provisional articles. The great points of sovereignty, limits, and
fisheries, are sufficiently clear. But there are too many other things
in much obscurity. No one of us alone would ever have put his hand to
such a writing. Yet there is no one to blame. It must be confessed,
that it was done in haste, but that haste was inevitable. The peace
depended absolutely upon the critical moment, when that treaty was
signed. The meeting of Parliament was so near, and the state of the
Ministry so critical, that if that opportunity had been lost, there
would have been at least another campaign. There were never less than
three of us, and there were finally no less than three to be consulted
on the other side. These inaccuracies are much to be lamented, but
they were quite unavoidable. We shall endeavor to explain them in the
definitive treaty, but I fear without success.
I hope, Sir, you will excuse me, if I think your expressions fall
short of the real merit of the Dutch. If they had accepted the Russian
mediation for a separate peace, we should have seen a very formidable
difference. The vast weight of the Dutch in the East Indies, being
added to that of France, has influenced the minds of the natives in
such a manner, as to turn the scale against England. The Cape of Good
Hope was indispensable to France, and we are not yet informed what
proportion of the expense of French operations in the East Indies is
to be borne by the Dutch East India Company, at whose solicitations,
by their agents, sent early to Versailles, they were undertaken. From
twelve to fifteen British ships of the line, in the best condition,
with the best officers and men, have been kept almost constantly in
the North seas to watch the Dutch, a momentous diversion, which made
the balance more clear in favor of the allies in the East and West
Indies, as well as in the Channel; and it may be added, and that with
strict truth, the battle of Doggerbank imprinted more terror on the
imaginations of the British navy and nation, than all the other sea
engagements of the war.
Your observations of their unfortunate situation are, however, very
just, and their exertions have not been such as they might and ought
to have been. But this was the fault of the enemies of France in
Holland, not of their friends, and, unhappily, those enemies are to be
gratified by the terms of peace prescribed to that power, and those
friends mortified. And this misfortune probably arises from the
instructions in question, by which they made themselves of no
importance, instead of acting the part of a sovereign, independent,
and respectable power. If they had held their own negotiations in
their own hands, they would probably have obtained better terms. I
could mention many facts and anecdotes of much importance; but these
have been communicated to me in confidence, and as this is a
discussion that concerns us only indirectly, and as our instructions
were parallel to theirs, although the execution of them was different,
and the event different, I shall waive any further observations upon
the subject.
We are happy to learn, that Congress have ratified the treaty,
imperfect as it is, and that each side has released its prisoners. Mr
Hartley communicated to us officially, two days ago, that orders were
gone to New York to evacuate the United States.
Dr Franklin has never made any use of the bills for my salary, and I
have never received any part of them. I shall easily settle that
matter when I get home, which your letter encourages me to hope will
be very soon. The connexions I have formed in Holland may be of use to
the public, wherever I may be, in America, or elsewhere, as well as
even in that country itself. Those connexions will readily become
those of any Minister Congress may send there. It cost me all my
happiness, and had very nearly cost me my life, to form them; it cost
me more; it has left me in an ill state of health, which I never shall
fully repair. I shall carry Holland in my veins to my grave. It will
cost no man anything to go there now. His mind will be at ease, and he
will have spirits necessary to take care to preserve his health. To me
it has become physically necessary, as well as a moral and religious
duty, to join my family. This can be done only by going to them, or
bringing them to me; and to bring them to Holland is what I cannot
think of, both because, that on account of my own health, as well as
theirs, and on other considerations, I should not choose to live among
those putrid lakes, and because I think I can do my country more and
better service at home than there.
I will not disguise another motive, which would be altogether
insurmountable, if it were alone. I do not think it consistent with
the honor of the United States, any more than with my own, for me to
stay in Holland, after the appointment of any other Minister
whatsoever to the mission upon which I came to Europe, and which has
been taken from me without assigning any reason. Congress are the
sovereign judges for themselves and the public of the persons proper
for all services, excepting that every citizen is a sovereign judge
for himself. I have never adopted the principle, that it is a
citizen's duty to accept of any trust, that is pointed out to him,
unless he approves of it. On the contrary, I think it a right and a
duty, that no law of society can take away, for every man to judge
for himself, whether he can serve consistently with his own honor, and
the honor and interest of the public.
When the existence of our country and her essential interests were at
stake, it was a duty to run all risks, to stifle every feeling, to
sacrifice every interest, and this duty I have discharged with
patience and perseverance, and with a success, that can be attributed
only to Providence. But in time of peace, the public in less danger
abroad than at home, knowing I can do more good at home, I should do a
very wrong thing to remove my family to stay in Holland, merely for
the sake of holding an honorable commission, making and receiving
bows, and compliments, and eating splendid suppers at Court.
There is one piece of advice I beg leave to offer to the Minister who
may go to Holland, respecting a future loan of money. It is, to
inquire whether the house of Hope would undertake a loan for us,
either in conjunction with the houses who have the present one, or
with any of them, or alone. In my private opinion, which ought to be
kept as secret as possible, we might obtain a large loan in that way,
and that we cannot in any other. The people in that interest have the
money. I am not personally known to that House, nor any one of them to
me, but I know they are all powerful in money matters, and I believe
they would engage.
The happy turn given to the discontents of the army, by the General,
is consistent with his character, which, as you observe, is above all
praise, as every character is whose rule and object are duty, not
interest, nor glory, which I think has been strictly true with the
General from the beginning, and I trust will continue to the end. May
he long live, and enjoy his reflections, and the confidence and
affections of a free, grateful, and virtuous people.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 23d, 1783.
Sir,
Your favor of the 14th of April, No. 16, acknowledged the receipt of
mine of the 21st and the 22d of January, but took no notice of any
letters, which went by Captain Barney. Neither Dr Franklin, Mr Jay,
nor myself have any answer to the despatches, which went by this
express; although yours to me, No. 16, gave cause to expect letters to
us all, with instructions concerning the Definitive Treaty. This
profound silence of Congress, and the total darkness in which we are
left, concerning their sentiments, is very distressing to us, and very
dangerous and injurious to the public.
I see no prospect of agreeing upon any regulation of commerce here.
The present Ministry are afraid of every knot of merchants. A clamor
of an interested party, more than an evil to their country, is their
dread. A few West India merchants, in opposition to the sense and
interest of the West India planters, are endeavoring to excite an
opposition to our carrying the produce of the West India Islands from
those islands to Europe, even to Great Britain. There are also secret
schemes to exclude us, if they can, from the trade of Ireland, to
possess themselves of the carrying trade of the United States, by
prohibiting any American vessel to bring to Great Britain any
commodity but those of the State to which it belongs. Thus, a
Philadelphia vessel can carry no tobacco, rice, or indigo, nor a
Carolina vessel wheat or flour, nor a Boston vessel either, unless
grown in its own State. In this way, a superficial party think they
can possess themselves of the carriage of almost all the productions
of the United States, annihilate our navigation and nurseries of
seamen, and keep all to themselves more effectually than ever. They
talk too of discouraging the people of the United States, and
encouraging those of Canada and Nova Scotia, in such a manner as to
increase the population of those two Provinces, even by migrations
from the United States. These are dreams, to be sure; but the dreamers
are so many, as to intimidate the present Ministry, who dare venture
upon nothing that will make a clamor. I have lately heard, that the
merchants in America are waiting to hear the regulations of trade made
here. They will wait, I know not how long. There is no present
prospect of our agreeing at all upon any regulations of trade.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 23d, 1783.
Sir,
The British nation and Ministry are in a very unsettled state; they
find themselves in a new situation, and have not digested any plan.
Ireland is in a new situation; she is independent of Parliament, and
the English know not how to manage her. To what an extent she will
claim a right of trading with the United States, is unknown. Canada
too, and Nova Scotia, are in a new situation; the former, they say,
must have a new government. But what form to give them, and, indeed,
what kind of government they are capable of, or would be agreeable to
them, is uncertain. Nothing is digested.
There is a party, composed probably of refugees, friends of the old
hostile system, and fomented by emissaries of several foreign nations,
who do not wish a cordial reconciliation and sincere friendship
between Great Britain and the United States, who clamor for the
conservation of the navigation act, and the carrying trade. If these
should succeed so far as to excite Parliament or the Ministry to adopt
a contracted principle, to exclude us from the West India trade, and
from trading with Canada and Nova Scotia, and from carrying freely, in
vessels belonging to any one of the Thirteen States, the production of
any other to Great Britain, the consequences may be to perplex us for
a time, may bind us closer to France, Spain, Holland, Germany, Italy,
and the northern nations, and thus be fatal to Great Britain, without
being finally very hurtful to us.
The nations of Europe, who have islands in the West Indies, have, at
this moment, a delicate part to take. Upon their present decisions,
great things will depend. The commerce of the West India Islands, is a
part of the American system of commerce. They can neither do without
us, nor we without them. The Creator has placed us upon the globe in
such a situation, that we have occasion for each other. We have the
means of assisting each other, and politicians and artful contrivances
cannot separate us. Wise statesmen, like able artists of every kind,
study nature, and their works are perfect in proportion as they
conform to her laws. Obstinate attempts to prevent the islands and the
continent, by force or policy, from deriving from each other those
blessings, which nature has enabled them to afford, will only put
both to thinking of means of coming together. And an injudicious
regulation at this time may lay a foundation for intimate
combinations, between the islands and the continent, which otherwise
would not be wished for, or thought of by either.
If the French, Dutch, and Danes, have common sense, they will profit
of any blunder Great Britain may commit upon this occasion. The ideas
of the British cabinet and merchants, at present, are so confused upon
all these subjects, that we can get them to agree to nothing. I still
think, that the best policy of the United States is, to send a
Minister to London to negotiate a treaty of commerce, instructed to
conclude nothing, not the smallest article, until he has sent it to
Congress, and received their approbation. In the meantime, Congress
may admit any British or Irish ships, that have arrived, or may
arrive, to trade as they please.
For my own part, I confess I would not advise Congress to bind
themselves to anything, that is not reasonable and just. If we should
agree to revive the trade upon the old footing, it is the utmost that
can, with a color of justice or modesty, be requested of us. This is
not equal, but might be borne. Rather than go further, and deny
ourselves the freight from the West Indies to Europe, at least, to
Great Britain, especially rather than give away our own carrying
trade, by agreeing that the ships of one State should not carry to
Great Britain the produce of another, I would be for entering into
still closer connexions with France, Spain, and Holland, and purchase
of them, at the expense of Great Britain, what she has not wisdom
enough to allow us for her own good.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 24th, 1783.
Sir,
The gazettes of Europe still continue to be employed, as the great
engines of fraud and imposture to the good people of America.
Stockjobbers are not the only people, who employ a set of scribblers
to invent and publish falsehoods for their own peculiar purposes.
British and French, as well as other politicians, entertain these
fabricators of paragraphs, who are stationed about in the various
cities of Europe, and take up each other's productions in such a
manner, that no sooner does a paragraph appear in a French, Dutch, or
English paper, but it is immediately seized on, and reprinted in all
the others; this is not all; in looking over the American newspapers,
I observe, that nothing is seized on with so much avidity by the
American _nouvellists_, for republication in their gazettes, as these
political lies. I cannot attribute this merely to the credulity of the
printers, who have generally more discernment than to be deceived. But
I verily believe, there are persons in every State employed to select
out these things, and get them reprinted.
Sometimes the invention is so simple, as really to deceive. Such, I
doubt not, will be that of a long paragraph in the English papers, all
importing that Mr Hartley had made a treaty of commerce with us, or
was upon the point of concluding one. Nothing is further from the
truth. We have not to this hour agreed upon one proposition, nor do I
see any probability that we shall at all, respecting commerce.
We have not, indeed, as yet, agreed upon a point respecting the
definitive treaty. We are waiting for those instructions of yours,
which you mentioned in yours of the 14th of April, which I have not
yet received.
Americans should be cautious of European newspapers, as well as of
their own; more so, indeed, because they have not so much knowledge,
and so good opportunities to detect the former as the latter. There is
a great number of persons in Europe, who insert things in the papers
in order to make impressions in America. Characters are in this way
built up and pulled down, without the least consideration of justice,
and merely to answer sinister purposes, sometimes extremely pernicious
to the United States.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 27th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, met to prepare the
definitive treaty, and made so much progress in it, that tomorrow we
shall be ready to communicate to Mr Hartley the result. But I have
small hopes of obtaining anything more by the definitive treaty.
The Duke of Manchester, and Count d'Aranda have arranged everything
between England and Spain, and are ready to finish for their two
Courts. France, I presume, waits only for Holland, or perhaps for some
other negotiation with the Imperial Courts. If all the other parties
were now to declare themselves ready, we should be puzzled. In such a
case, however, I am determined (and I believe, but do not know, that
my colleagues would join me) to declare myself ready to sign the
provisional treaty, _totidem verbis_, for a definitive treaty.
From all I can learn, I am persuaded we shall gain nothing by any
further negotiation. If we obtain anything by way of addition or
explanation, we shall be obliged to give more for it than it is worth.
If the British Minister refuses to agree to such changes as we may
think reasonable, and refuses to sign the provisional articles as
definitive ones, I take it for granted, France will not sign till we
do. If they should they are still safe, for the provisional articles
are to constitute the treaty as soon as France has made peace, and I
should rather have it on that footing, than make any material
alteration.
I have put these several cases, because I should be supprised at
nothing from the present British Ministry. If they have any plan at
all, it is a much less gracious one towards America, than that of
their immediate predecessors. If Shelburne, Townshend, Pitt, &c. had
continued, we should have had everything settled long ago, to our
entire satisfaction, and to the infinite advantage of Great Britain
and America, in such a manner as would have restored good humor and
affection, as far as in the nature of things they can now be restored.
After the great point of acknowledging our independence was got over,
by issuing Mr Oswald's last commission, this Shelburne administration
conducted towards us like men of sense and honor. The present
administration have neither discovered understanding nor sincerity.
The present British administration is unpopular, and it is in itself
so heterogeneous a composition, that it seems impossible it should
last long. Their present design seems to be not to commit themselves
by agreeing to anything. As soon as anything is done, somebody will
clamor. While nothing is done, it is not known what to clamor about.
If there should be a change in favor of the Ministry that made the
peace, and a dissolution of this profligate league, which they call
the coalition, it would be much for the good of all who speak the
English language. If fame says true, the coalition was formed at
gambling tables, and is conducted as it was formed, upon no other than
gambling principles.
Such is the fate of a nation, which stands tottering on the brink of a
precipice, with a debt of two hundred and fiftysix millions sterling
on its shoulders; the interest of which, added to the peace
establishment only, exceeds by above a million annually all their
revenues, enormously and intolerably as they are already taxed. The
only chance they have for salvation is in a reform, and in recovering
the affection of America. The last Ministry were sensible of this, and
acted accordingly. The present Ministry are so far from being sensible
of it, or caring about it, that they seem to me to be throwing the
last dice for the destruction of their country.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 27th, 1783.
Sir,
A few vessels have arrived in England from various parts of America,
and have probably made the Ministry, merchants, and manufacturers less
anxious about a present arrangement of commerce. Whether these vessels
have rashly hazarded these voyages against the laws of their country,
or whether they have permission from Congress, or their States, we are
not informed.
It would have been better, no doubt, to have had an agreement made
before the trade was opened, but the eagerness of both sides may not
easily be restrained. Whether it is practicable for Congress to stop
the trade, I know not, or whether it would be expedient if
practicable, I doubt.
The balance of parties in England is so nicely poised, that the
smallest weight shifts the scales. In truth nothing can be done
without changing the Ministry, for whatever is done raises a cry
sufficient to shake those who do it. In this situation, it is a
question whether it is best to keep things in suspense, or bring them
to a decision. If Congress were to prohibit all trade with England,
until a Treaty of Commerce were made, or some temporary convention at
least, it might bring on a decision, by exciting a cry against the
Ministry for not making a convention. But the moment a convention is
made, a cry will be raised against them for making it. The present
Ministry, to judge by their motions hitherto, will hazard the clamor
for not making one, rather than that for making one. They think it
least dangerous to them, especially since they have seen so many
American vessels arrive in England, and have heard, that British ships
are admitted to an entry in the ports of America, particularly
Philadelphia.
The most difficult thing to adjust in a Treaty of Commerce, will be
the communications we shall have with the West India Islands. This is
of great importance to us, and to the islands, and I think to Great
Britain too. Yet there is a formidable party for excluding us at least
from carrying the produce of those islands to Great Britain.
Much will depend upon the Minister you first send to London. An
American Minister would be a formidable person to any British Minister
whatever. He would converse with all parties, and if he is a prudent,
cautious man, he would at this moment have more influence there than
you can imagine.
We are chained here on the only spot in the world, where we can be of
no use. If my colleagues were of my mind, we would all go together to
London, where we could negotiate the Definitive Treaty, and talk of
arrangements of commerce to some purpose. However, one Minister in
London, with proper instructions, would do better than four. He would
have the artifices of French emissaries to counteract, as well as
English partizans; for you may depend upon it, the French see with
pleasure the improbability of our coming soon and cordially together,
as they saw with manifest regret, the appearances of cordial
reconciliation under the former administration. These sentiments are
not unnatural, but we are under no obligation, from mere complaisance,
to sacrifice interests of such deep and lasting consequence. For it is
not merely mercantile profit and convenience, that is at stake; future
wars, long and bloody wars, may be either avoided or entailed upon our
posterity, as we conduct wisely or otherwise the present negotiation
with Great Britain.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 3d, 1783.
Sir,
On the last Ambassador's day, which was last Tuesday, Dr Franklin, Mr
Jay, and myself waited on the Count de Vergennes, who told us, he
thought he had agreed with the Duke of Manchester, but that his Grace
had not yet received the positive approbation of his Court. The Count
advised us to make a visit altogether to the Ambassadors of the two
Imperial Courts. Accordingly, yesterday morning we went, first to the
Count de Mercy Argenteau, the Ambassador of the Emperor of Germany,
and King of Hungary and Bohemia. His Excellency was not at home, so we
left our card.