exercise, pointing out all errors of tactics and of execution. There
should be much more of tactical instruction and less of mechanical
training in battalion work than in the company.
Majors should not be limited to these drill periods to instruct their
officers but be allowed to have tactical walks at other times. A
major should have a good knowledge of tactics, be able to give clear
and concise orders and enter into the spirit of his work. Four good
companies, under a competent major learn with very little practice to
work together as a team and become an efficient battalion.
THE REGIMENT
[Sidenote: Regimental training]
In the period alloted to the regiment the solution of tactical
problems and thereby the gaining of experience in team work and
imparting tactical instruction to the officers are the ends sought.
The same rules as to method of control, giving of orders and critique
apply as in the case of the battalion.
The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. It is
not trained until the three battalions, the band, machine gun platoon
and mounted detachment are trained, each in its special work, and
then the whole is practiced as a team.
The training of the twelve companies, as such and as battalions, has
been discussed.
[Sidenote: Band]
The band forms a large part numerically of the sanitary detachment of
the regiment in battle. It must be trained and made efficient. This
should be done by the officers of the Medical Corps serving with the
regiment. There should be no perfunctory performance of this work;
the colonel should see that it is thoroughly done.
[Sidenote: Machine gun platoon]
The officer in command of the machine gun platoon must not only
instruct his men in the care and working of the guns, but in the
proper care of all his equipment, including the animals. The machine
gun is an emergency weapon; the commander of the machine gun company
must thoroughly understand the tactical use of this weapon and be
able to act as circumstances demand even without instructions.
[Sidenote: Mounted detachment]
The mounted detachment must be trained as scouts.
[Sidenote: Objects sought in regimental training]
The principal objects sought in the regimental period are practice
and experience by the colonel in handling his regiment as a whole,
practice by the regiment in team work, and tactical instruction for
all. A practical knowledge of tactics on the part of the colonel is
essential if these exercises are to be correctly carried out and his
critique of value. Overlooking tactical errors in these exercises
does much harm, younger officers gain wrong ideas and it is hard to
eradicate errors once firmly fixed in the mind.
If the different units of the regiment are separately well trained
it requires few exercises to make a team of them, good regimental
work is largely a question of the tactical skill and ability of the
colonel. If he is competent and the units are separately well trained
the regiment is trained. Placing these well trained units in the
hands of an incompetent regimental commander is but placing a fine
and complicated machine in the hands of an unskilled operator; there
is a fair chance that he will ruin the machine.
V
ARTILLERY FIRE
[Sidenote: Object of study of artillery]
Except in small engagements in detachment warfare the infantry will
have the assistance of friendly artillery and will be opposed not
only by infantry but by artillery fire. Some knowledge of artillery,
its use, the effects it can produce and how best to utilize the aid
afforded by our own and to meet the opposition of the enemy’s, is
therefore necessary for the infantry officer and also for the men in
ranks. While familiarity with the artillery will be far from breeding
contempt, it will enable the infantry to escape much unnecessary loss
and, by correcting the false conception so many have of its power, it
will improve the morale of our men.
This chapter is not intended to teach infantry officers what they
should know about artillery and its use. It is offered merely as a
suggestion as to what our men should be taught and how to train them
to meet certain phases of this fire. The officer should know much
more about the subject and must go to more extended works by more
competent men for the instruction.
Artillery is effective against infantry both physically and morally.
The moral effect is the greater, the less instructed and trained is
the man. Most untrained men have very exaggerated ideas as to the
effectiveness of artillery, they know nothing but guess much. It is
the terror of the unknown.
[Sidenote: Classes of artillery]
There are two general classes of artillery that accompany an
army: light and heavy. The light artillery may be rifles or light
howitzers; the first have a flat trajectory, the others, of greater
caliber, have the advantage of being able to use high angle fire.
Mountain and horse artillery are merely subdivisions of the light
artillery and, except that the mountain artillery is less effective
at long ranges than the others, “all look alike” to the infantry
advancing under their fire.
The heavy field artillery in our service comprises 4.7” and 5” rifles
and 6” and 7” howitzers. Their range is much greater than that of
the pieces of the light field artillery. In a general way we may say
that these heavy pieces will be used only against hostile batteries,
earth works and material objects or against troops caught in some
mass formation. They will generally not be used against an advancing
skirmish line or troops in proper formation to meet light artillery
fire. There is no training to be given infantry except discipline to
hold them to their duty in an earth work under fire by heavy field
artillery, hence in this chapter we may ignore it.
[Sidenote: Light artillery]
With light field artillery it is very different. The light field
artillery is what concerns us most in our training. The extreme
range for which these guns are sighted is 6500 yards, and at all
ranges under 5000 yards they can produce serious losses on infantry
exposed to their fire. They use two classes of projectiles, shell
and shrapnel. The high explosive shell has a much smaller radius of
action than the shrapnel, but is very effective within this area. It
is generally used to batter material objects and with high angle fire
to get at men in trenches or behind cover.
[Sidenote: Shrapnel]
The shrapnel of the 3” rifle contains 252 bullets and on burst these
bullets are scattered over an area, roughly speaking, elliptical
in form, 200 yards in depth by 25 yards in width. The flatter
the trajectory, the deeper becomes the pattern made; the width
practically does not vary. In other words the 252 bullets are
scattered on burst over an area of 5000 square yards.
If these bullets were uniformly distributed there would be _one_
for every 20 square yards or an area of 15 x 12 feet. They are,
however, not evenly distributed, being thicker in a small area near
the front end. This bullet will not penetrate the infantry soldier’s
pack at any range, so that when lying on the ground his pack affords
complete protection to his spine and considerable protection to all
vital parts except his head. The chance then of a man being wounded
by a single shrapnel, even when inside the cone of dispersion, would
only be about 1 in 80 if in the open and very much less with partial
cover, as a trench, log, etc. The shrapnel bullet will not pass
through one man and wound a second as will the infantry bullet.
[Sidenote: Rate of fire]
While artillery can fire very rapidly once the range data is
accurately determined it requires considerable time to get into
position and determine this data. Until then it is harmless.
[Sidenote: Moving target]
An erratically shifting target is hard for artillery to keep on.
The fuze must be so set that the burst is at the proper height and
distance to the front of the target to be effective, both not easy
especially in case of a moving target, and the more erratic the
movement the harder is the task of the artillery-man.
[Sidenote: On the defensive]
On the defense the man’s protection is much better for he will
generally have cover of some kind, but he has also a serious
disadvantage, the line remains fixed, the hostile artillery soon
locates it, gets its exact range and can place its own fire where it
will do the most good. This is a decided offset to the defenders’
diminished vulnerability. The use of high explosive shells by their
moral as well as physical effect weakens any advantage the defense
might have as concerns artillery fire.
[Sidenote: Artillery targets]
To determine the relative vulnerability of different infantry
formations let us apply to them the target made by a bursting
shrapnel. A line of skirmishers at the normal interval extending
across this beaten zone would have 19 or 20 men inside its extreme
limits; if in squad columns there would be 2 squads at least and
generally 3 squads or 24 men and the target, being much deeper, would
give the artillery a better chance as it is easier to get direction
correctly than the point of burst.
In platoon columns there can be but one platoon in the same burst if
fire comes from the front, and platoons are 4 squads strong, but the
whole platoon may be within it. If, however, the direction of the
artillery fire be very oblique, and the platoons are on a line, more
than one platoon may be caught by a single burst but not all of any
one column.
In successive thin lines, if the advance be made by one man from a
squad, and the fuze and direction be just right, there may be 2 men
in the cone of dispersion, which is to say that, in that formation,
the artillery has about one chance in forty of wounding a man. If
the advance be by one man from each platoon the artillery’s chance,
provided range and fuze are correct, is one in two that one man
will be within the cone of dispersion of a given shrapnel and, if
in there, there is one chance in 80 of his being hit; in other
words, the artillery has one chance in 160 of getting one man and no
possibility of getting two. Such a target will hardly draw artillery
fire.
An infantry battalion in column of squads well closed up can nearly
all be covered by the burst of a shrapnel. Such a target would likely
draw many shots as would a company in this formation.
[Sidenote: The advance under artillery fire]
We can only win in the attack if our infantry can advance to the
hostile position. We must get there, and as soon as practicable and
with the least loss of life. We can not afford to lose too many in
the advance or we shall be too weak at the end to drive the enemy
from his position.
The infantry can not open fire until within rifle range of the enemy
and should try to get much closer before doing so. In open country,
however, infantry may be subjected to artillery fire while crossing
the ground from 5000 yards to, say 1200 yards from the hostile
position, with no chance to reply. The problem to be solved by the
infantry commander is how to cross this zone without losing too many
men and too much time.
[Sidenote: In skirmish line]
In skirmish line. The long advance in this formation is tedious
work, and the target offered is sufficiently vulnerable to draw
artillery fire. If no cover is afforded in the terrain the line
is apt to suffer heavy loss and become more or less disorganized
before reaching the point where it will take up the fire fight.
Where the line of advance is crossed by ridges, sunken roads and
other features of that kind affording cover, where the line can
rest and to a certain extent reform, this formation can be used to
advantage, especially if the terrain permits us to approach under
cover from artillery fire to within two or three thousand yards. If
this formation be used in a force of some size, as a war strength
battalion or more, the platoons should not keep on a line but in an
irregular echelon formation.
[Illustration:
—— ——
——
—— ——
——
——
——
——
This makes a much more difficult target for the artillery. The
distance from front to rear between any two adjoining platoons should
not be less than 150 yards. The advance in skirmish line has the
advantage of being in the formation that it will be necessary to have
when you open fire and no changes are necessary and, if the enemy is
encountered much sooner than expected, you are prepared.
[Sidenote: The squad column]
The squad column. This formation was devised by our soldiers at
maneuvers at Sparta and in California, where the ground in part was
covered with thick brush. It was found an excellent formation to take
when the skirmish line encountered these patches of thick brush.
Since it was placed in the I. D. R. it has been understood by some as
a good formation for advancing in the _open_ against artillery fire.
This is a mistake. It should never be so used. In this formation
there will always be two squads, and generally three, in the burst of
a single shrapnel, exposing more men to danger than if they were in
skirmish line.
Marching in column of files is not as easy as in line on open ground.
Remember good artillery is pretty accurate in getting direction. Most
shots will be at the head of a column and if at the head of one,
another on each side is included in the burst. Direction is much
easier to get in artillery fire than exact fuze setting in the case
of a moving target; this is another reason against the squad column,
the target is deeper and thus slightly improves the chances of the
artillery. This formation not only has no advantage on open ground,
in an advance under artillery fire, but does have disadvantages.
[Sidenote: Platoon columns]
Platoon columns. In average terrain this formation will be more used
than any other. The distance between these columns is great enough so
that a shrapnel bursting between two may entirely miss both; it also
permits a more or less erratic or zig zag course to be followed.
Each column is lead presumably by a more intelligent and better
instructed man than in the case of the squad.
These columns should never be on the same line but echeloned as
explained for the skirmish line.
In most terrains there are little hills, clumps of trees, buildings
and other cover of the same general kind. Platoon leaders must while
keeping generally within their own zones of advance, rush from one
cover to another where it is offered and, where cover is wanting,
vary the pace and avoid advancing in a straight line.
Properly done this formation is one of the best. No time is lost, the
columns are far enough apart to allow of advantage being taken of all
the cover afforded, and the target is not, on average terrain, too
vulnerable. It is not so good on flat open plains and it should not
be used on such ground if the artillery fire is very oblique to the
line of advance.
This form of advance requires that platoon leaders understand the
theory and also requires much practice on different sites to give
platoon commanders facility in leading and skill in taking advantage
of the cover offered. This is one of the things in which captains
should give instruction during the indoor season with the aid of the
sand table. In addition outdoor practice is most necessary. When this
formation is adopted platoon commanders should know, if possible,
before starting where line of skirmishers is to be formed.
[Sidenote: Successive thin lines]
Successive thin lines. This is by all means the safest formation on
open ground in plain view of the hostile artillery observing station.
The successive lines must be so far apart that no one shrapnel can
reach two; this distance depends on the range but may be taken as 200
yards. With one man from each squad there will be two in the cone of
a single shrapnel that bursts right; if the enemy is so situated that
he can afford to fire at such a target and you do not want to pay the
cost for such an advance, then send one man from each platoon in each
line. Hostile artillery cannot afford to fire at such a target and if
it does it will use up ammunition that will be much needed later and
get small results for the expenditure.
The chief objection to this formation is the time it takes. In
advancing in skirmish line or in platoon columns your firing line
is established as soon as you get your first line up, while, with
successive lines formed from squads, it takes the longer time
required for a line to advance 1400 yards, and if formed from
platoons it takes the time required for a line to advance 6200 yards.
This formation is also safe against oblique fire.
The training of the men for it is simple. Before the line starts the
point where it is to be rebuilt must be carefully designated. That
the line may be rebuilt without confusion or mixing, each man must be
taught to keep his eyes on the next preceding man of his own squad or
platoon to ensure his finding his right place in the new line.
After a few of the successive lines have reached the new position,
they form a dense enough target to draw artillery fire. For this
reason the position of the new line should be one affording cover
from artillery fire if possible; if not, men must get cover by
digging to protect at least their heads from shrapnel. Head cover
and the pack will give them protection from being killed if not from
being wounded.
If the advance in this manner must be for three or four thousand
yards and the enemy has advanced posts or is likely to make an
infantry counter attack, the advance over this whole distance can not
be made at once but must be made by steps, growing shorter as you
approach the enemy’s position.
[Sidenote: Artillery sweeping fire]
The artillery will often sweep with fire an area being crossed by
infantry. This is done by increasing or decreasing the range after
each shot until the entire area is beaten. If this process be
repeated often enough the artillery will get anything within this
area not under cover. But this does not change the average number of
shrapnel required to get a man nor does it render advisable a great
expenditure of ammunition for meager results.
Infantry encountering this kind of fire should, as it approaches, lie
down and get what cover is available and, after the storm has passed,
move on.
The artillery may determine the exact range to some zone which the
advancing infantry has to cross and, as the infantry reaches it, open
a heavy and accurate fire. The infantry must cross this zone in a
formation which decreases its vulnerability as much as practicable,
consistent with other conditions, such as the hostile infantry fire.
The enemy’s guns can get you if they expend enough ammunition at the
task; but can they afford the ammunition? Your own artillery may
interfere with such an expenditure even if the enemy were willing to
make it.
A division deployed with 2500 men on the firing line, crossing
correctly in thin lines a fire-swept zone from 4000 to 1200 yards,
might lose 10% of this number from artillery fire and not have its
advance even checked. With this open formation the loss is so small
that the moral effect of it will be negligible with trained men.
But a loss of 250 men at an expenditure of 160 shrapnel for each
means 40,000 shrapnel. Even half that much would be more than could
generally be afforded.
[Sidenote: Forming skirmish line]
After the skirmish line is formed at the position for opening the
infantry attack, the further advance from there is conducted as
already explained. In skirmish line the hostile infantry is now
by far your most dangerous foe, but the artillery will still be
punishing you: your line must advance under both fires.
Artillery fire will seldom be uniformly distributed along the entire
skirmish line or continuous in its action. There will be blasts
of intense fire, then a lull. The troops must be trained to take
advantage of these lulls to advance and to lie quiet during the
periods of hottest fire. Of course, if for any cause the artillery
fire is not very effective, the advance continues as against the
infantry.
Our infantry must be taught to keep their fire superiority over the
hostile infantry and to this object to devote all their skill and
energy, but to avoid unnecessary heavy loss from artillery whenever
possible. The hostile infantry is their real opponent, their real
danger. As the opposing lines get close the losses from artillery
fire become relatively slight, compared with the losses from infantry
fire.
[Sidenote: How to practice advance under artillery fire]
How are we to get this training in most of our posts where there is
no artillery to afford us the practice?
A man with a red flag indicates the position of a hostile battery,
or, if the battery is concealed, a position that can be seen and
is in the general direction of the battery. When the flag is waved
rapidly it indicates a rafale or violent burst of fire; waved very
slowly, it indicates slow fire by battery. In most exercises no flag
is necessary; the instructor can give verbally the direction from
which the artillery fire is coming in stating the problem; but
in practicing the attack formation, under combined artillery and
infantry fire, the flags should be used to practice platoon leaders
in the rushes under such conditions.
[Sidenote: Infantry as an artillery support]
Infantry is sometimes detailed to support batteries that are somewhat
separated from the rest of the troops and liable to attack by a
rush of infantry or cavalry. Officers on this duty must thoroughly
understand their mission. They must protect the artillery. Artillery
can generally take ample care of itself if the attack comes directly
from the front. The infantry commander must never mask the fire
of the guns. Where he will place his men and what his general
dispositions will be is a problem in tactics and the solution will
vary with each case. These general propositions may be stated: his
position must be such that from it he can effectively meet the
attack; it should not be where he will get too much of the fire
directed on the batteries; the command must be well in hand and the
reconnaissance and observation groups so employed that he will have
timely warning of the hostile approach and be prepared to meet it.
His position will generally be to a flank and probably somewhat to
the rear, never in front of the guns.
An occasional exercise in this work should be carried out as a
maneuver. Something should be placed to represent the guns and a
battalion or company assigned as their protection while another force
is given the mission to capture them. This exercise should always be
carefully umpired to see that the guns get credit for what they could
do if fire is not masked. A problem of this kind is a small part
of the work of infantry in war and when it comes it is a tactical
problem like any other attack or defense. The reason for recommending
it is that it affords excellent practice in security and information
service and in combat when one position must be avoided. Combat
exercises should be as varied as possible, here is another variety.
[Sidenote: Fire superiority]
The importance of fire superiority has already been dwelt upon as
well as how much the effectiveness of hostile fire falls off as the
effectiveness of our own increases. Infantry alone does not gain this
fire superiority but it gains it by the help of our powerful ally and
sister arm, the artillery.
[Sidenote: Artillery fire over infantry]
Battle fronts are too short for the artillery to occupy space in the
line, even if this were a good place for it which it is not; it must
fire over the infantry. All our men must be made to understand the
effect of this artillery fire on the effectiveness of the hostile
infantry, how much more effective this latter would be without the
fire of our artillery, and the importance of having this artillery
fire kept up to the last possible moment. Prove to them how much less
we shall lose by an occasional premature burst than we should lose by
the increased effectiveness of the hostile infantry if our artillery
ceased to fire. The men must be taught that it is the infantry that
does most of the killing and that, especially at the very short
ranges, we want all the help we can get to keep down this killing by
the enemy’s infantry.