This development rendered useless any further effort on Hancock's

part or mine to carry out the plan of the expedition, for General

Grant did not intend Hancock to assault the enemy's works unless

there should be found in them but a very thin line of infantry which

could be surprised. In such event, Hancock was to operate so that

the cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or Charles

City road, but the continually increasing force of the enemy showed

this to be impracticable. The long front presented by Hancock's

corps and the cavalry deceived General Lee, and he undoubtedly

thought that nearly all of Grant's army had been moved to the north

side of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred the

most of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary,

thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing us

on the Central and New Market roads. This was what Grant hoped Lee

would do in case the operations of Hancock and myself became

impracticable, for Grant had an alternative plan for carrying

Petersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a mine

that had been driven under the enemy's works from the front of

Burnside's corps.

Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn the

enemy's left, our attention was directed to keeping up the deception

of Lee, and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock's corps withdrew to

a line nearer the head of the bridge, the cavalry drawing back to a

position on his right. From now on, all sorts of devices and

stratagems were practiced--anything that would tend to make the

Confederates believe we were being reinforced, while Hancock was

preparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time. In

order to delude the enemy still more after night-fall of the 28th I

sent one of my divisions to the south side of the James, first

covering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tramp of the horses

from being heard. After daylight the next morning, I marched this

division back again on foot, in full view of the enemy, to create the

impression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to the

north side, while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with the

enemy on our extreme right. These various artifices had the effect

intended, for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all his

infantry to the north bank of the James, except three divisions, and

all his cavalry save one.

The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine and

assault the enemy's works, so after dark on the evening of the 29th

Hancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side to

take part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion, and I

was directed to follow Hancock. This left me on the north side of

the river confronting two-thirds of Lee's army in a perilous

position, where I could easily be driven into Curl's Neck and my

whole command annihilated. The situation, therefore, was not a

pleasant one to contemplate, but it could not be avoided. Luckily

the enemy did not see fit to attack, and my anxiety was greatly

relieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridge

shortly after daylight, having drawn in the different brigades

successively from my right. By 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30th

my leading division was well over toward the left of our army in

front of Petersburg, marching with the purpose to get around the

enemy's right flank during the operations that were to succeed the

mine explosion, but when I reached General Meade's headquarters I

found that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when the

enemy's works were blown up in the morning. Blunder after blunder

had rendered the assault abortive, and all the opportunities opened

by our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost, so

General Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry.

In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command of

Major-General Hancock, who, by seniority, was to control my corps as

well as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on the

Virginia Central railroad. If this opportunity was gained, I was to

cut loose and damage Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valley

in such manner as best suited the conditions, but my return was not to

be jeopardized nor long delayed. This necessitated that Hancock's

line should extend to Bottom's bridge on the Chickahominy. The

enemy's early discovery of the movement and his concentration of

troops on the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing the

programme laid out for him. Its impracticability was demonstrated

early on the 27th, and Hancock's soldierly instincts told him this the

moment he unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market and

Charles City roads. To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw's

position was strong indeed, but if he carried it there would still

remain the dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safe

return, so with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to the

alternative proposition--the assault on Petersburg--for more

significant results. This was the only occasion during the war in

which I was associated with Hancock in campaign. Up till then we had

seldom met, and that was the first opportunity I had to observe his

quick apprehension, his physical courage, and the soldierly

personality which had long before established his high reputation.

On the 1st of August, two days after the mine explosion, I was.

relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps, and ordered

to the Shenandoah Valley, where at a later date Torbert's and

Wilson's divisions joined me. Practically, after I went to the

valley, my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely.

During the period of my immediate control of the corps, I tried to

carry into effect, as far as possible, the views I had advanced

before and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i.e., "that

our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the

enemy's infantry"; for there was great danger of breaking the spirit

of the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compact

masses of foot-troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there

was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained,

such a use of it would not be justified. Immediately succeeding the

battles of the Wilderness, opportunity offered to put this plan into

execution to some extent, and from that time forward--from the battle

of Yellow Tavern--our success was almost continuous, resulting

finally, before the close of the war, in the nearly total

annihilation of the enemy's cavalry.

The constant activity of the corps from May 5 till August 1 gave

little opportunity for the various division and brigade commanders to

record its work in detail; so there exists but meagre accounts of the

numerous skirmishes and graver conflicts in which, in addition to the

fights mentioned in this narrative, it engaged. A detailed history

of its performances is not within the province of a work of this

nature; but in review, it can be said, without trespassing on the

reader's time, that the Cavalry Corps led the advance of the Army of

the Potomac into the Wilderness in the memorable campaign of 1864;

that on the expedition by way of Richmond to Haxall's it marked out

the army's line of march to the North Anna; that it again led the

advance to the Tolopotomy, and also to Cold Harbor, holding that

important strategic point at great hazard; and that by the Trevillian

expedition it drew away the enemy's cavalry from the south side of

the Chickahominy, and thereby assisted General Grant materially in

successfully marching to the James River and Petersburg.

Subsequently, Wilson made his march to Staunton bridge, destroying

railroads and supplies of inestimable value, and though this was

neutralized by his disaster near Ream's Station, the temporary

set-back there to one division was soon redeemed by victory over

the Confederate infantry at the battle of Darbytown.

In the campaign we were almost always on the march, night and day,

often unable to care properly for our wounded, and obliged to bury

our dead where they fell; and innumerable combats attest the part the

cavalry played in Grant's march from the Rapidan to Petersburg. In

nearly all of these our casualties were heavy, particularly so when,

as was often the case, we had to engage the Confederate infantry; but

the enemy returned such a full equivalent in dead and wounded in

every instance, that finally his mounted power, which from the

beginning of the war had been nurtured with a wise appreciation of

its value, was utterly broken.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GENERAL HUNTER'S SUCCESSFUL MARCH AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--GENERAL

JUBAL A. EARLY THREATENS WASHINGTON--CHAMBERSBURG, PA., BURNED

--SELECTED TO OPERATE AGAINST GENERAL EARLY--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY

--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

When the attempt to take Petersburg in conjunction with the mine

explosion resulted in such a dismal failure, all the operations

contemplated in connection with that project came to a standstill,

and there was every prospect that the intensely hot and sultry

weather would prevent further activity in the Army of the Potomac

till a more propitious season. Just now, however, the conditions

existing in the Shenandoah Valley and along the upper Potomac

demanded the special attention of General Grant, for, notwithstanding

the successful march that Major-General David Hunter had made toward

Lynchburg early in the summer, what he had first gained was

subsequently lost by strategical mistakes, that culminated in

disaster during the retreat he was obliged to make from the vicinity

of Lynchburg to the Kanawha Valley. This route of march uncovered

the lower portion of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and with the

exception of a small force of Union troops under General Franz Sigel

posted aft Martinsburg for the purpose of covering the Baltimore and

Ohio railroad, there was nothing at hand to defend the lower valley.

The different bodies of Confederates which compelled Hunter's retreat

were under command of General Jubal A. Early, who had been sent to

Lynchburg with Ewell's corps after the defeat of the Confederate

General W. C. Jones near Staunton on the 5th of June, to take command

of the Valley District. When Early had forced Hunter into the

Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not

again be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corps

General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of

Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland. B. T. Johnson, and J. D.

Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western

Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus

formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah

Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move

north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland

and threaten Washington. Indeed, General Lee had foreshadowed such a

course when Early started toward Lynchburg for the purpose of

relieving the pressure in front of Petersburg, but was in some doubt

as to the practicability of the movement later, till persuaded to it

by the representations of Early after that general had driven Hunter

beyond the mountains and found little or nothing opposing except the

small force of Sigel, which he thought he could readily overcome by

celerity of movement.

By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on

the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place

the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat

through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was

thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving

around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he

found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where

Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had

been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates

till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital

from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of

the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward

Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched

to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations

which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main

purpose in front of Petersburg.

Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some

concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked

upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive

issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the

Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm

and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the

capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among

the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary

dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who,

with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed

out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in

hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement;

and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury,

retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some

Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter,

who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore

and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester

toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place

he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the

combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to

Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This

reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the

offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in

administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat

to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal

restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this

stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes, leaving three

thousand non-combatants without shelter or food.

When Early fell back from the vicinity of Washington toward

Strasburg, General Grant believed that he would rejoin Lee, but later

manoeuvres of the enemy indicated that Early had given up this idea,

if he ever, entertained it, and intended to remain in the valley,

since it would furnish Lee and himself with subsistence, and also

afford renewed opportunities for threatening Washington. Indeed, the

possession of the Valley of the Shenandoah at this time was of vast

importance to Lee's army, and on every hand there were indications

that the Confederate Government wished to hold it at least until

after the crops could be gathered in to their depots at Lynchburg and

Richmond. Its retention, besides being of great advantage in the

matter of supplies, would also be a menace to the North difficult for

General Grant to explain, and thereby add an element of considerable

benefit to the Confederate cause; so when Early's troops again

appeared at Martinsburg it was necessary for General Grant to

confront them with a force strong enough to put an end to incursions

north of the Potomac, which hitherto had always led to National

discomfiture at some critical juncture, by turning our army in

eastern Virginia from its chief purpose--the destruction of Lee and

the capture of the Confederate capital.

This second irruption of Early, and his ruthless destruction of

Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant

looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among

the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the

authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions.

The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt his

suggestions, and one measure which he deemed very important--the

consolidation into a single command of the four geographical

districts into which, to relieve political pressure no doubt, the

territory had been divided--met with serious opposition. Despite

Grant's representations, he could not prevail on the Administration

to approve this measure, but finally the manoeuvres of Early and the

raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had

somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a

commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against

Early.

On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander, and

in obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to his

headquarters at City Point. In the interview that followed, he

detailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, telling

me that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operate

against Early, but that General Hunter, who was at the head of the

geographical department, would be continued in his position for the

reason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or

consolidate the different districts. After informing me that one

division of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command, he

went on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as this

division arrived, and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I was

to pursue, but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south of

him and try to compass his destruction. The interview having ended,

I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure, and on the

evening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army

of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps

organization.

I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day

received instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grant

at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in

consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President

indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder, and helplessness

prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's

presence there was necessary.

In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President before

leaving Washington, and during a short conversation Mr. Lincoln

candidly told me that Mr. Stanton had objected to my assignment to

General Hunter's command, because he thought me too young, and that

he himself had concurred with the Secretary; but now, since General

Grant had "ploughed round" the difficulties of the situation by

picking me out to command the "boys in the field," he felt satisfied

with what had been done, and "hoped for the best." Mr. Stanton

remained silent during these remarks, never once indicating whether

he, too, had become reconciled to my selection or not; and although,

after we left the White House, he conversed with me freely in regard

to the campaign I was expected to make, seeking to impress on me the

necessity for success from the political as well as from the military

point of view, yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any

part in disapproving the recommendation of the general-in-chief.

August 6, I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy, and he there

turned over to me the following instructions, which he had previously

prepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general would

continue to command the department:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

"Monocacy Bridge, Md., Aug. 5, 1864.

"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the

vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and

garrisons for public property as may be necessary.

"Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can be

saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved

north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following and

attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the

Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that

the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south

the main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficient

force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In

detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from

Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.

"There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the

best of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses.

These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join

you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably

start to-morrow.

"In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will have

to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to

invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock

wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed,

destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed

--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should be informed

that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these

raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all

hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this

you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by

the course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country

through which you march.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."

"Major-General D. HUNTER,

"Commanding Department of West Virginia."

When I had read the letter addressed to Hunter, General Grant said I

would be expected to report directly to him, as Hunter had asked that

day to be wholly relieved, not from any chagrin at my assignment to

the control of the active forces of his command, but because he

thought that his fitness for the position he was filling was

distrusted by General Halleck, and he had no wish to cause

embarrassment by remaining where he could but remove me one degree

from the headquarters of the army. The next day Hunter's unselfish

request was complied with, and an order was issued by the President,

consolidating the Middle Department, the Department of Washington,

the Department of the Susquehanna, and the Department of West

Virginia.

Under this order these four geographical districts constituted the

Middle Military Division, and I was temporarily assigned to command

it. Hunter's men had been bivouacking for some days past in the

vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick, but before General

Grant's instructions were written out, Hunter had conformed to them

by directing the concentration at Halltown, about four miles in front

of Harper's Ferry, of all his force available for field service.

Therefore the different bodies of troops, with the exception of

Averell's cavalry, which had followed McCausland toward Moorefield

after the burning of Chambersburg, were all in motion toward Halltown

on August 6.

Affairs at Monocacy kept me but an hour or two, and these disposed

of, I continued on to Harper's Ferry by the special train which had

brought me from Washington, that point being intended as my

headquarters while making preparations to advance. The enemy was

occupying Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown at the time;

sending occasional raiding parties into Maryland as far as

Hagerstown. The concentration of my troops at Halltown being an

indication to Early that we intended to renew the offensive, however,

he immediately began counter preparations by drawing in all his

detached columns from the north side of the Potomac, abandoning a

contemplated raid into Maryland, which his success against Crook at

Kernstown had prompted him to project, and otherwise disposing

himself for defense.

At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of a

small and very dilapidated hotel, and as soon as settled sent for

Lieutenant John R. Meigs, the chief engineer officer of the command,

to study with him the maps of my geographical division. It always

came rather easy to me to learn the geography of a new section, and

its important topographical features as well; therefore I found that,

with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession,

the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my

mind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream, and

with all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and was

particularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the Shenandoah

Valley, even down to the farmhouses. He imparted with great

readiness what he knew of this, clearly pointing out its

configuration and indicating the strongest points for Confederate

defense, at the same time illustrating scientifically and forcibly

the peculiar disadvantages under which the Union army had hitherto

labored.

The section that received my closest attention has its northern limit

along the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of the

North Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the Blue

Ridge. The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide which

separates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run to

the James. The western boundary is the eastern slope of the

Alleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinct

mountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quite

open, undulating country varying in width from the northern to the

southern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches of

heavy woods: At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad,

and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester about

forty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five.

Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between the

eastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range of

mountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges which

extend southward between the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah

River until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but broken

ground between New Market and Harrisonburg. The Massanutten ranges,

with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into two

valleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, while

that next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah.

A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland,

to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect the

interior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, and

along this road are situated the principal towns and villages of the

Shenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending to

the mountain ranges on the east and west. The roads running toward

the Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal ones

lead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's,

Ashby's Manassas, Chester, Thornton's Swift Run, Brown's and

Rock-fish gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond. These gaps

are low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an army

coming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating west

of the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flank

attack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail to

Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points they could move

with such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than one

occasion, the Shenandoah Valley had been the theatre of Confederate

success, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interior

lines.

Nature had been very kind to the valley, making it rich and

productive to an exceptional degree, and though for three years

contending armies had been marching up and down it, the fertile soil

still yielded ample subsistence for Early's men, with a large surplus

for the army of Lee. The ground had long been well cleared of

timber, and the rolling surface presented so few obstacles to the

movement of armies that they could march over the country in any

direction almost as well as on the roads, the creeks and rivers being

everywhere fordable, with little or no difficulty beyond that of

leveling the approaches.

I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that had

operated in this region hitherto under "Stonewall" Jackson with

marked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost every

time the two armies had come in contact. These men were now commanded

by a veteran officer of the Confederacy-General Jubal A. Early--whose

past services had so signalized his ability that General Lee

specially selected him to take charge of the Valley District, and,

notwithstanding the misfortunes that befell him later, clung to him

till the end, of the war. The Confederate army at this date was

about twenty thousand strong, and consisted of Early's own corps,

with Generals Rodes, Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions;

the infantry of Breckenridge from southwestern Virginia; three

battalions of artillery; and the cavalry brigades of Vaughn, Johnson,

McCausland, and Imboden. This cavalry was a short time afterward

organized into a division under the command of General Lomax.

After discovering that my troops were massing in front of Harper's

Ferry, Early lost not a moment in concentrating his in the vicinity

of Martinsburg, in positions from which he could continue to obstruct

the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and yet be enabled to retire up the

valley under conditions of safety when I should begin an offensive

campaign.

When I took command of the Army of the Shenandoah its infantry force

comprised the Sixth Corps, one division of the Nineteenth Corps, and

two divisions from West Virginia. The Sixth Corps was commanded

by Major-General Horatio G. Wright; its three divisions by

Brigadier-Generals David A. Russell, Geo. W. Getty, and James B.

Ricketts. The single division of the Nineteenth Corps had for its

immediate chief Brigadier-General William Dwight, the corps being

commanded by Brigadier-General Wm. H. Emory. The troops from West

Virginia were under Brigadier-General George Crook, with Colonels

Joseph Thoburn and Isaac H. Duval as division commanders, and though

in all not more than one fair-sized division, they had been

designated, on account of the department they belonged to, the Army of

West Virginia. General Torbert's division, then arriving from the

Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, represented the mounted arm

of the service, and in the expectation that Averell would soon join me

with his troopers, I assigned General Torbert as chief of cavalry, and

General Wesley Merritt succeeded to the command of Torbert's division.

General Wright, the commander of the Sixth Corps, was an officer of

high standing in the Corps of Engineers, and had seen much active

service during the preceding three years. He commanded the

Department of the Ohio throughout the very trying period of the

summer and fall of 1862, and while in that position he, with

other prominent officers, recommended my appointment as a

brigadier-general. In 1863 he rendered valuable service at the battle

of Gettysburg, following which he was assigned to the Sixth Corps, and

commanded it at the capture of the Confederate works at Rappahannock

Station and in the operations at Mine Run. He ranked me as a

major-general of volunteers by nearly a year in date of commission,

but my assignment by the President to the command of the army in the

valley met with Wright's approbation, and, so far as I have ever

known, he never questioned the propriety of the President's action.

The Sixth Corps division commanders, Getty, Russell, and Ricketts,

were all educated soldiers, whose records, beginning with the Mexican

War, had already been illustrated in the war of the rebellion by

distinguished service in the Army of the Potomac.

General Emory was a veteran, having graduated at the Military Academy

in 1831, the year I was born. In early life he had seen much service

in the Artillery, the Topographical Engineers, and the Cavalry, and

in the war of the rebellion had exhibited the most soldierly

characteristics at Port Hudson and on the Red River campaign. At

this time he had but one division of the Nineteenth Corps present,

which division was well commanded by General Dwight, a volunteer

officer who had risen to the grade of brigadier-general through

constant hard work. Crook was a classmate of mine--at least, we

entered the Military Academy the same year, though he graduated a

year ahead of me. We had known each other as boys before we entered

the army, and later as men, and I placed implicit faith in his

experience and qualifications as a general.

The transfer of Torbert to the position of chief of cavalry left

Merritt, as I have already said, in command of the First Cavalry

Division. He had been tried in the place before, and from the day he

was selected as one of a number of young men to be appointed general

officers, with the object of giving life to the Cavalry Corps, he

filled the measure of expectation. Custer was one of these young men

too, and though as yet commanding a brigade under Merritt, his

gallant fight at Trevillian Station, as well as a dozen others during

the summer, indicated that he would be equal to the work that was to

fall to him when in a few weeks he should succeed Wilson. But to go

on down the scale of rank, describing the officers who commanded in

the Army of the Shenandoah, would carry me beyond all limit, so I

refrain from the digression with regret that I cannot pay to each his

well-earned tribute.

The force that I could take with me into the field at this time

numbered about 26,000 men. Within the limits of the geographical

division there was a much greater number of troops than this.

Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Frederick,

Cumberland, and a score of other points; besides the strong

detachments that it took to keep the Baltimore and Ohio railroad open

through the mountains of West Virginia, and escorts for my trains,

absorbed so many men that the column which could be made available

for field operations was small when compared with the showing on

paper. Indeed, it was much less than it ought to have been, but for

me, in the face of the opposition made by different interests

involved, to detach troops from any of the points to which they had

been distributed before I took charge was next to impossible.

In a few days after my arrival preparations were completed, and I was

ready to make the first move for the possession of the Shenandoah

Valley. For the next five weeks the operations on my part consisted

almost wholly of offensive and defensive manoeuvring for certain

advantages, the enemy confining himself meanwhile to measures

intended to counteract my designs. Upon the advent of Torbert, Early

immediately grew suspicious, and fell back twelve miles south of

Martinsburg, to Bunker Hill and vicinity, where his right flank would

be less exposed, but from which position he could continue to

maintain the break in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and push

reconnoitring parties through Smithfield to Charlestown. These

reconnoitring parties exhibited considerable boldness at times, but

since they had no purpose in view save to discover whether or not we

were moving, I did not contest any ground with them except about our

outposts. Indeed, I desired that Early might remain at some point

well to the north till I was fully prepared to throw my army on his

right and rear and force a battle, and hence I abstained from

disturbing him by premature activity, for I thought that if I could

beat him at Winchester, or north of it, there would be far greater

chances of weighty results. I therefore determined to bring my

troops, if it were at all possible to do so, into such a position

near that town as to oblige Early to fight. The sequel proved,

however, that he was accurately informed of all my movements. To

anticipate them, therefore, he began his retreat up the valley the

day that I moved out from Halltown, and consequently was able to

place himself south of Winchester before I could get there.

CHAPTER XXIV.

MOVING ON GENERAL EARLY--GENERAL GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS

--DESTROYING THE RESOURCES OF THE VALLEY--REASON FOR THE DESTRUCTION

--WITHDRAWAL TO HALLTOWN--ALARM IN THE NORTH OVER THE RETROGRADE

MOVEMENT--RENEWING THE ADVANCE UP THE VALLEY--GENERAL ANDERSON'S

ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO PETERSBURG--STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES.

For a clear understanding of the operations which preceded the

victories that resulted in almost annihilating General Early's army

in the Shenandoah Valley, it is necessary to describe in considerable

detail the events that took place prior to the 19th of September. My

army marched from Harper's Ferry on the 10th of August, 1864, General

Torbert with Merritt's division of cavalry moving in advance through

Berryville, going into position near White Post. The Sixth Corps,

under General Wright, moved by way of Charlestown and Summit Point to

Clifton; General Emory, with Dwight's division of the Nineteenth

Corps, marched along the Berryville pike through Berryville to the

left of the position of the Sixth Corps at Clifton; General Crook's

command, moving on the Kabletown road, passed through Kabletown to

the vicinity of Berryville, and went into position on the left of

Dwight's division, while Colonel Lowell, with a detached force of two

small regiments of cavalry, marched to Summit Point; so that on the

night of August 10 my infantry occupied a line stretching from

Clifton to Berryville, with Merritt's cavalry at White Post and

Lowell's at Summit Point. The enemy, as stated before, moved at the

same time from Bunker Hill and vicinity, and stretched his line from

where the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequon Creek to

the point at which the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses the

same stream, thus occupying the west bank to cover Winchester.

On the morning of the 11th the Sixth Corps was ordered to move across

the country toward the junction of the Berryville-Winchester pike and

the Opequon, and to take the crossing and hold it, Dwight's division

being directed to move through Berryville on the White Post road for

a mile, then file to the right by heads of regiments at deploying

distances, and carry the crossing of Opequon Creek at a ford about

three-fourths of a mile from the left of the Sixth Corps, while Crook

was instructed to move out on the White Post road, a mile and a half

beyond Berryville, then head to the right and secure the ford about a

mile to the left of Dwight; Torbert's orders were to push Merritt's

division up the Millwood pike toward Winchester, attack any force he

might run against, and ascertain the movements of the Confederate

army; and lastly, Lowell received instructions to close in from

Summit Point on the right of the Sixth Corps.

My object in securing the fords was to further my march on Winchester

from the southeast, since, from all the information gathered during

the 10th, I still thought Early could be brought to a stand at that

point; but in this I was mistaken, as Torbert's reconnoissance

proved, for on the morning of the 11th, when Merritt had driven the

Confederate cavalry, then covering the Millwood pike west of the

Opequon, off toward Kernstown, he found that their infantry and

artillery were retreating south, up the Valley pike.

As soon as this information was obtained Torbert moved quickly

through the toll-gate on the Front Royal and Winchester road to

Newtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat,

Lowell following up through Winchester, on the Valley pike; Crook was

turned to the left and ordered to Stony Point, while Emory and

Wright, marching to the left also, were directed to take post on the

night of the 11th between the Millwood and Front Royal roads, within

supporting distance of Crook. Merritt meeting some of the enemy's

cavalry at the tollgate, drove it in the direction of Newtown till it

got inside the line of Gordon's division of infantry, which had been

thrown out and posted behind barricades to cover the flank of the

main force in its retreat. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attacked

this infantry and drove in its skirmish-line, and though not able to

dislodge Gordon, Merritt held the ground gained till night-fall, when

the Confederate infantry moved off under cover of darkness to Hupp's

Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek.

The next morning Crook marched from Stony Point to Cedar Creek, Emory

followed with Dwight, and the cavalry moved to the same point by way

of Newtown and the Valley pike, the Sixth Corps following the

cavalry. That night Crook was in position at Cedar Creek, on the

left of the Valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the Sixth

Corps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the flanks. In the

afternoon a heavy skirmish-line had been thrown forward to the

heights on the south side of Cedar Creek, and a brisk affair with the

enemy's pickets took place, the Confederates occupying with their

main force the heights north of Strasburg. On the morning of the

13th my cavalry went out to reconnoitre toward Strasburg, on the

middle road, about two and a half miles west of the Valley pike, and

discovered that Early's infantry was at Fisher's Hill, where he had

thrown up behind Tumbling Run earthworks extending clear across the

narrow valley between the Massanutten and North mountains. On the

left of these works he had Vaughan's, McCausland's, and Johnson's

brigades of cavalry under General Lomax, who at this time relieved

General Ramseur from the command of the Confederate mounted forces.

Within the past day or two I had received information that a column

of the enemy was moving up from Culpeper Court House and approaching

Front Royal through Chester Gap, and although the intelligence was

unconfirmed, it caused me much solicitude; for there was strong

probability that such a movement would be made, and any considerable

force advancing through Front Royal toward Winchester could fall upon

my rear and destroy my communication with Harper's Ferry, or, moving

along the base of Massanutten Mountain, could attack my flank in

conjunction with the force at Fisher's Hill without a possibility of

my preventing it.

Neither Wilson's cavalry nor Grower's infantry had yet joined me, and

the necessities, already explained, which obliged me to hold with

string garrisons Winchester and other points heretofore mentioned.

had so depleted my line of battle strength that I knew the enemy

would outnumber me when Anderson's corps should arrive in the valley.

I deemed it advisable, therefore, to act with extreme caution, so,

with the exception of a cavalry reconnoissance on the 13th, I

remained on the defensive, quietly awaiting developments. In the

evening of that day the enemy's skirmishers withdrew to Tumbling Run,

his main force remaining inactive behind the intrenchments at

Fisher's Hill waiting for the arrival of Anderson.

The rumors in regard to the force advancing from Culpeper kept

increasing every hour, so on the morning of the 14th I concluded to

send a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal to ascertain definitely what

was up. At the same time I crossed the Sixth Corps to the south side

of Cedar Creek, and occupied the heights near Strasburg. That day I

received from the hands of Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General's

Department, the following despatch, to deliver which he had ridden in

great haste from Washington through Snicker's Gap, escorted by a

regiment of cavalry:

"CITY POINT, August 12, 1864--9 A. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK

"Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two (2) divisions of

infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) pieces

of artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He must

be cautious, and act now on the defensive until movements here force

them to detach to send this way. Early's force, with this increase,

cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for General

Sheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade of

the Nineteenth Corps.

"I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men. Their

time will soon be out, but for the present they will do to serve in

the defenses.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

The despatch explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morning

of the 15th Merritt's two remaining brigades were sent to Front Royal

to oppose Anderson, and the Sixth Corps withdrawn to the north side

of Cedar Creek, where it would be in a position enabling me either to

confront Anderson or to act defensively, as desired by General Grant.

To meet the requirements of his instructions I examined the map of

the valley for a defensive line--a position where a smaller number of

troops could hold a larger number--for this information led me to

suppose that Early's force would greatly exceed mine when Anderson's

two divisions of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had joined him.

I could see but one such position, and that was at Halltown, in front

of Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience convinced me that there was

no other really defensive line in the Shenandoah Valley, for at

almost any other point the open country and its peculiar topography

invites rather than forbids flanking operations.

This retrograde movement would also enable me to strengthen my

command by Grower's division of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson's

cavalry, both of which divisions were marching from Washington by way

of Snicker's Gap.

After fully considering the matter, I determined to move back to

Halltown, carrying out, as I retired, my instructions to destroy all

the forage and subsistence the country afforded. So Emory was

ordered to retire to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and Wright

and Crook to follow through Winchester to Clifton the next night.

For the cavalry, in this move to the rear, I gave the following

instructions:

"....In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will

have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left

to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and

stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be

consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should be

destroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should

be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them,

recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to

stop them at all hazards...." [Grant's letter of instructions.]

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,

"Cedar Creek, Va., August 16, 1864.

"GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-General

commanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give the

necessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of a

line from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap. You will seize

all mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyal

citizens can bring in their claims against the Government for this

necessary destruction. No houses will be burned, and officers in

charge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the people

that the object is to make this valley untenable for the raiding

parties of the rebel army.

"Very respectfully,

"P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Major-General Commanding.

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. T. A. TORBERT,

"Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division."

During his visit to General Hunter at the Monocacy, General Grant had

not only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large force

sufficient to defeat Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he had

furthermore determined to make that sections by the destruction of

its supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the Confederates.

This would cut off one of Lee's main-stays in the way of subsistence,

and at the same time diminish the number of recruits and conscripts

he received; the valley district while under his control not only

supplying Lee with an abundance of food, but also furnishing him many

men for his regular and irregular forces. Grant's instructions to

destroy the valley began with the letter of August 5 to Hunter, which

was turned over to me, and this was followed at intervals by more

specific directions, all showing the earnestness of his purpose.

"CITY POINT, Va., Aug. 16--3:30 P. M., 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Winchester, Va.:

"If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them through

Loudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes,

and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. In

this way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens under

fifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizen

prisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the moment

the rebel army gets hold of them.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"CITY POINT, Aug. 21, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va.:

"In stripping Loudoun County of supplies, etc., impress from all

loyal persons so that they may receive pay for what is taken from

them. I am informed by the Assistant Secretary of War that Loudoun

County has a large population of Quakers, who are all favorably

disposed to the Union. These people may be exempted from arrest.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

"CITY POINT, Va., Aug. 26,2:30 P. M. 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Halltown, Va.:

"Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Lee

had been ordered back here. I now think it likely that all troops

will be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to be

the minimum number to detain you. My reason for supposing this is

based upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be a

blow to the enemy he cannot stand. I think I do not overstate the

loss of the enemy in the last two weeks at 10,000 killed and wounded.

We have lost heavily, mostly in captured when the enemy gained

temporary advantages. Watch closely, and if you find this theory

correct, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it is

possible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Do

all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of

all descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If

the war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley to

remain a barren waste.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"CITY POINT, Va., Sept. 4,--10 A. M.--1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va.:

"In cleaning out the arms-bearing community of Loudoun County and the

subsistence for armies, exercise your own judgment as to who should

be exempt from arrest, and as to who should receive pay for their

stock, grain, etc. It is our interest that that county should not be

capable of subsisting a hostile army, and at the same time we want to

inflict as little hardship upon Union men as possible.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"CITY POINT, Va., Nov. 9, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.:

"Do you not think it advisable to notify all citizens living east of

the Blue Ridge to move out north of the Potomac all their stock,

grain, and provisions of every description? There is no doubt about

the necessity of clearing out that country so that it will not

support Mosby's gang. And the question is whether it is not better

that the people should save what they can. So long as the war lasts

they must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and as

high up the valley as we can control.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

He had rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to a

people engaged in raising crops from a prolific soil to feed the

country's enemies, and devoting to the Confederacy its best youth. I

endorsed the programme in all its parts, for the stores of meat and

grain that the valley provided, and the men it furnished for Lee's

depleted regiments, were the strongest auxiliaries he possessed in

the whole insurgent section. In war a territory like this is a

factor of great importance, and whichever adversary controls it

permanently reaps all the advantages of its prosperity. Hence, as I

have said, I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war to

mean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, and

material interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which one

combatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is far

worse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but

little of the horrors attending such a duel, and even grow

indifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselves

with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, to

fill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is another

matter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to their

own doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of

property weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, than

the sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularly

considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction

to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than

does the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has

demonstrated in more than one great conflict.

In the afternoon of the 16th I started back to Winchester, whence I

could better supervise our regressive march. As I was passing

through Newtown, I heard cannonading from the direction of Front

Royal, and on reaching Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought me word

that he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah by

Kershaw's division of Anderson's corps and two brigades of Fitzhugh

Lee's cavalry, but that the attack had been handsomely repulsed, with

a capture of two battle-flags and three hundred prisoners. This was

an absolute confirmation of the despatch from Grant; and I was now

more than satisfied with the wisdom of my withdrawal.

At daylight of the 17th Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville,

and the same morning Crook and Wright reached Winchester, having

started from Cedar Creek the day before. From Winchester, Crook and

Wright resumed their march toward Clifton, Wright, who had the rear

guard, getting that day as far as the Berryville crossing of the

Opequon, where he was ordered to remain, while Crook went ahead till

he reached the vicinity of Berryville. On the afternoon of the 17th

Lowell with his two regiments of troopers came into Winchester, where

he was joined by Wilson's mounted division, which had come by a rapid

march from Snicker's ferry. In the mean time Merritt, after his

handsome engagement with Kershaw near Front Royal, had been ordered

back to the neighborhood of White Post, so that my cavalry outposts

now extended from this last point around to the west of Winchester.

During all these operations the enemy had a signal-station on Three

Top Mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, from which every movement

made by our troops could be plainly seen; therefore, early on the

morning of the 17th he became aware of the fact that we were retiring

down the valley, and at once made after us, and about sundown drove

Torbert out of Winchester, he having been left there-with Wilson and

Lowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth Corps, to develop the

character of the enemy's pursuit. After a severe skirmish Wilson and

Lowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined its

corps at the crossing of the Opequon. This affair demonstrated that

Early's whole army had followed us from Fisher's Hill, in concert

with Anderson and Fitzhugh Lee from Front Royal, and the two columns

joined near Winchester the morning of the 18th.

That day I moved the Sixth Corps by way of Clifton to Flowing Spring,

two and a half miles west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; and

Emory, with Dwight's and Grower's divisions (Grower's having joined

that morning from Washington), to a position about the same distance

south of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike. Following these

movements, Merritt fell back to Berryville, covering the Berryville

pike crossing of the Opequon, and Wilson was stationed at Summit

Point, whence he held a line along the Opequon as far north as the

bridge at Smithfield. Crook continued to hold on near Clifton until

the next day, and was then moved into place on the left of Emory.

This line was practically maintained till the 21st, when the enemy,

throwing a heavy force across the Opequon by the bridge at

Smithfield, drove in my cavalry pickets to Summit Point, and followed

up with a rapid advance against the position of the Sixth Corps near

Flowing Spring. A sharp and obstinate skirmish with a heavy

picket-line of the Sixth Corps grew out of this manoeuvre, and

resulted very much in our favor, but the quick withdrawal of the

Confederates left no opportunity for a general engagement. It seems

that General Early thought I had taken position near Summit Point, and

that by moving rapidly around through Smithfield he could fall upon my

rear in concert with an attack in front by Anderson, but the warm

reception given him disclosed his error, for he soon discovered that

my line lay in front of Charlestown instead of where he supposed.

In the manoeuvre Merritt had been attacked in front of Berryville and

Wilson at Summit Point, the former by cavalry and the latter by

Anderson's infantry. The exposed positions of Merritt and Wilson

necessitated their withdrawal if I was to continue to act on the

defensive; so, after the army had moved back to Halltown the

preceding night, without loss or inconvenience, I called them in and

posted them on the right of the infantry.

My retrograde move from Strasburg to Halltown caused considerable

alarm in the North, as the public was ignorant of the reasons for it;

and in the excited state of mind then prevailing, it was generally

expected that the reinforced Confederate army would again cross the

Potomac, ravage Maryland and Pennsylvania, and possibly capture

Washington. Mutterings of dissatisfaction reached me from many

sources, and loud calls were made for my removal, but I felt

confident that my course would be justified when the true situation

was understood, for I knew that I was complying with my instructions.

Therefore I paid small heed to the adverse criticisms pouring down

from the North almost every day, being fully convinced that the best

course was to bide my time, and wait till I could get the enemy into

a position from which he could not escape without such serious

misfortune as to have some bearing on the general result of the war.

Indeed, at this time I was hoping that my adversary would renew the

boldness he had exhibited the early part of the month, and strike for

the north side of the Potomac, and wrote to General Grant on the 20th

of August that I had purposely left everything in that direction open

to the enemy.

On the 22d the Confederates moved to Charlestown and pushed well up

to my position at Halltown. Here for the next three days they

skirmished with my videttes and infantry pickets, Emory and Cook

receiving the main attention; but finding that they could make no

impression, and judging it to be an auspicious time to intensify the

scare in the North, on the 25th of August Early despatched Fitzhugh

Lee's cavalry to Williamsport, and moved all the rest of his army but

Anderson's infantry and McCausland's cavalry to Kerneysville. This

same day there was sharp picket firing along the whole front of my

infantry line, arising, as afterward ascertained, from a heavy

demonstration by Anderson. During this firing I sent Torbert, with

Merritt's and Wilson's divisions, to Kerrteysville, whence he was to

proceed toward Leetown and learn what had become of Fitz. Lee.

About a mile from Leetown Torbert met a small force of Confederate

cavalry, and soon after encountering it, stumbled on Breckenridge's

corps of infantry on the march, apparently heading for Shepherdstown.

The surprise was mutual, for Torbert expected to meet only the

enemy's cavalry, while the Confederate infantry column was

anticipating an unobstructed march to the Potomac. Torbert attacked

with such vigor as at first to double up the head of Breckenridge's

corps and throw it into confusion, but when the Confederates realized

that they were confronted only by cavalry, Early brought up the whole

of the four infantry divisions engaged in his manoeuvre, and in a

sharp attack pushed Torbert rapidly back.

All the advantages which Torbert had gained by surprising the enemy

were nullified by this counter-attack, and he was obliged to withdraw

Wilson's division toward my right, to the neighborhood of Duffield's

Station, Merritt drawing back to the same point by way of the

Shepherdstown ford. Custer's brigade becoming isolated after the

fight while assisting the rear guard, was also obliged to retire,

which it did to Shepherdstown and there halted, picketing the river

to Antietam ford.

When Torbert reported to me the nature of his encounter, and that a

part of Early's infantry was marching to the north, while Fitzhugh

Lee's cavalry had gone toward Martinsburg, I thought that the

Confederate general meditated crossing his cavalry into Maryland, so

I sent Wilson by way of Harper's Ferry to watch his movements from

Boonesboro', and at the same time directed Averell, who had reported

from West Virginia some days before, to take post at Williamsport and

hold the crossing there until he was driven away. I also thought it

possible that Early might cross the Potomac with his whole army, but

the doubts of a movement like this outweighed the probabilities

favoring it. Nevertheless, to meet such a contingency I arranged to

throw my army on his rear should the occasion arise, and deeming my

position at Halltown the most advantageous in which to await

developments, my infantry was retained there.

If General Early had ever intended to cross the Potomac, Torbert's

discovery of his manoeuvre put an end to his scheme of invasion, for

he well knew that and success he might derive from such a course

would depend on his moving with celerity, and keeping me in ignorance

of his march till it should be well under way; so he settled all the

present uncertainties by retiring with all his troops about

Kerneysville to his old position at Bunker Hill behind the Opequon,

and on the night of the 26th silently withdrew Anderson and

McCausland from my front at Halltown to Stephenson's depot.

By the 27th all of Early's infantry was in position at Brucetown and

Bunker Hill, his cavalry holding the outposts of Leetown and

Smithfield, and on that day Merritt's division attacked the enemy's

horse at Leetown, and pressed it back through Smithfield to the west

side of the Opequon. This reconnoissance determined definitely that

Early had abandoned the projected movement into Maryland, if he ever

seriously contemplated it; and I marched my infantry out from

Halltown to the front of Charlestown, with the intention of occupying

a line between Clifton and Berryville the moment matters should so

shape themselves that I could do so with advantage. The night of the

28th Wilson joined me near Charlestown from his points of observation

in Maryland, and the next day Averell crossed the Potomac at

Williamsport and advanced to Martinsburg.

Merritt's possession of Smithfield bridge made Early somewhat uneasy,

since it afforded opportunity for interposing a column between his

right and left flanks, so he concluded to retake the crossing, and,

to this end, on the 29th advanced two divisions of infantry. A

severe fight followed, and Merritt was forced to retire, being driven

through the village toward Charlestown with considerable loss. As

Merritt was nearing my infantry line, I ordered. Ricketts's division

of the Sixth Corps to his relief, and this in a few minutes turned

the tide, the Smithfield crossing of the Opequon being regained, and

afterward held by Lowell's brigade, supported by Ricketts. The next

morning I moved Torbert, with Wilson and Merritt, to Berryville, and

succeeding their occupation of that point there occurred along my

whole line a lull, which lasted until the 3d of September, being

undisturbed except by a combat near Bunker Hill between Averell's

cavalry and a part of McCausland's, supported by Rodes's division of

infantry, in which affair the Confederates were defeated with the

loss of about fifty prisoners and considerable property in the shape

of wagons and beef-cattle.

Meanwhile Torbert's movement to Berryville had alarmed Early, and as

a counter move on the 2d of September he marched with the bulk of his

army to Summit Point, but while reconnoitring in that region on the

3d he learned of the havoc that Averell was creating in his rear, and

this compelled him to recross to the west side of the Opequon and

mass his troops in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot, whence he

could extend down to Bunker Hill, continue to threaten the Baltimore

and Ohio railroad, and at the same time cover Winchester.

The same day I was moving my infantry to take up the Clifton-Berryville

line, and that afternoon Wright went into position at Clifton, Crook

occupied Berryville, and Emory's corps came in between them, forming

almost a continuous line. Torbert had moved to White Post meanwhile,

with directions to reconnoitre as far south as the Front Royal Pike.

My infantry had just got fairly into this position about an hour

before sunset, when along Crook's front a combat took place that at

the time caused me to believe it was Early's purpose to throw a

column between Crook and Torbert, with the intention of isolating the

latter; but the fight really arose from the attempt of General

Anderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw's division in response

to loud calls from General Lee. Anderson started south on the 3d of

September, and possibly this explains Early's reconnoissance that day

to Summit Point as a covering movement, but his rapid withdrawal left

him in ignorance of my advance, and Anderson marched on heedlessly

toward Berryville, expecting to cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby's

Gap. At Berryville however, he blundered into Crook's lines about

sunset, and a bitter little fight ensued, in which the Confederates

got so much the worst of it that they withdrew toward Winchester.

When General Early received word of this encounter he hurried to

Anderson's assistance with three divisions, but soon perceiving what

was hitherto unknown to him, that my whole army was on a new line, he

decided, after some slight skirmishing, that Anderson must remain at

Winchester until a favorable opportunity offered for him to rejoin

Lee by another route.

Succeeding the discomfiture of Anderson, some minor operations took

place on the part of, Averell on the right and McIntosh's brigade of

Wilson's division on the left, but from that time until the 19th of

September no engagement of much importance occurred. The line from

Clifton to Berryville was occupied by the Sixth Corps and Grower's

and Dwight's divisions of the Nineteenth, Crook being transferred to

Summit Point, whence I could use him to protect my right flank and my

communication with Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened the

enemy's right flank and line of retreat up the valley.

The difference of strength between the two armies at this date was

considerably in my favor, but the conditions attending my situation

in a hostile region necessitated so much detached service to protect

trains, and to secure Maryland and Pennsylvania from raids, that my

excess in numbers was almost canceled by these incidental demands

that could not be avoided, and although I knew that I was strong,

yet, in consequence of the injunctions of General Grant, I deemed it

necessary to be very cautious; and the fact that the Presidential

election was impending made me doubly so, the authorities at

Washington having impressed upon me that the defeat of my army might

be followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, it

was believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if,

indeed, it did not lead to the complete abandonment of all coercive

measures. Under circumstances such as these I could not afford to

risk a disaster, to say nothing of the intense disinclination every

soldier has for such results; so, notwithstanding my superior

strength, I determined to take all the time necessary to equip myself

with the fullest information, and then seize an opportunity under

such conditions that I could not well fail of success.

PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 2.

By Philip Henry Sheridan

CHAPTER I.

ORGANIZING SCOUTS--MISS REBECCA WRIGHT--IMPORTANT INFORMATION--DECIDE

TO MOVE ON NEWTOWN--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION

ARMY--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE OPEQUON--DEATH OF GENERAL RUSSELL

--A TURNING MOVEMENT--A SUCCESSFUL CAVALRY CHARGE--VICTORY--THREE

LOYAL GIRLS--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY

--REMARKS ON THE BATTLE.

While occupying the ground between Clifton and Berryville, referred

to in the last chapter of the preceding volume, I felt the need of an

efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy,

for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out

from Harper's Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory. I

therefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped would

give better results than bad the method hitherto pursued in the

department, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens and

Confederate deserters. If these should turn out untrustworthy, the

mischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finally

concluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for the

delicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, and

decided that they should have a battalion organization and be

commanded by an officer, Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode Island

Infantry. These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenever

necessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion to

the value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us in

good stead in checking the forays of Gilmore, Mosby, and other

irregulars. Beneficial results came from the plan in many other ways

too, and particularly so when in a few days two of my scouts put me

in the way of getting news conveyed from Winchester. They had

learned that just outside of my lines, near Millwood, there was

living an old colored man, who had a permit from the Confederate

commander to go into Winchester and return three times a week, for

the purpose of selling vegetables to the inhabitants. The scouts had

sounded this man, and, finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggested

that he might be made useful to us within the enemy's lines; and the

proposal struck me as feasible, provided there could be found in

Winchester some reliable person who would be willing to co-operate

and correspond with me. I asked General Crook, who was acquainted

with many of the Union people of Winchester, if he knew of such a

person, and he recommended a Miss Rebecca Wright, a young lady whom

he had met there before the battle of Kernstown, who, he said, was a

member of the Society of Friends and the teacher of a small private

school. He knew she was faithful and loyal to the Government, and

thought she might be willing to render us assistance, but he could

not be certain of this, for on account of her well known loyalty she

was under constant surveillance. I hesitated at first, but finally

deciding to try it, despatched the two scouts to the old negro's

cabin, and they brought him to my headquarters late that night. I

was soon convinced of the negro's fidelity, and asking him if he was

acquainted with Miss Rebecca Wright, of Winchester, he replied that

he knew her well. There upon I told him what I wished to do, and

after a little persuasion he agreed to carry a letter to her on his

next marketing trip. My message was prepared by writing it on tissue

paper, which was then compressed into a small pellet, and protected

by wrapping it in tin-foil so that it could be safely carried in the

man's mouth. The probability, of his being searched when he came to

the Confederate picketline was not remote, and in such event he was

to swallow the pellet. The letter appealed to Miss Wright's loyalty

and patriotism, and requested her to furnish me with information

regarding the strength and condition of Early's army. The night

before the negro started one of the scouts placed the odd-looking

communication in his hands, with renewed injunctions as to secrecy

and promptitude. Early the next morning it was delivered to Miss

Wright, with an intimation that a letter of importance was enclosed

in the tin-foil, the negro telling her at the same time that she

might expect him to call for a message in reply before his return

home. At first Miss Wright began to open the pellet nervously, but

when told to be careful, and to preserve the foil as a wrapping for

her answer, she proceeded slowly and carefully, and when the note

appeared intact the messenger retired, remarking again that in the

evening he would come for an answer.

On reading my communication Miss Wright was much startled by the

perils it involved, and hesitatingly consulted her mother, but her

devoted loyalty soon silenced every other consideration, and the

brave girl resolved to comply with my request, notwithstanding it

might jeopardize her life. The evening before a convalescent

Confederate officer had visited her mother's house, and in

conversation about the war had disclosed the fact that Kershaw's

division of infantry and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery had started

to rejoin General Lee. At the time Miss Wright heard this she

attached little if any importance to it, but now she perceived the

value of the intelligence, and, as her first venture, determined to

send it to me at once, which she did with a promise that in the

future she would with great pleasure continue to transmit information

by the negro messenger.

"SEPTEMBER 15, 1864.

"I learn from Major-General Crook that you are a loyal lady, and

still love the old flag. Can you inform me of the position of

Early's forces, the number of divisions in his army, and the strength

of any or all of them, and his probable or reported intentions? Have

any more troops arrived from Richmond, or are any more coming, or

reported to be coming?

"You can trust the bearer."

"I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General Commanding."

"SEPTEMBER 16, 1864.

"I have no communication whatever with the rebels, but will tell you

what I know. The division of General Kershaw, and Cutshaw's

artillery, twelve guns and men, General Anderson commanding, have

been sent away, and no more are expected, as they cannot be spared

from Richmond. I do not know how the troops are situated, but the

force is much smaller than represented. I will take pleasure

hereafter in learning all I can of their strength and position, and

the bearer may call again.

"Very respectfully yours,"

............

Miss Wright's answer proved of more value to me than she anticipated,

for it not only quieted the conflicting reports concerning Anderson's

corps, but was most important in showing positively that Kershaw was

gone, and this circumstance led, three days later, to the battle of

the Opequon, or Winchester as it has been unofficially called. Word

to the effect that some of Early's troops were under orders to return

to Petersburg, and would start back at the first favorable

opportunity, had been communicated to me already from many sources,

but we had not been able to ascertain the date for their departure.

Now that they had actually started, I decided to wait before offering

battle until Kershaw had gone so far as to preclude his return,

feeling confident that my prudence would be justified by the improved

chances of victory; and then, besides, Mr. Stanton kept reminding me

that positive success was necessary to counteract the political

dissatisfaction existing in some of the Northern States. This course

was advised and approved by General Grant, but even with his powerful

backing it was difficult to resist the persistent pressure of those

whose judgment, warped by their interests in the Baltimore and Ohio

railroad, was often confused and misled by stories of scouts (sent

out from Washington), averring that Kershaw and Fitzhugh Lee had

returned to Petersburg, Breckenridge to southwestern Virginia, and at

one time even maintaining that Early's whole army was east of the

Blue Ridge, and its commander himself at Gordonsville.

During the inactivity prevailing in my army for the ten days

preceding Miss Wright's communication the infantry was quiet, with

the exception of Getty's division, which made a reconnoissance to the

Opequon, and developed a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards's

Corners. The cavalry, however, was employed a good deal in this

interval skirmishing heavily at times to maintain a space about six

miles in width between the hostile lines, for I wished to control

this ground so that when I was released from the instructions of

August 12, I could move my men into position for attack without the

knowledge of Early. The most noteworthy of these mounted encounters

was that of McIntosh's brigade, which captured the Eighth South

Carolina at Abraham's Creek September 13.

It was the evening of the 16th of September that I received from Miss

Wright the positive information that Kershaw was in march toward

Front Royal on his way by Chester Gap to Richmond. Concluding that

this was my opportunity, I at once resolved to throw my whole force

into Newtown the next day, but a despatch from General Grant

directing me to meet him at Charlestown, whither he was coming to

consult with me, caused me to defer action until after I should see

him. In our resulting interview at Charlestown, I went over the

situation very thoroughly, and pointed out with so much confidence

the chances of a complete victory should I throw my army across the

Valley pike near Newtown that he fell in with the plan at once,

authorized me to resume the offensive, and to attack Early as soon as

I deemed it most propitious to do so; and although before leaving

City Point he had outlined certain operations for my army, yet he

neither discussed nor disclosed his plans, my knowledge of the

situation striking him as being so much more accurate than his own.

[Extract from "Grant's Memoirs," page 328.]

"....Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan,

which I had brought with me; but seeing that he was so clear and so

positive in his views, and so confident of success, I said nothing

about this, and did not take it out of my pocket...."

The interview over, I returned to my army to arrange for its movement

toward Newtown, but while busy with these preparations, a report came

to me from General Averell which showed that Early was moving with

two divisions of infantry toward Martinsburg. This considerably

altered the state of affairs, and I now decided to change my plan and

attack at once the two divisions remaining about Winchester and

Stephenson's depot, and later, the two sent to Martinsburg; the

disjointed state of the enemy giving me an opportunity to take him in

detail, unless the Martinsburg column should be returned by forced

marches.

While General Early was in the telegraph office at Martinsburg on the

morning of the 18th, he learned of Grant's visit to me; and

anticipating activity by reason of this circumstance, he promptly

proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within

supporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryville

pike about two miles east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek and

Red Bud Run, so by the night of the 18th Wharton's division, under

Breckenridge, was at Stephenson's depot, Rodes near there, and

Gordon's at Bunker Hill. At daylight of the 19th these positions of

the Confederate infantry still obtained, with the cavalry of Lomax,

Jackson, and Johnson on the right of Ramseur, while to the left and

rear of the enemy's general line was Fitzhugh Lee, covering from

Stephenson's depot west across the Valley pike to Applepie Ridge.

My army moved at 3 o'clock that morning. The plan was for Torbert to

advance with Merritt's division of cavalry from Summit Point, carry

the crossings of the Opequon at Stevens's and Lock's fords, and form

a junction near Stephenson's depot, with Averell, who was to move

south from Darksville by the Valley pike. Meanwhile, Wilson was to

strike up the Berryville pike, carry the Berryville crossing of the

Opequon, charge through the gorge or canyon on the road west of the

stream, and occupy the open ground at the head of this defile.

Wilson's attack was to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenth

corps, which were ordered to the Berryville crossing, and as the

cavalry gained the open ground beyond the gorge, the two infantry

corps, under command of General Wright, were expected to press on

after and occupy Wilson's ground, who was then to shift to the south

bank of Abraham's Creek and cover my left; Crook's two divisions,

having to march from Summit Point, were to follow the Sixth and

Nineteenth corps to the Opcquon, and should they arrive before the

action began, they were to be held in reserve till the proper moment

came, and then, as a turning-column, be thrown over toward the Valley

pike, south of Winchester.

McIntosh's brigade of Wilson's division drove the enemy's pickets

away from the Berryville crossing at dawn, and Wilson following

rapidly through the gorge with the rest of the division, debouched

from its western extremity with such suddenness as to capture a

small earthwork in front of General Ramseur's main line; and

not-withstanding the Confederate infantry, on recovering from its

astonishment, tried hard to dislodge them, Wilson's troopers

obstinately held the work till the Sixth Corps came up. I followed

Wilson to select the ground on which to form the infantry. The Sixth

Corps began to arrive about 8 o'clock, and taking up the line Wilson

had been holding, just beyond the head of the narrow ravine, the

cavalry was transferred to the south side of Abraham's Creek.

The Confederate line lay along some elevated ground about two miles

east of Winchester, and extended from Abraham's Creek north across

the Berryville pike, the left being hidden in the heavy timber on Red

Bud Run. Between this line and mine, especially on my right, clumps

of woods and patches of underbrush occurred here and there, but the

undulating ground consisted mainly of open fields, many of which were

covered with standing corn that had already ripened.

Much time was lost in getting all of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps

through the narrow defile, Grover's division being greatly delayed

there by a train of ammunition wagons, and it was not until late in

the forenoon that the troops intended for the attack could be got

into line ready to advance. General Early was not slow to avail

himself of the advantages thus offered him, and my chances of

striking him in detail were growing less every moment, for Gordon and

Rodes were hurrying their divisions from Stephenson's depot

--across-country on a line that would place Gordon in the woods south

of Red Bud Run, and bring Rodes into the interval between Gordon and

Ramseur.

When the two corps had all got through the canyon they were formed

with Getty's division of the Sixth to the left of the Berryville

pike, Rickett's division to the right of the pike, and Russell's

division in reserve in rear of the other two. Grover's division of

the Nineteenth Corps came next on the right of Rickett's, with Dwight

to its rear in reserve, while Crook was to begin massing near the

Opequon crossing about the time Wright and Emory were ready to

attack.

Just before noon the line of Getty, Ricketts, and Grover moved

forward, and as we advanced, the Confederates, covered by some heavy

woods on their right, slight underbrush and corn-fields along their

Centre, and a large body of timber on their left along the Red Bud,

opened fire from their whole front. We gained considerable ground at

first, especially on our left but the desperate resistance which the

right met with demonstrated that the time we had unavoidably lost in

the morning had been of incalculable value to Early, for it was

evident that he had been enabled already to so far concentrate his

troops as to have the different divisions of his army in a connected

line of battle, in good shape to resist.

Getty and Ricketts made some progress toward Winchester in connection

with Wilson's cavalry, which was beyond the Senseny road on Getty's

left, and as they were pressing back Ramseur's infantry and Lomax's

cavalry Grover attacked from the right with decided effect. Grover

in a few minutes broke up Evans's brigade of Gordon's division, but

his pursuit of Evans destroyed the continuity of my general line, and

increased an interval that had already been made by the deflection of

Ricketts to the left, in obedience to instructions that had been

given him to guide his division on the Berryville pike. As the line

pressed forward, Ricketts observed this widening interval and

endeavored to fill it with the small brigade of Colonel Keifer, but

at this juncture both Gordon and Rodes struck the weak spot where the

right of the Sixth Corps and the left of the Nineteenth should have

been in conjunction, and succeeded in checking my advance by driving

back a part of Ricketts's division, and the most of Grover's. As

these troops were retiring I ordered Russell's reserve division to be

put into action, and just as the flank of the enemy's troops in

pursuit of Grover was presented, Upton's brigade, led in person by

both Russell and Upton, struck it in a charge so vigorous as to drive

the Confederates back in turn to their original ground.

The success of Russell enabled me to re-establish the right of my

line some little distance in advance of the position from which it

started in the morning, and behind Russell's division (now commanded

by Upton) the broken regiments of Ricketts's division were rallied.

Dwight's division was then brought up on the right, and Grover's men

formed behind it.

The charge of Russell was most opportune, but it cost many men in

killed and wounded. Among the former was the courageous Russell

himself; killed by a piece of shell that passed through his heart,

although he had previously been struck by a bullet in the left

breast, which wound, from its nature, must have proved mortal, yet of

which he had not spoken. Russell's death oppressed us all with

sadness, and me particularly. In the early days of my army life he

was my captain and friend, and I was deeply indebted to him, not only

for sound advice and good example, but for the inestimable service he

had just performed, and sealed with his life, so it may be inferred

how keenly I felt his loss.

As my lines were being rearranged, it was suggested to me to put

Crook into the battle, but so strongly had I set my heart on using

him to take possession of the Valley pike and cut off the enemy, that

I resisted this advice, hoping that the necessity for putting him in

would be obviated by the attack near Stephenson's depot that

Torbert's cavalry was to make, and from which I was momentarily

expecting to hear. No news of Torbert's progress came, however, so,

yielding at last, I directed Crook to take post on the right of the

Nineteenth Corps and, when the action was renewed, to push his

command forward as a turning-column in conjunction with Emory. After

some delay in the annoying defile, Crook got his men up, and posting

Colonel Thoburn's division on the prolongation of the Nineteenth

Corps, he formed Colonel Duval's division to the right of Thoburn.

Here I joined Crook, informing him that I had just got word that

Torbert was driving the enemy in confusion along the Martinsburg pike

toward Winchester; at the same time I directed him to attack the

moment all of Duval's men were in line. Wright was instructed to

advance in concert with Crook, by swinging Emory and the right of the

Sixth Corps to the left together in a half-wheel. Then leaving

Crook, I rode along the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the open ground

over which they were passing affording a rare opportunity to witness

the precision with which the attack was taken up from right to left.

Crook's success began the moment he started to turn the enemy's left;

and assured by the fact that Torbert had stampeded the Confederate

cavalry and thrown Breckenridge's infantry into such disorder that it

could do little to prevent the envelopment of Gordon's left, Crook

pressed forward without even a halt.

Both Emory and Wright took up the fight as ordered, and as they did

so I sent word to Wilson, in the hope that he could partly perform

the work originally laid out for Crook, to push along the Senseny

road and, if possible, gain the valley pike south of Winchester. I

then returned toward my right flank, and as I reached the Nineteenth

Corps the enemy was contesting the ground in its front with great

obstinacy; but Emory's dogged persistence was at length rewarded with

success, just as Crook's command emerged from the morass of Red Bud

Run, and swept around Gordon, toward the right of Breckenridge, who,

with two of Wharton's brigades, was holding a line at right angles

with the Valley pike for the protection of the Confederate rear.

Early had ordered these two brigades back from Stephenson's depot in

the morning, purposing to protect with them his right flank and line

of retreat, but while they were en route to this end, he was obliged

to recall them to his left to meet Crook's attack.

To confront Torbert, Patton's brigade of infantry and some of

Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had been left back by Breckenridge, but, with

Averell on the west side of the Valley pike and Merritt on the east,

Torbert began to drive this opposing force toward Winchester the

moment he struck it near Stephenson's depot, keeping it on the go

till it reached the position held by Breckenridge, where it

endeavored to make a stand.

The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an

opportunity such as seldom had been presented during the war for a

mounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it.

The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it

went at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with such

momentum as to break the Confederate left, just as Averell was

passing around it. Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, and

Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and with sabre or

pistol in hand literally rode down a battery of five guns and took

about 1,200 prisoners. Almost simultaneously with this cavalry

charge, Crook struck Breckenridge's right and Gordon's left, forcing

these divisions to give way, and as they retired, Wright, in a

vigorous attack, quickly broke Rodes up and pressed Ramseur so hard

that the whole Confederate army fell back, contracting its lines

within some breastworks which had been thrown up at a former period

of the war, immediately in front of Winchester.

Here Early tried hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalry

began passing around his left flank, and as Crook, Emory, and Wright

attacked in front, panic took possession of the enemy, his troops,

now fugitives and stragglers, seeking escape into and through

Winchester.

When this second break occurred, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were

moved over toward the Millwood pike to help Wilson on the left, but

the day was so far spent that they could render him no assistance,

and Ramseur's division, which had maintained some organization, was

in such tolerable shape as to check him. Meanwhile Torbert passed

around to the west of Winchester to join Wilson, but was unable to do

so till after dark. Crook's command pursued the enemy through the

town to Mill Greek, I going along.

Just after entering the town, Crook and I met, in the main street,

three young girls, who gave us the most hearty reception. One of

these young women was a Miss Griffith, the other two Miss Jennie and

Miss Susie Meredith. During the day they had been watching the

battle from the roof of the Meredith residence, with tears and

lamentations, they said, in the morning when misfortune appeared to

have overtaken the Union troops, but with unbounded exultation when,

later, the tide set in against the Confederates. Our presence was,

to them, an assurance of victory, and their delight being

irrepressible, they indulged in the most unguarded manifestations and

expressions. When cautioned by Crook, who knew them well, and

reminded that the valley had hitherto been a race-course--one day in

the possession of friends, and the next of enemies--and warned of the

dangers they were incurring by such demonstrations, they assured him

that they had no further fears of that kind now, adding that Early's

army was so demoralized by the defeat it had just sustained that it

would never be in condition to enter Winchester again. As soon as we

had succeeded in calming the excited girls a little I expressed a

desire to find some place where I could write a telegram to General

Grant informing him of the result of the battle, and General Crook

conducted me to the home of Miss Wright, where I met for the first

time the woman who had contributed so much to our success, and on a

desk in her school-room wrote the despatch announcing that we had

sent Early's army whirling up the valley.

My losses in the battle of the Opequon were heavy, amounting to about

4,500 killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was General

Russell, commanding a division, and the wounded included Generals

Upton, McIntosh and Chapman, and Colonels Duval and Sharpe. The

Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners about equaled

mine, General Rodes being of the killed, while Generals Fitzhugh Lee

and York were severely wounded.

We captured five pieces of artillery and nine battle-flags. The

restoration of the lower valley--from the Potomac to Strasburg--to

the control of the Union forces caused great rejoicing in the North,

and relieved the Administration from further solicitude for the

safety of the Maryland and Pennsylvania borders. The President's

appreciation of the victory was expressed in a despatch so like Mr.

Lincoln that I give a facsimile of it to the reader:

[In the handwriting of President Lincoln]

"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

"WASHINGTON, Sep. 20, 1864

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN

"WINCHESTER, VA.

"Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers

and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you.

"A. LINCOLN."

This he supplemented by promoting me to the grade of

brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning me to the

permanent command of the Middle Military Department, and following that

came warm congratulations from Mr. Stanton and from Generals Grant,

Sherman, and Meade.

The battle was not fought out on the plan in accordance with which

marching orders were issued to my troops, for I then hoped to take

Early in detail, and with Crook's force cut off his retreat. I

adhered to this purpose during the early part of the contest, but was

obliged to abandon the idea because of unavoidable delays by which I

was prevented from getting the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through the

narrow defile and into position early enough to destroy Ramseur while

still isolated. So much delay had not been anticipated, and this

loss of time was taken advantage of by the enemy to recall the troops

diverted to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg on the 17th, thus enabling

him to bring them all to the support of Ramseur before I could strike

with effect. My idea was to attack Ramseur and Wharton,

successively, at a very early hour and before they could get succor,

but I was not in condition to do it till nearly noon, by which time

Gordon and Rodes had been enabled to get upon the ground at a point

from which, as I advanced, they enfiladed my right flank, and gave it

such a repulse that to re-form this part of my line I was obliged to

recall the left from some of the ground it had gained. It was during

this reorganization of my lines that I changed my plan as to Crook,

and moved him from my left to my right. This I did with great

reluctance, for I hoped to destroy Early's army entirely if Crook

continued on his original line of march toward the Valley pike, south

of Winchester; and although the ultimate results did, in a measure

vindicate the change, yet I have always thought that by adhering to

the original plan we might have captured the bulk of Early's army.

CHAPTER 11.

PURSUING EARLY--A SECRET MARCH--FISHER'S HILL--A GREAT SUCCESS

--REMOVAL OF AVERELL--THE RETREAT--CAPTURING AN OLD COMRADE

--THE MURDER OF LIEUTENANT MEIGS.

The night of the 19th of September I gave orders for following Early

up the valley next morning--the pursuit to begin at daybreak--and in

obedience to these directions Torbert moved Averell out on the Back

road leading to Cedar Creek, and Merritt up the Valley pike toward

Strasburg, while Wilson was directed on Front Royal by way of

Stevensburg. Merritt's division was followed by the infantry,

Emory's and Wright's columns marching abreast in the open country to

the right and left of the pike, and Crook's immediately behind them.

The enemy having kept up his retreat at night, presented no

opposition whatever until the cavalry discovered him posted at

Fisher's Hill, on the first defensive line where he could hope to

make any serious resistance. No effort was made to dislodge him, and

later in the day, after Wright and Emory came up, Torbert shifted

Merritt over toward the Back road till he rejoined Averell. As

Merritt moved to the right, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps crossed

Cedar Creek and took up the ground the cavalry was vacating, Wright

posting his own corps to the west of the Valley pike overlooking

Strasburg, and Emory's on his left so as to extend almost to the road

leading from Strasburg to Front Royal. Crook, as he came up the same

evening, went into position in some heavy timber on the north bank of

Cedar Creek.

A reconnoissance made pending these movements convinced me that the

enemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so strong that a direct assault

would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be of

doubtful result. At the point where Early's troops were in position,

between the Massanutten range and Little North Mountain, the valley

is only about three and a half miles wide. All along the precipitous

bluff which overhangs Tumbling Run on the south side, a heavy line of

earthworks had been constructed when Early retreated to this point in

August, and these were now being strengthened so as to make them

almost impregnable; in fact, so secure did Early consider himself

that, for convenience, his ammunition chests were taken from the

caissons and placed behind the breastworks. Wharton, now in command

of Breckenridge's division--its late commander having gone to

southwest Virginia--held the right of this line, with Gordon next

him; Pegram, commanding Ramseur's old division, joined Gordon.

Ramseur with Rodes's division, was on Pegram's left, while Lomax's

cavalry, now serving as foot-troops, extended the line to the Back

road. Fitzhugh Lee being wounded, his cavalry, under General

Wickham, was sent to Milford to prevent Fisher's Hill from being

turned through the Luray Valley.

In consequence of the enemy's being so well protected from a direct

assault, I resolved on the night of the 20th to use again a

turning-column against his left, as had been done on the 19th at the

Opequon. To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived if possible,

over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he could

strike the left and rear of the Confederate line, and as he broke it

up, I could support him by a left half-wheel of my whole line of

battle. The execution of this plan would require perfect secrecy,

however, for the enemy from his signal-station on Three Top could

plainly see every movement of our troops in daylight. Hence, to escape

such observation, I marched Crook during the night of the 20th into

some heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he lay concealed all day

the 21st. This same day Wright and Emory were moved up closer to the

Confederate works, and the Sixth Corps, after a severe fight, in which

Ricketts's and Getty were engaged, took up some high ground on the

right of the Manassas Gap railroad in plain view of the Confederate

works, and confronting a commanding point where much of Early's

artillery was massed. Soon after General Wright had established this

line I rode with him along it to the westward, and finding that the

enemy was still holding an elevated position further to our right, on

the north side of Tumbling Run, I directed this also to be occupied.

Wright soon carried the point, which gave us an unobstructed view of

the enemy's works and offered good ground for our artillery. It also

enabled me to move the whole of the Sixth Corps to the front till its

line was within about seven hundred yards of the enemy's works; the

Nineteenth Corps, on the morning of the 22d, covering the ground

vacated by the Sixth by moving to the front and extending to the right,

but still keeping its reserves on the railroad.

In the darkness of the night of the gist, Crook was brought across

Cedar Creek and hidden in a clump of timber behind Hupp's Hill till

daylight of the 22d, when, under cover of the intervening woods and

ravines, he was marched beyond the right of the Sixth Corps and again

concealed not far from the Back road. After Crook had got into this

last position, Ricketts's division was pushed out until it confronted

the left of the enemy's infantry, the rest of the Sixth Corps

extending from Ricketts's left to the Manassas Gap railroad, while

the Nineteenth Corps filled in the space between the left of the

Sixth and the North Fork of the Shenandoah.

When Ricketts moved out on this new line, in conjunction with

Averell's cavalry on his right, the enemy surmising, from information

secured from his signal-station, no doubt, that my attack was to be

made from Ricketts's front, prepared for it there, but no such

intention ever existed. Ricketts was pushed forward only that he

might readily join Crook's turning-column as it swung into the

enemy's rear. To ensure success, all that I needed now was enough

daylight to complete my arrangements, the secrecy of movement imposed

by the situation consuming many valuable hours.

While Ricketts was occupying the enemy's attention, Crook, again

moving unobserved into the dense timber on the eastern face of Little

North Mountain, conducted his command south in two parallel columns

until he gained the rear of the enemy's works, when, marching his

divisions by the left flank, he led them in an easterly direction

down the mountain-side. As he emerged from the timber near the base

of the mountain, the Confederates discovered him, of course, and

opened with their batteries, but it was too late--they having few

troops at hand to confront the turning-column. Loudly cheering,

Crook's men quickly crossed the broken stretch in rear of the enemy's

left, producing confusion and consternation at every step.

About a mile from the mountain's base Crook's left was joined by

Ricketts, who in proper time had begun to swing his division into the

action, and the two commands moved along in rear of the works so

rapidly that, with but slight resistance, the Confederates abandoned

the guns massed near the centre. The swinging movement of Ricketts

was taken up successively from right to left throughout my line, and

in a few minutes the enemy was thoroughly routed, the action, though

brief, being none the less decisive. Lomax's dismounted cavalry gave

way first, but was shortly followed by all the Confederate infantry

in an indescribable panic, precipitated doubtless by fears of being

caught and captured in the pocket formed by Tumbling Run and the

North Fork of the Shenandoah River. The stampede was complete, the

enemy leaving the field without semblance of organization, abandoning

nearly all his artillery and such other property as was in the works,

and the rout extending through the fields and over the roads toward

Woodstock, Wright and Emory in hot pursuit.

Midway between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock there is some high ground,

where at night-fall a small squad endeavored to stay us with two

pieces of artillery, but this attempt at resistance proved fruitless,

and, notwithstanding the darkness, the guns were soon captured. The

chase was then taken up by Devin's brigade as soon as it could be

passed to the front, and continued till after daylight the next

morning, but the delays incident to a night pursuit made it

impossible for Devin to do more than pick up stragglers.

Our success was very great, yet I had anticipated results still more

pregnant. Indeed, I had high hopes of capturing almost the whole of

Early's army before it reached New Market, and with this object in

view, during the manoeuvres of the 21st I had sent Torbert up the

Luray Valley with Wilson's division and two of Merritt's brigades, in

the expectation that he would drive Wickham out of the Luray Pass by

Early's right, and by crossing the Massanutten Mountain near New

Market, gain his rear. Torbert started in good season, and after

some slight skirmishing at Gooney Run, got as far as Milford, but

failed to dislodge Wickham. In fact, he made little or no attempt to

force Wickham from his position, and with only a feeble effort

withdrew. I heard nothing at all from Torbert during the 22d, and

supposing that everything was progressing favorably, I was astonished

and chagrined on the morning of the 23d, at Woodstock, to receive the

intelligence that he had fallen back to Front Royal and Buckton ford.

My disappointment was extreme, but there was now no help for the

situation save to renew and emphasize Torbert's orders, and this was

done at once, notwithstanding that I thought, the delay, had so much

diminished the chances of his getting in the rear of Early as to make

such a result a very remote possibility, unless, indeed, far greater

zeal was displayed than had been in the first attempt to penetrate

the Luray Valley.

The battle of Fisher's Hill was, in a measure, a part of the battle

of the Opequon; that is to say, it was an incident of the pursuit

resulting from that action. In many ways, however, it was much more

satisfactory, and particularly so because the plan arranged on the

evening of the 20th was carried out to the very letter by Generals

Wright, Crook, and Emory, not only in all their preliminary

manoeuvres, but also during the fight itself. The only drawback was

with the cavalry, and to this day I have been unable to account

satisfactorily for Torbert's failure. No doubt, Wickham's position

near Milford was a strong one, but Torbert ought to have made a

fight. Had he been defeated in this, his withdrawal then to await

the result at Fisher's Hill would have been justified, but it does

not appear that he made any serious effort of all to dislodge the

Confederate cavalry: his impotent attempt not only chagrined me very

much, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army.

We reached Woodstock early on the morning of the 23d, and halted

there some little time to let the troops recover their organization,

which had been broken in the night march they had just made. When

the commands had closed up we pushed on toward Edinburg, in the hope

of making more captures at Narrow Passage Creek; but the

Confederates, too fleet for us, got away; so General Wright halted

the infantry not far from Edinburg, till rations could be brought the

men. Meanwhile I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Dedin's brigade

to press the enemy under every favorable opportunity, and if possible

prevent him from halting long enough to reorganize. Notwithstanding

Devin's efforts the Confederates managed to assemble a considerable

force to resist him, and being too weak for the rearguard, he awaited

the arrival of Averell, who, I had informed him, would be hurried to

the front with all possible despatch, for I thought that Averell must

be close at hand. It turned out, however, that he was not near by at

all, and, moreover, that without good reason he had refrained from

taking any part whatever in pursuing the enemy in the flight from

Fisher's Hill; and in fact had gone into camp and left to the

infantry the work of pursuit.

It was nearly noon when Averell came up, and a great deal of precious

time had been lost. We had some hot words, but hoping that he would

retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed

to the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin close with the

enemy. He reached Devin's command about 3 o'clock in the afternoon,

just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energetically

that they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failed

to accomplish anything. Indeed, his indifferent attack was not at

all worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learned

that it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy's front, and

this, too, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that a

"brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank,

and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information, I

sent him this order:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,

"Woodstock, Va., Sept. 23, 1864

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL AVERELL

"Your report and report of signal-officer received. I do not want

you to let the enemy bluff you or your command, and I want you to

distinctly understand this note. I do not advise rashness, but I do

desire resolution and actual fighting, with necessary casualties,

before you retire. There must now be no backing or filling by you

without a superior force of the enemy actually engaging you.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Major-General Commanding."

Some little time after this note went to Averell, word was brought me

that he had already carried out the programme indicated when

forwarding the report of the expected turning of his right, and that

he had actually withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg. I

then decided to relieve him from the command of his division, which I

did, ordering him to Wheeling, Colonel William H. Powell being

assigned to succeed him.

The removal of Averell was but the culmination of a series of events

extending back to the time I assumed command of the Middle Military

Division. At the outset, General Grant, fearing discord on account

of Averell's ranking Torbert, authorized me to relieve the former

officer, but I hoped that if any trouble of this sort arose, it could

be allayed, or at least repressed, during the campaign against Early,

since the different commands would often have to act separately.

After that, the dispersion of my army by the return of the Sixth

Corps and Torbert's cavalry to the Army of the Potomac would take

place, I thought, and this would restore matters to their normal

condition; but Averell's dissatisfaction began to show itself

immediately after his arrival at Martinsburg, on the 14th of August,

and, except when he was conducting some independent expedition, had

been manifested on all occasions since. I therefore thought that the

interest of the service would be subserved by removing one whose

growing indifference might render the best-laid plans inoperative.

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION.

"HARRISONBURG, VA., SEPT. 25, 1864 11:30 P. M.

"LIEUT-GENERAL GRANT, Comd'g, City Point, Va.

"I have relieved Averell from his command. Instead of following the

enemy when he was broken at Fisher's Hill (so there was not a cavalry

organization left), he went into camp and let me pursue the enemy for

a distance of fifteen miles, with infantry, during the night.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."

The failure of Averell to press the enemy the evening of the 23d gave

Early time to collect his scattered forces and take up a position on

the east side of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, his left resting

on the west side of that stream at Rude's Hill, a commanding point

about two miles south of Mt. Jackson. Along this line he had

constructed some slight works during the night, and at daylight on

the 24th, I moved the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through Mt. Jackson

to attack him, sending Powell's division to pass around his left

flank, toward Timberville, and Devin's brigade across the North Fork,

to move along the base of Peaked Ridge and attack his right. The

country was entirely open, and none of these manoeuvres could be

executed without being observed, so as soon as my advance began, the

enemy rapidly retreated in line of battle up the valley through New

Market, closely followed by Wright and Emory, their artillery on the

pike and their columns on its right and left. Both sides moved with

celerity, the Confederates stimulated by the desire to escape, and

our men animated by the prospect of wholly destroying Early's army.

The stern-chase continued for about thirteen miles, our infantry

often coming within range, yet whenever we began to deploy, the

Confederates increased the distance between us by resorting to a

double quick, evading battle with admirable tact. While all this was

going on, the open country permitted us a rare and brilliant sight,

the bright sun gleaming from the arms and trappings of the thousands

of pursuers and pursued.

Near New Market, as a last effort to hold the enemy, I pushed Devin's

cavalry--comprising about five hundred men--with two guns right up on

Early's lines, in the hope that the tempting opportunity given him to

capture the guns would stay his retreat long enough to let my

infantry deploy within range, but he refused the bait, and after

momentarily checking Devin he continued on with little loss and in

pretty good order.

All hope of Torbert's appearing in rear of the Confederates vanished

as they passed beyond New Market. Some six miles south of this place

Early left the Valley Pike and took the road to Keezletown, a move

due in a measure to Powell's march by way of Timberville toward

Lacy's Springs, but mainly caused by the fact that the Keezletown

road ran immediately along the base of Peaked Mountain--a rugged

ridge affording protection to Early's right flank--and led in a

direction facilitating his junction with Kershaw, who had been

ordered back to him from Culpeper the day after the battle of the

Opequon. The chase was kept up on the Keezeltown road till darkness

overtook us, when my weary troops were permitted to go into camp; and

as soon as the enemy discovered by our fires that the pursuit had

stopped, he also bivouacked some five miles farther south toward Port

Republic.

The next morning Early was joined by Lomax's cavalry from

Harrisonburg, Wickham's and Payne's brigades of cavalry also uniting

with him from the Luray Valley. His whole army then fell back to the

mouth of Brown's Gap to await Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's

artillery, now on their return.

By the morning of the 25th the main body of the enemy had disappeared

entirely from my front, and the capture of some small, squads of

Confederates in the neighboring hills furnished us the only incidents

of the day. Among the prisoners was a tall and fine looking officer,

much worn with hunger and fatigue. The moment I saw him I recognized

him as a former comrade, George W. Carr, with whom I had served in

Washington Territory. He was in those days a lieutenant in the Ninth

Infantry, and was one of the officers who superintended the execution

of the nine Indians at the Cascades of the Columbia in 1856. Carr

was very much emaciated, and greatly discouraged by the turn events

had recently taken. For old acquaintance sake I gave him plenty to

eat, and kept him in comfort at my headquarters until the next batch

of prisoners was sent to the rear, when he went with them. He had

resigned from the regular army at the commencement of hostilities,

and, full of high anticipation, cast his lot with the Confederacy,

but when he fell into our hands, his bright dreams having been

dispelled by the harsh realities of war, he appeared to think that

for him there was no future.

Picking up prisoners here and there, my troops resumed their march

directly south on the Valley pike, and when the Sixth and Nineteenth

corps reached Harrisonburg, they went into camp, Powell in the

meanwhile pushing on to Mt. Crawford, and Crook taking up a position

in our rear at the junction of the Keezletown road and the Valley

pike. Late in the afternoon Torbert's cavalry came in from New

Market arriving at that place many hours later than it had been

expected.

The succeeding day I sent Merritt to Port Republic to occupy the

enemy's attention, while Torbert, with Wilson's division and the

regular brigade, was ordered to Staunton, whence he was to proceed to

Waynesboro' and blow up the railroad bridge. Having done this,

Torbert, as he returned, was to drive off whatever cattle he could

find, destroy all forage and breadstuffs, and burn the mills. He

took possession of Waynesboro' in due time, but had succeeded in only

partially demolishing the railroad bridge when, attacked by Pegram's

division of infantry and Wickham's cavalry, he was compelled to fall

back to Staunton. From the latter place he retired to Bridgewater,

and Spring Hill, on the way, however, fully executing his

instructions regarding the destruction of supplies.

While Torbert was on this expedition, Merritt had occupied Port

Republic, but he happened to get there the very day that Kershaw's

division was marching from Swift Run Gap to join Early. By accident

Kershaw ran into Merritt shortly after the latter had gained the

village. Kershaw's four infantry brigades attacked at once, and

Merrit, forced out of Port Republic, fell back toward Cross Keys; and

in anticipation that the Confederates could be coaxed to that point,

I ordered the infantry there, but Torbert's attack at Wavnesboro' had

alarmed Early, and in consequence he drew all his forces in toward

Rock-fish Gap. This enabled me to re-establish Merritt at Port

Republic, send the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the neighborhood of

Mt. Crawford to await the return of Torbert, and to post Crook at

Harrisonburg; these dispositions practically obtained till the 6th of

October, I holding a line across the valley from Port Republic along

North River by Mt. Crawford to the Back road near the mouth of Briery

Branch Gap.

It was during this period, about dusk on the evening of October 3,

that between Harrisonburg and Dayton my engineer officer, Lieutenant

John R. Meigs, was murdered within my lines. He had gone out with

two topographical assistants to plot the country, and late in the

evening, while riding along the public road on his return to camp, he

overtook three men dressed in our uniform. From their dress, and

also because the party was immediately behind our lines and within a

mile and a half of my headquarters, Meigs and his assistants

naturally thought that they were joining friends, and wholly

unsuspicious of anything to the contrary, rode on with the three men

some little distance; but their perfidy was abruptly discovered by

their suddenly turning upon Meigs with a call for his surrender. It

has been claimed that, refusing to submit, he fired on the

treacherous party, but the statement is not true, for one of the

topographers escaped--the other was captured--and reported a few

minutes later at my headquarters that Meigs was killed without

resistance of any kind whatever, and without even the chance to give

himself up. This man was so cool, and related all the circumstances

of the occurrence with such exactness, as to prove the truthfulness

of his statement. The fact that the murder had been committed inside

our lines was evidence that the perpetrators of the crime, having

their homes in the vicinity, had been clandestinely visiting them,

and been secretly harbored by some of the neighboring residents.

Determining to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed--a

lesson they would never forget--I ordered all the houses within an

area of five miles to be burned. General Custer, who had succeeded

to the command of the Third Cavalry division (General Wilson having

been detailed as chief of cavalry to Sherman's army), was charged

with this duty, and the next morning proceeded to put the order into

execution. The prescribed area included the little village of

Dayton, but when a few houses in the immediate neighborhood of the

scene of the murder had been burned, Custer was directed to cease his

desolating work, but to fetch away all the able-bodied males as

prisoners.

CHAPTER III.

REASONS FOR NOT PURSUING EARLY THROUGH THE BLUE RIDGE--GENERAL

TORBERT DETAILED TO GIVE GENERAL ROSSER A "DRUBBING"--GENERAL ROSSER

ROUTED--TELEGRAPHED TO MEET STANTON--LONGSTREET'S MESSAGE--RETURN TO

WINCHESTER--THE RIDE TO CEDAR CREEK--THE RETREATING ARMY--RALLYING

THE TROOPS--REFORMING THE LINE--COMMENCING THE ATTACK--DEFEAT OF THE

CONFEDERATES--APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY--RESULTS

OF THE BATTLE.