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TRAINING
INFANTRY
BY
JOHN F. MORRISON
Colonel of Infantry
U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1914
COPYRIGHT. 1914. BY JOHN F. MORRISON
Ketcheson Printing Company
Leavenworth
PREFACE
In my commissioned service of over thirty-three years I have spent
over twenty-two years with my regiment and three years in training
a battalion of college cadets. I have been intimately associated
with the national guard of one state and have had experience with
the guard of four other states. I have seen something of foreign
troops in both peace and war. In these many years I have observed the
methods of training employed by a number of officers.
Our infantry training has improved over what I first knew but there
still exists in places a lack of completeness and system. Of late
years a much greater interest than formerly has been taken in the
tactical instruction and training of our officers and the progress
has been marked. The tactician is, however, but the skilled mechanic;
the tools with which he works are his troops. New recruits are like
the lump of ore, of no use until converted into steel and then forged
into shape. The making of this tool from the raw material is our
principal business during peace.
At the request of officers with whom I have often talked and
corresponded on the subject of training infantry, this little book of
suggestions has been prepared. It is based on my own experience and
observation and what others have told me of their work. It is offered
by an older officer to his younger brothers in the infantry in the
hope that it may be of some service to them.
J. F. M.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE 3
INTRODUCTION 7
CHAPTER
I THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE 9
KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT
II GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 19
WINTER AND SUMMER WORK
III FIRE SUPERIORITY 32
FIRE DISTRIBUTION, CONTROL AND
DISCIPLINE, SIGNALS
IV COMBAT 44
THE COMPANY, BATTALION, REGIMENT
V ARTILLERY FIRE 70
EFFECTIVENESS, FORMATIONS TO MEET
TEAM PLAY
VI PATROLS, ADVANCE AND REAR GUARDS, OUTPOSTS 89
VII MARCHING 104
PREPARATIONS, INSTRUCTION, PRACTICE
VIII THE NATIONAL GUARD 113
ESSENTIAL TRAINING FOR, ARMORY
WORK AND SUMMER CAMPS
IX INSPECTIONS 130
YEARLY, COMPANY AND BATTALION
EXAMINATIONS
X TRAINING A NEW REGIMENT 134
PRINCIPLES, SCHEDULE FOR
XI RECRUITING 161
NEED FOR A CHANGE, PLAN, REASONS
XII IN CONCLUSION 177
RELATIVE VALUES, STRENGTH OF THE
COMPANY, OUR RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
[Sidenote: Importance of training infantry]
There is nothing more important to an army than the correct training
of its infantry. The training of all the arms has much in common, but
training infantry, owing to the manner of its use in battle, calls
for much that is not required in the other arms.
The infantry soldier must work more independently than men in the
other branches. He cannot be led or controlled as can men in groups
or close formations; hence he needs to be more thoroughly instructed
in the part he is to play. This instruction cannot be given him on
the field of battle. The man who must steadily advance on an enemy in
position requires not only higher training but higher discipline than
one who does his fighting in close formation, or at long range and
out of sight of the enemy and protected from hostile fire by steel
shields.
The mere mechanical part of the drill of all the arms is not
difficult as regards its execution on the peaceful drillground but
it requires much training to carry out these same things on the
battlefield.
[Sidenote: Importance of infantry training]
It is reported as an incident in the recent Balkan War that a general
of division, whose infantry had been reinforced by the addition of
fifty per cent of recruits who had only received about a month’s
training, prepared for battle by sending all his new men to the rear,
preferring to fight without them. His division was successful but the
other divisions, which retained their new men in ranks during combat,
broke and were routed.
War of today is not a game for amateurs. Infantry to be of any value
has not only to be trained but to be properly and thoroughly trained.
On the part of those in charge of this training there is necessary
an appreciative understanding of the objects sought, earnest effort,
tact, enthusiasm, and a real knowledge of men.
I
THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT
[Sidenote: Practise and theory]
To ensure the proper training of our infantry there are needed
competent officers—officers who know what should be taught and how to
teach it. One sometimes hears: “He is a good practical soldier but he
knows nothing of the theory.” Such an expression is an absurdity. A
man may know the theory yet be unable to apply it or make practical
use of it; we have all seen such men. But a man cannot practice what
he does not know. The knowledge of theory required by the junior
commander is not great and the time it takes to learn it is short
compared with the time required to master its practical application
and to instruct properly a command.
[Sidenote: Needs of the unit commander]
The first requisite for a unit commander is a knowledge of the
fundamental principles of the tactics of his arm and its employment
in combination with the other arms, especially with the artillery.
He must have a clear conception of the modern battlefield in order
to understand for what he must train his unit. He must train it for
battle conditions, not peace conditions. A company trained to be
handled exclusively by word of command, as in a close order drill on
the parade ground, lacks the training that fits for battle.
[Sidenote: Needs of the unit commander]
[Sidenote: Essential and desirable instruction]
The more the enlisted men know of the art of war the better. Time
is not available however, to teach them the whole art of war even
if the men in ranks were capable of mastering it. The instructor
must therefore clearly understand what are the things the men _must_
know and what are merely _desirable_ as additions to their training.
Every effort should be spent and all available time devoted to first
perfecting the men in the things they _must_ know; afterwards, if
more time is available, it is well to extend in other directions
their education and training.
[Sidenote: Close order drill]
Under the first heading, _essentials_, the men must be taught their
close order drill. This is necessary for two reasons: it renders
possible the orderly movement of troops and it makes for discipline.
So far as the orderly movement of troops is concerned very little
is necessary but without precision close order drill is of no value
towards discipline. To have a disciplinary value, drill movements
must be carried out with exactitude. Discipline is injured if,
when an officer gives a command at drill, it is only carried out
approximately; the soldier is acquiring the habit of slighting his
work and of doing an approximation, not the precise duty demanded of
him.
It takes but little longer to learn to execute correctly the few
movements prescribed than to learn them incorrectly, but it requires
constant attention on the part of the instructor to maintain
exactness. The attention and effort required on the part of the
instructor are, however, amply compensated by the results.
[Sidenote: Extended order drill]
The men must know perfectly the mechanism of the extended order
drill. A company must be able without confusion or mix-up to form
line of skirmishers in the least possible time from any formation and
facing in any direction. This will necessitate much practice. It does
not take long to learn to form line of skirmishers quietly, from line
or column of squads, facing to the front; but that is not sufficient.
[Sidenote: Other essentials]
The men must know how to estimate distances, how to shoot, how to use
the bayonet; they must understand patrolling and outpost duty, the
construction of hasty intrenchments, the application of first aid,
how to cook the ration and how to care for their arms and equipment.
Especially important is it that the men know how to march and how to
care for themselves in the field. However well instructed a soldier
may be he is of no use if at the time of battle he is back in the
hospital.
[Sidenote: Desirable instruction]
Under the second heading, of things that it is desirable the men
should know, are subjects which are essential for the officers to
know but which are not equally essential for the men. Nevertheless
it is an advantage to have them know as much as possible, provided
the merely desirable instruction does not interfere with the proper
training in essentials. Among these subjects are topography and the
construction of temporary bridges; the list might be extended almost
indefinitely.
[Sidenote: Things to be understood and things to be made fixed habits]
The instructor must further distinguish between the essential things
which the men need merely to know or to understand and those which
need to be practiced until they become habits. Those things the men
will only be required to do off the battlefield, where they will
have time to think and be in condition to use their heads, need only
be known.
Psychology teaches us that under great stress of danger and
excitement a man can be depended upon to do only those things which
have become fixed habits, and further, that under these same trying
conditions, a man who has acquired by practice a habit of doing
something a certain way cannot do that thing differently. Action
contrary to habit requires thought, and mental activity is difficult
if not impossible under the circumstances. Acting according to habit
is merely following the line of least resistance.
It is difficult to conceive of greater stress of danger and
excitement than exists in a modern battle. Certainly there is no
other case in which the knowledge of this psychological truth can be
used to greater advantage than in training for battle.
[Sidenote: Fixed habits in battle]
As far as possible, then, all those things which the men must do
under fire should be practiced until they become fixed habits. It has
been said that if in the heat of battle a man even raises his rifle
to his shoulder, before firing, it shows fair discipline. Not only
must bringing the rifle to the shoulder be made a habit, but correct
aiming and trigger pull whenever the rifle is brought to the shoulder
must be made a habit, and one so strongly developed that these acts
will always be done mechanically and without mental effort.
[Sidenote: Habits of correct aiming and firing]
This desired result cannot be accomplished by two or three weeks
a year of target practice. The training must be continuous for an
extended period. To accomplish it altogether with ball cartridges
would be too costly and often impracticable. The desired results can
be obtained by pointing and aiming drills and gallery practice, if
these are so conducted that the men never pull the trigger without
properly bringing the rifle to the shoulder and looking through the
sights at some target.
A week of continuous work every six months will not accomplish the
results; frequent short drill periods are necessary. A man who starts
in by smoking three strong cigars every Christmas and Fourth of
July but not touching tobacco between times will not be so likely
to acquire the smoking habit as one who starts very moderately
and repeats the act daily. Overdoing any kind of training at one
time, with long intervals between has a tendency to produce dislike
rather than a habit. A few minutes of honest work at least twice
every week, in pointing and aiming drill and gallery practice, will
accomplish the result desired and my experience convinces me that it
also produces much better results on the target range than crowding
even more of this practice into the last month before going on the
range. Certainly it is worth more than the other as a habit-former.
[Sidenote: Estimating the range]
The better a man can shoot when the range is known to him the more
important it is that his sight elevation be correct. A poor shot will
scatter his bullets and may hit something even with a wrong elevation
but the accurate shot will not hit anything; yet the correct range is
valuable even to the poor shot.
On the battlefield we can count only on our estimate of the range;
seldom will it be practicable to determine it otherwise. Thus
estimating distances has to be made a habit for two reasons: since
habits alone count in battle, only by making it a habit can we depend
on its being done; and second, it requires constant practice to
enable men to estimate distances with fair accuracy.
Devoting two or three consecutive days annually to estimating
distances is almost a waste of time; practice should be had every
week. I have seen both methods used and I am certain as to their
relative values. How this instruction should be given will be
mentioned later.
The deployments, advancing the attack, working by signals, taking
advantage of cover, and in fact everything pertaining to combat from
the opening of fire until the end of the battle must be practiced
until it becomes a fixed habit on the part of the men.
[Sidenote: The officer as instructor]
If we are to have good infantry the officers as instructors must
be competent, have an appreciation of relative values, be able to
distinguish between what is essential and what is merely desirable
and make sure of essentials before spending time on the latter. Each
officer must realize fully what has only to be known and what must be
made fixed habit and govern his work accordingly.
[Sidenote: Hints as to instruction work]
Now a few hints as to the instruction work. Never do this work in a
perfunctory manner. Always have in mind what you want to teach and
how you are going to do it. Put your heart in your work.
I have seen a well drilled company go to pieces under an officer who
gave his commands in an indifferent manner and who gave too much
“place rest.” The spirit of indifference is contagious as well as the
spirit of enthusiasm. If you have no keen interest simulate it and
you will find it grow into the real thing. Remember that you are paid
for good work and if you do not give this kind of service you are
obtaining money fraudulently.
But not only have you yourself to keep interested; if the best
results are to be obtained you must keep up the interest of your men.
Nothing kills interest like monotony. There are so many things to be
taught and there is so great an opportunity for variety that there is
no excuse for not keeping the men interestedly busy for four hours a
day.
Make clear to the men in the instruction work, particularly in the
field training, not only the object sought but the why and wherefore.
In maneuvers always explain the problem to them so far as is
necessary to make them understand what the command is trying to do,
where the enemy is supposed to be, and the rest. They will respond
not only by taking more interest but by doing their part much better.
I have seen a flank patrol out at a maneuver the leader of which
knew nothing of the supposed situation and had been given no
instructions, except to act as left flank patrol. What interest could
he be expected to take in the maneuver? How could he be counted on
properly to perform his duty?
[Sidenote: Callisthenic drill]
I believe in carrying out this principle even in the callisthenic
drill. Explain to the men the object of each movement, what muscle is
to be developed by it and its advantage. Doing this makes this work
much more profitable to the men as well as more interesting. It will
also prevent our seeing these movements so executed as to deprive
them of all their intended value.
[Sidenote: Appeal to the intelligence of the men]
In other words, treat the men being instructed as the intelligent men
they are. They will both learn faster and do better work when they
fully understand what is to be done and the reason why. A horse must
be simply made to do certain things in a given way; it is a tedious
process and a horse never does know much. Men trained as soldiers
on the same plan as the horse give results out of all proportion to
the time and effort spent. Why not, therefore, make use of the man’s
intelligence and simply help him train himself?
II
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME
In this country we cannot follow literally any of the systems of
training adopted by the great military powers: our whole military
system is too different. We can, however, profit by their experience
and, if we translate, not the literal text of their regulations but
the spirit, gain much. It is essential that any scheme of instruction
adopted should be suited to our organization, method of recruitment
and the various conditions surrounding our service.
[Sidenote: Requisites of a system of training]
The work must be so planned as to utilize all the available time
of the year and in that time to cover all the absolute essentials
of instruction. In this utilization of the time schools for
non-commissioned officers and officers must be included. There is
much ground to be covered during the year and unless the time be
wisely apportioned it cannot be done.
There is much of the work that can be done indoors; other work can
only be done outside. Our troops are so widely scattered and under
such varying climatic conditions that the distribution of time cannot
profitably be the same for all.
[Sidenote: Winter and summer work]
[Sidenote: Schools]
Each post should make its own schedule. The work in each post must,
however, be uniform. For example, in the northern part of the United
States the year’s training should begin November 1st and end October
31st. All the instruction that can be given during the winter months,
should be given, leaving the rest for the open season. The schools
for both officers and non-commissioned officers are held during the
indoor season; the work done in them should dovetail in with the
general scheme of instruction. Particular care should be exercised
with respect to the non-commissioned officers’ schools; in them the
non-commissioned officers should be taught thoroughly how to play
their part in the varied work in the field and be given the reasons
for things.
Simply repeating the words of a book should be avoided; teach them to
do things. The company commander who is capable and in earnest can do
much in winter toward training his company even in garrisons where
weather conditions are the worst.
[Sidenote: Methods of winter instruction]
Most of the captains of one regiment known to me have been doing good
work during the past two years in teaching the principles of the
conduct of patrols and covering detachments. Some of them made use
of the Stacey Relief Map; others simply built a sand table about ten
feet by five. On this the sand was moulded to form hills and valleys.
Blue strings were laid down for streams, yellow ones for roads.
Miniature bridges were constructed and placed where desired. Small
twigs were used to make forests.
By means of practical examples worked out on these made or improvised
maps the principles were thoroughly taught and more easily than is
possible out of doors; when spring came, only a few exercises on the
ground were necessary to make these companies proficient.
[Sidenote: Entrenching]
Another use made of the sand table was in the teaching of
entrenching. Bull Durham tobacco sacks were converted into sand
bags and the men taught their use in revetting, loop-holing, etc.
Similarly on a miniature scale were taught the preparation of
headlogs, the making of gabions, facines and hurdle revetment. Brush
work thus taught indoors needs only be followed by one outdoor
exercise, in which work is done on the scale actually used in the
field, in order to render the company proficient.
[Sidenote: Gymnasium]
Where the post is so fortunate as to be provided with a gymnasium
full advantage should be taken during the winter season of the
opportunities for physical training which it affords. The physical
development of the men is most important. Where no gymnasium is
available a well-planned course in callisthenics is the best
substitute and should be used. Callisthenics to music or for pure
show should be prohibited.
[Sidenote: First aid Signalling]
The indoor season must be fully utilized to save the full time of
the outdoor season for that training which can only be given then.
Instruction in such subjects as first aid and signalling naturally is
given at this time. A place for gallery practice can always be rigged
up.
[Sidenote: Estimating distances]
The foundation for estimating distances must be laid, and there
should be practice in it every week, during the closed season. In
this work the whole company should be employed together only for the
first one or two exercises when the principles are being explained;
after that a platoon or less at a time. Near each barracks there
should be two stakes one hundred yards apart and so placed that the
men see them every time the company forms. This is their unit of
measure and cannot become too familiar to them.
The captain or someone designated by him selects a couple of
distances to be estimated. Each subdivision of the company then goes
out in turn and upon completing the exercise returns and another goes
out.
The men must be taught to estimate distances both from themselves
to a given point and between two points, both at some distance from
them. The latter is necessary in their patrol work in estimating
lengths of column and frontages occupied. If the estimating be
conducted in this way the weather will make little difference; the
men dress suitably for it and are out only a short time. The work to
be of value must be done under varying conditions of light.
There should be no week in the year in which this exercise is not
conducted. In summer it should be done on the days when the company
is away from the garrison on the weekly practice march; there is
ample time for it during the long halt.
This work can be conducted so as only to take about fifteen minutes
of each man’s time per week. It is well worth it. I have seen the
above plan carried out intelligently in two or three companies and
the results were remarkably good; the ability of the men to estimate
distance was better than that given for musketry school graduates
in foreign services. On the other hand I have seen it indifferently
carried out and, like most indifferent work, it was a waste of time.
[Sidenote: Position and aiming drills, gallery practice]
Position and aiming drills and gallery practice must be a weekly
occurrence and holding them twice a week will be better. If the
detachments are made small enough gallery practice requires but
little time for each man. It is important in conducting this practice
to see that no man ever fires a score in a careless or indifferent
manner; if this is permitted the result obtained will be the opposite
of that desired. I found one very effective means of preventing such
careless work: a man found guilty of careless firing was required
to repeat his score—but not at that time when it would delay the
regular course. He had to remain near the gallery until I, or someone
designated by me, came around to supervise his firing and it was
usually some little time before I got around.
[Sidenote: Bayonet fencing]
Throughout the year careful attention should be given to bayonet
fencing. I do not believe that there is much probability of a bayonet
contest in war but, for psychological reasons, this training is
necessary. Positions are carried by the bayonet, but past experience
shows that in such charges the bayonets seldom crossed and when they
did it was a “rough and tumble.” Our men may go in with the best
intentions in the world to use the bayonet according to rule, yet the
chances are that, in the excitement of the mélee, habit will assert
itself and the gun become a bat.
Nevertheless, troops are very seldom “shot out of a position”; the
imminent threat of the bayonet is necessary; but, as the opposing
bayonets get close, one side or the other weakens.
[Sidenote: Kind of bayonet required]
It would be folly to expect men without bayonets to charge an enemy
with long and sharp ones, or to expect them without bayonets to stand
a charge by an enemy armed with such weapons, even though, if they
had bayonets, they would be likely to club their rifles. The moral
effect of a line of bayonets is great.
Infantry should be armed with the best of bayonets, long and, in war
time, razor sharp. The men must have confidence in their ability to
use them with skill and effect; otherwise they will neither charge
nor stand the enemy’s charge. At that stage of the fight success
largely depends on the confidence of the individual man in his power
to win.
[Sidenote: Amount of bayonet practice]
Bayonet fencing should be continuous throughout the year. At least
one-half-hour weekly should be devoted to it and during the indoor
season extended and careful instruction should be given to groups
not larger than a squad. During the outdoor season this instruction
should be so arranged as not to interfere with the regular drills.
[Sidenote: Division into sections for instruction]
The company should be divided into sections that can be handled
conveniently for the instruction work. The success of the indoor work
largely depends on keeping the sections small enough.
This is especially necessary in first aid and sandtable work. If the
sections are too large at estimating distance and gallery practice it
results in too much idle standing around.
[Sidenote: Changing sections]
The sections must be changed from one class of work to another before
the work drags or the men become tired of it. Give them variety.
[Sidenote: Selecting instructors]
The captain must exercise care in selecting the instructors for the
various subjects. The man who will do it the best should be the
instructor in each. Perfunctory or indifferent work should never be
allowed on the part of an instructor or by the man being instructed.
[Sidenote: The captain]
The capable, intelligent and honest captain will utilize the
indoor season to the great benefit of his company and of his
government. He will discover the best ways and means of instructing
his own particular men. The incompetent captain, lacking average
intelligence, will accomplish nothing under any circumstances.
[Sidenote: Initiative in the instruction work]
As much latitude as practicable should be given to subordinate
commanders in carrying out any system of instruction and they should
be held strictly responsible for results. A scheme in which there
is laid down just how each thing is to be taught, and how much time
and what time is to be devoted to it, is radically wrong. We need to
develop our officers as well as our men. The conditions are different
at different posts. The needs of different companies at the same
posts are varied. Each captain should know just how much time he has
and what is absolutely required of him in that time. He should then
be allowed to work out his own solution of the problem.
When every detail is prescribed the officer has no initiative,
his interest is diminished, he thinks less, exercises less
responsibility, and his work is not so good. If that policy be kept
up long enough the subordinate officer will never do anything without
positive instructions. An officer who exercises no judgment is of no
value in war.
[Sidenote: The regiment a team]
But absolute liberty for the subordinate to do as he pleases is
impracticable. The regiment is a team of which his unit is only one
member. There must be team play and every member must know and be
able to do his part. The company must be taught certain things or it
will not fit into the battalion team; the battalion must be fitted
for the regimental team. Each larger unit must have time for training
and has a right to demand that each lower unit which forms a part of
it shall have accomplished its own special work on time and be ready
to play its part in the work of the larger unit.
[Sidenote: The colonel]
The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. He
should allot the time, supervise the work and see that every member
of the team is ready. He is the best judge of the requirements of
his regiment. But the colonel should do this so as to leave all the
liberty practicable to subordinate commanders.
[Sidenote: Orders and restriction]
If all our captains were competent and reliable this work of
the colonel would be very simple. But there are a few captains,
unfortunately, who are far from the best, whose long suit at drill
is “place rest” and having a sergeant drill the company in Butts’
Manual. While more restrictions are necessary for such captains these
restrictions do not hamper the others; they merely prohibit things
the right kind of captain would never think of doing or require what
he would never think of omitting.
[Sidenote: Time to organizations]
Of course most of the instruction time belongs to the companies; it
is in them that most of the work must be done. Four well trained
companies under a competent major can be made into a well trained
battalion in a very few days, and the time required for each higher
unit is less than that for the one next below.
[Sidenote: Time to target practice]
To the company belongs all the indoor season. In dividing the rest
of the year for the northern part of the U. S. I believe that the
available time from April 1st to October 1st should be allotted in
the proportion of 4 days to the company for each 2 to the battalion
and 1 to the regiment. The month of October should be devoted to
maneuvers and to work in higher units. The time spent on the target
range is excluded in computing the available time but no company
should be allowed to devote more than two weeks to target practice
exclusive of field firing; of the latter we can hardly get too much.
It is appreciated that conditions at various posts make different
schedules necessary.
In the past we have seen the training done in a back-handed way: work
in the higher units first, finally down to the company and soldier.
This is so unlikely to occur in future that its evil results are not
worth mentioning.
[Sidenote: Time to close order drill]
Too much time should not be devoted to close order drill, especially
during the outdoor season. An hour a day for the first five or six
drills and thereafter fifteen minutes a day is ample. There should
always be, however, at least ten minutes a day of snappy, precise
close order work; this together with the ceremonies will keep the
companies up to the standard. Too much close order drill becomes
monotonous; when that happens the command fails to improve even if
it does not deteriorate.
[Sidenote: Length of drills]
The drills during the indoor season should be two hours long; for the
rest of the year not less than three and generally from four to six
hours daily.
III
FIRE SUPERIORITY
We are told that in battle we must have fire superiority to win; and
fire control and direction are held as important. I doubt if these
terms are fully understood by all. A hope to aid some of our younger
officers to a better understanding of these terms, and of the vital
importance of fire distribution, is the excuse for this chapter.
[Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle]
A line of men firing with the rifle, if not disturbed or endangered
by the fire of an enemy, can do approximately target practice work.
Now let a heavy fire be opened on them, one that is fairly accurate
and well placed, and their work falls off very greatly; the heavier
the fire they are subjected to the less effective becomes their own
fire.
Careful study and research by competent men of foreign armies leads
to the conclusion that if this line, when not under fire, could make
280 hits in a given time, subjected to a heavy, well placed fire its
effectiveness would fall to 1/40 or 1/70; that is, from 280 hits to 7
or 4.
[Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle]
This looks extreme at first thought; but what captain with a good
company but would know that he could deploy his company at from 800
to 1000 yards from a line of lying down figures and get a hit for at
least every 10 shots. Yet history tells us that it takes from 1200
to 2000 shots in battle to put a man out of action. In the light of
these facts our first figures look very moderate.
With our present infantry arm an advance against a hostile line doing
280 work is impossible. Bring the enemy’s effectiveness down to the
four and keep it there and you can advance and win.
Fire superiority does not mean that you are firing more shots than
the enemy, it does not mean he is firing less than you; it means that
your fire has become so close and effective that he has lost his
nerve and is shooting wildly.
[Sidenote: Fire distribution]
To obtain this fire superiority certain things are necessary. We must
have proper fire distribution. To explain this let us assume that a
hostile line is 200 yards long, that our force is the stronger. We
concentrate our fire on the right half of the hostile line, leaving
the other half untouched. The effectiveness of the fire of half of
this line remains at 280, the other half falls to 2, average 141;
our advance is impossible. We now cover the entire target and its
fire effectiveness falls to 7; our advance is possible.
[Sidenote: Fire distribution]
Fire superiority is possible, then, only if we have fire
distribution. It is not sufficient to fire a certain number of shots
at part of the line, the whole hostile line must be subjected to a
nerve racking fire to reduce the effectiveness of its fire.
Another thing to be considered is that the enemy will conceal himself
as much as possible. On a large part of the hostile line no one will
be seen; men will be hidden by tufts of grass, bushes, etc. But while
this cover conceals the enemy from our view, he sees our location
and his fire is not interrupted. There is a strong tendency to shoot
only at the men that can be seen. This must be overcome; much of
our firing must be aimed at a locality, although unseen the enemy
is nevertheless there and his fire effectiveness must be kept down.
Our fire must be distributed to cover every part of the hostile line
whether the enemy is seen or not.
[Sidenote: Fire control]
To secure this fire distribution we must be able to direct the fire
of our men, to place it where wanted. But direction necessarily
implies control; you can not direct what you cannot control. Thus a
fire control system which will work on the battlefield is a primary
requisite to success.
[Sidenote: Fire discipline]
Another term used is fire discipline. The word fire adds nothing to
its meaning; but discipline is vital to success. No matter what your
system of control, if the men do not respond with prompt obedience it
is worthless. Disciplined men can be counted on to do what is wanted
if they know how, others cannot. There is no fire discipline distinct
from other military discipline.
To sum up: fire superiority is necessary to success, to attain fire
superiority we must properly distribute our fire, to do this we must
be able to control and hence direct it, and this can only be done if
our men are disciplined. An attack with raw troops is possible only
against still poorer ones.
[Sidenote: Method of fire control]
Our fire control and direction needs more explanation. A method
must be had which will work on the battlefield. No one who has seen
a modern battle will think for a moment that it is practicable to
control and direct a firing line by verbal orders. A battalion
commander must be far enough to the rear to observe his entire line.
In the noise of a real battle his voice could not be heard ten yards
by men on the firing line. The same is equally true of company and
platoon commanders. These officers cannot be running up and down the
line giving instructions; if they tried it they would not last long.
[Sidenote: Use of signals]
Our method must therefore be one that can be executed independently
of the voice and with as little exposure of the officers as
practicable. The method by signals given in our I. D. R. answers the
requirements. The text of it can be learned in a few minutes, but to
train a battalion so that it will fully respond under danger requires
hours of practice: it is one thing that must become a habit.
After the mechanism of the drill is learned officers should conduct
their line as in battle by signals only. Do not teach men to expect
you to be running up and down the line personally correcting errors
and giving directions, leading them to expect this to be done in
battle. The effect of a decided change in conduct when danger is
present is apt not to be good. Moreover, the command will not respond
to signals alone on the battlefield if, in instruction work, they
have never been taught to depend on them exclusively. We should do
everything at battle exercises just as nearly as possible as it will
be done in battle.
[Sidenote: Use of signals]
I have seen at battle exercises men stand up in the open and wave
their flags to give the signals. This is absurd. In battle it would
be needlessly dangerous, would give the enemy too much information,
and it is unnecessary. The necessary signals in the battalion can
be given by a man lying on the ground with a handkerchief, or flag
without the staff, and be seen for the short distances separating the
major from his captains or the captain from his platoon commanders.
Practice alone is required to enable this to be done efficiently. It
must be so done in battle and must therefore be drilled that way.
It should be remembered that the new semaphore code recently adopted
does not apply to these signals. The new code requires men to stand;
the old must be used for these battle signals.
[Sidenote: Additional signals]
Additional signals to those given in the I. D. R. may be taught
and used in companies. It is doubtful if they are necessary and if
not necessary they are wrong. The more signals you have, the more
chance of mistakes. Signals for forming squad or platoon columns are
unnecessary. These movements are not executed close to the enemy nor
when your line is firing, hence verbal commands are practicable and
when practicable are desirable, are surer and easier.
[Sidenote: Additional signals]
Signals are necessary when your line has commenced the fire fight but
from there on few commands are necessary; there are so few things
that can be ordered, the time for maneuver and instruction is past.
One or two of those given might be dispensed with and one for fixing
bayonets should be added; possibly there are one or two others that
should be added.
[Sidenote: Observing fire effectiveness]
We have discussed how to obtain fire superiority; how may we
know when we have it, if the volume of the enemy’s fire remains
practically the same? Company and platoon commanders must watch for
the effect of the enemy’s fire, where his bullets are striking. If
the hostile bullets are going wild, some striking far short, others
way high, and very few are effective, you have fire superiority;
that is the time to gain distance to the front. On the other hand,
although you may be suffering no loss, you see that the enemy’s
bullets, well massed, are striking, say 50 yards in your front; you
have no fire superiority; the enemy has simply underestimated the
range and your advance will bring you into the center of his beaten
zone. But this is your opportunity to gain fire superiority. Your men
are suffering little or no loss, should be less affected and should
do better work. If this opportunity is well utilized you will gain
fire superiority.
[Sidenote: Observing fire effectiveness]
When you have fire superiority you must push the advance, take full
advantage of your opportunity; if you temporarily lose it, suspend
the advance until you regain the necessary superiority.
[Sidenote: Distribution of fire]
Fire properly distributed is one essential to gaining fire
superiority. Proper distribution means it is placed _on_ the target
and on all of the target, not just one part. Placing our fire on the
target requires that our men be at least fair shots, have their nerve
and know the range. To cover all the target rather than concentrate
on a part is not easy and to attain practical efficiency in this
requires skill and practice.
In the deployment for battle the division is generally given a
specific mission, the division commander assigns to each brigade its
part of the task, and so on down to the battalion, company, platoon
and even squad.
[Sidenote: Distribution of fire]
There is little involved in the larger units except the tactical
skill to know how to use the larger units to gain the required end;
dividing the terrain is easy. It is difficult with the commanders
of the smaller units; the division of the target generally becomes
harder the smaller the subdivision. The major must divide his target,
say between two companies, and do it so that there can be no mistake
on the part of the captains as to just what part each is to cover.
The company commander must then divide his section among his platoons
and the latter often among the squads.
[Sidenote: The captain’s problems]
The battalion commander has only one difficulty—to find a way to make
each captain clearly understand where is the division of target and
where its extreme limit. The company commander has a shorter line to
divide and has to divide it into more parts. Landmarks are not so
common as he will then desire.
[Sidenote: The captain’s problems]
The captain has another problem in this connection: shall he divide
his target into four parts and assign each platoon a separate part,
or into two parts and give two platoons the same target, i. e., 1st
and 3d the right half, 2d and 4th the left half? The captain has not
only the problem of finding proper dividing points in the target,
but he must divide and allot the target so as to get the best fire
effect. It might happen, as I once saw in a field firing problem,
that the right platoon could not see the corresponding part of the
target, hence was given the other extreme flank and the rest of the
target divided accordingly. It is not the division alone, but what is
the best division and allotment, that must be considered.
[Sidenote: Practice in distributing the target]
This will all be more clearly understood if you will go in the
country and assume a regiment is ordered to attack a certain line
under certain conditions, and then give the colonel’s attack
order, from that take each major’s target and divide it between
the companies and then divide each company target. This should, of
course, always be done at the same distance from the target that you
would have to make the distribution if a real enemy were there. You
should have two or three men with you to act as the subordinates
in each case and to determine whether the division is fully and
perfectly understood. It is easy on a map, but often very difficult
on the ground; distinctive marks are sometimes very scarce.
Each commander should practice this, devising a method for himself
that will work. Officers alone or together in small groups should
practice it as a sort of tactical walk. But primarily it should be
done in each unit: the colonel should take the majors on such a
tactical walk; the majors their captains; the captains their platoon
commanders. Estimating distance should be worked in the same exercise.
For the companies this is good work for the indoor season. There
are days when work can be planned for the company that does not
require the presence of the captain or of most of his officers and
non-commissioned officers; these can then utilize the drill period
as above described. It may be made a real tactical walk with special
stress laid on the division and allotment of the target.
[Sidenote: Assistance of artillery]
It must be borne in mind that in most cases the artillery will play
a large part in the gaining and maintaining of fire superiority.
But this fact does not alter the work of the infantry; we must
still do most of the killing and unnerving of the enemy and this is
true whether the enemy consists of infantry alone or of infantry in
conjunction with artillery.
In this chapter the first part is much like “right line strategy”
mathematics applied to a battlefield where little is subject to such
treatment. But that seemed the easiest and simplest way to make clear
to beginners terms that must be fully understood. It is hoped that
that part of the chapter will be understood as meant, as offering
merely a means of illustration and not as implying that a battle can
be worked out with mathematical precision.
IV
COMBAT
War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of diplomacy.
Diplomacy is not always able to settle international disputes, then
the army must do what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. In our
own history it has been the mass of the people who have forced our
wars, and who, in the case of a strong public sentiment arising, will
involve us again. On account of the state of preparedness of most
great nations and because of the enormous cost of modern war, wars
are shorter than formerly.
[Sidenote: Object of an army]
If this country becomes involved in a war with a military power it
will be impracticable to learn the art of war and train an army after
the outbreak; the war will not last long enough. The object of having
an army is for war not for peace, and the battles alone really decide
the issue; the battles are not numerous but each tends one way or the
other to end the struggle. Great armies exist for many years between
wars and are then trained for these few days of battles which
determine the fate of the nation. The whole aim of an army should be
to be ready for war and the success or failure in war is determined
by a few days of battle. Untrained troops are of no value on the
modern battlefield.
[Sidenote: Training for battle]
Part of our close order drill, the ceremonies and some other things
we teach, are accessories and, if given their proper place, are
of value, but the battlefield is the crucial test; by our fitness
for that must our training be judged. The work of generals and the
general staff is vitally important but the best plan will accomplish
nothing if there are no trained companies to carry out their part.
In this chapter is considered the training necessary for combat. This
is the work executed under the severest strain and under the greatest
difficulties of leadership and control. This training must be
thorough and the things in combat which have to be done must become a
habit.
THE COMPANY
[Sidenote: Extended order practice]
The first essential is that the men must know the mechanism of the
extended order drill, including all signals used. To keep control
of the skirmish line in battle, that is to maintain such order
therein that it can be directed and used as desired, is far from
easy. Excitement and confusion, especially in the last stages of
the combat, are apt to occur. Everything possible must be done to
preserve organization and control.
Much depends upon the start; if there is confusion at the start and
the squads get mixed, success is more than doubtful. In the majority
of cases the deployment will be made quietly at long range, but not
in all. The company must be drilled until able to deploy from all
formations, facing in any direction, in the least time practicable,
and without any confusion or mix-up.
[Sidenote: Calmness in giving orders]
The captain who can give all his orders and commands at the start
of a fight in a calm, unexcited manner has a great advantage over
the one whose voice or manner indicates excitement. This calm manner
should be cultivated during training. As good a way as I know for
such training is to have a few men to represent hostile forces
conceal themselves at various points in a moderately close country;
march the company through this terrain and, as the represented enemy
appears, form skirmish line facing the supposed enemy, give the
range and the commands for opening fire in the least possible time.
The captain himself should not know where the represented enemy will
appear. This is training for the captain and also excellent practice
for the company.
[Sidenote: Restoring order]