in its considering that to self-consciousness on its own account,
there proceeds from the disappearance of all that is objective, all
that is held to be true, existent or universal, all that is definite,
all that is affirmative, through the withholding of assent, the
immovability and security of mind, this imperturbability in itself.
Hence the same result is obtained, that we have already seen in systems
of philosophy immediately preceding this. Thus as soon as anything is
held to be truth to self-consciousness, we find the result that to
self-consciousness this truth is the universal reality, passing beyond
itself, and in regard to this, self-consciousness esteems itself as
nothing. But this external and determinate truth, as finite, is not
implicitly existent, so that its necessity is to vacillate and give
way. Then when this security disappears, self-consciousness itself
loses its equilibrium, and becomes driven hither and thither in unrest,
fear and anguish; for its stability and rest is the permanence of its
existence and truth. But sceptical self-consciousness is just this
subjective liberation from all the truth of objective Being, and from
the placing of its existence in anything of the kind; Scepticism thus
makes its end the doing away with the unconscious servitude in which
the natural self-consciousness is confined, the returning into its
simplicity, and, in so far as thought establishes itself in a content,
the curing it of having a content such as this established in thought.
“The effective principle of Scepticism,” Sextus hence tells us (Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. c. 6, § 12, c. 12, §§ 25-30), “is the hope of attaining to
security. Men of distinguished excellence, disquieted through the
instability of things, and dubious as to which should in preference
be given assent to, began the investigation of what is the truth and
what false in things, as if they could reach imperturbability through
the decision of such matters. But while engaged in this investigation,
man attains the knowledge that opposite determinations,” desires,
customs, &c., “have equal power,” and thus resolve themselves; “since
in this way he cannot decide between them, he really only then attains
to imperturbability when he withholds his judgment. For if he holds
anything to be good or evil by nature, he never is at rest, whether it
be that he does not possess what he holds to be good, or that he thinks
himself vexed and assailed by natural evil. But he who is undecided
respecting that which is good and beautiful in nature, neither shuns
nor seeks anything with zeal; and thus he remains unmoved. What
happened to the painter Apelles, befalls the Sceptic. For it is told
that when he was painting a horse, and was altogether unsuccessful in
rendering the foam, he finally in anger threw the sponge on which he
had wiped his brushes, and in which every colour was therefore mixed,
against the picture, and thereby formed a true representation of foam.”
Thus, the Sceptics find in the mingling of all that exists, and of
all thoughts, the simple self-identity of self-consciousness which
“follows mind as the shadow does the body,” and is only acquired, and
can only be acquired through reason. “Hence we say that the end of the
Sceptic is imperturbability in the conceptions and moderation in the
affections which he is compelled to have.” This is the indifference
which the animals have by nature, and the possession of which through
reason distinguishes men from animals. Thus, Pyrrho once showed to his
fellow-passengers on board a ship, who were afraid during a storm, a
pig, which remained quite indifferent and peacefully ate on, saying to
them: in such indifference the wise man must also abide.[195] However
the indifference must not be like that of the pig, but must be born
of reason. But if to Scepticism existence was only a manifestation or
conception, it was yet esteemed by it as that in respect to which
the Sceptics directed their conduct, both in what they did, and what
they left undone. The above-quoted (p. 336) anecdotes about Pyrrho are
thus opposed to what the Sceptics themselves said on the subject: “We
undoubtedly direct our conduct in accordance with a reason which, in
conformity with sensuous phenomena, teaches us to live conformably to
the customs and laws of our country, and in consonance with recognized
institutions and personal affections.”[196] But for them this had only
the significance of a subjective certainty and conviction, and not the
value of an absolute truth.
Thus the universal method of Scepticism was, as Sextus Empiricus puts
it (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 4, §§ 8-10; c. 6, § 12): “a power of in some way
or other setting what is felt, and what is thought, in opposition,
whether it be the sensuous to the sensuous, and what is thought to
what is thought, or what is sensuous to what is thought, or what is
thought to what is sensuous, _i.e._ showing that any one of these has
as much force and weight as its opposite, and is hence equivalent as
far as conviction and non-conviction are concerned. From this the
suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) results, in conformity with which we
select and posit nothing, and thereby complete freedom from all mental
emotion is attained. The principle of Scepticism is thus found in the
proposition that each reason is confronted by another, which holds
equally good. We do not, however, necessarily accept affirmation and
negation as opposite grounds, but merely those that conflict with
one another.” That which is felt is really existence for sensuous
certainty, which simply accepts it as truth; or it is that which is
felt in the Epicurean form, which consciously asserts it to be true.
What is thought is in the Stoic form a determinate Notion, a content in
a simple form of thought; both these classes, immediate consciousness
and thinking consciousness, comprehend everything which is in any
way to be set in opposition. In as far as Scepticism limits itself
to this, it is a moment in Philosophy itself, which last, having an
attitude of negativity in relation to both, only recognizes them
as true in their abrogation. But Scepticism thinks that it reaches
further; it sets up a pretension of venturing against the speculative
Idea and conquering it; Philosophy, however, since Scepticism itself
is present in it as a moment, rather overcomes it (_supra_, p. 330).
As far as what is sensuous and what is thought in their separation
are concerned, it certainly may conquer, but the Idea is neither the
one nor the other, and it does not touch on the rational at all. The
perpetual misunderstanding which those who do not know the nature of
the Idea are under concerning Scepticism, is that they think that the
truth necessarily falls into the one form or the other, and is thus
either a determinate Notion or a determinate Being. Against the Notion
as Notion, _i.e._ against the absolute Notion, Scepticism does not in
any way proceed; the absolute Notion is rather its weapon of defence,
though Scepticism has no consciousness of this. We shall on the one
hand see Scepticism use that weapon against the finite, and on the
other, how it tries its skill upon the rational.
But though, according to this, Scepticism always expresses itself as if
everything were in appearance only, the Sceptics go further than those
who support the newer and purely formal idealism. For they deal with
content, and demonstrate of all content that it is either experienced
by the senses or thought, and consequently that it has something in
opposition to it. Thus they show in the same thing the contradiction
that exists, so that of everything that is presented the opposite
also holds good. This is the objective element in Scepticism in its
manifestation, and that through which it is not subjective idealism.
Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 13, §§ 32, 33) says: “Thus, for instance,
the sensuous is set against the sensuous by our being reminded of
the fact that the same tower when looked at near is square and when
regarded in the distance looks round;” and hence the one assertion is
as good as the other. This, indeed, is a very trivial example, but its
interest lies in the thought that is present in it. “Or what is thought
is set in opposition to what is thought. As to the fact that there
is a providence,” which rewards the good and punishes the evil, “men
appeal,” as against those who deny it, “to the system of the heavenly
bodies; to this it is objected that the good often fare badly and the
evil well, from which we demonstrate that there is no providence.” As
to the “opposition of what is thought to the sensuous,” Sextus adduces
the conclusion of Anaxagoras, who asserts of the snow, that although
it appears to be white, regarded in relation to the reasons given by
reflection it is black. For it is frozen water, but water has no colour
and hence is black; consequently snow must be the same.
We must now consider further the method in which the Sceptics proceed,
and it consists in this, that they have brought the universal principle
that each definite assertion has to be set over against its ‘other,’
into certain forms, not propositions. Thus, in view of the nature of
Scepticism, we cannot ask for any system of propositions, nor will this
philosophy really be a system; just as little did it lie in the spirit
of Scepticism to form a school, properly speaking, but only an external
connection in the wider sense of the word. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 8,
§ 16, c. 3, § 7) hence says that Scepticism is no selection (αἵρεσις)
of dogmas, it is not a preference for certain propositions, but only
that which leads, or rather which directs us (ἀγωγή) to live rightly
and think correctly; thus it is in this way rather a method or manner
by which only universal modes of that opposition are shown. Now since
what sort of thoughts reveal themselves is a matter of contingency, the
manner and mode of grasping them is contingent likewise; for in one the
contradiction appears thus and in another otherwise. These determinate
modes of opposition, whereby the withholding of assent comes to pass,
the Sceptics called tropes (τρόποι), which are turned upon everything
that is thought and felt in order to show that this is not what it is
implicitly, but only in relation to another—that it thus itself appears
in another, and allows this other to appear in it, and consequently
that, speaking generally, what is, only seems; and this, indeed,
follows directly from the matter in itself, and not from another which
is assumed as true. If, for example, men say that empiric science has
no truth because truth exists only in reason, this is only assuming the
opposite of empiricism; likewise the truth of reason proved in itself
is not a refutation of empiric science, for this last stands alongside
of the former with equal rights as, and within the same.
Now since the sceptical doctrine consists in the art of demonstrating
contradictions through these _tropes_, we only require to elucidate
these modes. The Sceptics themselves, like Sextus, for example (Pyrrh.
Hyp. I. c. 14, 15) distinguish in these forms the earlier and the
later: ten of them belong to the elder Sceptics, that is to say to
Pyrrho, and five were afterwards added by the later Sceptics, and
Diogenes Laertius indeed tells us (IX. 88) that this was first done
by Agrippa. From a specification of these it will be shown that the
earlier are directed against the ordinary consciousness generally and
belong to a thought of little culture, to a consciousness which has
sensuous existence immediately before it. For they proceed against what
we call common belief in the immediate truth of things, and refute it
in a manner which is immediate likewise, not through the Notion but
through the existence which is opposed to it. In their enumeration,
too, there is this same absence of the Notion. But the five others
appear to be better, have more interest, and are manifestly of later
origin; they proceed against reflection, _i.e._ against a consciousness
which relates itself to the developed understanding, and thus
specially against thought-forms, scientific categories, the thought of
the sensuous, and the determination of the same through Notions. Now
though the most part of these may appear to us to be quite trivial, we
must still be indulgent towards them, for they are historically, and
consequently really, directed against the form “it is.” But without
doubt it is a very abstract consciousness that makes this abstract form
“it is” its object and combats it. However trivial then and commonplace
these tropes may always appear to be, even more trivial and commonplace
is the reality of the so-called external objects, that is, immediate
knowledge, as when, for instance, I say “This is yellow.” Men ought
not to talk about philosophy, if in this innocent way they assert the
reality of such determinations. But this Scepticism was really far from
holding things of immediate certainty to be true; thus it actually
stands in contrast to modern Scepticism, in which it is believed
that what is in our immediate consciousness, or indeed, all that is
sensuous, is a truth (_supra_, pp. 331, 332). As distinguished from
this, the older Scepticism, the modes of which we would now consider
further, is directed against the reality of things.
1. THE EARLIER TROPES.
In the earlier tropes we see the lack of abstraction appearing as
the incapacity to grasp their diversitude under more simple general
points of view, although they all, in fact, partly under a simple
conception and partly in their difference, do in fact converge into
some necessary simple determinations. From all alike, in relation to
immediate knowledge, is the insecurity demonstrated of that of which
we say “it is.” Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, § 38) even
remarks, that “all the tropes may be summed up in three: the one is the
judging subject; the other that respecting which the judgment is made;
the third that which contains both sides”—the relation of subject and
object. If thought is developed further, it embraces things in these
more general determinations.
a. “The first trope is the diversitude in animal organization,
according to which different living beings experience different
conceptions and sensations respecting the same object. This the
Sceptics conclude from the different nature of their origin, because
some are brought into being through copulation and others without
copulation” (from a _generatio æquivoca_): “but of the first some are
hatched from eggs, and others come immediately living into the world,
&c. Thus it is a matter of no doubt that this difference of origin
produces opposite constitutions, temperaments, &c. The variety in
the parts of the body, and particularly in those which are given to
the animal for purposes of distinguishing and feeling, thus produces
in them the greatest differences in conceptions. For instance, the
jaundiced patient sees as yellow what to others appears white,” and as
green, what to the latter seems blue. “Similarly the eyes of animals
are differently constructed in different species, and have different
colours, being pale, grey or red; consequently what is perceived
thereby must be different.”[197]
This difference in the subject undoubtedly establishes a difference in
perception, and this last a difference between the conception and the
nature of the object of perception. But if we say “That is,” we mean
something fixed, maintaining itself under all conditions; whereas in
opposition to this the Sceptics show that everything is variable. But
if they thereby destroy similarity and identity for the senses, and
consequently _this_ universality, another steps in, for universality
or existence rests simply in the fact of men knowing that, in the
hackneyed example of the jaundiced man, things appear so to him, _i.e._
the necessary law is known whereby a change of sensation arises for
him. But certainly it is implied in this that the first sensuous
universality is not true universality, because it is one immediate
and unknown; and in it as sensuous existence, its non-universality is
rightly demonstrated within itself through another universality. As
against the statement “This is blue because I see it as such,” which
clearly makes sight the ground of its being asserted to be blue, it
is quite fair to point to another who has immediate perception of the
object and for whom it is not blue.
b. The second trope, the diversitude of mankind in reference to
feelings and conditions, amounts very much to the same thing as in
the first case. In respect to difference in constitution of body, the
Sceptics discover many idiosyncrasies. As regards the proposition
“Shade is cool,” for instance, they say that someone felt cold in the
sunlight, but warm in shadow; as against the statement “Hemlock is
poisonous,” they instance an old woman in Attica who could swallow a
large dose of hemlock without harm—thus the predicate poisonous is
not objective, because it suits the one and not the other. Because
such great bodily differences are present amongst men, and the body is
the image of the soul, men must have a diversity of mind likewise and
give the most contradictory judgments, so that no one can know whom to
believe. To judge by the greater number would be foolish, for all men
cannot be inquired of.[198] This trope again relates to the immediate;
if, therefore, what has to be done is merely to believe some statement
inasmuch as it is made by others, undoubtedly nothing but contradiction
takes place. But a belief like this, that is ready to believe anything,
is, as a matter of fact, incapable of understanding what is said; it
is an immediate acceptance of an immediate proposition. For it did not
demand the reason; but the reason is, in the first place, the mediation
and the meaning of the words of the immediate proposition. Diversitude
in men is really something which now likewise appears in other forms.
It is said that men differ in regard to taste, religion, &c.; that
religion must be left for each to decide for himself; that each, from
a standpoint of his own, must settle how things are to be regarded
as far as religion is concerned. The consequence of this is that in
regard to religion there is nothing objective or true, everything ends
in subjectivity, and the result is indifference to all truth. For then
there is no longer a church; each man has a church and a liturgy of his
own, each has his own religion. The Sceptics more particularly—as those
who in all times spare themselves the trouble of philosophizing, on
some sort of pretext, and who try to justify this evasion—persistently
preach the diversity of philosophies; Sextus Empiricus does this
very expressly, and it may even be brought forward here, although it
will appear more definitely as the first of the later tropes. If the
principle of the Stoics, as it is in its immediacy, holds good, the
opposite principle, that of the Epicureans, has just as much truth, and
holds equally good. In this way, when it is said that some particular
philosophy asserts and maintains certain propositions, the greatest
diversity is undoubtedly to be found. For here we have the talk which
we censured earlier (Vol. I. p. 16): “Since the greatest men of all
times have thought so differently and have not been able to come to
an agreement, it would be presumptuous on our part to believe we had
found what they could not attain to,” and with those who speak thus,
the timid shrinking from knowledge makes out the inertness of their
reason to be a virtue. Now if the diversity cannot be denied, because
it is a fact that the philosophies of Thales, Plato, and Aristotle were
different, and that this was not merely apparently the case, but that
they contradicted one another, this way of wishing in such statements
of them to gain a knowledge of the philosophies, shows a want of
understanding as regards Philosophy; for such propositions are not
Philosophy, nor do they give expression to it. Philosophy is quite the
reverse of this immediacy of a proposition, because in that the very
knowledge that is essential is not taken into account; hence such men
see everything in a philosophy excepting Philosophy itself, and this is
overlooked. However different the philosophic systems may be, they are
not as different as white and sweet, green and rough; for they agree in
the fact that they are philosophies, and this is what is overlooked.
But as regards the difference in philosophies, we must likewise remark
upon this immediate validity accorded to them, and upon the form, that
the essence of Philosophy is expressed in an immediate manner. As
regards this ‘is’ the trope undoubtedly does its work, for all tropes
proceed against the ‘is,’ but the truth is all the time not this dry
‘is,’ but genuine process. The relative difference in philosophies is,
in their mutual attitude towards one another (see the fifth trope),
always to be comprehended as a connection, and therefore not as an ‘is.’
c. The third trope turns on the difference in the constitution of
the organs of sense as related to one another; _e.g._ in a picture
something appears raised to the eye but not to the touch, to which it
is smooth, &c.[199] This is, properly speaking, a subordinate trope,
for in fact a determination such as this coming through some sense,
does not constitute the truth of the thing, what it is in itself.
The consciousness is required that the unthinking description which
ascribes existence to blue, square, &c., one after the other, does not
exhaust and express the Being of the thing; they are only predicates
which do not express the thing as subject. It is always important
to keep in mind that the different senses grasp the same thing in
contradictory ways, for by this the nullity of sensuous certainty is
revealed.
d. The fourth trope deals with the diversitude of circumstances in the
subject, in reference to its condition, the changes taking place in it,
which must prevent our making an assertion respecting any particular
thing. The same thing manifests itself differently to the same man,
according as he, for instance, is at rest or moving, asleep or awake,
moved by hatred or love, sober or drunk, young or old, &c. In the
diversitude of these circumstances very different judgments are passed
regarding one and the same object, hence we must not talk of anything
as being more than a manifestation.[200]
e. The fifth trope relates to the different positions, distances and
places, for from every different standpoint the object appears to be
different. In respect to position, a long passage appears to the man
who stands at the one end to taper to a point at the other; but if he
goes there he finds it to be of the same breadth at that end as it was
at the other. Distance is likewise, properly speaking, a difference
in the greatness and smallness of objects. In respect to place, the
light in a lantern is quite feeble in the sunshine, and yet in darkness
it shines quite brightly. Pigeons’ necks, regarded from different
points of view, shimmer quite differently.[201] In regard to motion
in particular very different views prevail. The best known example of
such is found in the course of the sun round the earth, or the earth
round the sun. As the earth is said to go round the sun, even though
the opposite appears to be the case, the former assertion is based
on reasons. This example does not, however, come in here, but this
trope will show that because one sensuous feeling contradicts another,
existence is not expressed in it.
f. The sixth trope is taken from intermixture, because nothing comes
within the scope of the sense alone and isolated, but only as mingled
with something else; this admixture with something else, however,
causes change, just as scents are stronger in the sunshine than in
cold air, &c. Further, through the subject himself, this admixture
comes in; the eyes consist of various tunics and humours, the ear has
different passages, &c., consequently they cannot allow sensations—the
light or the voice—to come to us in their purity, for the sensuous
element comes to us first of all modified by these tunics of the eye
and likewise by the passages of the ear.[202] But if we are to express
ourselves in this particular manner, the direct opposite might likewise
be maintained, that the sensuous element there present is simply
purified; the apprehending ear, for example, again purifies the voice
that comes in bodily form from a soul.
g. The seventh trope is the cohesion, the size or quantity of things,
through which they appear different; for instance, we see how glass is
transparent, but loses this transparency when it is pounded, and thus
has its cohesion altered. Shavings of goat’s-horn appear to be white,
but the whole piece looks black; or Carrara marble ground into powder
looks white, though the whole piece is yellow. The same holds good as
regards quantity. A moderate portion of wine fortifies and exhilarates,
a large quantity of it destroys the body, and the case is similar with
drugs.[203] If the quantity is not to be spoken of as the substance,
it is still an abstraction that quantity and combination are matters
of indifference as regards quality and disintegration; the change of
quantity likewise changes the quality.
h. The eighth trope arises from the relativity of things, and is thus
the universal trope of relationship. This relativity of everything
existent and thought is a more inward, real determinateness, and all
the tropes already mentioned really aim at it. “According to this
trope,” says Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, §§ 135, 136), “we conclude
that since everything is in relation to something, we must withhold
our judgment as to what it is on its own account and in its nature.
But it must be remarked that we here make use of ‘is’ in the sense
of appearance only. Relationship is used in two respects: first in
relation to the judging subject,” and this difference we saw in the
previous tropes, “and in the second place in relation to the object
which is to be judged, like right and left.” Sextus, in the passage
above (§§ 137, 140), argues as follows: “As regards what is set forth
on its own account and separate from others, is it distinguished from
the mere relative or not? If it were not different from it, it would
itself be a relative. If it is different, it again is a relative.
That is to say, what is different is related to something, for it
is set forth in relation to that from which it is distinguished.”
Relativity, generally, is present in what is absolutely predicated,
for relationship is a relationship in itself and not to another.
Relationship contains opposition: what is in relation to another is
on the one hand independent on its own account, but on the other,
because it is in relationship, it is likewise not independent. For if
anything is only in relation to something else, the other likewise
belongs to it; it is thus not on its own account. But if its other
already belongs to it, its non-being also already belongs to it, and
it is a contradictory as soon as it is not without its other. “But
because we cannot separate the relative from its other, we likewise do
not know what it is on its own account and in its nature, and we must
consequently suspend our judgment.”