While we lay in camp at Harrisonburg it became necessary to decide

whether or not I would advance to Brown's Gap, and, after driving the

enemy from there, follow him through the Blue Ridge into eastern

Virginia. Indeed, this question began to cause me solicitude as soon

as I knew Early had escaped me at New Market, for I felt certain that

I should be urged to pursue the Confederates toward Charlottesville

and Gordonsville, and be expected to operate on that line against

Richmond. For many reasons I was much opposed to such a plan, but

mainly because its execution would involve the opening of the Orange

and Alexandria railroad. To protect this road against the raids of

the numerous guerrilla bands that infested the region through which

it passed, and to keep it in operation, would require a large force

of infantry, and would also greatly reduce my cavalry; besides, I

should be obliged to leave a force in the valley strong enough to

give security to the line of the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and

Ohio railroad, and this alone would probably take the whole of

Crook's command, leaving me a wholly inadequate number of fighting

men to prosecute a campaign against the city of Richmond. Then, too,

I was in doubt whether the besiegers could hold the entire army at

Petersburg; and in case they could not, a number of troops sufficient

to crush me might be detached by Lee, moved rapidly by rail, and,

after overwhelming me, be quickly returned to confront General Meade.

I was satisfied, moreover, that my transportation could not supply me

further than Harrisonburg, and if in penetrating the Blue Ridge I met

with protracted resistance, a lack of supplies might compel me to

abandon the attempt at a most inopportune time.

I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north of

Staunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way my

original instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as to

make it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates. I

proposed to detach the bulk of my army when this work of destruction

was completed, and send it by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad

through Washington to the Petersburg line, believing that I could

move it more rapidly by that route than by any other. I was

confident that if a movement of this character could be made with

celerity it would culminate in the capture of Richmond and possibly

of General Lee's army, and I was in hopes that General Grant would

take the same view of the matter; but just at this time he was so

pressed by the Government and by public-opinion at the North, that he

advocated the wholly different conception of driving Early into

eastern Virginia, and adhered to this plan with some tenacity.

Considerable correspondence regarding the subject took place between

us, throughout which I stoutly maintained that we should not risk, by

what I held to be a false move, all that my army had gained. I being

on the ground, General Grant left to me the final decision of the

question, and I solved the first step by determining to withdraw down

the valley at least as far as Strasburg, which movement was begun on

the 6th of October.

The cavalry as it retired was stretched across the country from the

Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with orders to

drive off all stock and destroy all supplies as it moved northward.

The infantry preceded the cavalry, passing down the Valley pike, and

as we marched along the many columns of smoke from burning stacks,

and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country was

fast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazine

of stores for the Confederate armies.

During the 6th and 7th of October, the enemy's horse followed us up,

though at a respectful distance. This cavalry was now under command

of General T. W. Rosser, who on October 5 had joined Early with an

additional brigade from Richmond. As we proceeded the Confederates

gained confidence, probably on account of the reputation with which

its new commander had been heralded, and on the third day's march had

the temerity to annoy my rear guard considerably. Tired of these

annoyances, I concluded to open the enemy's eyes in earnest, so that

night I told Torbert I expected him either to give Rosser a drubbing

next morning or get whipped himself, and that the infantry would be

halted until the affair was over; I also informed him that I proposed

to ride out to Round Top Mountain to see the fight. When I decided

to have Rosser chastised, Merritt was encamped at the foot of Round

Top, an elevation just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer some six

miles farther north and west, near Tumbling Run. In the night Custer

was ordered to retrace his steps before daylight by the Back road,

which is parallel to and about three miles from the Valley pike, and

attack the enemy at Tom's Brook crossing, while Merritt's

instructions were to assail him on the Valley pike in concert with

Custer. About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosser

himself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of the

resulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valley

Merritt moved briskly to the front and fell upon Generals Lomax and

Johnson on the Valley pike. Merritt, by extending his right, quickly

established connection with Custer, and the two divisions moved

forward together under Torbert's direction, with a determination to

inflict on the enemy the sharp and summary punishment his rashness

had invited.

The engagement soon became general across the valley, both sides

fighting mainly mounted. For about two hours the contending lines

struggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and counter

charges at many points being plainly visible from the summit of Round

Top, where I had my headquarters for the time.

The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent on

using that arm. In the centre the Confederates maintained their

position with much stubbornness, and for a time seemed to have

recovered their former spirit, but at last they began to give way on

both flanks, and as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at the

wavering ranks in a charge along the whole front. The result was a

general smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quickly

degenerating into a rout the like of which was never before seen.

For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopers

close at the enemy's heels; and the ludicrous incidents of the chase

never ceased to be amusing topics around the camp-fires of Merritt

and Custer. In the fight and pursuit Torbert took eleven pieces of

artillery, with their caissons, all the wagons and ambulances the

enemy had on the ground, and three hundred prisoners. Some of

Rosser's troopers fled to the mountains by way of Columbia Furnace,

and some up the Valley pike and into the Massamitten Range,

apparently not discovering that the chase had been discontinued till

south of Mount Jackson they rallied on Early's infantry.

After this catastrophe, Early reported to General Lee that his

cavalry was so badly demoralized that it should be dismounted; and

the citizens of the valley, intensely disgusted with the boasting and

swaggering that had characterized the arrival of the "Laurel Brigade"

in that section, baptized the action (known to us as Tom's Brook) the

"Woodstock Races," and never tired of poking fun at General Rosser

about his precipitate and inglorious flight. (When Rosser arrived

from Richmond with his brigade he was proclaimed as the savior of the

Valley, and his men came all bedecked with laurel branches.)

On the 10th my army, resuming its retrograde movement, crossed to the

north side of Cedar Creek. The work of repairing the Manassas Gap

branch of the Orange and Alexandria railroad had been begun some days

before, out from Washington, and, anticipating that it would be in

readiness to transport troops by the time they could reach Piedmont,

I directed the Sixth Corps to continue its march toward Front Royal,

expecting to return to the Army of the Potomac by that line. By the

12th, however, my views regarding the reconstruction of this railroad

began to prevail, and the work on it was discontinued. The Sixth

Corps, therefore, abandoned that route, and moved toward Ashby's Gap

with the purpose of marching direct to Washington, but on the 13th I

recalled it to Cedar Creek, in consequence of the arrival of the

enemy's infantry at Fisher's Hill, and the receipt, the night before,

of the following despatch, which again opened the question of an

advance on Gordonsville and Charlottesville:

(Cipher.)

"WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to

serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and

Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.

Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for

all purposes. Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent to

consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General."

As it was well known in Washington that the views expressed in the

above despatch were counter to my convictions, I was the next day

required by the following telegram from Secretary Stanton to repair

to that city:

"WASHINGTON, October 13, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN

(through General Augur)

"If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely

desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see

you first.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War."

I got all ready to comply with the terms of Secretary Stanton's

despatch, but in the meantime the enemy appeared in my front in

force, with infantry and cavalry, and attacked Colonel Thoburn, who

had been pushed out toward Strasburg from Crook's command, and also

Custer's division of cavalry on the Back road. As afterward

appeared, this attack was made in the belief that all of my troops

but Crook's had gone to Petersburg. From this demonstration there

ensued near Hupp's Hill a bitter skirmish between Kershaw and

Thoburn, and the latter was finally compelled to withdraw to the

north bank of Cedar Creek. Custer gained better results, however, on

the Back road, with his usual dash driving the enemy's cavalry away

from his front, Merritt's division then joining him and remaining on

the right.

The day's events pointing to a probability that the enemy intended to

resume the offensive, to anticipate such a contingency I ordered the

Sixth Corps to return from its march toward Ashby's Gap. It reached

me by noon of the 14th, and went into position to the right and rear

of the Nineteenth Corps, which held a line along the north bank of

Cedar Creek, west of the Valley pike. Crook was posted on the left

of the Nineteenth Corps and east of the Valley pike, with Thoburn's

division advanced to a round hill, which commanded the junction of

Cedar Creek and the Shenandoah River, while Torbert retained both

Merritt and Custer on the right of the Sixth Corps, and at the

same time covered with Powell the roads toward Front Royal. My

head-quarters were at the Belle Grove House, which was to the west of

the pike and in rear of the Nineteenth Corps. It was my intention to

attack the enemy as soon as the Sixth Corps reached me, but General

Early having learned from his demonstration that I had not detached as

largely as his previous information had led him to believe, on the

night of the 13th withdrew to Fisher's Hill; so, concluding that he

could not do us serious hurt from there, I changed my mind as to

attacking, deciding to defer such action till I could get to

Washington, and come to some definite understanding about my future

operations.

To carry out this idea, on the evening of the 15th I ordered all of

the cavalry under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal,

again intending to push it thence through Chester Gap to the Virginia

Central railroad at Charlottesville, to destroy the bridge over the

Rivanna River, while I passed through Manassas Gap to Rectortown, and

thence by rail to Washington. On my arrival with the cavalry near

Front Royal on the 16th, I halted at the house of Mrs. Richards, on

the north bank of the river, and there received the following

despatch and inclosure from General Wright, who had been left in

command at Cedar Creek:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY Division,

"October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL:

"I enclose you despatch which explains itself. If the enemy should

be strongly reenforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right,

give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the

enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my

right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and

resisting.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. G. WRIGHT, Major-General Commanding.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Commanding Middle Military Division."

[INCLOSURE.] "To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EARLY:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush

Sheridan.

"LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General."

The message from Longstreet had been taken down as it was being

flagged from the Confederate signal-station on Three Top Mountain,

and afterward translated by our signal officers, who knew the

Confederate signal code. I first thought it a ruse, and hardly worth

attention, but on reflection deemed it best to be on the safe side,

so I abandoned the cavalry raid toward Charlottesville, in order to

give General Wright the entire strength of the army, for it did not

seem wise to reduce his numbers while reinforcement for the enemy

might be near, and especially when such pregnant messages were

reaching Early from one of the ablest of the Confederate generals.

Therefore I sent the following note to General Wright:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,

"Front Royal, October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position

strong. If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impression

that we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur, and may get

additional news. Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point.

If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him.

Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up everything

that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up on

Tuesday, if not sooner.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT,

"Commanding Sixth Army Corps."

At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 16th I telegraphed General Halleck

from Rectortown, giving him the information which had come to me from

Wright, asking if anything corroborative of it had been received from

General Grant, and also saying that I would like to see Halleck; the

telegram ending with the question: "Is it best for me to go to see

you?" Next morning I sent back to Wright all the cavalry except one

regiment, which escorted me through Manassas Gap to the terminus of

the railroad from Washington. I had with me Lieutenant-Colonel James

W. Forsyth, chief-of-staff, and three of my aides, Major George A.

Forsyth, Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and Captain Michael V. Sheridan. I

rode my black horse, Rienzi, and the others their own respective

mounts.

Before leaving Cedar Creek I had fixed the route of my return to be

by rail from Washington to Martinsburg, and thence by horseback to

Winchester and Cedar Creek, and had ordered three hundred cavalry to

Martinsburg to escort me from that point to the front. At Rectortown

I met General Augur, who had brought a force out from Washington to

reconstruct and protect the line of railroad, and through him

received the following reply from General Halleck:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16 1864

"To MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,

"Rectortown, Va.

General Grant says that Longstreet brought with him no troops from

Richmond, but I have very little confidence in the information

collected at his headquarters. If you can leave your command with

safety, come to Washington, as I wish to give you the views of the

authorities here.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

In consequence of the Longstreet despatch, I felt a concern about my

absence which I could hardly repress, but after duly considering what

Halleck said, and believing that Longstreet could not unite with

Early before I got back, and that even if he did Wright would be able

to cope with them both, I and my staff, with our horses, took the

cars for Washington, where we arrived on the morning of the 17th at

about 8 o'clock. I proceeded at an early hour to the War Department,

and as soon as I met Secretary Stanton, asked him for a special train

to be ready at 12 o'clock to take me to Martinsburg, saying that in

view of existing conditions I must get back to my army as quickly as

possible. He at once gave the order for the train, and then the

Secretary, Halleck, and I proceeded to hold a consultation in regard

to my operating east of the Blue Ridge. The upshot was that my views

against such a plan were practically agreed to, and two engineer

officers were designated to return with me for the purpose of

reporting on a defensive line in the valley that could be held while

the bulk of my troops were being detached to Petersburg. Colonel

Alexander and Colonel Thom both of the Engineer Corps, reported to

accompany me, and at 12 o'clock we took the train.

We arrived about dark at Martinsburg, and there found the escort of

three hundred men which I had ordered before leaving Cedar Creek. We

spent that night at Martinsburg, and early next morning mounted and

started up the Valley pike for Winchester, leaving Captain Sheridan

behind to conduct to the army the Commissioners whom the State of New

York had sent down to receive the vote of her troops in the coming

Presidential election. Colonel Alexander was a man of enormous

weight, and Colonel Thom correspondingly light, and as both were

unaccustomed to riding we had to go slowly, losing so much time, in

fact, that we did not reach Winchester till between 3 and 4 o'clock

in the afternoon, though the distance is but twenty-eight miles. As

soon as we arrived at Colonel Edwards's headquarters in the town,

where I intended stopping for the night, I sent a courier to the

front to bring me a report of the condition of affairs, and then took

Colonel Alexander out on the heights about Winchester, in order that

he might overlook the country, and make up his mind as to the utility

of fortifying there. By the time we had completed our survey it was

dark, and just as we reached Colonel Edwards's house on our return a

courier came in from Cedar Creek bringing word that everything was

all right, that the enemy was quiet at Fisher's Hill, and that a

brigade of Grover's division was to make a reconnoissance in the

morning, the 19th, so about 10 o'clock I went to bed greatly

relieved, and expecting to rejoin my headquarters at my leisure next

day.

Toward 6 o'clock the morning of the 19th, the officer on picket duty

at Winchester came to my room, I being yet in bed, and reported

artillery firing from the direction of Cedar Creek. I asked him if

the firing was continuous or only desultory, to which he replied that

it was not a sustained fire, but rather irregular and fitful. I

remarked: "It's all right; Grover has gone out this morning to make a

reconnoissance, and he is merely feeling the enemy." I tried to go to

sleep again, but grew so restless that I could not, and soon got up

and dressed myself. A little later the picket officer came back and

reported that the firing, which could be distinctly heard from his

line on the heights outside of Winchester, was still going on. I

asked him if it sounded like a battle, and as he again said that it

did not, I still inferred that the cannonading was caused by Grover's

division banging away at the enemy simply to find out what he was up

to. However, I went down-stairs and requested that breakfast be

hurried up, and at the same time ordered the horses to be saddled and

in readiness, for I concluded to go to the front before any further

examinations were made in regard to the defensive line.

We mounted our horses between half-past 8 and 9, and as we were

proceeding up the street which leads directly through Winchester,

from the Logan residence, where Edwards was quartered, to the Valley

pike, I noticed that there were many women at the windows and doors

of the houses, who kept shaking their skirts at us and who were

otherwise markedly insolent in their demeanor, but supposing this

conduct to be instigated by their well-known and perhaps natural

prejudices, I ascribed to it no unusual significance. On reaching

the edge of the town I halted a moment, and there heard quite

distinctly the sound of artillery firing in an unceasing roar.

Concluding from this that a battle was in progress, I now felt

confident that the women along the street had received intelligence

from the battle, field by the "grape-vine telegraph," and were in

raptures over some good news, while I as yet was utterly ignorant of

the actual situation. Moving on, I put my head down toward the

pommel of my saddle and listened intently, trying to locate and

interpret the sound, continuing in this position till we had crossed

Mill Creek, about half a mile from Winchester. The result of my

efforts in the interval was the conviction that the travel of the

sound was increasing too rapidly to be accounted for by my own rate

of motion, and that therefore my army must be falling back.

At Mill Creek my escort fell in behind, and we were going ahead at a

regular pace, when, just as we made the crest of the rise beyond the

stream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a

panic-stricken army-hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others

unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, all

pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly

that a disaster had occurred at the front. On accosting some of the

fugitives, they assured me that the army was broken up, in full

retreat, and that all was lost; all this with a manner true to that

peculiar indifference that takes possession of panic-stricken men. I

was greatly disturbed by the sight, but at once sent word to Colonel

Edwards commanding the brigade in Winchester, to stretch his troops

across the valley, near Mill Creek, and stop all fugitives, directing

also that the transportation be, passed through and parked on the north

side of the town.

As I continued at a walk a few hundred yards farther, thinking all

the time of Longstreet's telegram to Early, "Be ready when I join

you, and we will crush Sheridan," I was fixing in my mind what I

should do. My first thought was too stop the army in the suburbs of

Winchester as it came back, form a new line, and fight there; but as

the situation was more maturely considered a better conception

prevailed. I was sure the troops had confidence in me, for

heretofore we had been successful; and as at other times they had

seen me present at the slightest sign of trouble or distress, I felt

that I ought to try now to restore their broken ranks, or, failing in

that, to share their fate because of what they had done hitherto.

About this time Colonel Wood, my chief commissary, arrived from the

front and gave me fuller intelligence, reporting that everything was

gone, my headquarters captured, and the troops dispersed. When I

heard this I took two of my aides-de-camp, Major. George A. Forsyth

and Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and with twenty men from the escort

started for the front, at the same time directing Colonel James W.

Forsyth and Colonels Alexander and Thom to remain behind and do what

they could to stop the runaways.

For a short distance I traveled on the road, but soon found it so

blocked with wagons and wounded men that my progress was impeded, and

I was forced to take to the adjoining fields to make haste. When

most of the wagons and wounded were past I returned to the road,

which was thickly lined with unhurt men, who, having got far enough

to the rear to be out of danger, had halted, without any

organization, and begun cooking coffee, but when they saw me they

abandoned their coffee, threw up their hats, shouldered their

muskets, and as I passed along turned to follow with enthusiasm and

cheers. To acknowledge this exhibition of feeling I took off my hat,

and with Forsyth and O'Keefe rode some distance in advance of my

escort, while every mounted officer who saw me galloped out on either

side of the pike to tell the men at a distance that I had come back.

In this way the news was spread to the stragglers off the road, when

they, too, turned their faces to the front and marched toward the

enemy, changing in a moment from the depths of depression, to the

extreme of enthusiasm. I already knew that even in the ordinary

condition of mind enthusiasm is a potent element with soldiers, but

what I saw that day convinced me that if it can be excited from a

state of despondency its power is almost irresistible. I said

nothing except to remark as I rode among those on the road: "If I had

been, with you this morning this disaster would not have happened.

We must face the other way; we will go back and recover our camp."

My first halt was made just north of Newtown, where I met a chaplain

digging his heels into the sides of his jaded horse, and making for

the rear with all possible speed. I drew up for an instant, and

inquired of him how matters were going at the front. He replied,

"Everything is lost; but all will be right when you get there"; yet

notwithstanding this expression of confidence in me, the parson at

once resumed his breathless pace to the rear. At Newtown I was

obliged to make a circuit to the left, to get round the village. I

could not pass through it, the streets were so crowded, but meeting

on this detour Major McKinley, of Crook's staff, he spread the news

of my return through the motley throng there.

When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown I saw about

three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which

proved to be Ricketts's and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps,

and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little to the

right and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to the

extreme front. Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midway

between Newtown and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and a

little later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps.

When I arrived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops in

the presence of and resisting the enemy; they were apparently acting

as a rear-guard at a point about three miles north of the line we

held at Cedar Creek when the battle began. General Torbert was the

first officer to meet me, saying as he rode up, "My God! I am glad

you've come." Getty's division, when I found it, was about a mile

north of Middletown, posted on the reverse slope of some slightly

rising ground, holding a barricade made with fence-rails, and

skirmishing slightly with the enemy's pickets. Jumping my horse over

the line of rails, I rode to the crest of the elevation, and there

taking off my hat, the men rose up from behind their barricade with

cheers of recognition. An officer of the Vermont brigade, Colonel A.

S. Tracy, rode out to the front, and joining me, informed me that

General Louis A. Grant was in command there, the regular division

commander, General Getty, having taken charge of the Sixth Corps in

place of Ricketts, wounded early in the action, while temporarily

commanding the corps. I then turned back to the rear of Getty's

division, and as I came behind it, a line of regimental flags rose up

out of the ground, as it seemed, to welcome me. They were mostly the

colors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered in the

surprise of the morning. The color-bearers, having withstood the

panic, had formed behind the troops of Getty. The line with the

colors was largely composed of officers, among whom I recognized

Colonel R. B. Hayes, since president of the United States, one of the

brigade commanders. At the close of this incident I crossed the

little narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, and

dismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as my

headquarters. In a few minutes some of my staff joined me, and the

first directions I gave were to have the Nineteenth Corps and the two

divisions of Wright's corps brought to the front, so they could be

formed on Getty's division, prolonged to the right; for I had already

decided to attack the enemy from that line as soon as I could get

matters in shape to take the offensive. Crook met me at this time,

and strongly favored my idea of attacking, but said, however, that

most of his troops were gone. General Wright came up a little later,

when I saw that he was wounded, a ball having grazed the point of his

chin so as to draw the blood plentifully.

Wright gave me a hurried account of the day's events, and when told

that we would fight the enemy on the line which Getty and the cavalry

were holding, and that he must go himself and send all his staff to

bring up the troops, he zealously fell in with the scheme; and it was

then that the Nineteenth Corps and two divisions of the Sixth were

ordered to the front from where they had been halted to the right and

rear of Getty.

After this conversation I rode to the east of the Valley pike and to

the left of Getty's division, to a point from which I could obtain a

good view of the front, in the mean time sending Major Forsyth to

communicate with Colonel Lowell (who occupied a position close in

toward the suburbs of Middletown and directly in front of Getty's

left) to learn whether he could hold on there. Lowell replied that

he could. I then ordered Custer's division back to the right flank,

and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established

I met near them Ricketts's division under General Keifer and General

Frank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front. When the men

of these divisions saw me they began cheering and took up the double

quick to the front, while I turned back toward Getty's line to point

out where these returning troops should be placed. Having done this,

I ordered General Wright to resume command of the Sixth Corps, and

Getty, who was temporarily in charge of it, to take command of his

own division. A little later the Nineteenth Corps came up and was

posted between the right of the Sixth Corps and Middle Marsh Brook.

All this had consumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visit

again the point to the east of the Valley pike, from where I had

first observed the enemy, to see what he was doing. Arrived there, I

could plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth now

suggested that it would be well to ride along the line of battle

before the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned of

my return, but few of them had seen me. Following his suggestion I

started in behind the men, but when a few paces had been taken I

crossed to the front and, hat in hand, passed along the entire length

of the infantry line; and it is from this circumstance that many of

the officers and men who then received me with such heartiness have

since supposed that that was my first appearance on the field. But

at least two hours had elapsed since I reached the ground, for it was

after mid-day, when this incident of riding down the front took

place, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half-past 10 o'clock.

After re-arranging the line and preparing to attack I returned again

to observe the Confederates, who shortly began to advance on us. The

attacking columns did not cover my entire front, and it appeared that

their onset would be mainly directed against the Nineteenth Corps,

so, fearing that they might be too strong for Emory on account of his

depleted condition (many of his men not having had time to get up

from the rear), and Getty's division being free from assault I

transferred a part of it from the extreme left to the support of the

Nineteenth Corps. The assault was quickly repulsed by Emory,

however, and as the enemy fell back Getty's troops were returned to

their original place. This repulse of the Confederates made me feel

pretty safe from further offensive operations on their part, and I

now decided to suspend the fighting till my thin ranks were further

strengthened by the men who were continually coming up from the rear,

and particularly till Crook's troops could be assembled on the

extreme left.

In consequence of the despatch already mentioned, "Be ready when I

join you, and we will crush Sheridan," since learned to have been

fictitious, I had been supposing all day that Longstreet's troops

were present, but as no definite intelligence on this point had been

gathered, I concluded, in the lull that now occurred, to ascertain

something positive regarding Longstreet; and Merritt having been

transferred to our left in the morning, I directed him to attack an

exposed battery then at the edge of Middletown, and capture some

prisoners. Merritt soon did this work effectually, concealing his

intention till his troops got close in to the enemy, and then by a

quick dash gobbling up a number of Confederates. When the prisoners

were brought in, I learned from them that the only troops of

Longstreet's in the fight were of Kershaw's division, which had

rejoined Early at Brown's Gap in the latter part of September, and

that the rest of Longstreet's corps was not on the field. The

receipt of this information entirely cleared the way for me to take

the offensive, but on the heels of it came information that

Longstreet was marching by the Front Royal pike to strike my rear at

Winchester, driving Powell's cavalry in as he advanced. This renewed

my uneasiness, and caused me to delay the general attack till after

assurances came from Powell denying utterly the reports as to

Longstreet, and confirming the statements of the prisoners.

Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decided

to do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so as

to gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and the

Belle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the men

pushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence. General

Early's troops extended some little distance beyond our right, and

when my flank neared the overlapping enemy, he turned on it, with the

effect of causing a momentary confusion, but General McMillan quickly

realizing the danger, broke the Confederates at the reentering angle

by a counter charge with his brigade, doing his work so well that the

enemy's flanking troops were cut off from their main body and left to

shift for themselves. Custer, who was just then moving in from the

west side of Middle Marsh Brook, followed McMillan's timely blow with

a charge of cavalry, but before starting out on it, and while his men

were forming, riding at full speed himself, to throw his arms around

my neck. By the time he had disengaged himself from this embrace,

the troops broken by McMillan had gained some little distance to

their rear, but Custer's troopers sweeping across the Middletown

meadows and down toward Cedar Creek, took many of them prisoners

before they could reach the stream--so I forgave his delay.

My whole line as far as the eye could see was now driving everything

before it, from behind trees, stone walls, and all such sheltering

obstacles, so I rode toward the left to ascertain how matters were

getting on there. As I passed along behind the advancing troops,

first General Grover, and then Colonel Mackenzie, rode up to welcome

me. Both were severely wounded, and I told them to leave the field,

but they implored permission to remain till success was certain.

When I reached the Valley pike Crook had reorganized his men, and as

I desired that they should take part in the fight, for they were the

very same troops that had turned Early's flank at Winchester and at

Fisher's Hill, I ordered them to be pushed forward; and the alacrity

and celerity with which they moved on Middletown demonstrated that

their ill-fortune of the morning had not sprung from lack of valor.

Meanwhile Lowell's brigade of cavalry, which, it will be remembered,

had been holding on, dismounted, just north of Middletown ever since

the time I arrived from Winchester, fell to the rear for the purpose

of getting their led horses. A momentary panic was created in the

nearest brigade of infantry by this withdrawal of Lowell, but as soon

as his men were mounted they charged the enemy clear up to the stone

walls in the edge of Middletown; at sight of this the infantry

brigade renewed its attack, and the enemy's right gave way. The

accomplished Lowell received his death-wound in this courageous

charge.

All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and as

I rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made ready

for another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing the

enemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my right

would throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike,

and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher's

Hill. The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation,

however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre and

right, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at Cedar

Creek. Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turn

to the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting with

Custer, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns,

taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners being

Major-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day.

When the news of the victory was received, General Grant directed a

salute of one hundred shotted guns to be fired into Petersburg, and

the President at once thanked the army in an autograph letter. A few

weeks after, he promoted me, and I received notice of this in a

special letter from the Secretary of War, saying:

"--that for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence

in the courage and patriotism of your troops, displayed by you on the

19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of

Providence, your routed army was reorganized, a great National

disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels

for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H.

Sheridan is appointed a major-general in the United States Army."

The direct result of the battle was the recapture of all the

artillery, transportation, and camp equipage we had lost, and in

addition twenty-four pieces of the enemy's artillery, twelve hundred

prisoners, and a number of battle-flags. But more still flowed from

this victory, succeeding as it did the disaster of the morning, for

the reoccupation of our old camps at once re-established a morale

which for some hours had been greatly endangered by ill-fortune.

It was not till after the battle that I learned fully what had taken

place before my arrival, and then found that the enemy, having

gathered all the strength he could through the return of

convalescents and other absentees, had moved quietly from Fisher's

Hill, in the night of the 18th and early on the morning of the 19th,

to surprise my army, which, it should be remembered, was posted on

the north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook holding on the left of the

Valley pike, with Thoburn's division advanced toward the creek on

Duval's (under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) and Kitching's

provisional divisions to the north and rear of Thoburn. The

Nineteenth Corps was on the right of Crook, extending in a

semi-circular line from the pike nearly to Meadow Brook, while the

Sixth Corps lay to the west of the brook in readiness to be used as a

movable column. Merritt's division was to the right and rear of the

Sixth Corps, and about a mile and a half west of Merrit was Custer

covering the fords of Cedar Creek as far west as the Middle road.

General Early's plan was for one column under General Gordon,

consisting of three divisions of infantry (Gordon's, Ramseur's, and

Pegram's), and Payne's brigade of cavalry to cross the Shenandoah

River directly east of the Confederate works at Fisher's Hill, march

around the northerly face of the Massanutten Mountain, and again

cross the Shenandoah at Bowman's and McInturff's fords. Payne's task

was to capture me at the Belle Grove House. General Early himself,

with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, was to move through

Strasburg, Kershaw, accompanied by Early, to cross Cedar Creek at

Roberts's ford and connect with Gordon, while Wharton was to continue

on the Valley pike to Hupp's Hill and join the left of Kershaw, when

the crossing of the Valley pike over Cedar Creek became free.

Lomax's cavalry, then in the Luray Valley, was ordered to join the

right of Gordon on the field of battle, while Rosser was to carry the

crossing of Cedar Creek on the Back road and attack Custer. Early's

conceptions were carried through in the darkness with little accident

or delay, Kershaw opening the fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's

division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon struck Crook's

extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with

such suddenness as to stampede Crook's men. Gordon directing his

march on my headquarters (the Belle Grove House), successfully turned

our position as he gained the Valley pike, and General Wright was

thus forced to order the withdrawal of the Nineteenth Corps from its

post at the Cedar Creek crossing, and this enabled Wharton to get

over the stream there unmolested and join Kershaw early in the

action.

After Crook's troops had been driven from their camps, General Wright

endeavored to form a line with the Sixth Corps to hold the Valley

pike to the left of the Nineteenth, but failing in this he ordered

the withdrawal of the latter corps, Ricketts, temporarily commanding

the Sixth Corps, checking Gordon till Emory had retired. As already

stated, Wharton was thus permitted to cross Cedar Creek on the pike,

and now that Early had a continuous line, he pressed his advantage so

vigorously that the whole Union army was soon driven from its camps

in more or less disorder; and though much disjointed resistance was

displayed, it may be said that no systematic stand was made until

Getty's division, aided by Torbert's cavalry, which Wright had

ordered to the left early in the action, took up the ground where, on

arriving from Winchester, I found them.

When I left my command on the 16th, little did I anticipate that

anything like this would happen. Indeed, I felt satisfied that Early

was, of himself, too weak to take the offensive, and although I

doubted the Longstreet despatch, yet I was confident that, even

should it prove true, I could get back before the junction could be

made, and at the worst I felt certain that my army was equal to

confronting the forces of Longstreet and Early combined. Still, the

surprise of the morning might have befallen me as well as the general

on whom it did descend, and though it is possible that this could

have been precluded had Powell's cavalry been closed in, as suggested

in my despatch from Front Royal, yet the enemy's desperation might

have prompted some other clever and ingenious scheme for relieving

his fallen fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley.

CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL EARLY REORGANIZES HIS FORCES--MOSBY THE GUERRILLA--GENERAL

MERRITT SENT TO OPERATE AGAINST MOSBY--ROSSER AGAIN ACTIVE--GENERAL

CUSTER SURPRISED--COLONEL YOUNG SENT TO CAPTURE GILMORE THE

GUERRILLA--COLONEL YOUNG'S SUCCESS--CAPTURE OF GENERAL KELLY AND

GENERAL CROOK--SPIES--WAS WILKES BOOTH A SPY?--DRIVING THE

CONFEDERATES OUT OF THE VALLEY--THE BATTLE OF WAYNESBORO'--MARCHING

TO JOIN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Early's broken army practically made no halt in its retreat after the

battle of Cedar-Creek until it reached New Market, though at Fisher's

Hill was left a small rear-guard of cavalry, which hastily decamped,

however, when charged by Gibbs's brigade on the morning of the 20th.

Between the date of his signal defeat and the 11th of November, the

enemy's scattered forces had sufficiently reorganized to permit his

again making a reconnoissance in the valley as far north as Cedar

Creek, my army having meanwhile withdrawn to Kernstown, where it had

been finally decided that a defensive line should be held to enable

me to detach troops to General Grant, and where, by reconstructing

the Winchester and Potomac railroad from Stephenson's depot to

Harper's Ferry, my command might be more readily, supplied. Early's

reconnoissance north of Cedar Creek ended in a rapid withdrawal of

his infantry after feeling my front, and with the usual ill-fortune

to his cavalry; Merritt and Custer driving Rosser and Lomax with ease

across Cedar Creek on the Middle and Back roads, while Powell's

cavalry struck McCausland near Stony Point, and after capturing two

pieces of artillery and about three hundred officers and men chased

him into the Luray Valley.

Early got back to New Market on the 14th of November, and, from lack

of subsistence, being unable to continue demonstrations to prevent my

reinforcement of General Grant, began himself to detach to General

Lee by returning Kershaw's division to Petersburg, as was definitely

ascertained by Torbert in a reconnoissance to Mount Jackson. At this

time General Grant wished me to send him the Sixth Corps, and it was

got ready for the purpose, but when I informed him that Torbert's

reconnoissance had developed the fact that Early still retained four

divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, it was decided, on my

suggestion, to let the Sixth Corps remain till the season should be a

little further advanced, when the inclemency of the weather would

preclude infantry campaigning. These conditions came about early in

December, and by the middle of the month the whole of the Sixth Corps

was at Petersburg; simultaneously with its transfer to that line

Early sending his Second Corps to Lee.

During the entire campaign I had been annoyed by guerrilla bands

under such partisan chiefs as Mosby, White, Gilmore, McNeil, and

others, and this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle

strength, necessitating as it did large, escorts for my

supply-trains. The most redoubtable of these leaders was Mosby, whose

force was made up from the country around Upperville, east of the Blue

Ridge, to which section he always fled for a hiding-place when he

scented danger. I had not directed any special operations against

these partisans while the campaign was active, but as Mosby's men had

lately killed, within my lines, my chief quartermaster, Colonel Tolles,

and Medical Inspector Ohlenchlager, I concluded to devote particular

attention to these "irregulars" during the lull that now occurred; so

on the 28th of November, I directed General Merritt to march to the

Loudoun Valley and operate against Mosby, taking care to clear the

country of forage and subsistence, so as to prevent the guerrillas from

being harbored there in the future their destruction or capture being

well-nigh impossible, on account of their intimate knowledge of the

mountain region. Merritt carried out his instructions with his usual

sagacity and thoroughness, sweeping widely over each side of his

general line of march with flankers, who burned the grain and brought

in large herds of cattle, hogs and sheep, which were issued to the

troops.

While Merritt was engaged in this service the Baltimore and Ohio

railroad once more received the attention of the enemy; Rosser, with

two brigades of cavalry, crossing the Great North Mountain, capturing

the post of New Creek, with about five hundred prisoners and seven

guns, destroying all the supplies of the garrison, and breaking up

the railroad track. This slight success of the Confederates in West

Virginia, and the intelligence that they were contemplating further

raids in that section, led me to send, Crook there with one division,

his other troops going to City Point; and, I hoped that all the

threatened places would thus be sufficiently protected, but

negligence at Beverly resulted in the capture of that station by

Rosser on the 11th of January.

In the meanwhile, Early established himself with Wharton's division

at Staunton in winter quarters, posting his cavalry in that

neighborhood also, except a detachment at New Market, and another

small one at the signal-station on Three Top Mountain. The winter was

a most severe one, snow falling frequently to the depth of several

inches, and the mercury often sinking below zero. The rigor of the

season was very much against the success of any mounted operations,

but General Grant being very desirous to have the railroads broken up

about Gordonsville and Charlottesville, on the 19th of December I

started the cavalry out for that purpose, Torbert, with Merritt and

Powell, marching through Chester Gap, while Custer moved toward

Staunton to make a demonstration in Torbert's favor, hoping to hold

the enemy's troops in the valley. Unfortunately, Custer did not

accomplish all that was expected of him, and being surprised by

Rosser and Payne near Lacy's Springs before reveille, had to abandon

his bivouac and retreat down the valley, with the loss of a number of

prisoners, a few horses, and a good many horse equipments, for,

because of the suddenness of Rosser's attack, many of the men had no

time to saddle up. As soon as Custer's retreat was assured,

Wharton's division of infantry was sent to Charlottesville to check

Torbert, but this had already been done by Lomax, with the assistance

of infantry sent up from Richmond. Indeed, from the very beginning

of the movement the Confederates had been closely observing the

columns of Torbert and Custer, and in consequence of the knowledge

thus derived, Early had marched Lomax to Gordonsville in anticipation

of an attack there, at the same time sending Rosser down the valley

to meet Custer. Torbert in the performance of his task captured two

pieces of artillery from Johnson's and McCausland's brigades, at

Liberty Mills on the Rapidan River, but in the main the purpose of

the raid utterly failed, so by the 27th of December he returned,

many, of his men badly frost-bitten from the extreme cold which had

prevailed.

This expedition practically closed all operations for the season, and

the cavalry was put into winter cantonment near Winchester. The

distribution of my infantry to Petersburg and West Virginia left with

me in the beginning of the new year, as already stated, but the one

small division of the Nineteenth Corps. On account of this

diminution of force, it became necessary for me to keep thoroughly

posted in regard to the enemy, and I now realized more than I had

done hitherto how efficient my scouts had become since under the

control of Colonel Young; for not only did they bring me almost every

day intelligence from within Early's lines, but they also operated

efficiently against the guerrillas infesting West Virginia.

Harry Gilmore, of Maryland, was the most noted of these since the

death of McNeil, and as the scouts had reported him in Harrisonburg

the latter part of January, I directed two of the most trustworthy to

be sent to watch his movements and ascertain his purposes. In a few

days these spies returned with the intelligence that Gilmore was on

his way to Moorefield, the centre of a very disloyal section in West

Virginia, about ninety miles southwest of Winchester, where, under

the guise of a camp-meeting, a gathering was to take place, at which

he expected to enlist a number of men, be joined by a party of about

twenty recruits coming from Maryland, and then begin depredations

along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Believing that Gilmore might

be captured, I directed Young to undertake the task, and as a

preliminary step he sent to Moorefield two of his men who early in

the war had "refugeed" from that section and enlisted in one of the

Union regiments from West Virginia. In about a week these men came

back and reported that Gilmore was living at a house between three

and four miles from Moorefield, and gave full particulars as to his

coming and going, the number of men he had about there and where they

rendezvoused.

With this knowledge at hand I directed Young to take twenty of his

best men and leave that night for Moorefield, dressed in Confederate

uniforms, telling him that I would have about three hundred cavalry

follow in his wake when he had got about fifteen miles start, and

instructing him to pass his party off as a body of recruits for

Gilmore coming from Maryland and pursued by the Yankee cavalry. I

knew this would allay suspicion and provide him help on the road;

and, indeed, as Colonel Whittaker, who alone knew the secret,

followed after the fleeing "Marylanders," he found that their advent

had caused so little remark that the trail would have been lost had

he not already known their destination. Young met with a hearty,

welcome wherever he halted on the way, and as he passed through the

town of Moorefield learned with satisfaction that Gilmore still made

his headquarters at the house where the report of the two scouts had

located him a few days before. Reaching the designated place about

12 o'clock on the night of the 5th of February, Young, under the

representation that he had come directly from Maryland and was being

pursued by the Union cavalry, gained immediate access to Gilmore's

room. He found the bold guerrilla snugly tucked in bed, with two

pistols lying on a chair near by. He was sleeping so soundly that to

arouse him Young had to give him a violent shake. As he awoke and

asked who was disturbing his slumbers, Young, pointing at him a

cocked six-shooter, ordered him to dress without delay, and in answer

to his inquiry, informed him that he was a prisoner to one of

Sheridan's staff. Meanwhile Gilmore's men had learned of his

trouble, but the early appearance of Colonel Whittaker caused them to

disperse; thus the last link between Maryland and the Confederacy was

carried a prisoner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort Warren.

The capture of Gilmore caused the disbandment of the party he had

organized at the "camp-meeting," most of the men he had recruited

returning to their homes discouraged, though some few joined the

bands of Woodson and young Jesse McNeil, which, led by the latter,

dashed into Cumberland, Maryland, at 3 O'clock on the morning of the

21st of February and made a reprisal by carrying off General Crook

and General Kelly, and doing their work so silently and quickly that

they escaped without being noticed, and were some distance on their

way before the colored watchman at the hotel where Crook was

quartered could compose himself enough to give the alarm. A troop of

cavalry gave hot chase from Cumberland, striving to intercept the

party at Moorefield and other points, but all efforts were fruitless,

the prisoners soon being beyond reach.

Although I had adopted the general rule of employing only soldiers as

scouts, there was an occasional exception to it. I cannot say that

these exceptions proved wholly that an ironclad observance of the

rule would have been best, but I am sure of it in one instance. A

man named Lomas, who claimed to be a Marylander, offered me his

services as a spy, and coming highly recommended from Mr. Stanton,

who had made use of him in that capacity, I employed him. He made

many pretensions, often appearing over anxious to impart information

seemingly intended to impress me with his importance, and yet was

more than ordinarily intelligent, but in spite of that my confidence

in him was by no means unlimited. I often found what he reported to

me as taking place within the Confederate lines corroborated by

Young's men, but generally there were discrepancies in his tales,

which led me to suspect that he was employed by the enemy as well as

by me. I felt, however, that with good watching he could do me

little harm, and if my suspicions were incorrect he might be very

useful, so I held on to him.

Early in February Lomas was very solicitous for me to employ a man

who, he said, had been with Mosby, but on account of some quarrel in

the irregular camp had abandoned that leader. Thinking that with two

of them I might destroy the railroad bridges east of Lynchburg, I

concluded, after the Mosby man had been brought to my headquarters by

Lomas about 12 o'clock one night, to give him employment, at the same

time informing Colonel Young that I suspected their fidelity,

however, and that he must test it by shadowing their every movement.

When Lomas's companion entered my room he was completely disguised,

but on discarding the various contrivances by which his identity was

concealed he proved to be a rather slender, dark-complexioned,

handsome young man, of easy address and captivating manners. He gave

his name as Renfrew, answered all my questions satisfactorily, and

went into details about Mosby and his men which showed an intimacy

with them at some time. I explained to the two men the work I had

laid out for them, and stated the sum of money I would give to have

it done, but stipulated that in case of failure there would be no

compensation whatever beyond the few dollars necessary for their

expenses. They readily assented, and it was arranged that they

should start the following night. Meanwhile Young had selected his

men to shadow them, and in two days reported my spies as being

concealed at Strasburg, where they remained, without making the

slightest effort to continue on their mission, and were busy, no

doubt, communicating with the enemy, though I was not able to fasten

this on them. On the 16th of February they returned to Winchester,

and reported their failure, telling so many lies about their

hazardous adventure as to remove all remaining doubt as to their

double-dealing. Unquestionably they were spies from the enemy, and

hence liable to the usual penalties of such service; but it struck me

that through them, I might deceive Early as to the time of opening

the spring campaign, I having already received from General Grant an

intimation of what was expected of me. I therefore retained the men

without even a suggestion of my knowledge of their true character,

Young meanwhile keeping close watch over all their doings.

Toward the last of February General Early had at Staunton two

brigades of infantry under Wharton. All the rest of the infantry

except Echol's brigade, which was in southwestern Virginia, had been

sent to Petersburg during the winter, and Fitz. Lee's two brigades of

cavalry also. Rosser's men were mostly at their homes, where, on

account of a lack of subsistence and forage in the valley, they had

been permitted to go, subject to call. Lomax's cavalry was at

Millboro, west of Staunton, where supplies were obtainable. It was

my aim to get well on the road before Early could collect these

scattered forces, and as many of the officers had been in the habit

of amusing themselves fox-hunting during the latter part of the

winter, I decided to use the hunt as an expedient for stealing a

march on the enemy, and had it given out officially that a grand

fox-chase would take place on the 29th of February. Knowing that

Lomas, and Renfrew would spread the announcement South, they were

permitted to see several red foxes that had been secured, as well as a

large pack of hounds which Colonel Young had collected for the sport,

and were then started on a second expedition to burn the bridges. Of

course, they were shadowed as usual, and two days later, after they had

communicated with friends from their hiding-place, in Newtown, they

were arrested. On the way north to Fort Warren they escaped from their

guards when passing through Baltimore, and I never heard of them again,

though I learned that, after the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln,

Secretary Stanton strongly suspected his friend Lomas of being

associated with the conspirators, and it then occurred to me that the

good-looking Renfrew may have been Wilkes Booth, for he certainly bore

a strong resemblance to Booth's pictures.

On the 27th of February my cavalry entered upon the campaign which

cleared the Shenandoah Valley of every remnant of organized

Confederates. General Torbert being absent on leave at this time, I

did not recall him, but appointed General Merritt Chief of Cavalry.

for Torbert had disappointed me on two important occasions--in the

Luray Valley during the battle of Fisher's Hill, and on the recent

Gordonsville expedition--and I mistrusted his ability to conduct any

operations requiring much self-reliance. The column was composed of

Custer's and Devin's divisions of cavalry, and two sections of

artillery, comprising in all about 10,000 officers and men. On

wheels we had, to accompany this column, eight ambulances, sixteen

ammunition wagons, a pontoon train for eight canvas boats, and a

small supply-train, with fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar, and

salt, it being intended to depend on the country for the meat and

bread ration, the men carrying in their haversacks nearly enough to

subsist them till out of the exhausted valley.

Grant's orders were for me to destroy the Virginia Central railroad

and the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then

join General Sherman in North Carolina wherever he might be found, or

return to Winchester, but as to joining Sherman I was to be governed

by the state of affairs after the projected capture of Lynchburg.

The weather was cold, the valley and surrounding mountains being

still covered with snow; but this was fast disappearing, however,

under the heavy rain that was coming down as the column moved along

up the Valley pike at a steady gait that took us to Woodstock the

first day. The second day we crossed the North Fork of the

Shenandoah on our pontoon-bridge, and by night-fall reached Lacy's

Springs, having seen nothing of the enemy as yet but a few partisans

who hung on our flanks in the afternoon.

March 1 we encountered General Rosser at Mt. Crawford, he having been

able to call together only some five or six hundred of his troops,

our unsuspected march becoming known to Early only the day before.

Rosser attempted to delay us here, trying to burn the bridges over

the Middle Fork of the Shenandoah, but two regiments from Colonel

Capehart's brigade swam the stream and drove Rosser to Kline's Mills,

taking thirty prisoners and twenty ambulances and wagons.

Meanwhile General Early was busy at Staunton, but not knowing my

objective point, he had ordered the return of Echol's brigade from

southwestern Virginia for the protection of Lynchburg, directed

Lomax's cavalry to concentrate at Pond Gap for the purpose of

harassing me if I moved toward Lynchburg, and at the same time

marched Wharton's two brigades of infantry, Nelson's artillery, and

Rosser's cavalry to Waynesboro', whither he went also to remain till

the object of my movement was ascertained.

I entered Staunton the morning of March 2, and finding that Early had

gone to Waynesboro' with his infantry and Rosser, the question at

once arose whether I should continue my march to Lynchburg direct,

leaving my adversary in my rear, or turn east and open the way

through Rockfish Gap to the Virginia Central railroad and James River

canal. I felt confident of the success of the latter plan, for I

knew that Early numbered there not more than two thousand men; so,

influenced by this, and somewhat also by the fact that Early had left

word in Staunton that he would fight at Waynesboro', I directed

Merritt to move toward that place with Custer, to be closely followed

by Devin, who was to detach one brigade to destroy supplies at

Swoope's depot. The by-roads were miry beyond description, rain

having fallen almost incessantly since we left Winchester, but

notwithstanding the down-pour the column pushed on, men and horses

growing almost unrecognizable from the mud covering them from head to

foot.

General Early was true to the promise made his friends in Staunton,

for when Custer neared Waynesboro' he found, occupying a line of

breastworks on a ridge west of the town, two brigades of infantry,

with eleven pieces of artillery and Rosser's cavalry. Custer, when

developing the position of the Confederates, discovered that their

left was somewhat exposed instead of resting on South River; he

therefore made his dispositions for attack, sending around that flank

the dismounted regiments from Pennington's brigade, while he himself,

with two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, assaulted

along the whole line of breastworks. Pennington's flanking movement

stampeded the enemy in short order, thus enabling Custer to carry the

front with little resistance, and as he did so the Eighth New York

and First Connecticut, in a charge in column, broke through the

opening made by Custer, and continued on through the town of

Waynesboro', never stopping till they crossed South River. There,

finding themselves immediately in the enemy's rear, they promptly

formed as foragers and held the east bank of the stream till all the

Confederates surrendered except Rosser, who succeeded in making his

way back to the valley, and Generals Early, Wharton, Long, and

Lilley, who, with fifteen or twenty men, escaped across the Blue

Ridge. I followed up the victory immediately by despatching Capehart

through Rock-fish Gap, with orders to encamp on the east side of the

Blue Ridge. By reason of this move all the enemy's stores and

transportation fell into our hands, while we captured on the field

seventeen battle flags, sixteen hundred officers and men, and eleven

pieces of artillery. This decisive victory closed hostilities in the

Shenandoah Valley. The prisoners and artillery were sent back to

Winchester next morning, under a guard of 1,500 men, commanded by

Colonel J. H. Thompson, of the First New Hampshire.

The night of March 2 Custer camped at Brookfield, Devin remaining at

Waynesboro'. The former started for Charlottesville the next morning

early, followed by Devin with but two brigades, Gibbs having been

left behind to blow up the iron railroad bridge across South River.

Because of the incessant rains and spring thaws the roads were very

soft, and the columns cut them up terribly, the mud being thrown by

the sets of fours across the road in ridges as much as two feet high,

making it most difficult to get our wagons along, and distressingly

wearing on the animals toward the middle and rear of the columns.

Consequently I concluded to rest at Charlottesville for a couple of

days and recuperate a little, intending at the same time to destroy,

with small parties, the railroad from that point toward Lynchburg.

Custer reached Charlottesville the 3d, in the afternoon, and was met

at the outskirts by a deputation of its citizens, headed by the

mayor, who surrendered the town with medieval ceremony, formally

handing over the keys of the public buildings and of the University

of Virginia. But this little scene did not delay Custer long enough

to prevent his capturing, just beyond the village, a small body of

cavalry and three pieces of artillery. Gibbs's brigade, which was

bringing up my mud-impeded train, did not arrive until the 5th of

March. In the mean time Young's scouts had brought word that the

garrison of Lynchburg was being increased and the fortifications

strengthened, so that its capture would be improbable. I decided,

however, to move toward the place as far as Amherst Court House,

which is sixteen miles short of the town, so Devin, under Merritt's

supervision, marched along the James River, destroying the canal,

while Custer pushed ahead on the railroad and broke it up. The two

columns were to join at New Market, whence I intended to cross the

James River at some point east of Lynchburg, if practicable, so as to

make my way to Appomattox Court House, and destroy the Southside

railroad as far east as Farmville. Owing to its swollen condition

the river was unfordable but knowing that there was a covered bridge

at Duguidsville, I hoped to secure it by a dash, and cross there, but

the enemy, anticipating this, had filled the bridge with inflammable

material, and just as our troops got within striking distance it

burst into flames. The bridge at Hardwicksville also having been

burned by the enemy, there was now no means of crossing except by

pontoons. But, unfortunately, I had only eight of these, and they

could not be made to span the swollen river.

Being thus unable to cross until the river should fall, and knowing

that it was impracticable to join General Sherman, and useless to

adhere to my alternative instructions to return to Winchester, I now

decided to destroy still more thoroughly the James River canal and

the Virginia Central railroad and then join General Grant in front of

Petersburg. I was master of the whole country north of the James as

far down as Goochland; hence the destruction of these arteries of

supply could be easily compassed, and feeling that the war was

nearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death.

On March 9 the main column started eastward down the James River,

destroying locks, dams, and boats, having been preceded by Colonel

Fitzhugh's brigade of Devin's division in a forced march to Goochland

and Beaver Dam Creek, with orders to destroy everything below

Columbia. I made Columbia on the 10th, and from there sent a

communication to General Grant reporting what had occurred, informing

him of my condition and intention, asking him to send forage and

rations to meet me at the White House, and also a pontoon-bridge to

carry me over the Pamunkey, for in view of the fact that hitherto it

had been impracticable to hold Lee in the trenches around Petersburg,

I regarded as too hazardous a march down the south bank of the

Pamunkey, where the enemy, by sending troops out from Richmond, might

fall upon my flank and rear. It was of the utmost importance that

General Grant should receive these despatches without chance of

failure, in order that I might, depend absolutely on securing

supplies at the White House; therefore I sent the message in

duplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts,

Campbell and Rowan, and the other by Fannin and Moore, who were to go

down the James River in a small boat to Richmond, join the troops in

the trenches in front of Petersburg, and, deserting to the Union

lines, deliver their tidings into General Grant's hands. Each set of

messengers got through, but the copy confided to Campbell and Rowan

was first at Grant's headquarters.

I halted for one day at Columbia to let my trains catch up, for it

was still raining and the mud greatly delayed the teams, fatiguing

and wearying the mules so much that I believe we should have been

forced to abandon most of the wagons except for the invaluable help

given by some two thousand negroes who had attached themselves to the

column: they literally lifted the wagons out of the mud. From

Columbia Merritt, with Devin's division, marched to Louisa Court

House and destroyed the Virginia Central to Frederick's Hall.

Meanwhile Custer was performing similar work from Frederick's Hall to

Beaver Dam Station, and also pursued for a time General Early, who,

it was learned from despatches captured in the telegraph office at

Frederick's Hall, was in the neighborhood with a couple of hundred

men. Custer captured some of these men and two of Early's

staff-officers, but the commander of the Valley District, accompanied

by a single orderly, escaped across the South Anna and next day made

his way to Richmond, the last man of the Confederate army that had so

long contended with us in the Shenandoah Valley.

At Frederick's Hall, Young's scouts brought me word from Richmond

that General Longstreet was assembling a force there to prevent my

junction with Grant, and that Pickett's division, which had been sent

toward Lynchburg to oppose my march, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, were

moving east on the Southside railroad, with the object of

circumventing me. Reasoning that Longstreet could interpose

effectually only by getting to the White House ahead of me, I pushed

one column under Custer across the South Anna, by way of Ground

Squirrel bridge, to Ashland, where it united with Merritt, who had

meanwhile marched through Hanover Junction. Our appearance at

Ashland drew the Confederates out in that direction, as was hoped,

so, leaving Colonel Pennington's brigade there to amuse them, the

united command retraced its route to Mount Carmel church to cross the

North Anna. After dark Pennington came away, and all the troops

reached the church by midnight of the 15th.

Resuming the march at an early hour next morning, we took the road by

way of King William Court House to the White House, where, arriving

on the 18th, we found, greatly to our relief, the supplies which I

had requested to be sent there. In the meanwhile the enemy had

marched to Hanover Court House, but being unable either to cross the

Pamunkey there or forestall me at the White House on the south side

of the river, he withdrew to Richmond without further effort to

impede my column.

The hardships of this march far exceeded those of any previous

campaigns by the cavalry. Almost incessant rains had drenched us for

sixteen days and nights, and the swollen streams and well-nigh

bottomless roads east of Staunton presented grave difficulties on

every hand, but surmounting them all, we destroyed the enemy's means

of subsistence, in quantities beyond computation, and permanently

crippled the Virginia Central railroad, as well as the James River

canal, and as each day brought us nearer the Army of the Potomac, all

were filled with the comforting reflection that our work in the

Shenandoah Valley had been thoroughly done, and every one was buoyed

up by the cheering thought that we should soon take part in the final

struggle of the war.

CHAPTER V.

TRANSFERRED TO PETERSBURG--GENERAL RAWLINS CORDIAL WELCOME--GENERAL

GRANT's ORDERS AND PLANS--A TRIP WITH MR. LINCOLN AND GENERAL GRANT

--MEETING GENERAL SHERMAN--OPPOSED TO JOINING THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

--OPENING OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN--GENERAL GRANT AND GENERAL RAWLINS.

The transfer of my command from the Shenandoah Valley to the field of

operations in front of Petersburg was not anticipated by General

Grant; indeed, the despatch brought from Columbia by my scouts,

asking that supplies be sent me at the White House, was the first

word that reached him concerning the move. In view of my message the

general-in-chief decided to wait my arrival before beginning spring

operations with the investing troops south of the James River, for he

felt the importance of having my cavalry at hand in a campaign which

he was convinced would wind up the war. We remained a few days at

the White House resting and refitting the cavalry, a large amount of

shoeing being necessary; but nothing like enough horses were at hand

to replace those that had died or been disabled on the mud march from

Staunton to the Pamunkey River, so a good many of the men were still

without mounts, and all such were sent by boat to the dismounted camp

near City Point. When all was ready the column set out for Hancock

Station, a point on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and

arriving there on the 27th of March, was in orders reunited with its

comrades of the Second Division, who had been serving with the Army

of the Potomac since we parted from them the previous August.

General Crook, who had been exchanged within a few days, was now in

command of this Second Division. The reunited corps was to enter

upon the campaign as a separate army, I reporting directly to General

Grant; the intention being thus to reward me for foregoing, of my own

choice, my position as a department commander by joining the armies

at Petersburg.

Taking the road across the Peninsula, I started from the White House

with Merritt's column on the 25th of March and encamped that night at

Harrison's Landing. Very early next morning, in conformity with a

request from General Grant, I left by boat for City Point, Merritt

meanwhile conducting the column across the James River to the point

of rendezvous, The trip to City Point did not take long, and on

arrival at army headquarters the first person I met was General John

A. Rawlins, General Grant's chief-of-staff. Rawlins was a man of

strong likes and dislikes, and positive always both in speech and

action, exhibiting marked feelings when greeting any one, and on this

occasion met me with much warmth. His demonstrations of welcome

over, we held a few minutes' conversation about the coming campaign,

he taking strong ground against a part of the plan of operations

adopted, namely, that which contemplated my joining General Sherman's

army. His language was unequivocal and vehement, and when he was

through talking, he conducted me to General Grant's quarters, but he

himself did not enter.

General Grant was never impulsive, and always met his officers in an

unceremonious way, with a quiet "How are you" soon putting one at his

ease, since the pleasant tone in which he spoke gave assurance of

welcome, although his manner was otherwise impassive. When the

ordinary greeting was over, he usually waited for his visitor to open

the conversation, so on this occasion I began by giving him the

details of my march from Winchester, my reasons for not joining

Sherman, as contemplated in my instructions, and the motives which

had influenced me to march to the White House. The other provision

of my orders on setting out from Winchester--the alternative return

to that place--was not touched upon, for the wisdom of having ignored

that was fully apparent. Commenting on this recital of my doings,

the General referred only to the tortuous course of my march from

Waynesboro' down, our sore trials, and the valuable services of the

scouts who had brought him tidings of me, closing with the remark

that it was, rare a department commander voluntarily deprived himself

of independence, and added that I should not suffer for it. Then

turning to the business for which he had called me to City Point, he

outlined what he expected me to do; saying that I was to cut loose

from the Army of the Potomac by passing its left flank to the

southward along the line of the Danville railroad, and after crossing

the Roanoke River, join General Sherman. While speaking, he handed

me a copy of a general letter of instructions that had been drawn up

for the army on the 24th. The letter contained these words

concerning the movements of my command:

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under

General Davies, will move at the same time (29th inst.) by the Weldon

road and the Jerusalem plank-road, turning west from the latter

before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before

reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently

under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted

cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted

cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding

property belonging to their arm of the service, will report to

Brigadier-General Benham to be added to the defenses of City Point."

When I had gone over the entire letter I showed plainly that I was

dissatisfied with it, for, coupled with what the General had outlined

orally, which I supposed was the "other instructions," I believed it

foreshadowed my junction with General Sherman. Rawlins thought so

too, as his vigorous language had left no room to doubt, so I

immediately began to offer my objections to the programme. These

were, that it would be bad policy to send me down to the Carolinas

with a part of the Army of the Potomac, to come back to crush Lee

after the destruction of General Johnston's army; such a course would

give rise to the charge that his own forces around Petersburg were

not equal to the task, and would seriously affect public opinion in

the North; that in fact my cavalry belonged to the Army of the

Potomac, which army was able unaided to destroy Lee, and I could not

but oppose any dispersion of its strength.

All this was said in a somewhat emphatic manner, and when I had

finished he quietly told me that the portion of my instructions from

which I so strongly dissented was intended as a "blind" to cover any

check the army in its general move, to the left might meet with, and

prevent that element in the North which held that the war could be

ended only through negotiation, from charging defeat. The fact that

my cavalry was not to ultimately join Sherman was a great relief to

me, and after expressing the utmost confidence in the plans unfolded

for closing the war by directing every effort to the annihilation of

Lee's army, I left him to go to General Ingalls's quarters. On the

way I again met Rawlins, who, when I told him that General Grant had

intimated his intention to modify the written plan of operations so

far as regarded the cavalry, manifested the greatest satisfaction,

and I judged from this that the new view of the matter had not

previously been communicated to the chief-of-staff, though he must

have been acquainted of course with the programme made out on the

24th of March.

Toward noon General Grant sent for me to accompany him up the river.

When I joined the General he informed me that the President was on

board the boat--the steamer Mary Martin. For some days Mr. Lincoln

had been at City Point, established on the steamer River Queen,

having come down from Washington to be nearer his generals, no doubt,

and also to be conveniently situated for the reception of tidings

from the front when operations began, for he could not endure the

delays in getting news to Washington. This trip up the James had

been projected by General Meade, but on account of demands at the

front he could not go, so the President, General Grant, and I

composed the party. We steamed up to where my cavalry was crossing

on the pontoon-bridge below the mouth of the Dutch Gap canal, and for

a little while watched the column as it was passing over the river,

the bright sunshine presaging good weather, but only to delude, as

was proved by the torrents of rain brought by the succeeding days of

March. On the trip the President was not very cheerful. In fact, he

was dejected, giving no indication of his usual means of diversion,

by which (his quaint stories) I had often heard he could find relief

from his cares. He spoke to me of the impending operations and asked

many questions, laying stress upon the one, "What would be the result

when the army moved out to the left, if the enemy should come down

and capture City Point?" the question being prompted, doubtless, by

the bold assault on our lines and capture of Fort Steadman two days

before by General Gordon. I answered that I did not think it at all

probable that General Lee would undertake such a desperate measure to

relieve the strait he was in; that General Hartranft's successful

check to Gordon had ended, I thought, attacks of such a character;

and in any event General Grant would give Lee all he could attend to

on the left. Mr. Lincoln said nothing about my proposed route of

march, and I doubt if he knew of my instructions, or was in

possession at most of more than a very general outline of the plan of

campaign. It was late when the Mary Martin returned to City Point,

and I spent the night there with General Ingalls.

The morning of the 27th I went out to Hancock Station to look after

my troops and prepare for moving two days later. In the afternoon I

received a telegram from General Grant, saying: "General Sherman will

be here this evening to spend a few hours. I should like to have you

come down." Sherman's coming was a surprise--at least to me it was

--this despatch being my first intimation of his expected arrival.

Well knowing the zeal and emphasis with which General Sherman would

present his views, there again came into my mind many misgivings with

reference to the movement of the cavalry, and I made haste to start

for Grant's headquarters. I got off a little after 7 o'clock, taking

the rickety military railroad, the rails of which were laid on the

natural surface of the ground, with grading only here and there at

points of absolute necessity, and had not gone far when the

locomotive jumped the track. This delayed my arrival at City Point

till near midnight, but on repairing to the little cabin that

sheltered the general-in-chief, I found him and Sherman still up

talking over the problem whose solution was near at hand. As already

stated, thoughts as to the tenor of my instructions became uppermost

the moment I received the telegram in the afternoon, and they

continued to engross and disturb me all the way down the railroad,

for I feared that the telegram foreshadowed, under the propositions

Sherman would present, a more specific compliance with the written

instructions than General Grant had orally assured me would be

exacted.

My entrance into the shanty suspended the conversation for a moment

only, and then General Sherman, without prelude, rehearsed his plans

for moving his army, pointing out with every detail how he would come

up through the Carolinas to join the troops besieging Petersburg and

Richmond, and intimating that my cavalry, after striking the

Southside and Danville railroads, could join him with ease. I made

no comments on the projects for moving, his own troops, but as soon

as opportunity offered, dissented emphatically from the proposition

to have me join the Army of the Tennessee, repeating in substance

what I had previously expressed to General Grant.

My uneasiness made me somewhat too earnest, I fear, but General Grant

soon mollified me, and smoothed matters over by practically repeating

what he had told me in regard to this point at the close of our

interview the day before, so I pursued the subject no further. In a

little while the conference ended, and I again sought lodging at the

hospitable quarters of Ingalls.

Very early the next morning, while I was still in bed, General

Sherman came to me and renewed the subject of my joining him, but

when he saw that I was unalterably opposed to it the conversation

turned into other channels, and after we had chatted awhile he

withdrew, and later in the day went up the river with the President,

General Grant, and Admiral Porter, I returning to my command at

Hancock Station, where my presence was needed to put my troops in

march next day.

During the entire winter General Grant's lines fronting Petersburg

had extended south of the Appomattox River, practically from that

stream around to where the Vaughn road crosses Hatcher's Run, and

this was nearly the situation Wilien the cavalry concentrated at

Hancock Station, General Weitzel holding the line north of the

Appomattox, fronting Richmond and Bermuda Hundred.

The instructions of the 24th of March contemplated that the campaign

should begin with the movement of Warren's corps (the Fifth) at

3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and Humphreys's (the Second) at

6; the rest of the infantry holding on in the trenches. The cavalry

was to move in conjunction with Warren and Humphreys, and make its

way out beyond our left as these corps opened the road.

The night of the 28th I received the following additional

instructions, the general tenor of which again disturbed me, for

although I had been assured that I was not to join General Sherman,

it will be seen that the supplemental directions distinctly present

that alternative, and I therefore feared that during the trip up the

James River on the morning of the 28th General Grant had returned to

his original views:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"City Point, Va., March 28, 1865.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN:

"The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 A.M.

tomorrow morning. The Second moves at about 9 A.M., having but about

three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on

the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaches Dinwiddie

Court House.

"Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being

confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the

nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and

passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the

enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the

enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if possible.

Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be

attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with

the full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy, as

circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will

probably be able to communicate with you; should I not do so, and you

find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may

cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable

I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and

Burkeville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much

detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would

like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible; make your

destruction of that road as complete as possible; you can then pass

on to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that in

like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,

which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may

return to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go

on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select

the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so

that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."

These instructions did not alter my line of march for the morrow, and

I trusted matters would so come about as not to require compliance

with those portions relative to the railroads and to joining Sherman;

so early on the 29th I moved my cavalry out toward Ream's Station on

the Weldon road, Devin commanding the First Division, with Colonels

Gibbs, Stagg, and Fitzhugh in charge of the brigades; the Third

Division under Custer, Colonels Wells, Capehart and Pennington being

the brigade commanders. These two divisions united were commanded by

Merritt, as they had been since leaving Winchester. Crook headed the

Second Division, his brigades being under General Davies and Colonels

John I. Gregg and Smith.

Our general direction was westward, over such routes as could be

found, provided they did not embarrass the march of the infantry.

The roads, from the winter's frosts and rains, were in a frightful

state, and when it was sought to avoid a spot which the head of the

column had proved almost bottomless, the bogs and quicksands of the

adjoining fields demonstrated that to make a detour was to go from

bad to worse. In the face of these discouragements we floundered on,

however, crossing on the way a series of small streams swollen to

their banks. Crook and Devin reached the county-seat of Dinwiddie

about 5 o'clock in the evening, having encountered only a small

picket, that at once gave way to our advance. Merritt left Custer at

Malon's crossing of Rowanty Creek to care for the trains containing

our subsistence and the reserve ammunition, these being stuck in the

mire at, intervals all the way back to the Jerusalem plank-road; and

to make any headway at all with the trains, Custer's men often had to

unload the wagons and lift them out of the boggy places.

Crook and Devin camped near Dinwiddie Court House in such manner as

to cover the Vaughn, Flatfoot, Boydton, and Five Forks roads; for, as

these all intersected at Dinwiddie, they offered a chance for the

enemy's approach toward the rear of the Fifth Corps, as Warren

extended to the left across the Boydton road. Any of these routes

leading to the south or west might also be the one on which, in

conformity with one part of my instructions, I was expected to get

out toward the Danville and Southside railroads, and the Five Forks

road would lead directly to General Lee's right flank, in case

opportunity was found to comply with the other part. The place was,

therefore, of great strategic value, and getting it without cost

repaid us for floundering through the mud.

Dinwiddie Court House, though a most important point in the campaign,

was far from attractive in feature, being made up of a half-dozen

unsightly houses, a ramshackle tavern propped up on two sides with

pine poles, and the weatherbeaten building that gave official name to

the cross-roads. We had no tents--there were none in the command--so

I took possession of the tavern for shelter for myself and staff, and

just as we had finished looking over its primitive interior a rain

storm set in.

The wagon containing my mess equipment was back somewhere on the

road, hopelessly stuck in the mud, and hence we had nothing to eat

except some coffee which two young women living at the tavern kindly

made for us; a small quantity of the berry being furnished from the

haversacks of my escort. By the time we got the coffee, rain was

falling in sheets, and the evening bade fair to be a most dismal one;

but songs and choruses set up by some of my staff--the two young

women playing accompaniments on a battered piano--relieved the

situation and enlivened us a little. However, the dreary night

brought me one great comfort; for General Grant, who that day had

moved out to Gravelly Run, sent me instructions to abandon all idea

of the contemplated raid, and directed me to act in concert with the

infantry under his immediate command, to turn, if possible, the right

flank of Lee's army. The despatch made my mind easy with respect to

the objectionable feature of my original instructions, and of course

relieved me also from the anxiety growing out of the letter received

at Hancock Station the night of the 28th; so, notwithstanding the

suspicions excited by some of my staff concerning the Virginia

feather-bed that had been assigned me, I turned in at a late hour and

slept most soundly.

The night of the 29th the left of General Grant's infantry--Warren's

corps--rested on the Boydton road, not far from its intersection with

the Quaker road. Humphreys's corps was next to Warren; then came

Ord, next Wright, and then Parke, with his right resting on the

Appomattox. The moving of Warren and Humphreys to the left during

the day was early discovered by General Lee. He met it by extending

the right of his infantry on the White Oak road, while drawing in the

cavalry of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser along the south bank of Stony

Creek to cover a crossroads called Five Forks, to anticipate me

there; for assuming that my command was moving in conjunction with

the infantry, with the ultimate purpose of striking the Southside

railroad, Lee made no effort to hold Dinwiddie, which he might have

done with his cavalry, and in this he made a fatal mistake. The

cavalry of Fitz. Lee was ordered at this same time from Sunderland

depot to Five Forks, and its chief placed in command of all the

mounted troops of General Lee's army.

At daylight on the 30th I proceeded to make dispositions under the

new conditions imposed by my modified instructions, and directed

Merritt to push Devin out as far as the White Oak road to make a

reconnoissance to Five Forks, Crook being instructed to send Davies's

brigade to support Devin. Crook was to hold, with Gregg's brigade,

the Stony Creek crossing of the Boydton plank road, retaining Smith's

near Dinwiddie, for use in any direction required. On the 29th W. H.

F. Lee conformed the march of his cavalry with that of ours, but my

holding Stony Creek in this way forced him to make a detour west of

Chamberlin's Run, in order to get in communication with his friends

at Five Forks.

The rain that had been falling all night gave no sign of stopping,

but kept pouring down all day long, and the swamps and quicksands

mired the horses, whether they marched in the roads or across the

adjacent fields. Undismayed, nevertheless, each column set out for

its appointed duty, but shortly after the troops began to move I

received from General Grant this despatch, which put a new phase on

matters:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"GRAVELLY RUN, March 30, 1865.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much

until it dries up a little, or we get roads around our rear repaired.

You may, therefore, leave what cavalry you deem necessary to protect

the left, and hold such positions as you deem necessary for that

purpose, and send the remainder back to Humphrey's Station where they

can get hay and grain. Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sent

to you in the morning. Send an officer back to direct the wagons

back to where you want them. Report to me the cavalry you will leave

back, and the position you will occupy. Could not your cavalry go

back by the way of Stony Creek depot and destroy or capture the store

of supplies there?

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."

When I had read and pondered this, I determined to ride over to

General Grant's headquarters on Gravelly Run, and get a clear idea of

what it was proposed to do, for it seemed to me that a suspension of

operations would be a serious mistake. Mounting a powerful gray

pacing horse called Breckenridge (from its capture from one of

Breckenridge's staff-officers at Missionary Ridge), and that I knew

would carry me through the mud, I set out accompanied by my Assistant

Adjutant-General, Colonel Frederick C. Newhall, and an escort of

about ten or fifteen men. At first we rode north up the Boydton

plank-road, and coming upon our infantry pickets from a direction

where the enemy was expected to appear, they began to fire upon us,

but seeing from our actions that we were friends, they ceased, and

permitted us to pass the outposts. We then struggled on in a

northeasterly direction across-country, till we struck the Vaughn

road. This carried us to army headquarters, which were established

south of Gravelly Run in an old cornfield. I rode to within a few

yards of the front of General Grant's tent, my horse plunging at

every step almost to his knees in the mud, and dismounted near a

camp-fire, apparently a general one, for all the staff-officers were

standing around it on boards and rails placed here and there to keep

them from sinking into the mire.

Going directly to General Grant's tent, I found him and Rawlins

talking over the question of suspending operations till the weather

should improve. No orders about the matter had been issued yet,

except the despatch to me, and Rawlins, being strongly opposed to the

proposition, was frankly expostulating with General Grant, who, after

greeting me, remarked, in his quiet way: "Well, Rawlins, I think you

had better take command." Seeing that there was a difference up

between Rawlins and his chief, I made the excuse of being wet and

cold, and went outside to the fire. Here General Ingalls met me and

took me to his tent, where I was much more comfortable than when

standing outside, and where a few minutes later we were joined by

General Grant. Ingalls then retired, and General Grant began talking

of our fearful plight, resulting from the rains and mud, and saying

that because of this it seemed necessary to suspend operations. I at

once begged him not to do so, telling him that my cavalry was already

on the move in spite of the difficulties, and that although a

suspension of operations would not be fatal, yet it would give rise

to the very charge of disaster to which he had referred at City

Point, and, moreover, that we would surely be ridiculed, just as

General Burnside's army was after the mud march of 1863. His better

judgment was against suspending operations, but the proposition had

been suggested by all sorts of complaints as to the impossibility of

moving the trains and the like, so it needed little argument to

convince him, and without further discussion he said, in that manner

which with him meant a firmness of purpose that could not be changed

by further complainings, "We will go on." I then told him that I

believed I could break in the enemy's right if he would let me have

the Sixth Corps; but saying that the condition of the roads would

prevent the movement of infantry, he replied that I would have to

seize Five Forks with the cavalry alone.

On my way back to Dinwiddie I stopped at the headquarters of General

Warren, but the General being asleep, I went to the tent of one of

his staff-officers. Colonel William T. Gentry, an old personal

friend with whom I had served in Oregon. In a few minutes Warren

came in and we had a short conversation, he speaking rather

despondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by the

depressing weather.

From Warren's headquarters I returned, by the Boydton road to

Dinwiddie Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease. When I got as

far as the Dabney road I sent Colonel Newhall out on it toward Five

Forks, with orders for Merritt to develop the enemy's position and

strength, and then rode on to Dinwiddie to endeavor to get all my

other troops up. Merritt was halted at the intersection of the Five

Forks and Gravelly Church roads when Newhall delivered the orders,

and in compliance moving out Gibbs's brigade promptly, sharp

skirmishing was brought on, Gibbs driving the Confederates to Five

Forks, where he found them behind a line of breastworks running along

the White Oak road. The reconnoissance demonstrating the intention

of the enemy to hold this point, Gibbs was withdrawn.

That evening, at 7 o'clock, I reported the position of the

Confederate cavalry, and stated that it had been reinforced by

Pickett's division of infantry. On receipt of this despatch, General

Grant offered me the Fifth Corps, but I declined to take it, and

again asked for the Sixth, saying that with it I believed I could

turn the enemy (Pickett's) left, or break through his lines. The

morning of the 31st General Grant replied the the Sixth Corps could

not be taken from its position in the line, and offered me the

Second; but in the mean time circumstances had changed, and no corps

was ordered.

CHAPTER VI.

BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE--PICKETT REPULSED--REINFORCED BY THE

FIFTH CORPS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--TURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFT--AN

UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS--RELIEVING GENERAL WARREN--THE WARREN COURT OF

INQUIRY--GENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION.

The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin's division and Davies's

brigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in front

of Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau's. Crook, with Smith and Gregg's

brigades, continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still back

at Rowanty Creek, trying to get the trains up. This force had been

counted while crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisions

numbering 9,000 enlisted men, Crook having 3,300, and Custer and

Devin 5,700.

During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and by

evening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined Fitzhugh

Lee near Five Forks. To this force was added, about dark, five

brigades of infantry--three from Pickett's division, and two from

Johnson's--all under command of Pickett. The infantry came by the

White Oak road from the right of General Lee's intrenchments, and

their arrival became positively known to me about dark, the

confirmatory intelligence being brought in then by some of Young's

scouts who had been inside the Confederate lines.

On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an

early hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances

preparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merritt

started for the crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him. His

march was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy's

pickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell

to Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just

then bent on other things. At the same hour that Merritt started,

Crook moved Smith's brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie to

Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Creek, to cover Merritt's

left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear. The

occupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command of

both the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get in

Merritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek.

To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but

Mumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded in

getting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up than

Fitzgerald's ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in a

northeasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in

company with Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pass

between Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually

separating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road

to Dinwiddie, so that to get to that point they had to retreat across

the country to B. Boisseau's and then down the Boydton road.

Gibbs's brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the Five

Forks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, I

ordered Gregg's brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt's aid,

for if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road he

would expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, in

such case, from Gibbs's position. Gregg arrived in good season, and

as soon as his men were dismounted on Gibbs's left, Merritt assailed

fiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus

interrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett into

the rear of Warren's corps.

It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical

situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to

Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry

Custer to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the

Court House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there

at all hazards. At the same time orders were sent to Smith's

brigade, which, by the advance of Pickett past its right flank and

the pressure of W. H. F. Lee on its front, had been compelled to give

up Fitzgerald's crossing, to fall back toward Dinwiddie but to

contest every inch of ground so as to gain time.

When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from

his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided

attention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating

infantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle,

though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at different

points, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow,

and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the Court

House. I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of

the crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade,

took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some open

ground along the crest of a gentle ridge. Custer got Capehart into

place just in time to lend a hand to Smith, who, severely pressed,

came back on us here from his retreat along Chamberlain's "bed"--the

vernacular for a woody swamp such as that through which Smith

retired. A little later the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, falling to

the rear slowly and steadily, took up in the woods a line which

covered the Boydton Road some distance to the right of Capehart, the

intervening gap to be filled with Pennington's brigade. By this time

our horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud,

was all up, and every gun was posted in this line.

It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day was

theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared in

the open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their left

flank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith

to connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in good

shape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line,

excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered

Dinwiddie and the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods about

half a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended from

this flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly

direction, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton

Road.

A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed

for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came up

and filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart and

Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front

of Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were

outnumbered.

Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode

along the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiastic

reception showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcade

drew the enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddles--among

others Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald,

being wounded. In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing

Confederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still till

Pickett's troops were within short range. Then they opened, Custer's

repeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could

stand up against it. The repulse was very quick, and as the gray

lines retired to the woods from which but a few minutes before they

had so confidently advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie or

marching to the left and rear of our infantry line was over,

at least for the night. The enemy being thus checked, I sent a

staff-officer--Captain Sheridan--to General Grant to report what had

taken place during the afternoon, and to say that I proposed to stay at

Dinwiddie, but if ultimately compelled to abandon the place, I would do

so by retiring on the Vaughn road toward Hatcher's Run, for I then

thought the attack might be renewed next morning. Devin and Davies

joined me about dark, and my troops being now well in hand, I sent a

second staff-officer--Colonel John Kellogg--to explain my situation

more fully, and to assure General Grant that I would hold on at

Dinwiddie till forced to let go.

By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy's infantry had completely

isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a

rare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired,

and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the

first report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too from

the information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army

headquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to

General Grant:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"March 31, 1865. 9:45 p.m.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and

smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line

to the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it. Bartlett's

brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau's, running north, where

it crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road.

Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening

Sheridan in rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the

other two.

"G. G. MEADE, Major-General."

An hour later General Grant replied in these words:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"DABNEY'S MILLS, March 311, 1865. 10:15 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

"Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for

anything. Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the

Boydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth

Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when I

received word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie's cavalry

from the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command,

and that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forces

against Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within the

bounds of possibility, before he could rejoin Lee.

In a despatch, dated 10:05 p.m., telling me of the coming of Warren

and Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps should

reach me by 12 o'clock that night, but at that hour not only had none

of the corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if it

came all the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunity

would be gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren to

move in on the enemy's rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and,

therefore, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatch

to General Warren:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H.,

"April 1, 1865--3. A.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN,

"Commanding Fifth Army Corps.

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading

to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's

division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover

the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads across

Chamberlain's bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J.[G]

Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost on

his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at

daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at

daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side

of Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them.

Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak

road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any

force that may escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear my

leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."

With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately,

and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisions

advanced the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin

pressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over

toward Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony

Creek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require when

Warren attacked.

The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31--a copy

being sent me also--was positive in its directions, but as midnight

came without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstanding

that was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless assumed that

there were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never once

doubted that measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of

3 A. M. and therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowly

toward Five Forks, Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come in

on the Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J.[G]

Boisseau's house.

But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by. As a

matter of fact, when Pickett was passing the all-important point

Warren's men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chief

had placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin's division

did not get to Boisseau's till after my cavalry, which meanwhile had

been joined by Ayres's division of the Fifth Corps by way of the

Boydton and Dabney roads. By reason of the delay in moving Griffin

and Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I massed the Fifth Corps at

J.[G] Boisseau's so that the men could be rested, and directed it to

remain there; General Warren himself had not then come up. General

Mackenzie, who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at first

to stay at Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along the

Five Forks road to Dr. Smith's, and Crook's division was directed to

continue watching the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain's Run.

That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was

to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would

not give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him

back there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott

road, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G]

Boisseau's to Five Forks.

By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his

intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters

of a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White

Oak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks. From the left of

the return over toward Hatcher's Run was posted Mumford's cavalry,

dismounted. In the return itself was Wallace's brigade, and next on

its right came Ransom's, then Stewart's, then Terry's, then Corse's.

On the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. Ten

pieces of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of the

works, three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left,

in the return. Rosser's cavalry was guarding the Confederate trains

north of Hatcher's Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road.

I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forks--he had to--so,

while we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my plan

of battle. This was to attack his whole front with Merritt's two

cavalry divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and with

the Fifth Corps assail his left. As the Fifth Corps moved into

action, its right flank was to be covered by Mackenzie's cavalry,

thus entirely cutting off Pickett's troops from communication with

Lee's right flank, which rested near the Butler house at the junction

of the Claiborne and White Oaks roads. In execution of this plan,

Merritt worked his men close in toward the intrenchments, and while

he was thus engaged, I ordered Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps,

sending the order by my engineer officer, Captain Gillespie, who had

reconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church,

where the infantry was to form for attack.

Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o'clock, and when the corps was

put in motion, General Warren joined me at the front. Before he

came, I had received, through Colonel Babcock, authority from General

Grant to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly on

the eve of battle; so, saying nothing at all about the message

brought me, I entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett,

telling Warren how the enemy was posted, explaining with considerable

detail, and concluding by stating that I wished his troops to be

formed on the Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the White

Oak road, with two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to the

White Oak road, and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two.

General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join

his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing

Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the

enemy's right, and to assault the front of the works with his

dismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward I

rode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren's

column just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a

rough sketch of the ground. I was disappointed that more of the

corps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by without

any apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, this

disappointment grew into disgust. At last I expressed to Warren my

fears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before the

attack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battle

could be begun, or that troops from Lee's right, which, be it

remembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, by

striking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack on

Pickett.

Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner

exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that

"Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble." With unconcern

such as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours' time was

consumed in marching his corps from J.[G] Boisseau's to Gravelly Run

Church, though the distance was but two miles. However, when my

patience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready,

Ayres's division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Church

road, Crawford's on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind the

right of Crawford, a little different from my instructions. The

corps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud,

being still north of Gravelly Run. Meanwhile Merritt had been busy

working his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of the

return west, along the White Oak road.

About 4 o'clock Warren began the attack. He was to assault the left

flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett's

intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak

road. I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher's Run this part

of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford's cavalry

were covering, but I did know where the refusal began. This return,

then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault

was made with spirit, the line could be turned. I therefore intended

that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely,

and when these two divisions and Merritt's cavalry became hotly

engaged, Griffin's division was to pass around the left of the

Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished

him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank

would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward

the Ford road and Hatcher's Run.

The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on

getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular

to the road, keeping closed to the left. Ayres did his part well,

and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of

the return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as

was intended. On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford's

cavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the

return, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin,

uncertain of the enemy's position, naturally followed Crawford.

The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally

brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young's house, frustrated the

purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap

between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took

advantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres's division into

confusion. At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have

Crawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a

mistaken one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he ran

great risk of capture. Warren could not be found, so I then sent for

Griffin--first by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Sherman--to

come to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that part

of the enemy's infantry at the return. By this time Griffin had

observed and appreciated Crawford's mistake, however, and when the

staff-officers reached him, was already faced to the left; so,

marching across Crawford's rear, he quickly joined Ayres, who

meanwhile had rallied his troops and carried the return.

When Ayres's division went over the flank of the enemy's works,

Devin's division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front,

went over in company with it; and hardly halting to reform, the

intermingling infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside the

intrenchments, pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousands

of prisoners. The only stand the enemy tried to make was when he

attempted to form near the Ford road. Griffin pressed him so hard

there, however, that he had to give way in short order, and many of

his men, with three pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of

Crawford while on his circuitous march.