Parliament had been waiting long, and once prorogued. The Minister was

so pressed, he could not have met Parliament and kept his place,

without an agreement upon terms, at least, with America. If we had not

signed, the Ministry would have been changed, and the coalition come

in, and the whole world knows the coalition would not have made peace

upon the present terms, and, consequently, not at all this year. The

iron was struck in the few critical moments when it was of a proper

heat, and has been moulded into a handsome vessel. If it had been

suffered to cool, it would have flown in pieces like glass. Our

countrymen have great reason to rejoice, that they have obtained so

good a peace, when, and as they did. With the present threatening

appearances of a northern war, which will draw in France, if our peace

was still to be made we might find cause to tremble for many great

advantages, that are now secured. I believe the Count himself, if he

were now to speak his real sentiments, would say, he is very glad we

signed when we did, and that without asking his consent.

The Duc de la Vauguyon told me and M. Brantzen together, last

Saturday, "if you had not signed when you did, we should not have

signed when we did." If they had not signed when they did, d'Estaing

would have sailed from Cadiz, and in that case nobody would have

signed to this day. It is not possible for men to be in more

disagreeable circumstances than we were. We are none of us men of

principles or dispositions to take pleasure in going against your

sentiments, Sir, much less those of Congress. But in this case, if we

had not done it, our country would have lost advantages beyond

computation.

On Monday, Sir, we pursued our visits, and today we finish. Yesterday

at Court all the foreign Ministers behaved to us without reserve, as

members of the _Corps Diplomatique_, so that we shall no longer see

those lowering countenances, solemn looks, distant bows, and other

peculiarities, which have been sometimes diverting, and sometimes

provoking, for so many years.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 10th, 1783.

Sir,

In the present violent heat of the weather, and feverish state of my

health, I cannot pretend to sit long at my pen, and must pray you to

accept of a few short hints only.

To talk in a general style of confidence in the French Court, &c. is

to use a general language, which may mean almost anything, or almost

nothing. To a certain degree, and as far as the treaties and

engagements extend, I have as much confidence in the French Court as

Congress has, or even as you, Sir, appear to have. But if, by

confidence in the French Court is meant an opinion, that the French

Office of Foreign Affairs would be advocates with the English for our

rights to the fisheries, or to the Mississippi river, or our Western

Territory, or advocates to persuade the British Ministers to give up

the cause of the refugees, and make Parliamentary provision for them,

I own I have no such confidence, and never had. Seeing and hearing

what I have seen and heard, I must have been an idiot to have

entertained such confidence, I should be more of a Machiavelian, or a

Jesuit, than I ever was, or will be, to counterfeit it to you, or to

Congress.

M. Marbois' letter is to me full proof of the principles of the Count

de Vergennes. Why? Because I know, (for it was personally communicated

to me upon my passage home, by M. Marbois himself,) the intimacy and

confidence there is between these two. And I know further, that letter

contains sentiments concerning the fisheries, diametrically opposite

to those, which Marbois repeatedly expressed to me upon the passage,

viz. "That the Newfoundland fishery was our right, and we ought to

maintain it." From whence I conclude, M. Marbois' sentiments have been

changed by the instructions of the Minister. To what purpose is it

where this letter came from? Is it less genuine, whether it came from

Philadelphia, Versailles, or London? What if it came through English

hands? Is there less weight, less evidence in it for that? Are the

sentiments more just, or more friendly to us for that?

M. de Rayneval's correspondence too with Mr Jay. M. de Rayneval is a

_Chef de Bureau_. But we must be very ignorant of all Courts not to

know that an Under Secretary of State dares not carry on such a

correspondence without the knowledge, consent, and orders of the

principal.

There is another point now in agitation, in which the French will

never give us one good word. On the contrary, they will say everything

they can think of to persuade the English to deprive us of the trade

of their West India Islands. They have already, with their emissaries,

been the chief cause of the change of sentiment in London on this head

against us. In general they see with pain every appearance of

returning real and cordial friendship, such as may be permanent

between us and Great Britain. On the contrary, they see with pleasure

every seed of contention between us. The tories are an excellent

engine of mischief between us, and are, therefore, very precious.

Exclusion from the West India Islands will be another. I hold it to be

the indispensable duty of my station, not to conceal from Congress

these truths. Do not let us be dupes, under the idea of being

grateful. Innumerable anecdotes happen daily to show, that these

sentiments are general. In conversation, a few weeks ago, with the Duc

de la Vauguyon, upon the subject of the West India trade, I endeavored

to convince him, that France and England both ought to admit us freely

to their islands. He entered into a long argument to prove, that both

ought to exclude us. At last, I said, the English were a parcel of

sots to exclude us, for the consequence would be, that in fifteen or

twenty years we should have another war with them. _Tant mieux! tant

mieux! je vous en felicite_," cried the Duke, with great pleasure.

"_Tant mieux pour nous_," said I, because we shall conquer from the

English in that case all their islands, the inhabitants of which would

now declare for us, if they dared. But it will not be the better for

the English. They will be the dupes, if they lay a foundation for it.

"Yes," said the Duke, "I believe you will have another war with the

English." And in this wish he expressed the vows of every Frenchman

upon the face of the earth. If, therefore, we have it in contemplation

to avoid a future war with the English, do not let us have too much

confidence in the French, that they will favor us in this view.[6]

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[6] See a letter from Dr Franklin, containing remarks on Mr Adams's

opinions of the policy and designs of the French Court, dated July the

22d, 1783. _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 138. Also a letter

from Mr Laurens, Vol. II. p. 486.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Paris, July 10th, 1783.

Sir,

Upon the receipt of the despatches by Barney, I sent off your letters

for Messrs Willinks & Co. and I received last night an answer to the

letter I wrote them upon the occasion. They have engaged to remit Mr

Grand a million and a half of livres in a month, which has relieved Mr

Grand from his anxiety.

This Court has refused to Dr Franklin any more money. They are

apprehensive of being obliged to take a part in the northern war, and

their own financiers have not enough of the confidence of the public

to obtain money for their own purposes.

Your design of sending cargoes of tobacco and other things to

Amsterdam, to Messrs Willinks & Co. is the best possible to support

our credit there. The more you send, the more money will be obtained.

Send a Minister too; residing there, he may promote it much. It is a

misfortune, that I have not been able to be there, but this post

cannot be deserted. Instruct your Minister to inquire whether the

House of Hope could be persuaded to engage with Willinks in a new

loan. This should be done with secrecy and discretion. If that House

would undertake it, you would find money enough for your purpose, for

I rely upon it, the States will adopt a plan immediately for the

effectual payment of interest. This is indispensable. The foundation

of a happy government can only be laid in justice; and as soon as the

public shall see, that provision is made for this, you will no longer

want money.

It is a maxim among merchants and monied men, that "every man has

credit who does not want it." It is equally true of States. We shall

want it but little longer, if the States make provision for the

payment of interest, and therefore we shall have enough of it. There

is not a country in the world whose credit ought to be so good,

because there is none equally able to pay.

Enclosed is a pamphlet of Dr Price's, for your comfort. You will see

by it, that the only nation we have reason to fear wants credit so

much, that she is not likely to have it always, and this is our

security. By some hints from Mr Hartley, he will probably return to

London, and not be here again. The present Ministry is so undecided

and feeble, that it is at least doubtful whether they will make the

definitive treaty of peace.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Paris, July 11th, 1783.

Sir,

In my letter to you of yesterday, I hinted in confidence, at an

application to the house of Hope. This is a very delicate measure. I

was induced to think of it merely by a conversation which M. Van

Berckel, (who will soon be with you, as he sailed the 26th of June

from the Texel,) had with M. Dumas. It would be better to be steady to

the three Houses already employed, if that is possible. You will now

be able to converse freely with that Minister upon the subject. I

should not advise you to take any decisive resolution at Philadelphia,

but leave it to your Minister to act as shall appear to him best upon

the spot. The Houses now employed are well esteemed, and I hope will

do very well. But no House in the Republic has the force of that of

Hope.

All depends, however, upon the measures to be taken by Congress and

the States for ascertaining their debts, and a regular discharge of

the interest. The ability of the people to make such an establishment

cannot be doubted; and the inclination of no man who has a proper

sense of public honor can be called in question. The Thirteen States,

in relation to the discharge of the debts of Congress, must consider

themselves as one body animated by one soul. The stability of our

confederation at home, our reputation abroad, our power of defence,

the confidence and affection of the people of one State towards those

of another, all depend upon it. Without a sacred regard to public

justice no society can exist; it is the only tie which can unite men's

minds and hearts in pursuit of the common interest.

The commerce of the world is now open to us, and our exports and

imports are of so large amount, and our connexions will be so large

and extensive, that the least stain upon our character in this respect

will lose us in a very short time advantages of greater pecuniary

value than all our debt amounts to. The moral character of our people

is of infinitely greater worth than all the sums in question. Every

hesitation, every uncertainty about paying or receiving a just debt,

diminishes that sense of moral obligation of public justice, which

ought to be kept pure, and carefully cultivated in every American

mind. Creditors at home and abroad, the army, the navy, every man who

has a well founded claim upon the public, have an unalienable right to

be satisfied, and this by the fundamental principles of society. Can

there ever be content and satisfaction? Can there ever be peace and

order? Can there ever be industry or decency without it? To talk of a

sponge to wipe out this debt, or of reducing or diminishing it below

its real value, in a country so abundantly able to pay the last

farthing, would betray a total ignorance of the first principles of

national duty and interest.

Let us leave these odious speculations to countries that can plead a

necessity for them, and where corruption has arrived at its last

stages; where infamy is scarcely felt, and wrong may as well assume

one shape as another, since it must prevail in some.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 11th, 1783.

Sir,

As there are certain particulars, in which it has appeared to me, that

the friendship of a French Minister has been problematical, at least,

or rather, not to exist at all, I have freely mentioned them to

Congress; because I hold it to be the first duty of a public Minister,

in my situation, to conceal no important truth of this kind from his

masters.

But ingratitude is an odious vice, and ought to be held in detestation

by every American citizen. We ought to distinguish, therefore, between

those points, for which we are not obliged to our allies, from those

in which we are.

I think, then, we are under no particular obligations of gratitude to

them for the fisheries, the boundaries, exemption from the tories, or

for the progress of our negotiations in Europe.

We are under obligations of gratitude, for making the treaty with us

when they did; for those sums of money, which they have generously

given us, and for those, even, which they have lent us, which I hope

we shall punctually pay, and be thankful still for the loan; for the

fleet and army they sent to America, and for all the important

services they did. By other mutual exertions, a dangerous rival to

them, and I may be almost warranted in saying, an imperious master,

both to them and us, has been brought to reason, and put out of the

power to do harm to either. In this respect, however, our allies are

more secure than we. The House of Bourbon has acquired a great

accession of strength, while their hereditary enemy has been weakened

one half, and incurably crippled.

The French are, besides, a good natured and humane nation, very

respectable in arts, letters, arms, and commerce, and, therefore,

motives of interest, honor, and convenience, join themselves to those

of friendship and gratitude, to induce us to wish for the continuance

of their friendship and alliance. The Provinces of Canada and Nova

Scotia in the hands of the English are a constant warning to us to

have a care of ourselves, and, therefore, a continuance of the

friendship and alliance of France is of importance to our

tranquillity, and even to our safety. There is nothing, which will

have a greater effect to overawe the English, and induce them to

respect us and our rights, than the reputation of a good understanding

with the French. My voice and advice will, therefore, always be for

discharging, with the utmost fidelity, gratitude, and exactness, every

obligation we are under to France, and for cultivating her friendship

and alliance by all sorts of good offices. But I am sure, that to do

this effectually, we must reason with them at times, enter into

particulars, and be sure that we understand one another. We must act a

manly, honest, independent, as well as a sensible part.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 12th, 1783.

Sir,

Reports have been spread, that the Regency of Algiers has been

employed in fitting out ships to cruise for American vessels. There

are reports too, that Spain has an armament prepared to attack their

town. How much truth there may be in either, I cannot pretend to say.

Whether Congress will take any measures for treating with these

piratical States, must be submitted to them. The custom of these

Courts, as well as those of Asia and Africa, is to receive presents

with Ambassadors. The Grand Pensionary of Holland told me, that the

Republic paid annually to the Regency of Algiers a hundred thousand

dollars. I hope a less sum would serve for us; but in the present

state of our finances, it would be difficult to make any payment. Mr

Montgomery, of Alicant, has ventured to write a letter to the Emperor

of Morocco, in consequence of which, his Majesty was pleased to give

orders to all his vessels to treat American vessels with all

friendship. Mr Montgomery ventured too far, however, in writing in the

name of the United States, and what will be the consequences of the

deception I know not.

Dr Franklin lately mentioned to Mr Jay and me, that he was employed in

preparing, with the Portuguese Ambassador, a treaty between the United

States and Portugal. The next Ambassador's day at Versailles, I asked

him if we could be admitted to the Brazils? He said, no, they admitted

no nation to the Brazils. I asked, if we were admitted to the Western

Islands? He said he thought Madeira was mentioned. I told him, I

thought it would be of much importance to us to secure an admission to

all the Azores, and to have these Islands, or some of them, made a

depot for the sugars, coffee, cotton, and cocoa, &c. of the Brazils.

He liked this idea, and went immediately, and spoke to the Ambassador

upon it. He said, the Ambassador had told him, that they could furnish

us with these articles at Lisbon, fifteen per cent cheaper than the

English could from their West India Islands.

This treaty, I suppose, will be submitted to Congress before it is

signed, and I hope Congress will give a close attention to it, in

order to procure an exemption from as many duties as possible, and as

much freedom and security of trade in all their ports of Europe and

the Western Islands as possible. If any particular stipulations should

be necessary, concerning the free admission of all the articles of our

produce, as rice, wheat, flour, salt-fish, or any other, the members

of Congress may readily suggest them.

I could wish that the Court of Lisbon had sent a Minister to

Philadelphia to negotiate a treaty there. I wish that advantages may

not be lost by this method of preparing treaties here, by Ministers

who have made no particular study of the objects of them.[7] Benefits

on both sides may escape attention in this way. A good treaty with

Portugal is of so much consequence to us, that I should not wonder if

Congress should think it necessary to send a Minister to Lisbon to

complete it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[7] See the draft of a Treaty with Portugal, in _Franklin's

Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 150.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 13th, 1783.

Sir,

Yesterday Colonel Ogden arrived with the originals of what we had

before received in duplicates by Captain Barney. The ratification of

the Dutch treaty had been before received and exchanged. The

ratification of their High Mightinesses is in the safe custody of M.

Dumas, at present at the Hague.

I believe we shall accept of the mediation of the two Imperial Courts

at the definitive treaty, as it is a mere formality, a mere

compliment, consisting wholly in the Imperial Ministers putting their

names and seals to the parchment, and can have no ill effect. The

inclination of the Count de Vergennes seems to be, that we should

accept it, and as he calls upon us to decide in the affirmative or

negative, I believe we shall give an answer in the affirmative.

The Empress has promised to receive Mr Dana, as soon as the definitive

treaty shall be signed, and he has prepared a treaty of commerce,

which will be valuable if he can obtain it.

The Emperor of Germany has caused to be intimated several ways, his

inclination to have a treaty of commerce with us; but his rank is so

high, that his House never makes the first formal advance. I should

think it advisable, that we should have a treaty with that power for

several reasons.

1st. Because, as Emperor of Germany, and King of Bohemia and Hungary,

he is at the head of one of the greatest interests and most powerful

connexions in Europe. It is true it is the greatest weight in the

scale, which is, and has been, from age to age, opposite to the House

of Bourbon. But for this very reason, if there were no other, the

United States ought to have a treaty of commerce with it, in order to

be in practice with their theory, and to show to all the world, that

their system of commerce embraces, equally and impartially, all the

commercial States and countries of Europe.

2dly. Because the present Emperor is one of the greatest men of this

age. The wisdom and virtue of the man, as well as of the monarch; his

personal activity, intelligence, and accomplishments; his large and

liberal principles in matters of religion, government, and commerce,

are so much of kin to those of our States, (perhaps indeed so much

borrowed from them, and adopted in imitation of them,) that it seems

peculiarly proper we should show this respect to them.

3dly. Because, that if England should ever forget herself again so

much as to attack us, she may not be so likely to obtain the alliance

or assistance of this Power against us. A friendship once established

in a treaty of commerce, this power would never be likely to violate,

because she has no dominions near us, and could have no interest to

quarrel with us.

4thly. Because the countries belonging to this power upon the Adriatic

sea, and in the Austrian Flanders, are no inconsiderable sources of

commerce for America. And if the present negotiations between the two

Imperial Courts and the Porte shall terminate in a free navigation of

the Danube, the Black sea, and the Archipelago, the Emperor's

hereditary dominions will become very respectable commercial

countries.

5thly. Because, although we have at present a pleasant and joyful

prospect of friendship and uninterrupted alliance with the House of

Bourbon, which I wish may never be obscured, yet this friendship and

alliance will be the more likely to continue unimpaired, for our

having the friendship and commerce of the House of Austria. And (as in

the vicissitudes of human affairs all things are possible) if in

future times, however unlikely at present, the House of Bourbon

should deal unjustly by us, demand of us things we are not bound to

perform, or any way injure us we may find in the alliance, of Austria,

England, and Holland a resource against the storm. Supernumerary

strings to our bow, and provisions against possible inconveniences,

however improbable, can do us no harm.

If we were not straitened for money, I should advise Congress to send

a Minister to Vienna. But as every Mission abroad is a costly article,

and we find it difficult, at present, to procure money for the most

necessary purposes, I should think it proper for Congress to send a

commission to their Minister at Versailles, London, Madrid,

Petersburg, or the Hague, who might communicate it to the Court of

Vienna, by means of the Imperial Ambassador. The Emperor in such a

case would authorize his Ambassador at that Court to prepare and

conclude a treaty, and in this way the business may be well done,

without any additional expense.

M. Favi, _Charge d'Affaires_ of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the

Emperor's brother, has called upon me so often to converse with me

upon this subject, that I doubt not he has been employed, or at least

knows that it would be agreeable to his Court and their connexions,

although he has never made any official insinuations about it. This

gentleman has been employed by the Republic of Ragusa to consult

American Ministers upon the subject of commerce too. I have told him,

that the American ports were open to the Ragusan Vessels, as well as

to all others, and have given him the address, by which they propose

to write to Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 14th, 1783.

Sir,

A jealousy of American ships, seamen, carrying-trade, and naval power,

appears every day more and more conspicuous. This jealousy, which has

been all along discovered by the French Minister, is at length

communicated to the English. The following proclamation, which will

not increase British ships and seamen in any proportion as it will

diminish those of the United States, will contribute effectually to

make America afraid of England, and attach herself more closely to

France. The English are the dupes, and must take the consequences.

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