ED.]
On the night of the 5th and 6th of October the first parallel was
opened, at a distance of between five and six hundred yards from the
enemy's works. It extended from the river bank below the town to a deep
ravine nearly opposite the centre of the besieged lines. A battery on
the bank above the town opposed a battery of the enemy in that quarter,
and also prevented the British fleet from enfilading the works. Guns
were mounted and fire opened from this parallel on the afternoon of
the 9th. The ground was singularly favorable to the construction of
the approaches, and by the night of the 11th and 12th the works were
in such a state of forwardness that the second parallel was begun, not
more than three hundred yards from the British lines. On the extreme
right, however, there were two redoubts, commanding this parallel,
which on the night of the 14th and 15th were carried by storm,—the
smaller one, on the right, by Lafayette's division, the advance being
commanded by Alexander Hamilton; while the one further away from the
river was stormed by a party of French infantry commanded by Colonel G.
de Deux-Ponts, the Baron de Viomenil having command of the division.
The loss on the American side was inconsiderable, but that of the
French was severe, the redoubt carried by them being larger and much
more strongly garrisoned. Before morning the two redoubts were included
in the second parallel. Cornwallis, hoping for relief, determined to
prolong the defence as long as possible. To this end, on the morning of
the 16th, Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie led a determined but useless
assault on two batteries at the French end of the trenches. Cornwallis
next tried, on the night of the same day, to cut his way out by passing
his men over to Gloucester Point; but a storm arose in the midst of the
ferrying, and the enterprise, hazardous at best, was abandoned.
An assault becoming practicable, at ten o'clock of the morning of the
17th, four years since Burgoyne's surrender, a drummer-boy appeared on
the parapet and beat a parley. Negotiations were begun, but, though
pushed with the greatest energy by Washington, the final articles were
not signed in the trenches until two days later, on the 19th. On that
day, at noon, two redoubts were taken possession of by detachments from
the French and American forces. At two in the afternoon the British
army, with colors cased and drums beating "The World turned upside
down", marched out and laid down their arms; O'Hara, in the absence
of Cornwallis, making the formal surrender to Lincoln, Washington's
representative.
At the beginning of the siege the British numbered not far from seven
thousand men of all arms,—perhaps a few more. On the day of the
capitulation, according to Cornwallis, little more than thirty-eight
hundred were fit for duty, including the garrison at Gloucester Point.
The allied army is usually given at sixteen thousand men,—nine
thousand Americans, including thirty-five hundred militia. The French
numbered probably more than seven thousand. The total British loss
during the siege was five hundred and forty-one, including the missing.
The allied loss, excluding the missing, was seventy-six Americans and
one hundred and eighty French. It has been stated that, at the time
of the surrender, there were about fourteen hundred unfit for duty in
the allied camp. This great victory, due even more than most victories
to chance, virtually ended the war. It remains only to describe the
closing scenes in the South.
[Illustration: CAPITULATION OF YORKTOWN.
From a fac-simile of the articles in Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit.
Curios._, 1st ser., 6th ed., pl. xxxiv. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 523. The articles are given in Shea's _Operations of the French
fleet_, p. 78; R. E. Lee's ed. of Lee's _Memoirs_, 509; Tarleton, 438;
_Polit. Mag._, ii. 67; Sparks's _Washington_, viii. App. 8; _Cornwallis
Corresp._, App.—ED.]
[Illustrtation: NELSON HOUSE, YORKTOWN.
After a drawing given in Meade's _Churches and Families of Virginia_,
i. 204. It was here that Cornwallis had his headquarters.
See other views and accounts in Balch's _Les Français en Amérique_,
1; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (1881), vii. 47 (by R. A. Brock); x. 458,
July, 1881; Brotherhead's _Signers of the Declaration of Independence_
(1861), p. 61; E. M. Stone's _Our French Allies_, p. 428; G. W. P.
Custis's _Recoll. of Washington_, p. 337. A journal of Mr. Samuel
Vaughan in 1787, owned by Dr. Charles Deane, describes the havoc made
in this house by the bombardment.
The Moore house, at which the terms of surrender were arranged, is
depicted in _Appleton's Journal_, xii. 705; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._,
vi. 16 (etching); E. M. Stone's _French Allies_, 466; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 530. Washington's headquarters at Williamsburg is
shown in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, vii. 270. A view of the field
where the arms were laid down is in Paulding's _Washington_, vol.
ii. The so-called Cornwallis Cave is drawn in _Scribner's Mag._, v.
141. For other landmarks, see Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 509; _Cycl.
U. S. Hist._, 155-157; Porte Crayon's "Shrines of Old Virginia" in
_Lippincott's Mag._, April, 1879. In the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (1881),
pp. 270, 275, are views of Washington's headquarters at Williamsburg;
and of those, earlier occupied by Cornwallis, the president's house of
William and Mary College.
For the Yorktown and Saratoga medal, see Loubat's _Medallic Hist. U.
S._; _Amer. Jl. of Numismatics_, xv. 76; _Coin Collectors' Journal_,
vi. 173; Sparks's _Franklin_, ix. 173.
The best known picture of the surrender is Trumbull's painting, which
is engraved in _Harper's Mag._, lxiii. 344, and elsewhere. Cf. early
engravings of the scene in Barnard's _Hist. of England_; in Godefroy's
_Recueil d'Estamps_ (Paris, 1784).—ED.]
Greene's army had been so roughly handled at the Eutaws that it was the
first of November before he felt strong enough again to take the field.
He advanced first to Dorchester and the Round O. Then, reinforcements
arriving from the troops set free by the surrender at Yorktown, he
assumed a more vigorous offensive. He advanced to the eastern bank
of the Edisto, between Jacksonborough, where the legislature was
then assembling, and Charleston, still in the hands of the British.
But if the Pennsylvanians were a welcome addition on account of
their strength, they brought also a spirit of discontent. A plot was
discovered to betray the army into the power of the enemy. A few
examples were made and the attempted treason stamped out.
Greene now detached Wayne, with about five hundred men, to do what he
could toward the recovery of the Georgia seaboard. On his approach
the British retired to Savannah, burning everything that could not
be removed. Wayne was too weak to attempt more than the blockade of
the town. But on the 21st of May Lieutenant-Colonel Brown left the
fortifications as if to attack the Americans. Placing himself between
this party and the garrison, Wayne surprised Brown by a night attack,
killing or dispersing the whole party. About a month later he was
himself surprised by a large body of Creek Indians led by a British
officer. Successful at first, the savages were finally beaten off, with
the loss of their chief Escomaligo and a dozen braves. On the 11th of
the next month, July, 1782, Savannah was evacuated, and the whole State
once more came into the hands of the Americans.
The British government had decided upon the abandonment of all posts
in America with the exception of New York. On August 7th, Leslie,
then commanding in the South, announced in "after orders" that the
evacuation of Charleston had been determined on. He also wrote to
Greene, proposing a cessation of hostilities. The proposal was
declined, Greene having no instructions on the point. Later Leslie
again wrote, offering to pay for all rice and other provisions that
might be brought into Charleston; but Greene, fearing that the rice
was intended for use during a campaign against the French in the
West Indies, again refused. Leslie then endeavored to seize the
coveted articles by force. One of his foraging parties, commanded by
Lieutenant Benjamin Thompson,—better known by his later title of Count
Rumford,—surprised and dispersed Marion's brigade while its commander
was absent attending a meeting of the legislature. The most serious
loss through these desultory expeditions was in the death of the
younger Laurens, who was killed during a useless skirmish at Combahee
Ferry. This was the last action of the war in the South. On the 14th of
December the British left Charleston, and three days later their last
ship passed the bar and went to sea. The South was free.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
THE most complete contemporary account of the Southern campaign is
David Ramsay's _Revolution of South Carolina_.[1034] This author, by
birth a Pennsylvanian, removed to Charleston in 1773, and at once
took a leading part in the management of the affairs of that town.
During the stormy years of 1779-1780 he was a member of the governor's
council, but went with the Charleston artillery company to the siege
of Savannah. When Rutledge, with a portion of his council, left
Charleston during the siege, Ramsay remained behind with Gadsden. He
was, therefore, a prisoner during the greater portion of Gates's and
Greene's campaigns. Ramsay was thus a prominent actor in many of the
scenes described in his volumes, while his facilities for obtaining
accurate information as to the rest were so excellent that his book
may be regarded as an authority of the first importance. He retold the
story in a condensed form in several other publications.
[Illustration: NATHANAEL GREENE. (_Norman's print._)]
Moultrie[1035] was a prominent actor in the defence of his native
State before the capitulation of Charleston. After that he resided
with the other officers at Haddrell's Point until his exchange in
1781. At a later day he was present at the entry of the victorious
army into Charleston. Whenever he speaks from his own observation,
Moultrie may be trusted[1036]. But he seems to have been too ready to
listen to exaggerated stories, and though we must believe that there
was a foundation for his account of the sufferings of the Charleston
prisoners, it should always be remembered that the charges were
indignantly denied by the British officers in charge.
[Illustration: GENERAL GREENE. (_From Andrews' History of the War._)
PORTRAITS OF GENERAL GREENE.—One of the earliest of the contemporary
prints is the rude copperplate, made by the Boston engraver Norman,
which appeared in the Boston edition (1781, vol. ii. p. 229) of _An
Impartial History of the War in America_. A fac-simile is annexed. In
1785, Andrews' _History of the War_, published in London (vol. i.), had
a youthful picture, a reproduction of which is also given herewith.
The next year the _Columbian Magazine_ (Sept., 1786), published in
Philadelphia, gave an engraving after R. Peale's likeness of Greene, of
which a better engraving by Robert Whitechurch can be found in Irving's
_Washington_ (ii. p. 8) and in E. M. Stone's _French Allies_ (p. 496).
In 1794 the _New York Magazine_ (May) gave as from an original painting
a copperplate engraving, of which a fac-simile is given on another
page. It is evidently a rendering of the canvas of which, after a
photograph given in George W. Greene's _Life of Greene_, the woodcut on
the page opposite to the other is a more adequate representation. There
is also a print in the _Monthly Military Repository_, N. Y., 1796-1797.
A portrait by C. W. Peale was engraved, while in the Philadelphia
Museum, by Edwin, and appeared in Lee's _Memoirs of the War in the
Southern Department_ (vol. i., Philadelphia, 1812). It was again
engraved by James Neagle in 1819 for Charles Caldwell's _Memoirs of the
life and character of the Honorable Nathanael Greene_ (Philadelphia,
1819); and in 1822 it furnished the head and shoulders, turned in
the opposite direction, for the full-length figure, engraved by J.
B. Longacre, after a drawing by H. Bounetheau, which is in the first
volume of William Johnson's _Sketches of the life and correspondence
of Nathaniel Greene_ (Charleston, 1822). One of the pleasantest of the
likenesses of Greene is that painted by Col. John Trumbull, which was
engraved by J. B. Forrest for the _National Portrait Gallery_ (New
York, 1834). The same picture is selected by W. G. Simms for his _Life
of Greene_, and it is given in R. E. Lee's ed. of Henry Lee's _Memoirs
of the War_ (N. Y. 1869), and H. B. Anthony's _Memorial Address_
(Providence, 1875) on presenting the statue of Greene to Congress.
This statue, modelled by Henry K. Brown, was offered in 1870, and a
cut of it is given in the _Presentation of the Statue of Major-General
Greene in the Senate_, Jane 20, 1870 (Washington, 1870), an account
of which, under the title of _Proceedings in Congress attending the
reception of the statue of Maj.-Gen. Greene_, was reprinted (twenty
copies) in Providence the same year. For congressional documents
pertaining, see B. P. Poore's _Descriptive Catal. of U. S. Gov't
publications_, pp. 896, 901, 1221. Congress voted a medal to Greene
after the battle of Eutaw, and on one side it bears a profile likeness
of Greene. It is engraved in Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 704; and in
_Ibid._ p. 720, is a view of the monument erected to the memories
of Greene and Pulaski. The Polish hero has since, however, been
commemorated in a separate monument, so that the shaft first erected
is now called a memorial of Greene alone. Greene died in 1786 of a
sunstroke, at a plantation near Savannah, which had been given to
him by the State of Georgia,—it being the confiscated estate of the
late royal lieutenant-governor,—and he was buried in Savannah; but
when the monument was built, the search to discover his remains was
unsuccessful. Cf. _The Sepulture of Greene and Pulaski, by C. C. Jones,
Jr._ (Augusta, 1885)—ED.]
Henry Lee, of Virginia,—"Light-Horse" or "Legion Harry", as he was
often called,—though not in the South prior to the days of the
Cowpens, was so intimate with all the actors in the operations after
the fall of Charleston, and enjoyed such advantages for acquiring
information of earlier events, that as a source of information his
book[1037] is of considerable value. As the work of an outspoken and
generally impartial military critic of these campaigns, it has no
equal. It should be borne in mind, however, that as to dates and minor
details it needs the confirmation of contemporary documents.[1038] Like
so many of the Revolutionary heroes, Lee in his later years became
involved in unfortunate speculations, and a painful disease increased
the distress of his last days.[1039] As an orator he fashioned phrases
which have not yet lost their hold on the popular mind. As a writer he
avoided the stilted sentences of his contemporaries, and his book may
still be read with pleasure. Probably no one enjoyed the confidence of
Greene to such an extent as Henry Lee.[1040]
Nathanael Greene came of good Rhode Island stock,[1041] and, like
other prominent Rhode Islanders of his day, was a self-educated man.
Fortunately for posterity, though not always for himself, Greene was a
copious and candid letter-writer. His letters and fragments of letters,
so far as they have been printed, are his best biography.[1042] He has
not lacked biographers, however. First, in point of time, was Charles
Caldwell, who put forth a worthless volume as early as 1819.[1043]
William Gilmore Simms, the Carolina novelist, also tried his hand
at the alluring theme, and his book, while possessing no claim to
originality, has at least the merit of being interesting. The most
formidable of these early biographies was the work of Judge Johnson,
of Charleston. He enjoyed the best facilities, as the Greenes placed
the family papers at his disposal. Many of these documents he printed
at length, and as a repository his work has a value.[1044] In other
respects it is worth very little. This is due mainly to the fact
that in order to glorify his hero he belittled every other prominent
character—with the exception of Marion.[1045] A formidable antagonist
of Johnson was soon found in the person of Henry Lee, the son of
Light-Horse Harry. He resented the slurs of Johnson, and even wrote
a book[1046] to show the small reliance to be placed on the learned
judge's military criticisms. As a review, the work of the younger Lee
is interesting, but it is so one-sided as to be of little importance.
It is, however, to the labors of a descendant that the great leader
owes much of the honor in which he is held. In various publications,
from the little seven-page sketch in the _Pennsylvania Magazine of
History_ (vol. ii. p. 84) to the large three-volume biography,[1047]
the grandson sought to spread the fame of the grandsire. Unfortunately,
through these family works of love there runs the same spirit of
adulation that so disfigured Johnson. A still greater drawback to the
value of the largest work is the hesitation of the author in printing
letters and documents not elsewhere in print.
In this respect the biographer of Greene's able lieutenant, Daniel
Morgan, set a good example. In fact, Graham's _Morgan_[1048] is an
excellent and generally trustworthy book. It is to be noted that
Graham has cleared Morgan from the charge that he retired from the army
after the Cowpens, through a treasonable fear that the Revolution would
not be successful. Nor does the assertion that Morgan was chagrined at
the treatment accorded him by Greene appear to be well founded.
[Illustration: GENERAL GREENE. (_New York Magazine, 1794._)]
But of all the Southern leaders, Marion was most fortunate in his
biographers.[1049] It is true that Horry's work was largely written by
Mason L. Weems, notorious for his so-called _Life of Washington_. Both
Horry and James had a foundation for their narratives. The confidence
reposed by Greene in his ablest leader of irregular troops is best seen
in their letters printed by Gibbes in his _Documentary History_,[1050]
which is composed mainly of the "Horry Papers", already used in
Horry's memoir. Another partisan worthy of mention was Pickens. But of
him only slight and unworthy sketches have been printed.[1051]
The only extended notice of Benjamin Lincoln is the biography by
Francis Bowen in Sparks's collection.[1052] This book was not written
in the calm judicial spirit that should characterize an historical
work. Many of Lincoln's order-books have been preserved, and have
been of material service in preparing the foregoing narrative. Though
Lincoln's career was marked by no brilliant successes, his work was
always well done, and demands a fuller recognition.[1053]
[Illustration: GENERAL GREENE. (_After a Photograph of a Painting._)]
Little original material concerning the operations in Georgia has come
to light. It is fortunate, therefore, that Hugh McCall overcame his
physical infirmities to such an extent as to enable him to finish the
second volume of his _History of Georgia_. This writer was an active
cavalry leader in the defence of his native State. He also fought well
on other fields. It should he said, however, that what he wrote of
actions in which he did not take part should be received with caution.
His work is the basis of all subsequent accounts of the war in Georgia.
[Illustration]
Anthony Wayne and his Pennsylvanians did good service in Virginia, and
later in Georgia. But the life of Wayne remains to be written.[1054]
His letters and reports are scattered here and there through the books.
The best account of his career is the one printed by his son in the
_Casket_, a magazine not to be found in every library.
The second volume of Wheeler's _Sketches of North Carolina_ contains
many articles by actors in the struggle. But they were mostly
written long after the event, as, too, were those in the _North
Carolina University Magazine_. They should not be relied upon unless
confirmed.[1055] This is the more regrettable as there is very little
original material in print relating to these North Carolina campaigns
from a North Carolina point of view. The most labored defence of the
"Old North State" is Caruthers' _Incidents_.[1056] Much of this work
seems to be based on good material; but one should be especially
careful to separate such portions from those founded on tradition,
which must have misled Caruthers in several instances. Of the same
general character are Johnson's _Traditions_;[1057] Logan's _Upper
Country of South Carolina_; Foote's _Sketches of Western North
Carolina_; and C. L. Hunter's _Sketches of Western North Carolina_
(Raleigh, 1877). Such are the main sources of information from the
American side so far as the campaigns in the Carolinas and Georgia are
concerned. Let us now turn to Virginia.
On his way South, Greene left Steuben[1058] in Virginia to organize and
push forward recruits as fast as possible. The gallant Prussian seems
to have been ill-suited to the command of raw republican militia; but
the American leaders in the State, Muhlenberg, Lawson, and Stevens,
aided him as well as they could. It was not until the arrival of
Lafayette with his Continentals from the Eastern States that much was
done to oppose the enemy. The governor of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson,
showed a lamentable lack of energy during Arnold's and Cornwallis's
invasions, though the word "imbecility", applied to his conduct by
Howison, would seem to be undeserved.[1059] Of course, Jefferson's
biographers have defended their hero from these charges,[1060] but
Giradin's _Continuation of Burk's Virginia_,[1061] written in the
neighborhood of Monticello, and apparently under Jeffersonian auspices,
is the most extensive account of Jefferson's administration from his
side.
It was not, however, until the publication of the _Virginia State
Papers_[1062] that the truth concerning the campaigns preliminary
to Yorktown could be ascertained. But these two volumes taken in
connection with the _Nelson Papers_ have thrown a new light on all
these transactions.[1063]
Washington's _Writings_ and Sparks's _Correspondence of the Revolution_
contain much relating to all these operations, though Washington's
_Journal_ and his order-books are even more valuable for the Yorktown
campaign. Of the commander of the auxiliary troops, the Marquis
of Rochambeau, I have found little outside of his well-known
_Mémoires_.[1064] For much of what we know concerning the movements of
the French we are indebted to John Austin Stevens, a former editor of
the _Magazine of American History_. His articles, as well as those by
other hands, will be mentioned in the Notes.
The papers of the British commanders have been much better preserved.
All official documents of popular interest and conducing to the glory
of the nation were published, sometimes in full, sometimes in extract,
in the governmental organ known as _The London Gazette_. Thence they
were copied, in whole or in part, into the _Remembrancer_, _Gentleman's
Magazine_, _Scot's Magazine_, _Political Magazine_, and often into that
portion of the _Annual Register_ known as "Principal Occurrences." Many
of them, and many other papers of the greatest importance, were printed
in the _Parliamentary Register_, or Debrett's _Debates_, as it is often
called.
The Sackville Papers, forming the third appendix to the _Ninth Report_
of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts,[1065] contain much
of very great value; but many of the most important papers therein
printed have been accessible in other forms. Soon after the surrender
at Yorktown, the House of Lords appointed a committee to inquire
into the conduct of the Yorktown campaign. Later, upon their order,
many of the letters and papers bearing on this event were printed.
They may be found in the _Parliamentary Register_,[1066] while many
were translated into French, and published in a small volume under
the title of _Correspondance du Lord G. Germain avec les Généraux
Clinton, Cornwallis_, etc. (Berne, 1782). Most of these documents,
however, had been already printed in other places. The surrender
induced Cornwallis[1067] and Clinton to lay upon the shoulders of each
other the responsibility.[1068] The truth seems to be that neither was
responsible, since the disaster was due, above all, to the arrival
of De Grasse and the consequent transference of the control of the
sea from the British to the Allies. For this neither Clinton nor
Cornwallis was to blame. The quarrel led to the publication, however,
of so many papers of the greatest importance that the historical
student can hardly regret its occurrence.
Nor was Clinton on good terms with Mariot Arbuthnot, who had accused
Clinton of permitting thievery to go on under his very eyes.[1069]
Naturally this want of cordiality made coöperation very difficult.
After Clinton's departure Cornwallis was the commander-in-chief in
the South; but Colonel Nesbit Balfour, who commanded in the city of
Charleston, made separate reports to Germain. He does not seem to
have been possessed with a very sanguine disposition, and his reports
therefore present a more accurate picture of affairs than do the
despatches of Cornwallis himself.