have no confidence in one another; that they cannot agree to act in a
body as one nation; that they cannot agree upon any navigation act,
which may be common to the Thirteen States. Our proper remedy would be
to confine our exports to American ships, to make a law, that no
article should be exported from any of the States in British ships,
nor in the ships of any nation, which will not allow us reciprocally
to import their productions in our ships. I am much afraid there is
too good an understanding upon this subject between Versailles and St
James's.
Perhaps it may be proper for Congress to be silent upon this head
until New York, Penobscot, &c. are evacuated. But I should think, that
Congress would never bind themselves by any treaty built upon such
principles. They should negotiate, however, without loss of time, by a
Minister in London. A few weeks' delay may have unalterable effects.
PROCLAMATION
_At the Court of St James, the 2d of July, 1783._
Present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.
"Whereas, by an Act of Parliament, passed this session,
entitled an 'Act for preventing certain instruments from
being required from ships belonging to the United States of
America, and to give his Majesty, for a limited time, certain
powers for the better carrying on trade and commerce, between
the subjects of his Majesty's dominions, and the inhabitants
of the said United States;' it is amongst other things
enacted, that, during the continuance of the said act, 'it
shall and may be lawful for his Majesty in Council, by order
or orders to be issued and published from time to time, to
give such directions, and to make such regulations, with
respect to duties, drawbacks, or otherwise, for carrying on
the trade and commerce between the people and territories
belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, and the people and
territories of the said United States, as to his Majesty in
Council shall appear most expedient and salutary, any law,
usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding;' his
Majesty doth, therefore, by and with the advice of his Privy
Council, hereby order and direct, that pitch, tar,
turpentine, hemp and flax, masts, yards, and bowsprits,
staves, heading, boards, timber, shingles, and all other
species of lumber, horses, neat cattle, sheep, hogs, poultry,
and all other species of live stock, and live provisions;
peas, beans, potatoes, wheat, flour, bread, biscuit, rice,
oats, barley, and all other species of grain, being the
growth, or production of any one of the United States of
America, may, until further order, be imported by British
subjects, in British built ships, owned by his Majesty's
subjects, and navigated according to law, from any port of
the United States of America, to any of his Majesty's West
India Islands; and that rum, sugar, molasses, coffee,
cocoa-nuts, ginger, and pimento, may, until further order, be
exported by British subjects, in British built ships, owned
by his Majesty's subjects, and navigated according to law,
from any of his Majesty's West India Islands, and to any port
or place within the said United States, upon payment of the
same duties on exportation, and subject to the like rules,
regulations, securities, and restrictions, as the same
articles by law are, or may be, subject and liable to, if
exported to any British colony or plantation in America. And
the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's
Treasury, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, are
to give the necessary directions herein, as to them may
respectively appertain.
STEPHEN COTTRELL."
One of the most remarkable things in this proclamation is, the
omission of salt-fish, an article, which the islands want as much as
any that is enumerated. This is, no doubt, to encourage their own
fishery, and that of Nova Scotia, as well as a blow aimed at ours.
There was, in a former proclamation concerning the trade between the
United States and Great Britain, an omission of the articles of
_potash_ and _pearlash_. These omissions discover a _choice love_ for
New England. France, I am afraid, will exclude fish too, and imitate
this proclamation but too closely; if, indeed, this proclamation is
not an imitation of their system adopted, as I believe it is, upon
their advice and desire.
These, however, are important efforts. Without saying, writing, or
resolving anything suddenly, let us see what remedies or equivalents
we can obtain from Holland, Portugal and Denmark. Let us bind
ourselves to nothing, but reserve a right of making navigation acts
when we please, if we find them necessary or useful. If we had been
defeated of our fisheries, we should have been wormed out of all our
carrying-trade too, and should have been a mere society of
cultivators, without any but a passive trade. The policy of France has
succeeded, and laid, in these proclamations, if persisted in, the sure
source of another war between us and Great Britain.
The English nation is not, however, unanimous in this new system, as
Congress will see by the enclosed speculations,[8] which I know to
have been written by a confidential friend of my Lord Shelburne; I
mean Mr Benjamin Vaughan. This Minister is very strong in the House of
Lords, and Mr Pitt, in the House of Commons, has attached to him many
members in the course of this session. If that set should come in
again, we shall have a chance of making an equitable treaty of
commerce. To this end a Minister must be ready; and I hope in mercy to
our country, that such an opportunity will not be lost in delays, in
compliance to our allies.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[8] This paper is missing.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON
Paris. July 14th, 1783.
Sir,
The United States of America have propagated far and wide in Europe
the ideas of the liberty of navigation and commerce. The powers of
Europe, however, cannot agree, as yet, in adopting them in their full
extent. Each one desires to maintain the exclusive dominion of some
particular sea, or river, and yet to enjoy the liberty of navigating
all others. Great Britain wishes to preserve the exclusive dominion of
the British seas, and, at the same time, to obtain of the Dutch a free
navigation of all the seas in the East Indies. France has contended
for the free use of the British and American seas; yet she wishes to
maintain the Turks in their exclusive dominion of the Black sea, and
of the Danube, which flows into it through some of their Provinces,
and of the communication between the Black Sea and the Archipelago, by
the Dardanelles. Russia aims at the free navigation of the Black Sea,
the Danube, and the passage by the Dardanelles, yet she contends, that
the nations, which border on the Baltic, have a right to control the
navigation of it. Denmark claims the command of the passage of the
Sound, and by the late Marine Treaty between the neutral powers, it
was agreed, that the privateers of all the belligerent powers should
be excluded from the Baltic. France and Spain too begin to talk of an
exclusive dominion of the Mediterranean, and of excluding the Russian
fleet from it; or, at least, France is said to have menaced Russia
with a fleet of observation in the Mediterranean, to protect her
commerce to the trading seaport towns of the Levant. But, as England
possesses Gibraltar, and the Emperor of Morocco the other side of the
Straits, France and Spain cannot command the entrance; so that it will
be difficult for them to support their pretensions to any exclusive
dominion of the Mediterranean, upon the principle on which the
northern powers claim that of the Baltic, and the Porte the passage of
the Dardanelles.
France, at present, enjoys a large share of the trade to the Levant.
England has enjoyed a share too, and wishes, no doubt, to revive it.
The Emperor and the Empress, if they succeed in their views of
throwing open the Danube, Black Sea, and Archipelago, will take away
from France and England a great part of this trade; but it is not
likely that England will join with France in any opposition to the
Emperor and Empress.
In order to judge of the object, which the two Empires have in view,
we should look a little into the geography of those countries.
The project of setting at liberty the whole country of ancient Greece,
Macedonia, and Illyricum, and erecting independent Republics in those
famous seats, however splendid it may appear in speculation, is not
likely to be seriously entertained by the two Empires, because it is
impracticable. The Greeks of this day, although they are said to have
imagination and ingenuity, are corrupted in their morals to such a
degree, as to be a faithless, perfidious race, destitute of courage,
as well as of those principles of honor and virtue, without which
nations can have no confidence in one another, nor be trusted by
others.
The project of conquering the Provinces of Albania, Romelia,
Wallachia, Moldavia, and Little Tartary, from the Turks, and dividing
them between the two Empires, may be more probable; but the Turks, in
Asia and Europe together, are very powerful, and, if thoroughly
awakened, might make a great resistance; so that it is most probable,
the two Imperial Courts would be content, if they could obtain by
negotiation, or by arms, the free navigation of the Danube, Black Sea,
and Archipelago. This freedom alone would produce a great revolution
in the commerce of Europe. The river Don or Tanais, with its branches,
flows through the Ukraine, and a considerable part of the Russian
dominions, into the Black Sea. The Danube flows very near Trieste,
through the Kingdom of Hungary, and then through a Turkish Province
into the Black Sea. If, therefore, the Black Sea and the Danube only
were free, a communication would be immediately opened between Russia
and Hungary quite to Trieste, to the great advantage of both Empires.
But if, at the same time, the passage of the Dardanelles was laid
open, all the Levant trade would be opened to the two Empires, and
might be carried to Trieste, either by the Danube, or through the
Archipelago and the Gulf of Venice. This would be such an accession of
wealth, commerce, and naval power to the two Empires, as France is
jealous of, and may be drawn into a war to prevent.
It is a question how the King of Prussia will act. It is the general
opinion, that, as he is advanced in years, loves and enjoys his
laurels and his ease, and cannot hope to gain anything by the war, he
will be neuter. If he is, the issue cannot be foreseen. The Emperor is
vastly powerful, and his preparations are immense. Perhaps France may
not think it prudent to declare war. I should be sorry to see her
again involved in a war, especially against the principles she has
lately espoused with so much glory and advantage.
For my own part, I think nature wiser than all the Courts and States
in the world, and, therefore, I wish all her seas and rivers upon the
whole globe free, and am not at all surprised at the desire of the two
Empires to set those near them at liberty.
I think, however, that whatever turn these negotiations may take, they
cannot directly affect us, although we may be remotely interested in
the freedom of the Levant trade, and of the seas and rivers in the
neighborhood of it.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 15th, 1783.
Sir,
Enclosed are copies of papers, which have passed between Mr Hartley
and the American Ministers. We have not thought it prudent to enter
into any written controversy with him, upon any of these papers. We
have received whatever he has offered us. But he has offered nothing
in the name of his Court, has signed nothing, and upon inquiry of him
we have found that he has never had authority to sign officially any
proposition he has made.
I think it is evident, that his principals, the coalition, do not
intend to make any agreement with us about trade, but to try
experiments by their proclamations. I think, too, that they mean to
postpone the definitive treaty as long as possible. We can get no
answer, and I believe Mr Hartley gets no decisive answers to anything.
Enclosed also is a pamphlet, entitled, "Observations on the American
States," said to have been published by Lord Sheffield, and to have
been composed by four American renegadoes. The spirit of it needs no
comments. It deserves to be attended to, however, by Congress. It is a
fatal policy, as it appears to me, to see a British Ambassador at
Versailles, and a French Ambassador at St James's, and no American
Minister at the latter. This is admired at Versailles, I doubt not,
but not because they think it for our interest.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 16th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday we waited on the Count de Vergennes at Versailles, and
showed him the project of a letter to the Ministers of the two
Imperial Courts, which he read and approved. We told him, that we were
at a loss what might be the effect of the mediation; possibly we might
be involved in difficulties by it; possibly the British Ministers
might persuade the mediators to offer us their advice upon some
points, respecting the royalists for example, which we could not
comply with. The Count said, that he had told them, that as soon as he
had fully agreed with England upon all points, their mediation should
be accepted, and they should sign the treaty as such; and we might
agree to it in the same manner. He said we were not obliged to this,
but as they were to be present and sign one treaty, it would look
better to sign both. It would be a very notorious, public, and
respectable acknowledgment of us, as a power, by those Courts. Upon
this footing we left the letter with him to be shown to the Imperial
Ministers.
We asked the Count if he had seen the British proclamation of the 2d
of July. He answered, that he had. I asked him if the King had
determined anything on the subject of salt provisions, and salt-fish,
whether we might import them into his islands. He said we might depend
upon it, they could not supply their islands with fish, that we had
two free ports in their islands, St Lucia, and a port in Martinique.
By the thirtysecond article of the Treaty of Commerce, these free
ports are secured to us; nothing, he said, was determined concerning
salt beef and pork, but the greatest difficulty would be about flour.
I told the Count, that I did not think it would be possible either for
France or England to carry on this commerce between the islands and
continent; it was profitable to us only as it was a part of a system;
that it could not be carried on without loss in large vessels,
navigated by many seamen, which could sail only at certain seasons of
the year, &c. Upon the whole, I was much pleased with this
conversation, and conclude from it, that we shall do very well in the
French West India Islands, perhaps the better in them the worse we are
treated by the English.
The Dutch and Danes will, I doubt not, avail themselves of every
error, that may be committed by France or England. It is good to have
a variety of strings to our bow; and, therefore, I wish we had a
Treaty of Commerce with Denmark, by which a free admission of our
ships into their ports in the West Indies might be established. By
means of the Dutch, Danes, and Portuguese, I think we shall be able to
obtain finally proper terms of France and England.
The British proclamation of the 2d of this month, is the result of
refugee politics; it is intended to encourage Canada and Nova Scotia,
and their fisheries, to support still the ruins of their navigation
act, and to take from us the carriage even of our own productions. A
system, which has in it so little respect for us, and is so obviously
calculated to give a blow to our nurseries of ships and seamen, could
never have been adopted but from the opinion, that we had no common
legislature for the government of commerce.
All America from the Chesapeake Bay to St Croix I know love ships and
sailors, and those ports to the southward of that bay have advantages
for obtaining them when they will, and therefore I hope the Thirteen
States will unite in some measures to counteract this policy of
Britain, so evidently selfish, unsocial, and I had almost said
hostile. The question is, what is to be done? I answer, perhaps it
will be most prudent to say little about it at present, and until the
definitive treaty is signed, and the States evacuated. But after that,
I think in the negotiation of a treaty of commerce with Great Britain,
Congress should tell them, that they have the means of doing justice
to themselves. What are these means? I answer, let every State in the
Union lay on a duty of five per cent on all West India articles
imported in British ships, and upon all their own productions exported
in British ships. Let this impost be limited in duration, until Great
Britain shall allow our vessels to trade to their West Indies. This
would effectually defeat their plan, and encourage our own carrying
trade more than they can discourage it.
Another way of influencing England to a reasonable conduct, is to
take some measures for encouraging the growth in the United States,
of West India articles; another is to encourage manufactures,
especially of wool and iron among ourselves. As tilt-hammers are now
not unlawful, and wool may be water-borne, much more may be done now
than could have been done before the war. But the most certain method
is, to lay duties on exports and imports by British ships. The sense
of a common interest and common danger, it is to be hoped, will induce
a perfect unanimity among the States in this respect. There are other
ways of serving ourselves, and making impressions upon the English to
bring them to reason. One is to send ships immediately to China. This
trade is as open to us as to any nation, and if our natural advantages
at home are envied us, we should compensate ourselves in any honest
way we can.
Our natural share in the West India trade, is all that is now wanting
to complete the plan of happiness and prosperity of our country.
Deprived of it, we shall be straitened and shackled in some degree. We
cannot enjoy a free use of all our limits without this; with it, I see
nothing to desire, nothing to vex or chagrin our people, nothing to
interrupt our repose or keep up a dread of war.
I know not what permission may be expected from Spain to trade to the
Havana, but should think that this resource ought not to be neglected.
I confess I do not like the complexion of British politics. They are
mysterious and unintelligible. Mr Hartley appears not to be in the
secret of his Court. The things which happen appear as unexpected to
him as to us. Political jealousies and speculations are endless. It is
possible the British Ministers may be secretly employed, in fomenting
the quarrel between the two Imperial Courts and the Porte, and in
secretly stirring up the French to join the Turks in the war. The
prospect of seeing France engaged in a war may embolden them to adopt
a system less favorable to us. The possibility of these things should
stimulate us, I think, to form as soon as possible treaties of
commerce with the principal powers, especially the Imperial Courts,
that all our questions may be decided. This will be a great advantage
to us, even if we should afterwards be involved in a war. I put this
supposition with great reluctance. But if England should in the course
of a few years or months have the art to stir up a general war in
Europe, and get France and Spain seriously involved in it, which is at
least a possible case, she may assume a tone and conduct towards us,
which will make it very difficult for us to avoid taking a part in it.
If such a deplorable circumstance should take place, it will be still
a great advantage to us, to have our sovereignty explicitly
acknowledged by these powers, against whom we may be unfortunately
obliged to act. At present they are all disposed to it, and seem
desirous of forming connexions with us, that we may be out of the
question.
The politics of Europe are such a labyrinth of profound mysteries,
that the more one sees of them, the more causes of uncertainty and
anxiety he discovers.
The United States will have occasion to brace up their confederation,
and act as one body with one spirit. If they do not, it is now very
obvious, that Great Britain will take advantage of it in such a manner
as will endanger our peace, our safety, and even our very existence.
A change of Ministry may, but it is not certain that it will, give us
better prospects.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 17th, 1783.
Sir,
Last evening Mr Hartley spent two hours with me, and appeared much
chagrined at the proclamation, which had never been communicated to
him by his principals. He has too much contempt of the commercial
abilities of the French, and, consequently said, that the French could
derive but little benefit from this step of his Court, but he thought
the Dutch would make a great advantage of it. I endeavored to discover
from him, whether he suspected that his Court had any hand in stirring
up the two Imperial Courts to make war upon the Turks. I asked him
what was the state of their Mediterranean trade, and Levant trade. He
said, it was dead, and that their Turkey Company was dead, and,
therefore, he did not think his Court cared much about either, or
would ever do anything to prevent the Empires. He thought it possible,
that they might rather encourage them.
I am quite of Mr Hartley's mind, that the Dutch will profit by all the
English blunders in regulating the West India trade, and am happy that
M. Van Berckel will be soon with Congress, when its members and
Ministers may communicate through him anything they wish to their High
Mightinesses. They may inquire of him what are the rights of the East
and West India Companies? To what an extent our vessels may be
admitted to Surinam, Curacoa, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, St
Eustatia? What we may be allowed to carry there? and what bring from
thence to the United States, or to Europe? Whether we may carry
sugars, &c. to Amsterdam, Rotterdam, &c.? There are at Rotterdam and
Amsterdam one hundred and twentyseven or eight refineries of sugar.
How far these may be affected, &c.?
I lay it down for a rule, that the nation which shall allow us the
most perfect liberty to trade with her Colonies, whether it be France,
England, Spain, or Holland, will see her Colonies flourish above all
others, and will draw proportionally our trade to themselves; and I
rely upon it, the Dutch will have sagacity to see it, and as they are
more attentive to mercantile profit, than to a military marine, I have
great hopes from their friendship. As there will be an interval before
the signature of the definitive treaty, I propose a journey of three
weeks, to Amsterdam and the Hague, in hopes of learning in more detail
the intentions of the Dutch in this respect. I am in hopes too of
encouraging the loan to assist our Superintendent of Finance. The
Dutch may be a great resource to us in finance and commerce. I wish
that cargoes of produce may be hastened to Amsterdam to Messrs
Willinks & Co. for this will give vigor to the loan, and all the money
we can prevent England and the two Empires from obtaining in Holland,
will not only be nerves for us, but, perhaps, be useful too to France
in her negotiations.
I have spent the whole forenoon in conversation with the Duc de la
Vauguyon. He thinks that England wishes to revive her trade to the
Levant, to Smyrna, Aleppo, &c. and her carrying trade in Italy; and
although she might be pleased to see France involved in a war with the
Emperor and Empress, yet he thinks her funds are not in a condition to
afford subsidies to either, and, therefore, that she will be perfectly
neutral. Quere, however, whether if by a subsidy or a loan of a
million or two a year, she could make France spend eight or ten
millions, she would not strive hard to do it? The Duke thinks, that
France will proceed softly, and endeavor, if possible, to avert the
furious storm that threatens, and to compose the disputes of the three
Empires, if possible; but she will never suffer such a usurpation as
the conquest of the Turkish Provinces in Europe. France will certainly
defend Constantinople. He thinks that the Empress of Russia has not
revenues, and cannot get cash to march and subsist vast armies, and to
transport great fleets, and that the Emperor has not revenues to
support a long war.
This is, however, a serious business, and France lays it so much to
heart, and looks upon the chance of her being obliged to arm, as so
probable, that I presume this to be the principal motive of her
refusal to lend us two or three millions of livres more.