2. _Grinding_, or being compelled to do the same or a greater amount of
work for _less pay_.
1. Under the first head, if the employment be at all regular, I heard
few complaints, for the men seemed to have learned to look upon it as
an inevitable thing, that one way or other they _must_ submit, by the
receipt of a reduced wage, or the exercise of a greater toil, to a
deterioration in their means.
The system of driving, or, in other words, the means by which extra
work is got out of the men for the same remuneration, in the scavagers’
trade is as follows:--some employers cause their scavagers after their
day’s work in the streets, to load the barges with the street and
house-collected manure, without any additional payment; whereas, among
the more liberal employers, there are bargemen who are employed to
attend to this department of the trade, and if their street scavagers
_are_ so employed, which is not very often, it is computed as extra
work or “over hours,” and paid for accordingly. This same indirect mode
of reducing wages (by getting more work done for the same pay) is seen
in many piece-work callings. The slop boot and shoe makers pay the same
price as they did six or seven years ago, but they have “knocked off
the extras,” as the additional allowance for greater than the ordinary
height of heel, and the like. So the slop Mayor of Manchester, Sir
Elkanah Armitage, within the last year or two, sought to obtain from
his men a greater length of “cut” to each piece of woven for the same
wages.
Some master scavagers or contractors, moreover, reduce wages by making
their men do what is considered the work of “a man and a half” in a
week, without the recompense due for the labour of the “half” man’s
work; in other words, they require the men to condense eight or nine
days’ labour into six, and to be paid for the six days only; this again
is usual in the strapping shops of the carpenters’ trade.
Thus the class of street-sweepers do not differ materially in the
circumstances of their position from other bodies of workers skilled
and unskilled.
Let me, however, give a practical illustration of the loss accruing to
the working scavagers by the _driving_ method of reducing wages.
A is a large contractor and a driver. He employs 16 men, and pays them
the “regular wages” of the honourable trade; but, instead of limiting
the hours of labour to 12, as is usual among the better class of
employers, he compels each of his men to work at the least 16 hours per
diem, which is one-third more, and for which the men should receive
one-third more wages. Let us see, therefore, how much the men in his
employ lose annually by these means.
---------------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------
| Sum received | Sum they |
| per | should |
| Annum. | receive. |Difference.
---------------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------
4 Gangers, at 18_s._ a } | £ _s._ | £ _s._ | £ _s._
week, for 9 months } | 140 8 | 210 12 | 70 4
in the year } | | |
12 Sweepers, at 16_s._ a } | | |
week, for 9 months } | 374 8 | 499 4 | 124 16
in the year } | | |
---------------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------
Total wages per Ann. | 514 16 | 709 16 | 195 0
Here, then, we find the annual loss to these men through the system of
“driving” to be 195_l._ per annum.
But A is not the only driver in the scavagers’ trade; out of the 19
masters having contracts for scavaging, as cited in the table given at
pp. 213, 214, there are 4 who are regular drivers; and, making the same
calculation as above, we have the following results:--
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
|Sum received | Sum they |
| per | should |Difference.
| Annum. | receive. |
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
26 Gangers, at 18_s._ a }| £ _s._ | £ _s._| £ _s._
week, for 9 months }| 912 12 | 1216 16 | 304 4
in the year }| | |
80 Sweepers, at 16_s._ a}| | |
week, for 9 months }| 2496 0 | 3328 0 | 832 0
in the year }| | |
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
| 3308 12 | 4544 16 | 1136 4
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
Thus we find that the gross sum of which the men employed by these
drivers are deprived, is no less than 1136_l._ per annum.
2. The second or indirect mode of reducing the wages of the men in the
scavaging trade is by _Grinding_; that is to say, by making the men
do the same amount of work for less pay. It requires nothing but a
practical illustration to render the injury of this particular mode of
reduction apparent to the public.
B is a master scavager (a small contractor, though the instances are
not confined to this class), and a “_Grinder_.” He pays 1_s._ a week
less than the “regular wages” of the honourable trade. He employs six
men; hence the amount that the workmen in his pay are mulct of every
year is as follows:--
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
|Sum received | Sum they |
| per | should |Difference.
| Annum. | receive. |
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
6 men, at 15_s._ a week,}| £ _s._ | £ _s._ | £ _s._
for 9 months in the }| 175 10 | 187 4 | 11 14
year }| | |
-------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------
Here the loss to the men is 11_l._ 14_s._ per annum, and there is but
one such grinder among the 19 master scavagers who have contracts at
present.
3. The third and last method of reducing the earnings of the men as
above enumerated, is by a combination of both the systems before
explained, viz., by _grinding_ and _driving_ united, that is to say,
by not only paying the men a smaller wage than the more honourable
masters, but by compelling them to work longer hours as well. Let me
cite another illustration from the trade.
C is a large contractor, and both a grinder and driver. He employs
28 men, and not only pays them less wages, but makes them work
longer hours than the better class of employers. The men in his pay,
therefore, are annually mulct of the following sums.
SUMS THE MEN RECEIVE. | SUMS THEY SHOULD RECEIVE.
£ _s._ _d._| £ _s._ _d._
|
7 Gangers, at 16_s._ | 7 Gangers, at 18_s._
a week, for 9 | a week, for 9
months in the | months in the
year 218 8 0 | year 245 14 0
21 Sweepers, at | Over work, 4
15_s._ a week 614 5 0 | hours per day 61 8 6
------------- | 21 Sweepers, at
832 13 0 | 16_s._ a week, 12
| hours a day 655 4 0
| Over work, 4
| hours a day 163 6 0
| --------------
| 1125 12 6
Here the annual loss to the men employed by this one master is 292_l._
19_s._ 6_d._
Among the 19 master scavagers there are altogether 7 employers who
are both grinders and drivers. These employ among them no less than
111 hands; hence, the gross amount of which their workmen are yearly
defrau--no, let me adhere to the principles of political economy, and
say deprived--is as under:--
SUM THE MEN ANNUALLY RECEIVE. | SUM THEY SHOULD ANNUALLY RECEIVE.
£ _s._ _d._| £ _s._ _d._
28 Gangers, at 16_s._ | 28 Gangers, at
a week, employed | 18_s._ a week
for 9 months | (12 hours a
in the year 873 12 0 | day), for 9
| months in the
83 Sweepers, at | year 982 16 0
15_s._ a week, | Over work, 4
employed for | hours per day 245 14 0
9 months in | 83 Sweepers, at
the year 2427 15 0 | 16_s._ a week,
-------------- | 12 hours a day 2589 12 0
3301 7 0 | Over work, 4
| hours per day 647 8 0
| --------------
| 4465 10 0
Here we perceive the gross loss to the operatives from the system of
combined grinding and driving to be no less than 1164_l._ 3_s._ per
annum.
Now let us see what is the aggregate loss to the working men from the
several modes of reducing their wages as above detailed.
£. _s._ _d._
Loss to the working scavagers by the “driving” of employers 1136 4 0
Ditto by the “grinding” 11 14 0
Ditto by the “grinding _and_ driving” of employers 1164 3 0
--------------
Total loss to the working scavagers per annum 2312 1 0
Now this is a large sum of money to be wrested annually out of the
workmen--that it is so wrested is demonstrated by the fact cited at p.
174 in connection with the dust trade.
The wages of the dustmen employed by the large contractors, it is there
stated, have been increased within the last seven years from 6_d._ to
8_d._ per load. This increase in the rate of remuneration was owing to
complaints made by the men to the Commissioners of Sewers, that they
were not able to live on their earnings; an inquiry took place, and the
result was that the Commissioners decided upon letting the contracts
only to such parties as would undertake to pay a fair price to their
workmen. The contractors accordingly increased the remuneration of the
labourers as mentioned.
Now political economy would tell us that the Commissioners _interfered_
with wages in a most reprehensible manner--preventing the natural
operation of the law of Supply and Demand; but both justice and
benevolence assure us that the Commissioners did perfectly right. The
masters in the dust trade were forced to make good to the men what they
had previously taken from them, and the same should be done in the
scavaging trade--the contracts should be let only to these masters who
will undertake to pay the regular rate of wages, and employ their men
only the regular hours; for by such means, and by such means alone, can
_justice_ be done to the operatives.
This brings me to the _cause of the reduction of wages in the scavaging
trade_. The scurf trade, I am informed, has been carried on among
the master scavagers upwards of 20 years, and arose partly from the
contractors having _to pay_ the parishes for the house-dust and
street-sweepings, brieze and street manure at that period often selling
for 30_s._ the chaldron or load. The demand for this kind of manure
20 years ago was so great, that there was a competition carried on
among the contractors themselves, each out-bidding the other, so as to
obtain the right of collecting it; and in order not to lose anything
by the large sums which they were induced to bid for the contracts,
the employers began gradually to “grind down” their men from 17_s._
6_d._ (the sum paid 20 years back) to 17_s._ a week, and eventually
to 15_s._, and even 12_s._ weekly. This is a curious and instructive
fact, as showing that even an increase of prices will, _under the
contract system_, induce a reduction of wages. The greed of traders
becomes, it appears, from the very height of the prices, proportionally
intensified, and from the desire of each to reap the benefit, they are
led to outbid one another to such an extent, and to offer such large
premiums for the right of appropriation, as to necessitate a reduction
of every possible expense in order to make any profit at all upon the
transaction. Owing, moreover, to the surplus labour in the trade, the
contractors were enabled to offer any premiums and reduce wages as they
pleased; for the casually-employed men, when the wet season was over,
and their services no longer required, were continually calling upon
the contractors, and offering their services at 2_s._ and 3_s._ less
per week than the regular hands were receiving. The consequence was,
that five or six of the master scavagers began to reduce the wages of
their labourers, and since that time the number has been gradually
increasing, until now there are no less than 21 scurf masters (8 of
whom have no contracts) out of the 34 contractors; so that nearly
three-fifths of the entire trade belong to the _grinding_ class. Within
the last seven or eight years, however, there has been an increase of
wages in connection with the city operative scavagers. This was owing
mainly to the operatives complaining to the Commissioners that they
could not live upon the wages they were then receiving--12_s._ and
14_s._ a week. The circumstances inducing the change, I am informed,
were as follows:--one of the gangers asked a tradesman in the city to
give the street-sweepers “something for beer,” whereupon the tradesman
inquired if the men could not find beer out of their wages, and on
being assured that they were receiving only 12_s._ a week, he had the
matter brought before the Board. The result was, that the wages of the
operatives were increased from 12_s._ to 15_s._ and 16_s._ weekly,
since which time there has been neither an increase nor a decrease
in their pay. The cheapness of provisions seems to have caused no
reduction with them.
Now there are but two “efficient causes” to account for the reduction
of wages among the scurf employers in the scavagers’ trade:--(1) The
employers may diminish the pay of their men from a disposition to
“_grind_” out of them an inordinate rate of profit. (2) The price paid
for the work may be so reduced that, consistent with the ordinary rate
of profit on capital, and remuneration for superintendence, greater
wages cannot be paid. If the first be the fact, then the employers
are to blame, and the parishes should follow the example of the
Commissioners of Sewers, and let the work to those contractors only who
will undertake to pay the “regular wages” of the honourable trade; but
if the latter be the case, as I strongly suspect it is, though some
of the masters seem to be more “grasping” than the rest--but in the
paucity of returns on this matter, it is difficult to state positively
whether the price paid for the labour of the working scavager is in all
the parishes proportional to the price paid to the employers for the
work (a most important fact to be solved)--if, however, I repeat, the
decrease of the wages be mainly due to the decrease in the sums given
for the performance of the contract, then the parishes are to blame for
seeking to get their work done _at the expense of the working men_.
The contract system of work, I find, necessarily tends to this
diminution of the men’s earnings in a trade. Offer a certain quantity
of work to the lowest bidder, and the competition will assuredly be
maintained at _the operative’s expense_. It is idle to expect that,
as a general rule, traders will take less than the ordinary rate of
profit. Hence, he who underbids will usually be found to underpay.
This, indeed, is almost a necessity of the system, and one which
the parochial functionaries more than all others should be guarded
against--seeing that a decrease of the operative’s wages can but be
attended with an increase of the very paupers, and consequently of the
parochial expenses, which they are striving to reduce.
A labourer, in order to be self-supporting and avoid becoming
a “burden” on the parish, requires something more than bare
subsistence-money in remuneration for his labour, and yet this is
generally the mode by which we test the _sufficiency of wages_. “A man
can live very comfortably upon that!” is the exclamation of those who
have seldom thought upon what constitutes the _minimum_ of self-support
in this country. A man’s wages, to prevent pauperism, should include,
besides present subsistence, what Dr. Chalmers has called “his
secondaries;” viz., a sufficiency to pay for his maintenance: 1st,
during the slack season; 2nd, when out of employment; 3rd, when ill;
4th, when old[19]. If insufficient to do this, it is evident that
the man at such times must seek parochial relief; and it is by the
reduction of wages down to bare subsistence, that the cheap employers
of the present day shift the burden of supporting their labourers when
unemployed on to the parish; thus virtually perpetuating the allowance
system or relief in aid of wages under the old Poor Law. Formerly the
mode of hiring labourers was by the year, so that the employer was
bound to maintain the men when unemployed. But now journey-work, or
hiring by the day, prevails, and the labourers being paid--and that
mere subsistence-money--only when wanted, are necessitated to become
either paupers or thieves when their services are no longer required.
It is, moreover, this change from yearly to daily hirings, and the
consequent discarding of men when no longer required, that has partly
caused the immense mass of surplus labourers, who are continually
vagabondizing through the country begging or stealing as they go--men
for whom there is but some two or three weeks’ work (harvesting,
hop-picking, and the like) throughout the year.
That there is, however, a large system of _jobbing pursued by the
contractors_ for the house-dust and cleansing of the streets, there
cannot be the least doubt. The minute I have cited at page 210 gives
us a slight insight into the system of combination existing among the
employers, and the extraordinary fluctuations in the prices obtained by
the contractors would lead to the notion that the business was more a
system of gambling than trade. The following returns have been procured
by Mr. Cochrane within the last few days:--
“Average yearly cost of cleansing
the whole of the public ways within
the City of London, including the removal
of dust, ashes, &c., from the
houses of the inhabitants, for eight
years, terminating at Michaelmas in
the year 1850 £4,643
Square yards of carriage-way, estimated
at 430,000
Square yards of footway, estimated
at 300,000