Ministry, particularly the Count de Vergennes, are determined to do
everything they can consistent with their own essential interests, to
favor and promote the friendship and commerce between their country
and ours. That they, especially the Count, are declared enemies of the
French fiscal system, which is certainly the most ruinous to their
commerce, and intend to do everything they can to make alterations to
favor commerce; but no change can be made in this, without affecting
their revenues, and making voids, failures, and deficiencies, which
they cannot fill up. They must, therefore, proceed softly. That France
would favor the commerce between Portugal and America, because it
would tend to draw off that kingdom from her dependence on England.
That England, by her commercial treaty with the Portuguese, in 1703,
has turned them into an English Colony, made them entirely dependent,
and secured a commerce with them of three millions value. France would
be glad to see this, or as much of it as possible, turned to America.
The Duke agrees fully with me in the maxim, that those Colonies will
grow the most in wealth, improvement, population, and every sort of
prosperity, which are allowed the freest communication with us, and
that we shall be allowed to carry lumber, fish, and live stock, to
their islands, but that the export of their sugars to us, he thinks,
must be in their own ships, because they are afraid of our becoming
the carriers of all their commerce, because they know and say, that we
can do it cheaper than they can. These sentiments are different from
those, which he mentioned to me a few days ago, when he said, the West
India trade with us must be carried on in French bottoms.
The Duke said, the English had been trying to deceive us, but were now
developing their true sentiments. They pretended, for awhile, to
abolish the navigation act and all distinctions, to make one people
with us again, to be friends, brothers, &c. in hopes of drawing us off
from France, but not finding success, they were now showing their true
plan. As to the pretended system of Shelburne, of a universal free
commerce, although he thought it would be for the good of mankind in
general, yet, for an English Minister, it was the plan of a madman,
for it would be the ruin of that nation. He did not think Shelburne
was sincere in it; he only meant an illusion to us. Here I differ from
the Duke, and believe, that the late Ministry were very sincere
towards us, and would have made a treaty with us, at least to revive
the universal trade between us, upon a liberal plan. This doctrine of
ruin, from that plan, to the English, has been so much preached of
late in England by the French and the American refugees, who aim at
establishments in Canada and Nova Scotia, and by the old Butean
administration and their partisans, that I do not know whether any
Ministry could now support a generous plan. But if Temple, Thurlow,
Shelburne, Pitt, &c. should come in, I should not despair of it. It is
true, the Shelburne administration did encourage the ideas of cordial,
perfect friendship, of entire reconciliation of affections, of making
no distinction between their people and ours, especially between the
inhabitants of Canada and Nova Scotia and us, and this, with the
professed purpose of destroying all seeds of war between us. These
sentiments were freely uttered by Fitzherbert, Oswald, Whiteford,
Vaughan, and all who had the confidence of that Ministry; and in these
sentiments they were, I believe, very sincere. And they are, indeed,
the only means of preventing a future war between us and them, and so
sure as they depart from that plan, so sure, in less than fifteen
years, perhaps less than seven, there will break out another war.
Quarrels will arise among fishermen, between inhabitants of Canada and
Nova Scotia and us, and between their people and ours in the West
Indies, in our ports, and in the ports of the three kingdoms, which
will breed a war in spite of all we can do to prevent it. France sees
this and rejoices in it, and I know not whether we ought to be sorry;
yet I think we ought to make it a maxim to avoid all wars, if
possible; and to take care that it is not our fault if we cannot. We
ought to do everything, which the English will concur in, to remove
all causes of jealousies, and kill all the seeds of hostility as
effectually as we can; and to be upon our guard to prevent the French,
Spaniards, and Dutch, from sowing the seeds of war between us, for we
may rely upon it they will do it if they can.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 18th, 1783.
Sir,
There is cause to be solicitous about the state of things in England.
The present Ministry swerve more and more from the true system, for
the prosperity of their country and ours. Mr Hartley, whose sentiments
are at bottom just, is probably kept here, if he was not sent at
first, merely to amuse us, and to keep him out of the way of
embarrassing the coalition. We need not fear, that France and England
will make a common cause against us, even in relation to the
carrying-trade to and from the West Indies. Although they may mutually
inspire into each other false notions of their interests at times, yet
there can never be a concert of operations between them. Mutual enmity
is bred in the blood and bones of both, and rivals and enemies at
heart they eternally will be.
In order to induce both to allow us our natural right to the
carrying-trade, we must negotiate with the Dutch, Danes, Portuguese,
and even with the Empires; for the more friends and resources we have,
the more we shall be respected by the French and English; and the more
freedom of trade we enjoy with the Dutch possessions in America, the
more will France and England find themselves necessitated to allow us.
The present Ministers in England have very bad advisers; the refugees,
and emissaries of various other sorts, and we have nobody to watch
and counteract, to correct or prevent anything.
The United States will soon see the necessity of uniting in measures
to counteract their enemies, and even their friends. What powers
Congress should have for governing the trade of the whole, for making
or recommending prohibitions, or imposts, deserves the serious
consideration of every man in America. If a constitutional legislative
authority cannot be given them, a sense of common danger and necessity
should give to their recommendations all the force upon the minds of
the people, which they had six years ago.
If the union of the States is not preserved, and even their unity, in
many great points, instead of being the happiest people under the sun,
I do not know but we may be the most miserable. We shall find our
foreign affairs the most difficult to manage of any of our interests;
we shall see and feel them disturbed by invisible agents, and causes,
by secret intrigues, by dark and mysterious insinuations, by concealed
corruptions of a thousand sorts. Hypocrisy and simulation will assume
a million of shapes; we shall feel the evil, without being able to
prove the cause. Those, whose penetration reaches the true source of
the evil, will be called suspicious, envious, disappointed, ambitious.
In short, if there is not an authority sufficiently decisive to draw
together the minds, affections, and forces of the States, in their
common foreign concerns, it appears to me we shall be the sport of
transatlantic politicians of all denominations, who hate liberty in
every shape, and every man who loves it, and every country that enjoys
it. If there is no common authority, nor any common sense to secure a
revenue for the discharge of our engagements abroad for money, what
is to become of our honor, our justice, our faith, our universal,
moral, political, and commercial character? If there is no common
power to fulfil engagements with our citizens, to pay our soldiers,
and other creditors, can we have any moral character at home? Our
country will become the region of everlasting discontents, reproaches,
and animosities, and instead of finding our independence a blessing,
we shall soon become Cappadocians enough to wish it done away.
I may be thought gloomy, but this ought not to discourage me from
laying before Congress my apprehensions. The dependence of those who
have designs upon us, upon our want of affection to each other, and of
authority over one another, is so great, that in my opinion, if the
United States do not soon show to the world a proof, that they can
command a common revenue to satisfy their creditors at home and
abroad, that they can act as one people, as one nation, as one man, in
their transactions with foreign nations, we shall be soon so far
despised, that it will be but a few years, perhaps but a few months
only, before we are involved in another war.
What can I say in Holland, if a doubt is started, whether we can repay
the money we wish to borrow? I must assure them in a tone, that will
exclude all doubt that the money will be repaid. Am I to be hereafter
reproached with deceiving the money-lenders? I cannot believe there is
a man in America, who would not disdain the supposition, and therefore
I shall not scruple to give the strongest assurances in my power. But
if there is a doubt in Congress, they ought to recall their borrowers
of money.
I shall set off tomorrow for Holland, in hopes of improving my health,
at the same time that I shall endeavor to assist the loan, and to
turn the speculations of the Dutch merchants, capitalists and
statesmen, towards America. It is of vast importance that the Dutch
should form just ideas of their interests respecting the communication
between us and their islands, and other colonies in America. I beg
that no time may be lost in commencing conferences with M. Van Berckel
upon this subject, as well as that of money; but this should not be
communicated to the French nor the English, because we may depend upon
it, both will endeavor to persuade the Dutch to adopt the same plan
with themselves. There are jealousies on both sides the Pass of
Calais, of our connexions and negotiations with the Dutch. But while
we avoid as much as we can to inflame this jealousy, we must have
sense and firmness and independence enough not to be intimidated by
it, from availing ourselves of advantages, that Providence has placed
in our power. There ever have been, and ever will be, suspicions of
every honest, active, and intelligent American, and there will be as
there have been insidious attempts to destroy or lessen your
confidence in every such character. But if our country does not
support her own interests, and her own servants, she will assuredly
fall. Persons, who study to preserve or obtain the confidence of
America, by the favor of European statesmen, or Courts, must betray
their own country to preserve their places.
For my own part, I wish Mr Jay and myself almost anywhere else but
here. There is scarce any other place where we might not do some good.
Here we are in a state of annihilation.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
The Hague, July 23d, 1783.
Sir,
On Saturday last I left Paris, and arrived here last night. This
morning I sent M. Dumas to M. Van Berckel and M. Gyselaer, to inform
them of my arrival, and to desire a conversation with them, upon the
subject of the commerce between the United States and the Dutch
establishments in the West Indies.
M. Van Berckel told M. Dumas, "that St Eustatia and Curacoa were open
to the vessels of all nations, and to the commerce of all the world;
but that it was not the interest of the West India Company alone, but
that of the whole State, that obliged them to confine the commerce of
their sugars to themselves, because of the great number of their
refineries of sugar. That all their own sugars were not half enough to
employ their sugar-houses, and that at least one half of the sugars
refined in Holland were the production of the French West India
Islands."
I suppose that some of these sugars may have been carried first to St
Eustatia, and brought from thence to Holland, and some others may have
been purchased in the ports of France, and imported raw from thence. I
do not know that Dutch vessels were permitted to purchase sugars in
the French Islands, and export them from thence. This matter deserves
to be examined to the bottom. If France has not sugar-houses for the
refinement of her own sugars, but is obliged to carry them, or to
permit their being carried, to Amsterdam and Rotterdam for
manufacture, why should she not be willing, that the same sugars
should be carried by Americans to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia?
Surely France has no predilection for Holland rather than America. But
what is of more weight, all the sugars, which America takes, will be
paid for in articles more advantageous to the Islands, and to France,
than the pay that is made by the Dutch. If any sugars refined in
Holland are afterwards sold in France, surely it would be more for the
interest of France, or rather less against her interests, to have the
same sugars refined in America, and afterwards sold in France, because
the price of them would be laid out by us in France. There is this
difference between us and the Dutch, and all other nations, we spend
in Europe all the profits we make and more, the others do not. But if
the French sugars, refined in Holland, are afterwards sold in other
parts of Europe, it would be just as well that we should sell them. We
have sugar-houses as well as the Dutch, and ours ought not to be more
obnoxious to French policy or commerce than theirs.
Sugars are a great article. There is a great consumption in America.
It is not the interest of any nation, that has sugars to sell, to
lessen the consumption there. All such nations should favor that
consumption, in order to multiply purchasers, and quicken the
competition, by which the price is raised. None of these nations then
will wish to prevent our having sugar, provided we offer as high, or a
higher price. How they will be able to arrange their plans, so that we
may have enough for our own consumption, without having more, without
having some for exportation, I do not know.
We have now St Eustatia and Curacoa, St Lucia and Martinique, St
Thomas and St Martin's, no less than six free ports in the West
Indies; and perhaps England may be induced, necessitated indeed, to
add two more to the number, and make eight. At these free ports, it
will be hard if we cannot find sugars, when we carry thither all our
own productions, in our own ships. And if the worst should happen, and
all the nations, who have sugar Islands, should forbid sugars to be
carried to America in any other than their own bottoms, we might
depend upon having enough of this article at the free ports, to be
brought away in our own ships, if we should lay a prohibition or a
duty upon it in foreign ships. To do either, the States must be
united, which the English think cannot be. Perhaps the French think so
too, and in time, they may persuade the Dutch to be of the same
opinion. It is to be hoped we shall disappoint them all. In a point so
just and reasonable, when we are contending only for an equal chance
for the carriage of our own productions, and the articles of our own
consumption, when we are willing to allow to all other nations even a
free competition with us in this carriage, if we cannot unite, it will
discover an imperfection and weakness in our constitution, which will
deserve a serious consideration.
M. Visscher, Pensionary of Amsterdam, who came in to visit me, when I
had written thus far, showed me a list of the Directors of the West
India Company, and refers me to M. Bicker, of Amsterdam, as one of the
most intelligent of them. He says, that the Colonists of Surinam,
Berbice, Essequibo, and Demarara, have been in decay, and obliged to
borrow money of the merchants at home, and have entered into contracts
with those merchants, to send them annually all the productions of
their plantations to pay the interest and principal of their debts;
that this will make it difficult to open the trade.
Soon after M. Visscher went out, M. Van Berckel came in. I entered
into a like conversation with him, and told him that I thought the
decay of their plantations in the West Indies had been owing to the
rivalry of other nations, especially the English, whose Islands had
greater advantages from a freer communication with North America; and
I thought it might be laid down as a rule, that those Islands would
flourish most in population, culture, commerce, and wealth, which had
the freest intercourse with us, and that this intercourse would be a
natural means of attracting the American commerce to the metropolis.
He thought so too.
I then mentioned to him the loan; and asked him, if he thought that
the States-General, the States of Holland, or the Regency of
Amsterdam, would be likely, in any way, to aid us? He said, no; that
the country was still so much divided, that he could not depend upon
any assistance in that way. That the Council of Amsterdam was well
enough disposed; but that the Burgomasters were not so. That M.
Temmink, M. Huggens, and M. Rendorp, were not to be depended on in
such an affair. That, therefore, our only resource was, to endeavor to
gain upon the public opinion and the spirit of the nation, and that,
in this respect, he would do me all the service in his power. He
thought that the present uncertainty about the definitive treaty, and
the fate of the Republic, would be an obstacle; but the definitive
treaty once signed, he thought our loan would succeed very well. I
asked him, whether he thought that the junction of three houses in my
loan was any obstruction to it? and whether any one of them, or
whether any other house, would do better? I told him what his brother,
(now I hope in Philadelphia,) had said to M. Dumas, viz. that the
house of Wilkem and Van Willink alone would succeed sooner than the
three. I asked him, whether he thought the house of Hope, either
alone, or in conjunction with that of the Willinks, or any other,
would undertake it? He said, this might well be, and that if they saw
their interest in it they would, for those mercantile houses had no
other object in view. He promised me to make inquiry into this matter,
and let me know the result.
Upon this occasion, I must inform Congress, that it is absolutely
necessary they should send another Minister to this Republic, without
loss of time; because our three present houses, before they would
undertake the loan, extorted a promise from me, not to open another
with any other house until the five millions should be full. This
engagement I took for myself alone, however, and expressly premised
that Congress should not be bound by it; that Congress should be
perfectly free, and that any other Minister they might send here
should be perfectly free to open another loan, when and with whom they
pleased. A new Minister, therefore, may open a loan when he will, with
Hope, Willink, or whom he will, and I am persuaded it would succeed to
a good amount.
I made visits to day, the 25th of July, to the Grand Pensionary, the
Secretary Fagel, the President of the week, and M. Gyselaer; and
returned visits to M. Van Berckel and M. Visscher. M. Gyselaer says,
that at present there is no ready money (_argent comptant_) in the
Republic, but in two months there will be, and the loan will go very
well.
At noon I went to the house in the Grove, to make my court to the
Prince and Princess of Orange.
The Prince either happened to be in a social humor, or has had some
political speculations lately, for he thought fit to be uncommonly
gracious and agreeable. He made me sit, and sat down by me, and
entered into familiar conversation about the negotiations of peace. He
asked many questions about it, and the probability of a speedy
conclusion of the definitive treaty. At length, he asked me, if Dr
Franklin was left alone? I answered, that Mr Jay was with him. He
asked, if I returned before the signature? I answered, that such was
my intention. He asked, whether Dr Franklin was an Ambassador? I
answered, that he was a Minister Plenipotentiary only. He asked, if
none of us were Ambassadors? I answered, that we all had the same rank
of Ministers Plenipotentiary, and that Congress had never yet made an
Ambassador. He said, he was astonished at that; that he had a long
time expected to hear, that we had displayed the character of
Ambassadors. I asked his Highness, what reason he had for this, and
what advantage there was in it? "Why," said he, "I expected that your
Republic would early assert her right to appoint Ambassadors.
Republics have been generally fond of appointing Ambassadors, in order
to be on a footing with crowned heads. Our Republic began very early.
We had eight Ambassadors at the peace of Munster; one for each
Province, and one supernumerary. And we always choose to appoint
Ambassadors, for the sake of being upon an equality with crowned
heads. There are only crowned heads, Republics, and the Electors of
the Empire, who have a right to send Ambassadors; all others can only
send Envoys, and Ministers Plenipotentiary. Princes cannot send
Ambassadors. I cannot, as Stadtholder, nor as Prince, nor in any other
quality, send a Minister of any higher order, than an Envoy, or
Minister Plenipotentiary." He asked me, what was the reason the
Congress had not made use of their right? I answered his Highness,
that really I did not know. It was a subject I had never much
reflected on; perhaps Congress had not. Or they might think it a
matter of ceremony and of show, rather than substance; or might think
the expense greater than the advantage. He said, it was very true, the
dignity of the rank must be supported, but he thought the advantage
worth more than the expense.
I am utterly at a loss for his Highness' motives for entering so
minutely into this subject. Whether M. Van Berckel, before his
departure, had mentioned it; whether he thought he should please me by
it; whether he thought to please Congress by it; whether he affected
to interest himself in the honor of the United States; or whether any
of the politicians of this, or any other country, have put him upon
it, or whether it is mere accident, I know not. They are the words of
a Prince, and I have reported them very exactly.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
The Hague, July 25th, 1783.
Sir,
It is the general opinion here both among the members of the States,
and at the _Hotel de France_, that the delays of the definitive
pacification are contrived by the Court of London, in order to set all
their instruments at work in this Republic, to induce it to renew its
ancient connexions with Great Britain, particularly their alliance,
offensive and defensive, by which each power was bound to furnish the
other, if attacked, a certain number of ships and troops. Against this
the patriotic party is decided, and they are now very well satisfied
with the Grand Pensionary, Bleiswick, because he openly and roundly
takes their side, and the Court is said to be discontented with him
for the same reason. There is, no doubt, an intelligence and
correspondence between the two Courts of London and the Hague, to
bring about this point. The Grand Pensionary told me yesterday, that
the Court of London desired it, and there were persons here who
desired it, and he knew very well who they were; but that most
certainly they would not carry their point. Van Berckel, Visscher, and
Gyselaer, all assured me of the same, and added, that the fear of this
had determined them not to send a Minister to London, but to go
through with the negotiation at Paris, although they were all highly
dissatisfied with the conduct of France, and particularly with that of
the Count de Vergennes.