former is the dialectic of all that is determinate. The finitude of all
conceptions of truth can be shown, for they contain in themselves a
negation, and consequently a contradiction. The ordinary universal and
infinite is not exalted over this, for the universal which confronts
the particular, the indeterminate which opposes the determinate,
the infinite which confronts the finite, each form only the one
side, and, as such, are only a determinate. Scepticism is similarly
directed against the thought of the ordinary understanding which
makes determinate differences appear to be ultimate and existent. But
the logical Notion is itself this dialectic of Scepticism, for this
negativity which is characteristic of Scepticism likewise belongs
to the true knowledge of the Idea. The only difference is that the
sceptics remain at the result as negative, saying, “This and this
has an internal contradiction, it thus disintegrates itself, and
consequently does not exist.” But this result as merely negative is
itself again a one-sided determinateness opposed to the positive;
_i.e._ Scepticism only holds its place as abstract understanding.
It makes the mistake of thinking that this negation is likewise a
determinate affirmative content in itself; for it is, as the negation
of negation, the self-relating negativity or infinite affirmation.
This, put quite abstractly, is the relation of Philosophy to
Scepticism. The Idea, as abstract Idea, is the quiescent and inert; it
only is in truth in as far as it grasps itself as living. This occurs
because it is implicitly dialectic, in order to abrogate that inert
quiescence, and to change itself. But if the philosophic Idea is thus
implicitly dialectic, it is not so in a contingent manner. Scepticism,
on the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently, for just as the
material comes up before it, it shows in the same that implicitly it is
negative.
The older Scepticism must further be distinguished from the modern,
and it is only with the former that we have to do, for it alone is of
a true, profound nature; the modern more resembles Epicureanism. Thus
Schulze of Göttingen has in recent times boasted of his Scepticism;
he wrote an “Ænesidemus” in order thus to compare himself with that
sceptic; and in other works, too, he put forward Scepticism in
opposition to Leibnitz and to Kant. Nevertheless, he ignores entirely
the true position of Scepticism as it has just been described, and
instead of representing the true distinction which exists between his
Scepticism and the ancient, Schulze recognizes nothing but Dogmatism
and Scepticism, and not the third philosophy at all. Schulze and others
make it fundamental that we must consider sensuous Being, what is
given to us by sensuous consciousness, to be true; all else must be
doubted. What we think is ultimate, the facts of consciousness. The
older sceptics, indeed, allowed that men must direct their actions in
accordance with this last, but to assert it to be the truth did not
occur to them. Modern Scepticism is only directed against thought,
against the Notion and the Idea, and thus against what is in a higher
sense philosophic; it consequently leaves the reality of things quite
unquestioned, and merely asserts that from it nothing can be argued as
regards thought. But that is not even a peasants’ philosophy, for they
know that all earthly things are transient, and that thus their Being
is as good as their non-being. Modern Scepticism is the subjectivity
and vanity of consciousness, which is undoubtedly invincible, not,
however, to science and truth, but merely to itself, this subjectivity.
For it goes no further than saying, “This is held by me to be true, my
feeling, my heart is ultimate to me.” But here certainty is alone in
question, and not truth; and, indeed, this nowadays is no longer called
Scepticism. But the conviction of this individual subject expresses
nothing at all, however high the matter which we talk of is supposed to
be. Thus because on the one hand it is said that the truth is merely
the conviction of another, and on the other hand personal conviction,
which is also a ‘merely,’ is set on high, we must leave this subject
alone, first on account of its high pretensions, and then on account
of its lowliness. The result of the older Scepticism is indeed the
subjectivity of knowledge only, but this is founded on an elaborately
thought out annihilation of everything which is held to be true and
existent, so that everything is made transient.
According to this, the function of Scepticism is wrongly termed the
inculcation of proneness to doubt; nor can we translate σκέψις by
Doubt, if Scepticism was also called by Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 3, § 7)
ephectic (ἐφεκτική) because one of its chief points was that judgment
must be suspended. Doubt, however, is only uncertainty, irresolution,
indecision, the thought which is opposed to something held to be valid.
Doubt proceeds from the fact of there being two; it is a passing to and
fro between two or more points of view, so that we neither rest at the
one nor the other—and yet we ought to remain at one point or another.
Thus doubt in man is quite likely to involve a rending asunder of mind
and spirit; it gives unrest and brings unhappiness with it; doubts,
for instance, arise respecting the immortality of the soul and the
existence of God. Forty years ago,[186] much was written about this;
in poetry, too, we found the situation of the doubter was a subject of
the greatest interest, the unhappiness of doubt being depicted to us as
in the “Messias.” This supposes a deep interest in a content, and the
desire of the mind that this content should either be established in it
or not, because it desires to find its rest either in the one or the
other. Such doubt is said to betoken a keen and sharp-witted thinker,
but it is only vanity and simple verbiage, or a feebleness that can
never arrive at anything. This Scepticism has nowadays entered into our
life, and it thus makes itself of account as this universal negativity.
But the older Scepticism does not doubt, being certain of untruth, and
indifferent to the one as to the other; it does not only flit to and
fro with thoughts that leave the possibility that something may still
be true, but it proves with certainty the untruth of all. Or its doubt
to it is certainty which has not the intention of attaining to truth,
nor does it leave this matter undecided, for it is completely at a
point, and perfectly decided, although this decision is not truth to
it. This certainty of itself thus has as result the rest and security
of the mind in itself, which is not touched with any grief, and of
which doubt is the direct opposite. This is the standpoint of the
imperturbability of Scepticism.
Now what has to be considered even before treating of Scepticism
itself, is its external history. As regards the origin of Scepticism
the Sceptics say that it is very old, that is, if we take it in the
quite indeterminate and universal sense, in so far as to say “Things
are, but their Being is not true, for it likewise involves their
non-being; or they are changeable. For example, this day is to-day,
but to-morrow is also to-day, &c.; it is day now but night is also
now, &c.” Thus of what in this way is allowed to be a determinate,
the opposite is also expressed. Now if it be said that all things are
transient, things may in the first place be changed; however this is
not only possible, but the fact that all things are transient really
means when taken in its universality:—“Nothing exists in itself, for
its reality is the abrogation of self, because things in themselves,
in accordance with their necessity, are transient. Only now are they
thus; at another time they are different, and this time, the now, is
itself no more while I am speaking of it; for time is not itself fixed,
and it makes nothing fixed.” This uncertainty in what is sensuous
represents a long-standing belief amongst the unphilosophic public as
well as amongst philosophers up to this time; and this negativity in
all determinations likewise constitutes the characteristic feature
of Scepticism. The Sceptics have also presented this position in an
historic way, and they show that even Homer was a sceptic, because
he speaks of the same things in opposite ways. They also count in
this category Bias, with his maxim “Pledge thyself never.” For this
has the general sense “Do not consider anything to be anything, do
not attach yourself to any object to which you devote yourself, do
not believe in the security of any relationship, &c.” Likewise the
negative aspect of the philosophy of Zeno and Xenophanes is said to
be sceptical, and further, Heraclitus, too, with his principle that
everything flows, that everything is consequently contradictory and
transient; finally Plato and the Academy are sceptical, only here
Scepticism is not yet quite clearly expressed.[187] All this may be
taken as being in part the sceptical uncertainty of everything; but
that is not its real meaning. It is not this conscious and universal
negativity; as conscious, it must prove, as universal, it must extend
the untruth of the objective to everything; thus it is not a negativity
which says definitely that everything is not implicit but is only for
self-consciousness, and everything merely goes back into the certainty
of itself. As philosophic consciousness Scepticism is consequently of
later date. By Scepticism we must understand a specially constituted
consciousness for which in some measure not only sensuous Being, but
also Being for thought does not hold true, and which can then with
consciousness account for the nullity of that which is asserted to be
reality; and finally, in a general way, it not only annuls this and
that sensuous fact or thought, but is adapted for the recognition in
everything of its untruth.
The history of Scepticism, properly so called, is usually commenced
with Pyrrho as being its founder; and from him the names Pyrrhonism
and Pyrrhonic are derived. Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 3, § 7)
says of him “that he went into Scepticism more fully (σωματικώτερον)
and clearly than did his predecessors.” He is earlier than some of
the philosophers already considered; but because Scepticism is to be
taken as a whole, Pyrrho’s Scepticism, even if it is merely aimed
against the immediate truth both of the senses and of morality, must
be taken along with the later Scepticism, which directs its attention
rather against the truth as thought, as will be farther shown on a
closer consideration; for this last was the first, properly speaking,
to make a sensation. As to the events of Pyrrho’s life, they appear to
be as much a matter of doubt as his doctrine; for they are without any
connection, and little is known for certain concerning them. Pyrrho
lived in the time of Aristotle and was born at Elis. I shall not give
the names of his instructors; Anaxarchus, a disciple of Democritus, is
specially mentioned amongst them. We cannot discover where he really
lived, for the most part at least. As a proof of how very much he was
esteemed during his life, it is said that his native town chose him as
head priest, and the town of Athens gave him the right of citizenship.
It is finally stated that he accompanied Alexander the Great in his
journey to Asia; and that there he had considerable dealings with
magicians and Brahmins. We are told that Alexander had him put to
death because he desired the death of a Persian satrap; and this fate
befel him in his ninetieth year. If all this is to be accepted, since
Alexander spent between twelve and fourteen years in Asia, Pyrrho must
at the earliest have set out on his travels in his seventy-eighth year.
Pyrrho does not appear to have come forward as a public teacher, but
merely to have left behind him individual friends who had been educated
by him. Anecdotes are told, not so much about the circumstances of
his life as about the sceptical manner in which he conducted himself,
and in them his behaviour is made to look ridiculous; in this the
universal of Scepticism is set against a particular case, so that what
is absurd shoots up as of itself into relationships which appear to be
consistent. For because he asserted that the reality of sensuous things
has no truth, it is, for instance, said that were he walking he would
go out of the way of no object, no waggon or horse that came towards
him; or he would go straight up against a wall, completely disbelieving
in the reality of sensuous sensations and such like. They also said
that it was only the friends surrounding him who drew him away from
such dangers and saved him.[188] But such anecdotes are evidently
extravagant, because, for one thing, it is not conceivable that he
could have followed Alexander to Asia at ninety years of age. It is
also very clear that such stories are simply invented with the object
of ridiculing the sceptical philosophy, by following out its principle
to such extreme consequences. To the Sceptics sensuous existence
undoubtedly holds good as phenomenal in so far as the regulation of
ordinary conduct is concerned (_infra_, p. 343), but not in as far as
it is held to be the truth; for even the followers of the New Academy
said that men must not only direct their lives in accordance with
rules of prudence, but also in accordance with the laws of sensuous
manifestation (_supra_, pp. 319, 324).
After Pyrrho, Timon of Phliasis, the sillographist, became specially
famous.[189] Of his Silli, _i.e._ biting remarks respecting all
philosophies, many are quoted by the ancients; they are certainly
bitter and disdainful enough, but many of them are not very witty or
worthy of being preserved. Dr. Paul collected them in an essay, but in
it much is given that is meaningless. Goethe and Schiller certainly
show more capacity in works of a similar nature. The Pyrrhonians
hereupon disappear,—they seem in general only to have shown themselves
in a more or less isolated way; for a long time after this we read in
history of the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans being confronted
only by the Academicians and perhaps some of the older Sceptics who are
mentioned likewise.
Ænesidemus was the first to reawaken Scepticism; he was of Cnossus
in Crete, and lived in Cicero’s time in Alexandria,[190] which soon
began to compete with Athens for the honour of being the seat of
Philosophy and the sciences. Subsequently, when the Academy lost
itself in Scepticism, we see the latter, from which the former is all
the same only separated by a thin partition, taking up a position of
predominance as representing the purely negative point of view. But
a scepticism such as that of Pyrrho, which does not as yet show much
culture or tendency towards thought, but which is directed only against
what is sensuous, could have no interest in the culture of Philosophy
as it is found in Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, &c. Thus it is
requisite, in order that Scepticism should appear with the dignity
pertaining to Philosophy, that it should itself be developed on its
philosophic side; and this was first done by Ænesidemus.
However, one of the most celebrated of the Sceptics, whose works we
still in great measure possess, and who for us is by far the most
important writer upon Scepticism, because he gives us detailed accounts
of this philosophy, is Sextus Empiricus, of whose life unfortunately
as good as nothing is known. He was a physician, and that he was
an empirical physician, who did not act according to theory but in
accordance with what appears, his name tells us. He lived and taught
about the middle of the second century after Christ.[191] His works
are divided into two parts: first, his _Pyrrhoniæ Hypotyposes_, in
three books, which give us somewhat of a general presentation of
Scepticism, and secondly his books _adversus Mathematicos_, _i.e._
against scientific knowledge generally, and more especially against
the geometricians, arithmeticians, grammarians, musicians, logicians,
physicists, and moral philosophers. There were in all eleven books, six
of which are actually directed against mathematicians, but the other
five against the philosophers.
The distinction between the Academy and Scepticism was a matter as to
which the Sceptics exercised themselves much. The New Academy really
bordered so closely upon Scepticism, that the Sceptics had enough to
do to dissociate themselves from it, and in the Sceptic school a long
and important battle raged as to whether Plato, and subsequently the
New Academy, belonged to Scepticism or not;[192] in the course of this
we also see that Sextus did not really know what to make of Plato.
The Sceptics are, on the whole, very careful to distinguish their own
from other systems. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 1, §§ 1-4) distinguishes
three philosophies: “He who seeks an object must either find it or
deny that it can be found, or persevere in the search. Now the same
holds good with philosophic investigations; some assert that they
have found the truth; others deny that it can be grasped; a third set
are still engaged in search. The first, like Aristotle, Epicurus, the
Stoics, and others, are the so-called Dogmatists; those who assert
incomprehensibility are the Academicians; the Sceptics still continue
to seek. Hence there are three philosophies: the Dogmatic, the Academic
and the Sceptical.” For this reason, the Sceptics called themselves the
seekers (ζητητικοί), and their philosophy the seeking (ζητητική).[193]
However, the distinction between Scepticism and the New Academy rests
in the form of expression only, and is thus not a great one: indeed it
is founded only on the mania of the Sceptics to cut off and to shun
any sort of assertive statement. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 7, § 13; c
10, §§ 19-20) says: “The Sceptic does not dogmatize, but only assents
to the affections into which he is impelled, not of his own will, by
the conceptions; thus, if for example, he is warm or cold, he will
certainly not say, I seem not to be cold or warm. But if it be asked
if the subject is as it appears, we allow appearance (φαίνεσθαι); yet
we do not investigate the thing that appears, but only the predicate
predicate (ὃ λέγεται)[194] expressing its appearance. Thus, whether
anything is sweet or not, we consider only as regards the Notion Notion
(ὄσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ); but that is not what appears, but what is said of
what appears. But if we institute direct investigations respecting
what appears, we do so not in order to destroy what appears, but in
order to condemn the rashness (προπέτειαν) of the dogmatists.” Thus
the Sceptics endeavour to bring about the result that in what they say
no expression of a Being can be demonstrated, so that, for example, in
a proposition, they always set appearance in the place of existence.
According to Sextus they say (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 7, § 14; c. 28, § 206):
“The Sceptic makes use of his propositions—for example, determine
nothing (οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν), not the more (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον), nothing is true,
&c.—not as if they really did exist. For he believes, for instance,
that the proposition, everything is false, asserts that itself as well
as the others is false, and consequently limits it (συμπεριγράφει).
Thus we must similarly in all sceptical propositions recollect that
we do not at all assert their truth; for we say that they may destroy
themselves, since that limits them of which they are predicated.” Now,
the New Academy of Carneades does not express anything as being the
true and existent, or as anything to which thought could agree; the
Sceptics thus come very near to the Academy. Pure Scepticism merely
makes this objection to the Academy, that it is still impure. Sextus
says (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 33, §§ 226-233): “But clearly they differ from
us in the judgment of good and evil. For they assert that something is
good or evil,” that is to say, the former is the withholding of assent,
and the latter the granting of it (_supra_, p. 315), “whereby they are
convinced of its being probable that what of good is attributed to the
predicate, is more likely to be good than the opposite.” Thus they have
not elevated themselves to the purity of Scepticism, because they speak
of _existence_, and not of _appearance_. But this is nothing more than
a mere form, for the content immediately destroys that which in form
appears to be an assertion. If we say: “Something is a good, thought
assents to it,” and then ask, “But what is the good to which thought
assents?” the content here is that it should not assent. Hence the form
is, “It is a good,” but the content is that nothing should be held to
be good or true. Thus the Sceptics also assert this: To the Sceptics
“all conceptions are alike in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in
relation to the ground,” to truth. “But the Academicians say that some
are probable, and others improbable, and amongst the probable, some
again are to be preferred to the others.” Preference is thus one of the
forms which the Sceptics also object to (_infra_, p. 345); for such
expressions strike them as still too positive.