Jay, that nothing farther had been done since my departure, but to
deliver to Mr Hartley a fair copy of the project of a definitive
treaty, which I had left with my colleagues; that Mr Laurens had been
here in my absence, and returned to England; that he was of opinion,
the present British Ministry would not remain a fortnight; that Mr
Hartley had been seven weeks without a letter from his principals, and
then received only an apology for not having written, a promise to
write soon, and authority to assure the American Ministers that all
would go well. These last are words of course. There are but three
ways in which I can account for this conduct of the British Ministry.
1st. The fact is, that they foresee a change, and do not choose to
commit themselves, but wish to reserve everything for the foundation
of a future opposition, that they may attack the definitive treaty
which may be made by a future Ministry, as they attacked the
provisional and preliminary one, made by the last. 2dly. That they are
exciting secretly and insidiously the troubles in the north, in hopes
of involving France, and then assuming a higher tone. 3dly. That they
are in expectation, that seditions may be excited in Holland, and the
Dutch induced to renounce France, and renew the ancient alliance with
England.
I see no more appearance of the definitive treaty, than I have done
these six months. Mr Hartley, I am told by Mr Jay, thinks that the
French Court wish to delay the signature; that they do not wish to see
the peace finished between England and America, while matters are
uncertain in the north. There are so many considerations on both sides
of the question, whether the French Minister wishes to finish soon or
not, that it is hard to decide it. Neither Court possibly is very
zealous to finish, while so great a scene as the northern war lies
under so much obscurity.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, August 13th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday I went to Court with Dr Franklin, and presented to the Count
de Vergennes our project of a definitive treaty, who told us he would
examine it and give us his sentiments upon it.
It was Ambassadors' day, and I had conversations with a number of
Ministers, of which it is proper I should give you an account.
The Dutch Ambassador, Berkenrode, told me, that last Saturday the
Count de Vergennes went to Paris, and dined with the Imperial
Ambassador, the Count de Mercy, in company with the Duke of
Manchester, the Count d'Aranda, the Prince Bariatinski, and M.
Markoff, with their Secretaries; that after dinner the Secretaries in
presence of all the Ministers read over, compared, and corrected the
definitive treaties between France and Great Britain, and between
Spain and Great Britain, and finally agreed upon both. So that they
are now ready for signature by the Ministers of Great Britain, France,
and Spain as principals, and by those of the two Imperial Courts as
mediators.
The Duke of Manchester told me, that Mr Hartley's courier, who carried
our project of a treaty, arrived in London last Saturday, and might be
expected here on next Saturday on his return.
In the evening, on my return from Versailles, Mr Hartley called upon
me at my house, and informed me, that he had just received a courier
from Westminster, who had brought him the ratification of our
provisional treaty, under the King's own hand, and under the great
seal of the kingdom, enclosed in a silver box, ornamented with golden
tassels as usual, which he was ready to exchange tomorrow morning. He
informed me farther, that he had received very satisfactory letters
from the Duke of Portland and Mr Fox, and the strongest assurances,
that the dispositions of his Court were very good to finish
immediately, and to arrange all things upon the best footing; that he
had farther received plenary authority to sign the definitive treaty
tomorrow, or tonight, if we pleased; that he had received a draft
ready formed, which he would show us.
We agreed to go together in the morning to my colleagues, and this
morning we went out in Mr Hartley's carriage, exchanged the
ratifications, and he produced to us his project of a definitive
treaty. It is the provisional treaty in so many words; without
addition or diminution. It is only preceded with a preamble, which
makes it a definitive treaty. And he proposed to us, that all matters
of discussion respecting commerce or other things should be left to be
discussed by Ministers, to be mutually appointed to reside in London
and Philadelphia. We told him, that it had been proposed to us, that
the Ministers of the two Imperial Courts should sign the treaty as
mediators, and that we had answered, that we had no objection to it.
He said, he had unanswerable ones. First, he had no authority, and
could not obtain any certainly under ten days, nor probably ever. For
secondly, it would, he thought, give great offence to his Court, and
they never would agree that any nation should interfere between them
and America. Thirdly, for his part, he was fully against it, and
should write his opinion to his Court. If he was about to marry his
daughter, or set up a son in the world, after he was of age, he would
never admit any of his neighbors to interfere, and sign any contract
he might make, as mediators. There was no need of it.
We told him there was no need of warmth upon the occasion, or any
pretence for his Court to take offence; that it had been proposed to
us, that the Imperial Ministers should sign as mediators. Our answer
had been, that we had no objections, that we were willing and ready to
consent to it, or even to request it. His Court had a right to consent
or dissent, as it thought proper. To be sure, the mediation could not
take place without their consent. That he might write to his Court the
proposition, and if he received orders to consent or dissent, it would
be equally well. In the meantime, we were ready to sign the definitive
treaty, either with or without the mediation, whenever the other
parties were ready to sign, according to his project just received
from his Court, that is, simply a repetition of the provisional
treaty.
We have agreed to this, because it is plain, that all propositions for
alterations in the provisional articles will be an endless discussion,
and that we must give more than we can hope to receive. The critical
state of things in England, and at the Court of Versailles, and in all
the rest of Europe, affords pressing motives to get this business
finished.
Mr Hartley told us from his Court, that they had expected an American
Minister at St James's these three months, and that all further
matters might be there discussed.
He also announced to us the birth of another Princess, the fifteenth
child of the Queen, upon which event he received our congratulations,
which I hope Congress will approve and repeat by their Minister in
London; for these personal and family compliments are more attended
to in Courts, and have greater effects than may be imagined.
I lament very much, that we cannot obtain an explanation of the
article respecting the refugees, and that respecting debts; but it is
plain, we must give more than they are worth for such explanations;
and what is of more decisive importance, we must make a long delay,
and put infinitely greater things at hazard by this means.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, August 13th, 1783.
Sir,
The question before the French cabinet, whether they shall involve
themselves in a war against two Christian Empires, in order to support
a Turkish one, is of a serious nature on many accounts. If the Turks
should be driven out of Europe, France would lose some of the Levant
trade, and some of the coasting trade of Italy; and these commercial
and naval considerations are enforced by others, which lie deeper in
the human heart, the ancient rivalry between the great Houses of
Bourbon and Austria, and between the vast countries of Germany and
France, and between all the lesser powers, which depend upon them. To
these considerations is to be added, that an Austrian Princess is now
upon the throne of France, to whom it is no doubt a melancholy
consideration, that there is danger of a war between a husband and a
brother.
The city politicians are looking out for alliances with Prussia,
Holland, and even England, but can find none. It cannot be expected
that either will engage; yet the French Minister has gone far towards
compromising his master, by augmenting the array to a war
establishment, and by threatening to shut up the Mediterranean Sea.
In this posture of affairs, it is not surprising, that there should be
a fermentation at Versailles, and since my return to Paris, I find it
is the general topic of conversation. Monsieur de Breteuil, late
Ambassador to the Court of Vienna, who is supposed to be esteemed by
the Queen, and connected with her friends, is lately, about a
fortnight ago, called to the King's council, and the Mareschal de
Castries, who is in the same interest, is said to be new modelling the
subordinate offices in his department.
From these, and many other considerations, it is generally concluded,
that Count de Vergennes' continuance in the Ministry is precarious. Mr
Hartley last night and today began conversation with me upon the
subject, and is very sanguine that his Minister will continue in place
but a very short time, and assures me that the Duke of Manchester is
of the same opinion. I pretend to form no opinion, because I have ever
carefully avoided conversations and connexions, which might be
misinterpreted into an attachment to persons or parties in this
kingdom.
I know, that for the last nine months many sensible people have
thought this Minister in a tottering situation; others think he will
weather out the storm, which all people agree is preparing for him.
Time will discover. One thing is agreed on all hands, that he is not
in favor with the Queen, and as he has taken up the cause in a pretty
high tone against the Emperor and Empress, if he should be now
displaced, Congress, I think, may infer from it, that France will not
take a part in the war; on the contrary, if he remains, it is probable
she will.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, August 13th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday at Versailles, the Baron de Walterstorff came to me and told
me he had delivered to Dr Franklin, a project of a treaty between the
Court of Denmark and the United States, and asked me if Dr Franklin
had shown it to me? I answered him, that I knew nothing of it. He
said, he wondered at that, he presumed it was because of my absence at
the Hague, for that it had been shown to Mr Jay. There by the way he
was misinformed, for upon my return from Versailles, I called upon Mr
Jay on purpose to ask him, and he assured me he had not seen it. I
asked Walterstorff, if his orders were to propose his project to us
all. He said no, this Court had been informed, that Dr Franklin was
the Minister authorised and empowered by Congress to treat with all
the powers of Europe, and they had for this reason sent him orders to
deliver the project to Dr Franklin, but he supposed Dr Franklin would
consult his colleagues. The same information, I doubt not, has been
given to the Court of Portugal, and every other Court in Europe, viz.
that Dr Franklin is alone empowered to treat with them; and in
consequence of it, very probably, propositions have been or will be
made to him from all of them, and he will keep the whole as secret as
he can from Mr Jay, Mr Laurens, Mr Dana, and me.[11]
Now I beg to be informed by Congress, whether he has such authority or
not? Having never been informed of such powers, I do not believe he
has them. I remember there was seven years ago a resolution of
Congress, that their Commissioners at Versailles should have power to
treat with other powers of Europe; but upon the dissolution of that
commission this authority was dissolved with it; or if not, it still
resides in Mr Deane, Mr Lee, and myself, who were once in that
commission, as well as Dr Franklin. And if it is by virtue of this
power he acts, he ought at least to communicate with me, who alone am
present. I think, however, that neither he nor I have any legal
authority, and therefore that he ought to communicate everything of
this kind to all the Ministers here or hereabout, Mr Jay, Mr Laurens,
and myself, at least.
It is not from the vain wish of seeing my poor name upon a treaty,
that I write this. If the business is well done, it is not of much
importance in itself who does it.
But my duty to my country obliges me to say, that I seriously believe
this clandestine manner of smuggling treaties is contrived by European
politicians on purpose, that Mr Jay and I may not have an opportunity
of suggesting ideas for the preservation of American navigation,
transport-trade, and nurseries of seamen. But in another point of view
it is of equal importance. This method reflects contempt and ridicule
on your other Ministers. When all Europe sees, that a number of your
Ministers are kept here as a kind of satellites to Dr Franklin in the
affair of peace, but that they are not to be consulted or asked a
question, or even permitted to know the important negotiations which
are here going on with all Europe, they fall into contempt. It cannot
be supposed that Congress mean to cast this contempt upon us, because
it cannot be supposed they mean to destroy the reputation, character,
influence, and usefulness of those to whom in other respects they
intrust powers of so much consequence; and therefore I am persuaded,
that Congress is as much imposed on by it as the Courts of Europe are.
I asked the Baron, what was the substance of the treaty. He said his
Court had taken for a model, my treaty with Holland. I said nothing to
him in answer to this, but I beg leave to say to Congress, that the
negotiation with Holland was in very different circumstances. We were
then in the fiercest rage of the war. A treaty with that Republic was
at that time of as much weight in the war, as the captivity of
Burgoyne or Cornwallis. A treaty with any power was worth a battle or
a siege, and no moments of time were to be lost, especially in a
country so divided, that unanimity being necessary, every proposition
was dangerous. At present the case is altered, and we may take time to
weigh and inquire. The Baron tells me, that St Thomas and St John, two
of their Islands, are free ports, but that St Croix, which is of more
importance than both, is not. That foreign vessels, our vessels, are
permitted to bring our produce, and carry away half the value in
sugar, &c. The Island produces, _communibus annis_, twenty thousand
hogsheads of sugar, and their molasses is better than that of the
French, because they make only "_sucres crutes_." He says, they have
some sugar-houses at Copenhagen. But notwithstanding this, I think it
is worth while for Congress to try if they cannot, by the treaty,
obtain a right to take away cargoes, to the full value of those they
bring. It is worth while to try too, if we cannot obtain a tariff, to
ascertain the duties to be paid in exportation and importation. It is
worth while too, to endeavor to get the duties ascertained in the
Danish ports in Europe, at least that we may not pay in their ports
more than they pay in ours; or that our vessels may not be obliged to
pay more than theirs, especially when we import our own produce. I
pretend not to be a master of these commercial subjects, but I think
that Dr Franklin has not studied the subject more than myself, that
both of us need the advice of Mr Laurens and Mr Jay, and that all of
us want that of American merchants, and especially of Congress. I am
therefore against this secret and hasty method of concluding treaties,
at this time, when they may be more maturely reflected on.
I know very well to what ill-natured remarks these reflections are
liable, but they shall not hinder me from doing my duty. I do
sincerely believe, there are clandestine insinuations going about to
every commercial nation in the world, to excite them to increase their
own navigation and seamen at the expense of ours, and that this
smuggling of treaties is one means of accomplishing the design,
although Dr Franklin may not be let into the secret of it. For, from
long experience and observation, I am persuaded that one Minister at
least and his dependants would prefer, that the navigation of any
nation in the world, even that of the English, should grow, rather
than ours. In the last _Courier de l'Europe_, it is said, that all the
commercial powers are concerting measures to clip the wings of the
eagle, and to prevent us from having a navy. I believe it. That is to
say, I believe measures are taken with them all to bring them into
this system, although they are not let into the secret design, and do
not know from whom the measures come, nor with what views promoted.
With great regard, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[11] Franklin did not assume this authority, but reported to Congress,
that propositions for treaties had been made, and desired that
authority to conclude them might be sent to him, or _some other
person_. See on this subject, _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV.
pp. 74, 97, 99, 110, 114, 141. For the treaty with Sweden he had a
special authority. _Secret Journals_, Vol. III. p 240.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, August 15th, 1783.
Sir,
France, England, Spain, and America are all agreed; but Mr Hartley is
sanguine, that the treaty will not be signed, because, he says, the
Count de Vergennes does not mean to sign it. His reasons for this
opinion I know not, and I think he is mistaken. It is very certain,
however, that the French Minister is embarrassed, and would not,
perhaps, be sorry to find good reasons for postponing the signature
for some time.
Congress may judge in some degree of the situation of things, by the
following conversation, which I had this morning with M. Brantzen, the
Ambassador Extraordinary from the States-General, to whom I returned
the visit he made me yesterday, when I was abroad.
He told me, "that he was as far, and indeed farther than ever, from an
agreement with the Duke of Manchester. He had given up, he said, all
pretensions to a compensation for the unjust damages of the war, and
he had in a manner waived his claim of the restitution of Negapatnam.
But the Duke of Manchester now insisted peremptorily upon, not only
all the ancient salutations from the Dutch flag to the English, but
upon an unlimited liberty of navigation in all the seas of the East
Indies. He had despatched an express to the Hague the day before
yesterday, who would arrive today; but the Grand Pensionary was sick,
and the States of Holland not sitting; so that there must be some time
before he could have an answer. Concerning the salutes to the flag,
there would be different opinions, but they would be all of a mind
against the liberty of navigation in the Indies. He could not,
therefore, expect from their High Mightinesses permission to sign, and
the Count de Vergennes would be embarrassed. All the other powers were
ready, and to make them wait would raise a cry.
"To sign without Holland would raise a terrible storm in Holland
against the Count, and no small one in France. And even, if the States
should authorise him to sign a shameful peace, this would raise no
less clamor in Holland and France against the Count. He will,
therefore, not know what to do, and will seek to postpone; for the
parties of the Marquis de Castries and of M. de Breteuil will take
advantage of every clamor against the Count, as these parties wish M.
de Breteuil in his place. I am persuaded, therefore, that the Count
himself looks upon his own situation as very hazardous. It has been so
a long time. It was his instability in his place that made him sign
the preliminaries, for money to carry on the war could not be obtained
without M. Necker, and M. Necker would not come in with the Count, as
they were and are sworn enemies to each other. He was, therefore,
reduced to the dilemma to make peace or go out. I have good reasons to
believe, that the Mareschal de Castries disapproves of the Count's
conduct towards our Republic. He certainly deceived me. The
States-General did very wrong to bind me to leave so much to the
French Minister; but I thought him an honest man, and that I could
trust him; so I left things to him, according to my instructions,
depending on his word, and, at last, I found myself the dupe. No, not
a dupe, for I am always upon my guard not to be a dupe. But he
deceived me; and when one, whom I have reason to believe an honest
man, deceives me, I cannot call myself a dupe, for I can do no other
than believe an honest man, when he gives me his word."
In several of your letters, Sir, you have insisted on my reciting to
you my conversations with foreign Ministers. You must not esteem them
infallible oracles. They are often mistaken in their facts, and
sometimes wrong in their reasonings. But these sentiments of M.
Brantzen are of so much importance, that I thought proper to recite
them. It will, indeed, be necessary for your foreign Ministers to be
more inquisitive than we have been, and to transmit to Congress more
information concerning the intrigues of Courts, than we have done. If
the Mareschal de Castries and M. de Breteuil, who is now in the
Council, and M. Necker are not friends to the Count de Vergennes, and
all the world here agree they are not, Congress ought to know it.
Although I would have so much respect to the Queen, as not to name her
Majesty upon unnecessary occasions, yet, upon this, when she is sister
to the Emperor, and the question at Court is, whether there shall be a
war with her brother, it is obviously a matter of so much importance,
as to make it a duty to communicate to Congress her sentiments, which
all men here agree are favorable to de Castries and Breteuil, but not
partial to the present Minister of foreign Affairs. I said in a former
letter, if this Minister continues, there will be war; but I am told
by some, if there is war, he cannot continue; for neither he, nor his
friends, can raise the money. M. de Rayneval, however, affirmed
positively to Mr Hartley, that nothing but death could remove the
Count.[12]
All these things show the critical and uncertain constitution of this
Court, and the uncertainty when the definitive treaty will be signed,
notwithstanding that four powers are agreed, and, therefore, I can
give Congress no clear information upon that head. This is a great
chagrin to me, both on account of the public and myself, because I am
as uncertain about my own destiny as that of the public.
With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[12] This affirmation was verified. The Count de Vergennes continued
in the Ministry till his death, which happened, February 13th, 1787.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, September 5th 1783.
Sir,
On Wednesday, the 3d day of this month, the American Ministers met the
British Minister at his lodgings at the _Hotel de York_, and signed,
sealed, and delivered the Definitive Treaty of Peace between the
United States of America and the King of Great Britain. Although it is
but a confirmation or repetition of the provisional articles, I have
the honor to congratulate Congress upon it, as it is a completion of
the work of peace, and the best that we could obtain. Nothing remains
now to be done but a treaty of commerce; but this in my opinion cannot
be negotiated without a new commission from Congress to some one or
more persons. Time, it is easy to foresee, will not be likely to
render the British nation more disposed to a regulation of commerce
favorable to us, and therefore my advice is to issue a commission as
soon as may be.
There is another subject on which I beg leave to represent to Congress
my sentiments, because they seem to me of importance, and because they
differ from many sanguine opinions, which will be communicated to the
members of that assembly from partisans both of England and France.
In the late deliberations concerning an acceptance of the mediation of
the Imperial Courts, the British Minister refused it, and in the
conferences we had with the Count de Vergennes upon this subject, it
was manifest enough to me that he was not fond of our accepting it;
for although he maintained a perfect impartiality of language, neither
advising us for, nor against the measure, yet at last, when it was
observed that Mr Hartley was averse to it, he turned to Dr Franklin
and said, that we must agree with Mr Hartley about it, with such a
countenance, air, and tone of voice (for from these you must often
collect the sentiments of Ministers) as convinced me he did not wish
the mediation should take place.