conception that is not also false, as has been confirmed many times and
oft,” just as the Stoics themselves say that the apprehended conception
could be both true and false. Determinate content has its opposite in
a determinate which must likewise as an object of thought be true; and
this destroys itself. In this consists the blind wandering about in
thoughts and reasons such as these, which are not grasped as Idea, as
the unity of opposites, but in one of the opposites asserts one thing,
and then, with as good reason, the opposite. The truth of the world is,
on the contrary, quite different, the universal law of reason which is
as such for thought. Reasons are relatively ultimate for a content, but
not absolutely ultimate; they can only be regarded as good reasons, as
probability, as the Academics express it. This is a great truth which
Arcesilaus had attained. But because no unity can thus come forth, he
then draws the conclusion that the wise man must withhold his assent,
that is, not that he should not think, but that he must not merely for
that reason regard as true that which is thought. “For since nothing is
comprehensible, he will, if he assents, assent to an incomprehensible;
now because such an assent is opinion, the wise man will only be wise
in opinion.”[172] We still likewise hear this said: Man thinks, but
does not thereby arrive at the truth; it remains beyond. Cicero (Acad.
Quæst. IV. 24) thus expresses this: “Neither the false nor the true can
be known, if the true were simply to be such as is the false.”
_b._ In relation to what is practical, Arcesilaus says: “But since
the conduct of life without a criterion of the true or the false is
impossible, and the end of life, or happiness, can only be determined
through such grounds, the wise man, not withholding his approbation
regarding everything, will, as regards what has to be done and left
undone, direct his actions in accordance with the probable (εὔλογον),”
as the subjectively convincing conception. What is right in this is
that the good ground does not extend as far as truth. “Happiness is
brought about by discretion (φρόνησις), and rational conduct operates
in fitting and right action (κατορθώμασι); that is rightly done which
is permitted by a well-grounded justification,” so that it appears to
be true. “Thus, he who regards what is well-founded will do rightly and
be happy,” but for this culture and intelligent thought are requisite.
Arcesilaus thus remains at the indeterminate, at subjectivity of
conviction, and a probability justified by good grounds. Thus we see
that in regard to what is positive, Arcesilaus does not really get
any further than the Stoics, nor say anything different from what
they do; only the form is different, because, what the Stoics call
true, Arcesilaus calls well-founded or probable. But, on the whole, he
possessed a higher kind of knowledge than the Stoics, because what is
thus founded cannot be held to have the significance of an implicit
existence, but only a relative truth in consciousness.
2. CARNEADES.
Carneades was equally famous; he was one of the followers of Arcesilaus
in the Academy, and he also lived in Athens, though considerably later.
He was born in Cyrene in Ol. 141, 3 (217 B.C.), and died in Ol. 162,
4 (132 B.C.), thus being eighty-five years old; though, according to
others he was as much as ninety.[173] During the already mentioned (pp.
241, 242) embassy of the three philosophers to Rome, it was chiefly
Carneades’ quickness, eloquence, and power of conviction, as also his
great fame, which aroused remark, attracted men together, and gained
great approbation in Rome. For he here held, after the manner of the
Academics, two discourses on justice; the one for and the other against
justice. That on which both generally speaking rested, can easily be
discovered. In the justification of justice he took the universal as
principle; but in showing its nullity, he laid weight on the principle
of individuality, of self-interest. To the young Romans who knew little
of the opposition in the Notion, this was something new; they had no
idea of such methods of applying thought, were much attracted by them,
and were soon won over to them. But the older Romans, and particularly
the elder Cato, the Censor, who was then still living, saw this very
unwillingly, and declaimed much against it, because the youths were
thereby turned away from the strictness of ideas and virtues which
prevailed in Rome. As the evil gained ground, Caius Acilius made a
proposition in the Senate to banish all philosophers from the city,
amongst whom, naturally, without their names being mentioned, those
three ambassadors were included. The elder Cato, however, moved the
Senate to conclude the business with the ambassadors as quickly as
possible, so that they might again set forth, and return to their
schools, and might henceforth instruct only the sons of the Greeks.
The Roman youths might then as formerly give ear to their laws and
magistrates, and learn wisdom from intercourse with the senators.[174]
But this taint can no more be avoided than could in Paradise the
desire for knowledge. The knowledge which is a necessary moment in
the culture of a people, thus makes its appearance as the Fall from
innocence, and as corruption. An epoch such as this, in which thought
appears to veer about, is then regarded as an evil as far as the
security of the ancient constitution is concerned. But this evil of
thought cannot be prevented by laws, &c.; it can and must be the healer
of itself through itself alone, if thought through thought itself is
truly brought to pass.
a. The philosophy of Carneades has been given to us in most detail
by Sextus Empiricus; and all else of Carneades that we possess is
likewise directed against the dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean
philosophy. The fact that the nature of consciousness is what is most
particularly considered makes his propositions interesting. While in
Arcesilaus we still found a good reason or argument maintained, the
principle which Carneades supported is expressed as that “in the first
place there is absolutely no criterion of the truth, neither feeling,
conception, nor thought, nor any other such thing; for all this put
together deceives us.” This general empirical proposition is still in
vogue. In developing the matter further, Carneades proves what he says
from reasons, and we have the nature of consciousness more definitely
expressed in the following: “In the second place he shows that even if
such a criterion existed, it could not be without an affection (πάθος)
of consciousness, which proceeds from perception.”[175] For this,
speaking generally, is his principal reflection, that every criterion
must be constituted so that it has two elements, one being the
objective, existent, immediately determined, while the other element is
an affection, an activity, an attribute of consciousness, and belongs
to the sensitive, conceiving or thinking subject—but as such it could
not be the criterion. For this activity of consciousness consists in
the fact that it changes the objective, and thus does not allow the
objective as it is to come to us immediately. Hence the same attitude
of separation is pre-supposed as formerly, viz. that the understanding
is to be regarded as an ultimate and clearly absolute relationship.
α. As against the Epicureans, Carneades maintains this: “Because
the living is distinguished from the dead through the activity of
sensation, by this means it will comprehend itself and what is
external. But this sensation which,” as Epicurus puts it (_supra_, p.
281), “remains unmoved and is impassive and unchangeable, is neither
sensation nor does it comprehend anything. For not until they have been
changed and determined by the invasion of the actual does sensation
show forth things.”[176] The sensation of Epicurus is an existent,
but there is in it no principle of judgment, because each sensation
is independent. But sensation must be analyzed in accordance with
the two points of view there present, for as the soul is therein,
determined, so likewise is that which determines determined by the
energy of the conscious subject. Because I, as a living being, have
sensation, a change in my consciousness takes place, which means that I
am determined from without and from within. Consequently the criterion
cannot be a simple determinateness, for it is really an implicit
relationship in which two moments, sensation and thought, must be
distinguished.
β. Since to Carneades sensation is merely what comes first, he then
says: “The criterion is thus to be sought for in the affection of the
soul by actuality.” For it is only in the mean between the energy
of the soul and that of outward things that the criterion can fall.
A determinate content of sensation such as this, which is at the
same time again determined through consciousness, this passivity and
activity of consciousness, this third something, Carneades called the
conception which constituted to the Stoics the content of thought.
Respecting this criterion, he says: “This being determined must,
however, be an indication both of itself and of the apparent, or of
the thing through which it is affected; this affection is none other
than the conception. Hence in life the conception is something which
presents both itself and the other. If we see something, the sight has
an affection, and it no longer is just as it was before seeing. Through
an alteration such as this there arise in us two things: first change
itself, _i.e._ the ordinary conception” (the subjective side) “and
then that which change produced, what is seen” (the objective). “Now
just as the light shows itself and everything in it, the conception
reigns over knowledge in the animal, and it must, like the light, make
itself evident, and reveal the actual through which consciousness is
affected.” This is quite the correct standpoint for consciousness,
and it is in itself comprehensible, but it is only for the phenomenal
mind that the other in the determinateness of consciousness is
present. We now expect a development of this opposition; but Carneades
passes into the region of empiricism without giving this further
development. “Since the conception,” he continues, “does not always
point to the truth, but often lies, and resembles bad messengers in
that it misrepresents what it proceeds from, it follows that not every
conception can give a criterion of the truth, but only that which is
true, if any are so. But because none is so constituted that it might
not also be false, conceptions are likewise a common criterion of
the true as of the false, or they form no criterion.” Carneades also
appealed to the fact of a conception proceeding even from something
not existing, or—if the Stoics asserted that what in the objective is
thinkingly apprehended is an existent—to the fact that the false may
also be apprehended.[177] In a popular way that is stated thus: There
are also conceptions of untruth. Although I am convinced, it is still
my conception merely, even if men think they have said something by
saying that they have this conviction. They likewise say that insight
or objective knowledge is still only the conviction of difference, but
really the content is in its nature universal.
γ. Finally, “because no conception is a criterion, neither can thought
be taken as such, for this depends on conception”—and must hence be
just as uncertain as it is. “For to thought, that respecting which
it judges must be conception; but conception cannot exist without
unthinking sensation”—this may, however, be either true or false, “so
that there is no criterion.”[178] This constitutes the principle in the
Academic philosophy—that on the one hand the conception is in itself
this distinction of thought and existence, and that there is likewise
a unity of both, which, however, is no absolutely existing unity.
Philosophic culture of those times remained at this standpoint, and in
modern times Reinhold also arrived at the same result.
b. Now what Carneades gave expression to of an affirmative nature
respecting the criterion, is found in the statement that undoubtedly
criteria are to be maintained for the conduct of life and for the
acquisition of happiness, but not for the speculative consideration
of what is in and for itself. Thus Carneades passes more into
what is psychological, and into finite forms of the understanding
consciousness; this is consequently no criterion respecting truth,
but respecting the subjective habits and customs of the individual,
and hence it also is of subjective truth alone, although it still
remains a concrete end. “The conception is a conception of something;
of that from which it comes as of the externally perceived object, and
of the subject in which it is, _e.g._ of man. In this way it has two
relationships—on the one hand to the object, and, on the other, to that
which forms the conception. According to the former relationship it is
either true or false; true if it harmonizes with what is conceived of,
false if this is not so.” But this point of view cannot here in any
way come under consideration, for the judgment respecting this harmony
is most certainly not in a position to separate the matter itself
from the matter as conceived. “According to the relationship to that
which conceives, the one is conceived (φαινομένε) to be true, but the
other is not conceived to be true.” Merely this relationship to the
conceiver, however, comes under the consideration of the Academicians.
“That conceived of as true is called by the Academician appearance
(ἔμφασις) and conviction, and convincing conception; but what is not
conceived as true is called incongruity (ἀπέμφασις) and non-conviction
and non-convincing conception. For neither that which is presented to
us through itself as untrue, nor what is true but is not presented to
us, convinces us.”[179]
Carneades thus determines the leading principle very much as does
Arcesilaus, for he recognizes it merely in the form of a “convincing
conception;” but as convincing it is “likewise a firm and a developed
conception,” if it is to be a criterion of life. These distinctions, on
the whole, pertain to a correct analysis, and likewise approximately
appear in formal logic; they are very much the same stages as are
found, according to Wolff, in the clear, distinct, and adequate
conception. “We have now shortly to show what is the distinction
between these three steps.”[180]
α. “A convincing conception (πιθανή) is that which appears to be true
and which is sufficiently obvious; it has a certain breadth as well,
and may be applied in many ways and in a great variety of cases; ever
verifying itself more through repetitions,” as in the case of Epicurus,
“it makes itself ever more convincing and trustworthy.” No further
account of its content is given, but what is so frequently produced
is, as empirical universality, made the first criterion.[181] But this
is only an individual and, speaking generally, an immediate and quite
simple conception.
β. “Because, however, a conception is never for itself alone, but one
depends on another as in a chain, the second criterion is added, viz.
that it should be both convincing and secure (ἀπερίσπαστος),” _i.e._
connected and determined on all sides, so that it cannot be changed,
nor drawn this way and that and made variable by circumstances; and
other conceptions do not contradict it, because it is known in this
connection with others. This is quite a correct determination, which
everywhere appears in the universal. Nothing is seen or said alone, for
a number of circumstances stand in connection with it. “For example,
in the conception of a man much is contained, both as to what concerns
himself and what surrounds him: as to the former, there is colour,
size, form, movement, dress, &c.; and in reference to the latter,
air, light, friends, and the like. If none of such circumstances make
us uncertain or cause us to think the others false, but when all
uniformly agree, the conception is the more convincing.”[182] Thus
when a conception is in harmony with the manifold circumstances in
which it stands, it is secure. A cord may be thought to be a snake,
but all the circumstances of the same have not been considered. “Thus,
as in judging of an illness all the symptoms must be brought under
our consideration, so the fixed conception has conviction because all
circumstances agree.”[183]
γ. “Even more trustworthy than the fixed conception is the conception
as developed (διεξωδευμένη), which brings about perfect conviction,”
the third moment. “While in the case of the fixed conception we only
investigate whether the circumstances agree with one another, in the
developed conception each one of the circumstances existing in harmony
is strictly inquired into on its own account. Thus he who judges
as well as what is judged and that according to which judgment is
given, are subject to investigations. Just as in common life in some
unimportant matter one witness satisfies us, in one more important
several are required, and in a case which is more material still the
individual witnesses are themselves examined through a comparison of
their testimonies, so in less important matters a general convincing
conception satisfies us, in things of a certain importance one which is
established, but in those which pertain to a good and happy life one
which is investigated in its parts is required.”[184] We thus see—in
contradistinction to those who place truth in what is immediate, and,
especially in recent times, in sensuous perception, in an immediate
knowledge, whether as inward revelation or outward perception—that
this kind of certainty with Carneades rightly takes the lowest place;
the conception worked out and developed really is to him the essential
one, and yet it appears in a formal manner only. In fact, the truth
is only in thinking knowledge, and if Carneades does not exhaust all
that can be said of the nature of this knowledge, he still has rightly
emphasized an essential moment in it, the opening out and the judging
movements of the moments.
In the New Academy we see the subjective side of conviction expressed,
or the belief that not the truth as truth, but its manifestation, or
really what it is to the conception, is present in consciousness.
Thus only subjective certainty is demanded; of the truth nothing
more is said, for only what is relative in respect of consciousness
is considered. Just as the Academic principle limited itself to the
subjective act of the convincing conception, so likewise did the
Stoics really place implicit existence in thought, and Epicurus in
perception; but they called this the truth. The Academicians, on the
contrary, set it up against the truth, and asserted that it is not
the existent as such. They had thus a consciousness that the implicit
really has the moment of consciousness in it, and that without this
it cannot exist; this was also a fundamental principle to the former,
but they were not conscious of it. Though, according to this, the
implicit has now an essential relation to consciousness, this last
is still in contrast with the truth; to conscious knowledge, as to
the moment of explicitude, the implicit thus still stands in the
background, it still confronts it, but at the same time it includes
the explicit as an essential moment, even in antagonism to itself; in
other words, consciousness is not yet set forth in and for itself.
Now, if this Academic standpoint is driven to its ultimate limit, it
amounts to this, that everything is clearly for consciousness alone,
and that the form of an existent, and of the knowledge of existence,
also quite disappears as form; this, however, is Scepticism. Thus if
the Academicians still preferred one conviction, one estimate of truth
to another, as that in which the aim of a self-existent truth might be
said to dwell, or float before their eyes, there still remains this
simple belief in the validity of opinion without distinction, or the
fact that everything is in like manner only related to consciousness,
and is, in fact, phenomenal alone. Thus the Academy had no longer any
fixed subsistence, but hereby really passed into Scepticism, which
merely asserted a subjective belief in truth, so that all objective
truth has really been denied.
D. SCEPTICISM.
Scepticism completed the theory of the subjectivity of all knowledge
by the fact that in knowledge it universally substituted for Being the
expression _appearance_. Now this Scepticism undoubtedly appears to be
something most impressive, to which great respect is due from man. In
all times as now, it has been held to be the most formidable, and,
indeed, the invincible opponent of Philosophy, because it signifies
the art of dissolving all that is determinate, and showing it in its
nullity. Thus it might almost appear as though it were held to be in
itself invincible, and as though the only difference in convictions
were whether the individual decided for it or for a positive, dogmatic
philosophy. Its result undoubtedly is the disintegration of the
truth, and, consequently, of all content, and thus perfect negation.
The invincibility of Scepticism must undoubtedly be granted, only,
however, in a subjective sense as regards the individual, who may
keep to the point of view of taking no notice of Philosophy, and only
asserting the negative. Scepticism in this way seems to be something
to which men give themselves over, and we have the impression that we
are not able to get within reach of anyone who thus throws himself
entirely into Scepticism; another man, however, simply rests content
with his philosophy, because he takes no notice of Scepticism, and
this is really what he ought to do, for, properly speaking, it cannot
be refuted. Certainly if we were merely to escape from it, it would
not in reality have been defeated, for on its side it would remain
where it was, and in possession of the field. For positive philosophy
allows Scepticism to exist beside it; Scepticism, on the other hand,
encroaches upon the domain of positive philosophy, for Scepticism has
power to overcome the other, while positive philosophy cannot do the
same to it. If anyone actually desires to be a Sceptic, he cannot be
convinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy,[185] any more than
he who is paralyzed in all his limbs can be made to stand. Scepticism
is, in fact, such paralysis—an incapacity for truth which can only
reach certainty of self, and not of the universal, remaining merely in
the negative, and in individual self-consciousness. To keep oneself in
individuality depends on the will of the individual; no one can prevent
a man from doing this, because no one can possibly drive another out
of nothing. But thinking Scepticism is quite different; it is the
demonstration that all that is determinate and finite is unstable. As
to this, positive philosophy may have the consciousness that it has the
negation to Scepticism in itself; thus it does not oppose it, nor is it
outside of it, for Scepticism is a moment in it. But this is true in
such a way that this philosophy comprehends in itself the negative in
its truth, as it is not present in Scepticism.