is sheltered from fire. Advantage should always be taken of such
opportunities to reëstablish perfect order, replace fallen leaders
and thus get a new start. Such an opportunity decidedly increases
your chance of success in battle; real control is reëstablished.
Practice this in your battle training when the opportunity offers,
but never do it when, in a real combat, it would be impracticable.
[Sidenote: Combat exercises]
After the mechanism of the extended order drill is understood all
combat exercises should have a problem or situation. These should
always be simple; elaborate tactical problems for this instruction
work are unnecessary. For a simulated attack as part of a line,
all that is necessary is a statement that the enemy, a regiment of
infantry, is holding the line from —— to ——, our regiment is to
attack it at once, our battalion on the right, we are the right
company, our target or objective the part of the line from —— to ——.
This of course should be varied but need be no more complicated. The
captain should give this to his whole company, let all the men know
what they are supposed to be doing.
[Sidenote: Situation and orders]
[Sidenote: Method of conducting exercises]
The captain should then give his attack order, always carefully
distributing the target. For a company operating alone the following
form will answer every purpose: This company belongs to a division
engaged with a hostile division five miles north of here. This
company was detached to capture that building (pointing) which is
assumed to be important. The defending force occupies the line ——.
The order for the attack then follows. Usually in such a case, a
small support would be held out. Of course the problems will vary
according to what it is desired to teach. Always distribute the
target and let the men understand what you are trying to do. All
combat exercises should be conducted as nearly as possible as though
the enemy were real. Allow nothing to be done that would not be
attempted were it real war, otherwise you do not give instruction
but misinformation. After the mechanism is taught, the captain and
platoon commanders must conduct themselves in combat exercises as
they would under hostile fire, keep close to the ground, use signals
only. After the exercise is over have a critique, point out the
errors made and tell the command how they should be corrected.
You must expect that if mistakes are made at the drill they will be
made in battle; to correct these mistakes you should use only those
means at drill that will be practicable in battle. The captain needs
much practice in thus handling a skirmish line and those under him
need more practice before the company can be well handled in this
manner.
[Sidenote: Means of representing enemy’s fire]
The effectiveness of the enemy’s fire should be indicated that
platoon commanders can practice the control of rushes. The simplest
way to do this that I have found is to have a man at the hostile
position with two little flags. Holding both of these vertically over
his head means the enemy’s fire is wild and nearly harmless. One
flag vertical the other horizontal indicates a moderately effective
fire. Both flags horizontal indicates the maximum effectiveness—that
the enemy has a decided fire superiority. When both flags touch the
ground it indicates no fire.
The advance of the attacking force is only practicable by taking
advantage of the times when the fire is ineffective or weak to push
forward, and, when the hostile fire is too strong, shooting to gain
fire superiority. Platoon commanders and men must become accustomed
to seizing these opportunities to advance and suddenly getting down
when there is a burst of effective fire. The flags on the hostile
position may be controlled by an instructor, stationed behind the
company officers, indicating how the flags are to be held.
Remember that the hostile fire becomes more effective in proportion
as ours is less effective. If we have the most men we should gain
fire superiority if our shots are well placed. If the firing line has
not distributed its fire properly the instructor causes both flags to
be held horizontally; no advance is then possible until the company
officers find out the cause of the trouble and correct it. The same
is done whenever a serious error in sight elevation is made. Majors
should frequently conduct such exercises with their companies. The
company officers must become quick in determining why the hostile
fire is more effective than suits existing conditions and learn to
correct the error.
[Sidenote: Judging defects in firing]
You may not be able to reduce the effectiveness of the hostile fire
so that an advance under it is practicable and, in some cases, it may
not be your mission to do so; but in every case where the hostile
fire passes a certain point of effectiveness, depending on relative
numbers, your range, distribution or something is wrong, or else your
men have lost their nerve. Judging the effect of the hostile fire is
something in which company and platoon commanders must be proficient,
but off the battlefield this can only be taught in theory.
[Sidenote: Advance by rushes]
In advancing the attack by rushes the size of the fraction rushing
will be dependent upon the relative proportion of rifles necessary to
hold your fire superiority. If rushes are practicable at all it will
seldom be necessary to rush by smaller units than the platoon. But an
advance will sometimes have to be made by fractions of only a man or
two and sometimes by crawling. All these should be taught.
When the enemy is active the rushes should not be long, if of only 25
or 30 yards the time the men are actually running will be very short,
too short for the average man to pick up the target, raise the rifle
to his shoulder and fire with careful aim. Too much time is taken by
the average man in getting up and down. The men must be practiced in
springing to their feet and getting down again in the shortest time
possible. There is a knack in this not difficult to acquire.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements]
Reinforcing a firing line will generally bring about intermingling
of squads and platoons. To avoid this by closing in on the center by
companies, thus creating gaps for reinforcements, is impracticable on
a battlefield when reinforcing is necessary. In battle in the great
majority of cases reinforcements will go in as they can and fall into
the existing gaps where found. As this will be the rule in battle we
should so drill it.
When the next rush is made, say by squads, where do these
reinforcements go? In one regiment at least, they solved it
satisfactorily. The points of division along the firing line remain
where they were; the new man who joins the firing line always goes
with the man on his right, he belongs to the squad and to the platoon
of the man on his right. This provision should be added in the I. D.
R.
[Sidenote: Mixing on the firing line]
In teaching the mechanism of the extended order, practice should be
had in this by dividing the company into firing line and support and
then feeding in the support and continuing the advance by rushes. If
you expect this to be done in battle it must become a habit. To get
the best practice in this mixing, as well as to train officers and
sergeants to think quickly and to act properly, there should be many
rencontre engagements so planned as to bring about a mixing of units
on the firing line.
[Sidenote: Practice at war strength]
Some practice should be afforded with companies at war strength.
This can be had by combining two or more companies. By this means
it is sought to accustom officers to the fronts and depths of such
a company and also to the greater length of time required to change
formation.
[Sidenote: Redistributing the target]
In combat exercises of the company alone practice must be had in
shifting part of the fire to new targets and redistributing the old.
In large battles this will seldom if ever be required by men in the
firing line, but it will occur in detachment work. The companies
should get practice in this and it can be well coupled with the
instruction in hasty deployments suggested on page 46.
[Sidenote: Work on the defensive]
Some work should be done on the defensive. A few men should be
detailed to represent the enemy; if the man carries one little flag
he represents a squad, if two flags a platoon. These men should be
in charge of a competent man who as nearly as is practicable directs
their advance as such units would really advance under the assumed
conditions. Enveloping movements and surprise attacks can thus be
well simulated, giving the company the opportunity to practice
meeting such movements by the use of the support, redistribution of
targets, etc.
[Sidenote: Company against company]
The instruction against an outlined enemy having been practiced until
the companies are well instructed, the enemy should be represented,
one company should work against another. This gives an opportunity
for reconnaissance work before and during the attack and introduces
the elements of uncertainty as to what the enemy will do.
[Sidenote: Night operations]
In war, night operations are inevitable and we must recognize
this fact and prepare for them. Night marches by large commands,
patrolling by both large and small groups, and outpost work,
including the establishing of the outpost in the dark, will all occur
as well as an occasional night battle. In all this work the principal
difficulty seems to be to avoid confusion and mistakes.
[Sidenote: Orientation]
The men, especially those who are city bred, are unable to orient
themselves in the dark. The darkness when coupled with possible
unseen foes has a demoralizing effect and this effect will be the
greater the more helpless the man feels himself to be in the dark and
the less confidence he has in the ability of the company to act as a
company. Much of this difficulty can be overcome by a little careful
training.
The men should be taken out and taught to orient themselves by the
stars and prominent features that can be distinguished at night.
The effects of different backgrounds on the visibility of objects
should be demonstrated, and especially the prominence of objects on
a skyline. Estimating distance by sound should be practiced. The men
grouped into small patrols should be made to find their way from
place to place and then to operate against other patrols.
[Sidenote: Night drill]
The company should be drilled at night. Forming line from column,
front into line, on right or left into line, and even forming line of
skirmishers, should be practiced and an occasional night march made.
A very few drills each season, held at night instead of in daylight,
will do much toward giving the men that necessary confidence in the
ability of the company to work together in the dark.
It will sometimes happen that a command will have to go into camp
after dark and establish an outpost. This should be practiced at
least once each season after the company has been well instructed in
the work by daylight.
[Sidenote: Night attacks]
Satisfactory training for night attacks is difficult. The first
principle governing night attacks is not to shoot but to get in as
close as possible undiscovered and then rush with the bayonet. It
is impracticable to practice this with a represented enemy; it is
too dangerous. To practice it by allowing the opposing sides to fire
blanks at each other is all wrong because it is teaching the men to
do what they should not do in war.
One method is to place men to represent the enemy behind a suitable
fence, then to make the advance and attack, causing the represented
enemy to open fire as soon as the attack is discovered. An open wire
fence will not prevent the discovery of the attack but will stop the
bayonet rush before anyone is hurt. This is not very satisfactory
work for the company but is more appropriate for the battalion and
regiment. In these latter it is desirable to practice the necessary
formations for such attacks and to give the officers experience in
such troop leading. For this work to be of benefit the officers must
know their night tactics, the proper formations to take and the best
methods of troop leading; this knowledge should first be acquired by
study and then put to the test at night. It is not well to devote too
much time to such work.
[Sidenote: Woods fighting]
In many posts practice can be had in tactical work in the woods. This
opportunity should not be neglected. A good tactician will try to
avoid a thick forest as a battlefield but with long lines of battle
parts of the line will inevitably extend through forests. Hence the
officers must study the principles governing woods fighting and seek
to train the men so that they can play their part. Woods combat has
many of the difficulties of night work.
[Sidenote: Fire problem]
There should be considerable work on fire problems; it is excellent
practice, especially for the officers and non-commissioned officers.
Field firing is not here meant but simulated firing. A simple problem
is given and the officer or sergeant with a platoon or company solves
it practically. By using a few men with flags to represent the enemy
and with a proper critique afterwards for all the company, great
benefit should be derived.
As an example of such a problem: dispose one platoon of the company
under cover near a ridge with a concealed man watching to the front
and stationed about 25 yards from the platoon, the remainder of the
company 400 yards in rear but in sight of the platoon. The following
situation is then given out:
[Sidenote: Fire problem against cavalry]
“This company has been detached from a larger force back at X.
Hostile cavalry is in this neighborhood and is doing much damage.
The orders received when this company was detached stated that other
companies were to go out on other roads and this company on this
one to inflict as much punishment as practicable on this cavalry if
encountered. We have reached this point and just halted for a ten
minutes rest.”
As soon as the situation is fully understood and the men are in their
respective positions, a troop of cavalry, represented by a few men
with yellow flags, comes in view of the sentinel and halts. Either
verbally, or by a signal agreed upon, the captain explains that they
have dismounted for rest. The sentinel and platoon commander now have
their problem.
As another example take the same general situation in such terrain
that a glimpse is caught of the troop moving along a road but
immediately it passes behind cover; several hundred yards beyond, if
it continues on the road, the troop will again come into view and be
exposed for a considerable stretch of road and within rifle range.
What is done now?
After the exercise the captain assembles the company and criticises
the errors made and points out what should have been done. In the
first situation opening fire by a few men would result in the hostile
troop’s mounting and getting away with little damage or else in their
getting their horses back under cover and being prepared to fight on
foot. After the company once opens fire it will have a target but for
a very short time; hence great care must be exercised in estimating
the distance, dividing the target and giving the other necessary
orders so as to produce the greatest effect in the least time. The
captain should carefully study his problem and be prepared to give an
instructive critique.
[Sidenote: Suggestions for fire problems]
A little book called “Fire Problems” by T. D. Pilcher of the British
Army is recommended to our officers; it treats this subject more
fully, gives several problems and shows how the solutions should be
criticized.
The problems must be gotten up, as a matter of course, to fit the
ground you have. A great variety of fire problems is afforded by any
terrain. There should be some problems in which more than one target
is offered. In getting up problems do not let yourself be hampered
by the critics who will tell you that a troop of cavalry would not
have crossed your front without having discovered you or without
having been warned by its patrols: you are teaching fire tactics,
not cavalry tactics, and besides, even cavalry has been known to do
foolish and careless things. Try to make the problem reasonable and
one which might occur in war but do not discard a good fire problem
which teaches a valuable lesson because the situation is one which
ought never to arise in battle. Few problems that are tried out in
maneuvers will ever be duplicated in that exact form in war but the
tactical principles involved will recur often.
[Sidenote: Distribution of fire problem]
There is one field firing problem which, if practiced once each year,
would do a world of good in securing fire distribution. A line of
prone figures is placed to represent the enemy on ground so selected
that, while the figures cannot all be seen by the attackers, yet a
man in the place of each figure could see the ground over which the
advance is made. The defensive line should not be straight; it would
seldom be so in war, it must conform to the ground. There should be
stretches of thirty or forty figures that are concealed, then groups
in plain view; brush, clumps of heavy grass afford the kind of cover
desired. Have the battalion go through the form of attacking this
line, using ball cartridges. Then have the men inspect the targets,
see how plainly they could have been seen by the enemy while the
latter was out of sight and see the effect of cover on the fire drawn
and the faults in distribution. After this carefully explain the
results of a lack of distribution; point out that the long stretches
of the hostile line not under fire would have been doing target
practice work on your advancing line and what the resulting losses
would have been.
It is an effective way of impressing on men’s minds the necessity of
proper distribution and of firing where directed whether they see
anything or not. It also shows the advantage of cover, if only from
view. The men must be taught to take advantage of cover, if only from
view, whenever offered, if it can be done without interfering with
their doing their work.
[Sidenote: Combat against cavalry]
For combat against cavalry the men must be taught in their bayonet
work the proper way to oppose a man on horseback. How to meet a
charge with fire must be largely theoretical but it should be
carefully explained and, if a few mounted men are available to
outline a charging force, some practical work can be had; it is a
fire problem.
[Sidenote: Special company problems]
There are many problems in minor tactics that should form part of
every company’s training, such as forcing a defile or a bridge,
passing through a village as a patrol or as advance party of an
advance guard, passing a woods under the same conditions and, on the
side of the defense, preventing a hostile force from doing these
things. There may be no gorge or pass through hills in your immediate
vicinity but the practice can still be had: two large buildings
near together will answer for a defile; the garrison is a village.
If there be no bridge, with a little imagination you can improvise
something to answer. In this class of problems the captain must know
the tactics of his problem and be able to explain it thoroughly.
Generally in these problems detachments having important missions
have to be made; give their commanders much latitude in carrying
them out and in your critique point out the errors and how the work
should have been done. It is well in all such problems to precede
them by a simple talk to the whole company explaining the tactical
principles governing the work. These problems can be made the most
interesting part of the company’s training.
Instruction must be given the company in meeting artillery fire
and in the work of the various covering detachments but these two
subjects, owing to their importance and length, are reserved for
consideration in separate chapters.
[Sidenote: Hints for company work]
The company commander must get the full help and support of his
platoon and squad leaders, much depends upon them; they are the
real leaders of the men; they require much training and practice,
especially in leading the rushes and in controlling and directing
fire.
The discipline must be strict in these exercises, the men must never
be allowed to slight the work. A certain amount of latitude must be
given but prompt obedience to an order must be insisted upon. Without
such discipline an attack is hopeless; the drill field is the place
to acquire it.
In all this work keep the interest of the men. Occasionally take
them to a shady place and instruct them orally, explain the objects
sought and the reasons for doing things in anything that is part of
their proper training.
Do not keep at one class of work until the men are tired of it; vary
the work. You can keep a company interested for four hours a day if
you will only vary the instruction and put some soul into it. Give
very little place rest; for a rest change the work. Combat exercises
must be frequent. They are entitled to a large share of the time; the
work of the firing line must be a habit.
THE BATTALION
[Sidenote: Hints for battalion training]
The period of company training having been completed that of the
battalion commences. The same general plan should be followed as in
the case of the company. The mechanism of extended order should first
be thoroughly learned, then the attack against an outlined enemy,
then battalion against battalion. The enlisted men have little new to
learn, the work for them is merely practice in what they have learned
in the company training. For the captains it is instruction in team
work and in tactics.
The battalion is the attack unit and as a tactical unit is most
important. An infantry attack is largely a combination of battalion
attacks. Every exercise should be a problem which teaches some lesson
as well as affords practice. The employment of combat patrols of some
size can be made a part of the exercise and their proper use and
leading taught. The use of the local support, how it is handled and
how maneuvered, is a very important part.
In these exercises the major must control his battalion as in battle.
The absurdity of his riding around and giving verbal instructions
to his firing line must not be permitted. A great part of the value
of these combat exercises lies in the practice given in handling a
battalion with the limited means of control possible on the field of
battle and accustoming company commanders to carrying out their part
under the same conditions. Majors thus learn to give their initial
orders so as to insure the carrying out of their plan of action.
The battalion being the attack unit, whether alone or as part of a
long line, its rushes are independent of those of other battalions
although as a whole it keeps the general line. Each company of course
must govern its advance by that of the others in the same battalion.
An advance can only start from one flank or the other of the
battalion and then continue successively to completion. Rushes never
start from both flanks or the center; the reason for this is obvious.
The little flags mentioned under company training can be used in
battalion training to even better advantage. Captains are more on
their own responsibility in a battalion than are platoon commanders
in a company and must act according to assumed existing conditions.
In the battalion the shifting of fire from one target to another is
less frequent than in the company. New unexpected targets are cared
for, as a rule, by the support.
Battalion commanders have more need of reconnaissance and must get
experience in ordering it properly and judging the reports and basing
their action thereon.
When a battalion operates against battalion the colonel should
prepare the problems and act as umpire. If he does not do this the
practice should not be omitted, the majors concerned must get up
their own although this is not so satisfactory.