When the interview with the Secretary was over, I proceeded with

General Halleck to the White House to pay my respects to the

President. Mr. Lincoln received me very cordially, offering both his

hands, and saying that he hoped I would fulfill the expectations of

General Grant in the new command I was about to undertake, adding

that thus far the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had not done all

it might have done, and wound up our short conversation by quoting

that stale interrogation so prevalent during the early years of the

war, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" His manner did not impress

me, however, that in asking the question he had meant anything beyond

a jest, and I parted from the President convinced that he did not

believe all that the query implied.

After taking leave I separated from General Halleck, and on returning

to my hotel found there an order from the War Department assigning me

to the command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. The next

morning, April 5, as I took the cars for the headquarters of the Army

of the Potomac, General Grant, who had returned to Washington the

previous night from a visit to his family, came aboard the train on

his way to Culpeper Court House, and on the journey down I learned

among other things that he had wisely determined to continue

personally in the field, associating himself with General Meade's

army; where he could supervise its movements directly, and at the

same time escape the annoyances which, should he remain in

Washington, would surely arise from solicitude for the safety of the

Capital while the campaign was in progress. When we reached Brandy

Station, I left the train and reported to General Meade, who told me

that the headquarters of the Cavalry Corps were some distance back

from the Station, and indicated the general locations of the

different divisions of the corps, also giving me, in the short time I

remained with him, much information regarding their composition.

I reached the Cavalry Corps headquarters on the evening of April 5,

1864, and the next morning issued orders assuming command. General

Pleasonton had but recently been relieved, and many of his

staff-officers were still on duty at the headquarters awaiting the

arrival of the permanent commander. I resolved to retain the most of

these officers on my staff, and although they were all unknown to me

when I decided on this course, yet I never had reason to regret it,

nor to question the selections made by my predecessor.

The corps consisted of three cavalry divisions and twelve batteries

of horse artillery. Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert was in

command of the First Division, which was composed of three brigades;

Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg, of the Second, consisting of two

brigades; and Brigadier-General J. H. Wilson was afterward assigned

to command the Third, also comprising two brigades: Captain Robinson,

a veteran soldier of the Mexican war, was chief of artillery, and as

such had a general supervision of that arm, though the batteries,

either as units or in sections, were assigned to the different

divisions in campaign.

Each one of my division commanders was a soldier by profession.

Torbert graduated from the Military Academy in 1855, and was

commissioned in the infantry, in which arm he saw much service on the

frontier, in Florida, and on the Utah expedition. At the beginning

of hostilities in April, 1861, he was made a colonel of New Jersey

volunteers, and from that position was promoted in the fall of 1862

to be a brigadier-general, thereafter commanding a brigade of

infantry in the Army of the Potomac till, in the redistribution of

generals, after Grant came to the East, he was assigned to the First

Cavalry Division.

Gregg graduated in 1855 also, and was appointed to the First

Dragoons, with which regiment, up to the breaking out of the war, he

saw frontier service extending from Fort Union, New Mexico, through

to the Pacific coast, and up into Oregon and Washington Territories,

where I knew him slightly. In the fall of 1861 he became colonel of

the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and a year later was made a

brigadier-general. He then succeeded to the command of a division of

cavalry, and continued in that position till the close of his

service, at times temporarily commanding the Cavalry Corps. He was

the only division commander I had whose experience had been almost

exclusively derived from the cavalry arm.

Wilson graduated in 1860 in the Topographical Engineers, and was

first assigned to duty in Oregon, where he remained till July, 1861.

In the fall of that year his active service in the war began, and he

rose from one position to another, in the East and West, till, while

on General Grant's staff, he was made a brigadier-general in the fall

of 1863 in reward for services performed during the Vicksburg

campaign and for engineer duty at Chattanooga preceding the battle of

Missionary Ridge. At my request he was selected to command the Third

Division. General Grant thought highly of him, and, expecting much

from his active mental and physical ability, readily assented to

assign him in place of General Kilpatrick. The only other general

officers in the corps were Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt,

Brigadier-General George A. Custer, and Brigadier-General Henry E.

Davies, each commanding a brigade.

In a few days after my arrival at Brandy Station I reviewed my new

command, which consisted of about twelve thousand officers and men,

with the same number of horses in passable trim. Many of the general

officers of the army were present at the review, among them Generals

Meade, Hancock, and Sedgwick. Sedgwick being an old dragoon, came to

renew his former associations with mounted troops, and to encourage

me, as he jestingly said, because of the traditional prejudices the

cavalrymen were supposed to hold against being commanded by an

infantry officer. The corps presented a fine appearance at the

review, and so far as the health and equipment of the men were

concerned the showing was good and satisfactory; but the horses were

thin and very much worn down by excessive and, it seemed to me,

unnecessary picket duty, for the cavalry picket-line almost

completely encircled the infantry and artillery camps of the army,

covering a distance, on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles,

with hardly a mounted Confederate confronting it at any point. From

the very beginning of the war the enemy had shown more wisdom

respecting his cavalry than we. Instead of wasting its strength by a

policy of disintegration he, at an early day, had organized his

mounted force into compact masses, and plainly made it a favorite;

and, as usual, he was now husbanding the strength of his horses by

keeping them to the rear, so that in the spring he could bring them

out in good condition for the impending campaign.

Before and at the review I took in this situation, and determined to

remedy it if possible; so in due time I sought an interview with

General Meade and informed him that, as the effectiveness of my

command rested mainly on the strength of its horses, I thought the

duty it was then performing was both burdensome and wasteful. I also

gave him my idea as to what the cavalry should do, the main purport

of which was that it ought to be kept concentrated to fight the

enemy's cavalry. Heretofore, the commander of the Cavalry Corps had

been, virtually, but an adjunct at army headquarters--a sort of chief

of cavalry--and my proposition seemed to stagger General Meade not a

little. I knew that it would be difficult to overcome the recognized

custom of using the cavalry for the protection of trains and the

establishment of cordons around the infantry corps, and so far

subordinating its operations to the movements of the main army that

in name only was it a corps at all, but still I thought it my duty to

try.

At first General Meade would hardly listen to my proposition, for he

was filled with the prejudices that, from the beginning of the war,

had pervaded the army regarding the importance and usefulness of

cavalry, General Scott then predicting that the contest would be

settled by artillery, and thereafter refusing the services of

regiment after regiment of mounted troops. General Meade deemed

cavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty, and wanted to

know what would protect the transportation trains and artillery

reserve, cover the front of moving infantry columns, and secure his

flanks from intrusion, if my policy were pursued. I told him that if

he would let me use the cavalry as I contemplated, he need have

little solicitude in these respects, for, with a mass of ten thousand

mounted men, it was my belief that I could make it so lively for the

enemy's cavalry that, so far as attacks from it were concerned, the

flanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require little or no

defense, and claimed, further, that moving columns of infantry should

take care of their own fronts. I also told him that it was my object

to defeat the enemy's cavalry in a general combat, if possible, and

by such a result establish a feeling of confidence in my own troops

that would enable us after awhile to march where we pleased, for the

purpose of breaking General Lee's communications and destroying the

resources from which his army was supplied.

The idea as here outlined was contrary to Meade's convictions, for

though at different times since he commanded the Army of the Potomac

considerable bodies of the cavalry had been massed for some special

occasion, yet he had never agreed to the plan as a permanency, and

could not be bent to it now. He gave little encouragement,

therefore, to what I proposed, yet the conversation was immediately

beneficial in one way, for when I laid before him the true condition

of the cavalry, he promptly relieved it from much of the arduous and

harassing picket service it was performing, thus giving me about two

weeks in which to nurse the horses before the campaign opened.

The interview also disclosed the fact that the cavalry commander

should be, according to General Meade's views, at his headquarters

practically as one of his staff, through whom he would give detailed

directions as, in his judgment, occasion required. Meade's ideas and

mine being so widely divergent, disagreements arose between us later

during the battles of the Wilderness, which lack of concord ended in

some concessions on his part after the movement toward Spottsylvania

Court House began, and although I doubt that his convictions were

ever wholly changed, yet from that date on, in the organization of

the Army of the Potomac, the cavalry corps became more of a compact

body, with the same privileges and responsibilities that attached to

the other corps--conditions that never actually existed before.

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee, who was

occupying a defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan.

After detailing the various detachments which I was obliged to supply

for escorts and other mounted duty, I crossed the river with an

effective force of about 10,000 troopers. In the interval succeeding

my assignment to the command of the cavalry, I had taken the pains to

study carefully the topography of the country in eastern Virginia,

and felt convinced that, under the policy Meade intended I should

follow, there would be little opportunity for mounted troops to

acquit themselves well in a region so thickly wooded, and traversed

by so many almost parallel streams; but conscious that he would be

compelled sooner or later either to change his mind or partially give

way to the pressure of events, I entered on the campaign with the

loyal determination to aid zealously in all its plans.

General Lee's army was located in its winter quarters behind

intrenchments that lay along the Rapidan for a distance of about

twenty miles; extending from Barnett's to Morton's ford. The fords

below Morton's were watched by a few small detachments of Confederate

cavalry, the main body of which, however, was encamped below

Hamilton's crossing, where it could draw supplies from the rich

country along the Rappahannock. Only a few brigades of Lee's

infantry guarded the works along the river, the bulk of it being so

situated that it could be thrown to either flank toward which the

Union troops approached.

General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank, with the

purpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchments

along Mine Run and fight on equal terms. Grant knew well the

character of country through which he would have to pass, but he was

confident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly wooded

region of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facility

with which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and by

the fact that as he would thus cover Washington, there would be

little or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from his

force at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city.

In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance,

Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford and Wilson at Germania ford.

Torbert's division remained in the rear to cover the trains and

reserve artillery, holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper, and

thence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River. Gregg crossed

the Rapidan before daylight, in advance of the Second Corps, and when

the latter reached Ely's ford, he pushed on to Chancellorsville;

Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford, and when it reached

the river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by Wilderness

Tavern, as far as Parker's Store, from which point he sent a heavy

reconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division bivouacking

in a strong position. I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville and

fixed my headquarters at that place, whereon the 5th I was joined by

Torbert's division.

Meanwhile, General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established his

headquarters not far from Germania ford. From that point he was in

direct communication with Wilson, whose original instructions from me

carried him only as far as Parker's Store, but it being found, during

the night of the 4th, that the enemy was apparently unacquainted with

the occurrences of the day, Meade directed Wilson to advance in the

direction of Craig's Meeting House; leaving one regiment to hold

Parker's Store. Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser's

brigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House, and drove it back

rapidly a distance of about two miles, holding it there till noon,

while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson's

Run near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker's Store roads.

Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the Fifth

Corps, and the situation becoming threatening, he withdrew the second

brigade to the position occupied by the first, but scarcely had he

done so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon the

enemy's infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker's Store and cut

off his communication with General Meade. Surprised at this, he

determined to withdraw to Todd's Tavern, but before his resolution

could be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with a

heavy force, and at the same time began pushing troops down the

Catharpen road. Wilson was now in a perplexing situation, sandwiched

between the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker's

store and those occupying the Catharpen road, but he extricated his

command by passing it around the latter force, and reached Todd's

Tavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin's bridge. General Meade

discovering that the enemy had interposed at Parker's store between

Wilson and the Fifth Corps, sent me word to go to Wilson's relief,

and this was the first intimation I received that Wilson had been

pushed out so far, but, surmising that he would retire in the

direction of Todd's Tavern I immediately despatched Gregg's division

there to his relief. Just beyond Todd's Tavern Gregg met Wilson, who

was now being followed by the enemy's cavalry. The pursuing force

was soon checked, and then driven back to Shady Grove Church, while

Wilson's troops fell in behind Gregg's line, somewhat the worse for

their morning's adventure.

When the Army of the Potomac commenced crossing the Rapidan on the

4th, General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry,

began concentrating his command on the right of Lee's infantry,

bringing it from Hamilton's crossing and other points where it had

been wintering. Stuart's force at this date was a little more than

eight thousand men, organized in two divisions, commanded by Generals

Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Hampton's division was composed of

three brigades, commanded by Generals Cordon, Young, and Rosser;

Fitzhugh Lee's division comprised three brigades also, Generals W. H.

F. Lee, Lomax, and Wickham commanding them.

Information of this concentration, and of the additional fact that

the enemy's cavalry about Hamilton's crossing was all being drawn in,

reached me on the 5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving on

that point as I intended at the onset of the campaign. The

responsibility for the safety of our trains and of the left flank of

the army still continued, however, so I made such dispositions of my

troops as to secure these objects by holding the line of the Brock

road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's Tavern and

Piney Branch Church. On the 6th, through some false information,

General Meade became alarmed about his left flank, and sent me the

following note:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"May 6, 1864.--1 o'clock P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,

"Commanding Cavalry Corps

"Your despatch of 11.45 a.m., received. General Hancock has been

heavily pressed, and his left turned. The major-general commanding

thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry, so as to secure the

protection of the trains. The order requiring an escort for the

wagons to-night has been rescinded.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

On the morning of the 6th Custer's and Devin's brigades had been

severely engaged at the Furnaces before I received the above note.

They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks,

however, and I felt that the line taken up could be held; but the

despatch from General Humphreys was alarming, so I drew all the

cavalry close in toward Chancellorsville. It was found later that

Hancock's left had not been turned, and the points thus abandoned had

to be regained at a heavy cost in killed and wounded, to both the

cavalry and the infantry.

On the 7th of May, under directions from headquarters, Army of the

Potomac, the trains were put in motion to go into park at Piney

Branch Church, in anticipation of the movement that was about to be

made for the possession of Spottsylvania Court House. I felt

confident that the order to move the trains there had been given

without a full understanding of the situation, for Piney Branch

Church was now held by the enemy, a condition which had resulted from

the order withdrawing the cavalry on account of the supposed disaster

to Hancock's left the day before; but I thought the best way to

remedy matters was to hold the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich's

till the ground on which it was intended to park them should be

regained.

This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, a spirited fight for the

possession of the crossroads at that point, participated in by the

enemy's cavalry and Gregg's division, and two brigades of Torbert's

division, the latter commanded by Merritt, as Torbert became very ill

on the 6th, and had to be sent to the rear. To gain the objective

point--the crossroads--I directed Gregg to assail the enemy on the

Catharpen road with Irvin Gregg's brigade and drive him over Corbin's

bridge, while Merritt attacked him with the Reserve brigade on the

Spottsylvania road in conjunction with Davies's brigade of Gregg's

division, which was to be put in on the Piney Branch Church road, and

unite with Merritt's left. Davies's and Irvin Gregg's brigades on my

right and left flanks met with some resistance, yet not enough to

deter them from, executing their orders. In front of Merritt the

enemy held on more stubbornly, however, and there ensued an

exceedingly severe and, at times, fluctuating fight. Finally the

Confederates gave way, and we pursued them almost to Spottsylvania

Court House; but deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers about

dark, I encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the open fields

to the east of Todd's Tavern.

During the preceding three days the infantry corps of the army had

been engaged in the various conflicts known as the battles of the

Wilderness. The success of the Union troops in those battles had not

been all that was desired, and General Grant now felt that it was

necessary to throw himself on Lee's communications if possible, while

preserving his own intact by prolonging the movement to the left.

Therefore, on the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his whole

army toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement by

a night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern. In view of what was

contemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to move at daylight

on the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of gaining possession of

Snell's bridge over the Po River, the former by the crossing at

Corbin's bridge and the latter by the Block House. I also directed

Wilson, who was at Alsop's house, to take possession of Spottsylvania

as early as possible on the morning of the 8th, and then move into

position at Snell's bridge conjointly with the other two divisions.

Wilson's orders remained as I had issued them, so he moved

accordingly and got possession of Spottsylvania, driving the enemy's

cavalry a mile beyond, as will be seen by the following despatch sent

me at 9 A. M. of the 8th:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,

"ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

"SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 8, 1864 9 A. M.

"LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FORSYTH, CHIEF-OF-STAFF, C. C.

"Have run the enemy's cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court House;

have charged them, and drove them through the village; am fighting

now with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee's division.

Everything all right.

"J. H. WILSON,

"Brigadier-General Commanding.

During the night of the 7th General Meade arrived at Todd's Tavern

and modified the orders I had given Gregg and Merritt, directing

Gregg simply to hold Corbin's bridge, and Merritt to move out in

front of the infantry column marching on the Spottsylvania road.

Merritt proceeded to obey, but in advancing, our cavalry and infantry

became intermingled in the darkness, and much confusion and delay was

the consequence. I had not been duly advised of these changes in

Gregg's and Merritt's orders, and for a time I had fears for the

safety of Wilson, but, while he was preparing to move on to form his

junction with Gregg and Merritt at Snell's bridge, the advance of

Anderson (who was now commanding Longstreet's corps) appeared on the

scene and drove him from Spottsylvania.

Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they were

originally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought at

Spottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would have

encountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as to

enable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Lee

to take up a line behind the Po. I had directed Wilson to move from

the left by "the Gate" through Spottsylvania to Snell's bridge, while

Gregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Grove

and the Block House. There was nothing to prevent at least a partial

success of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of the

three divisions in front of Snell's bridge, even if we could not

actually have gained it. But both that important point and the

bridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee's

approach to Spottsylvania left entirely unobstructed, while three

divisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason of

disjointed and irregular instructions.

On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had been

given, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that had

been pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinations

I had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt on

the Spottsylvania road. On reaching Merritt I found General Warren

making complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantry

column, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division of

the Fifth Corps pushed up to the front. It got into line about 11

o'clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very far

before it struck Anderson's corps, and was hurled back with heavy

loss. This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day.

A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reached

his headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the better

of his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, laying

blame here and there for the blunders that had been committed. He

was particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things,

that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying the

Spottsylvania road. I replied that if this were true, he himself had

ordered it there without my knowledge. I also told him that he had

broken up my combinations, exposed Wilson's division to disaster, and

kept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuations

by saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring of

the cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficient

and useless before long. Meade was very much irritated, and I was

none the less so. One word brought on another, until, finally, I

told him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me,

but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without

consulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command the

Cavalry Corps himself--that I would not give it another order.

The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I left

him he went to General Grant's headquarters and repeated the

conversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whip

Stuart. At this General Grant remarked: "Did he say so? Then let him

go out and do it." This intimation was immediately acted upon by

General Meade, and a little later the following order came to me:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

"May 8th, 1864 1 P. M.

"GENERAL SHERIDAN,

"Commanding Cavalry Corps.

"The major-general commanding directs you to immediately concentrate

your available mounted force, and with your ammunition trains and

such supply trains as are filled (exclusive of ambulances) proceed

against the enemy's cavalry, and when your supplies are exhausted,

proceed via New Market and Green Bay to Haxall's Landing on the James

River, there communicating with General Butler, procuring supplies

and return to this army. Your dismounted men will be left with the

train here.

"A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major-General, Chief-of-staff."

As soon as the above order was received I issued instructions for the

concentration of the three divisions of cavalry at Aldrich's to

prepare for the contemplated expedition. Three days' rations for the

men were distributed, and half rations of grain for one day were

doled out for the horses. I sent for Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson and

communicated the order to them, saying at the same time, "We are

going out to fight Stuart's cavalry in consequence of a suggestion

from me; we will give him a fair, square fight; we are strong, and I

know we can beat him, and in view of my recent representations to

General Meade I shall expect nothing but success." I also indicated

to my division commanders the line of march I should take--moving in

one column around the right flank of Lee's army to get in its rear

--and stated at the same time that it was my intention to fight Stuart

wherever he presented himself, and if possible go through to Haxall's

Landing; but that if Stuart should successfully interpose between us

and that point we would swing back to the Army of the Potomac by

passing around the enemy's left flank by way of Gordonsville. At

first the proposition seemed to surprise the division commanders

somewhat, for hitherto even the boldest, mounted expeditions had been

confined to a hurried ride through the enemy's country, without

purpose of fighting more than enough to escape in case of

molestation, and here and there to destroy a bridge. Our move would

be a challenge to Stuart for a cavalry duel behind Lee's lines, in

his own country, but the advantages which it was reasonable to

anticipate from the plan being quickly perceived, each division

commander entered into its support unhesitatingly, and at once set

about preparing for the march next day.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE EXPEDITION STARTS--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--OPENING OF THE FIGHT AT

YELLOW TAVERN--GENERAL CUSTER'S BRILLIANT CHARGE--DEATH OF GENERAL

STUART--REMOVING TORPEDOES--EXCITEMENT IN RICHMOND--A NIGHT MARCH

--ENTERPRISING NEWSBOYS--THE EFFECTS OF STUART'S DEFEAT AND DEATH

--END OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION--ITS GREAT SUCCESS AND BENEFICIAL

RESULTS.

The expedition which resulted in the battle of Yellow Tavern and the

death of General Stuart started from the vicinity of Aldrich's toward

Fredericksburg early on the morning of May 9, 1864, marching on the

plank-road, Merritt's division leading. When the column reached

Tabernacle Church it headed almost due east to the telegraph road,

and thence down that highway to Thornburg, and from that point

through Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna River, it

being my desire to put my command south of that stream if possible,

where it could procure forage before it should be compelled to fight.

The corps moved at a walk, three divisions on the same road, making a

column nearly thirteen miles in length, and marched around the right

flank of the enemy unsuspected until my rear guard had passed

Massaponax Church. Although the column was very long, I preferred to

move it all on one road rather than to attempt combinations for

carrying the divisions to any given point by different routes.

Unless the separate commands in an expedition of this nature are very

prompt in movement, and each fully equal to overcoming at once any

obstacle it may meet, combinations rarely work out as expected;

besides, an engagement was at all times imminent, hence it was

specially necessary to keep the whole force well together.

As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta rivers were crossed, each of which

streams would have afforded an excellent defensive line to the enemy,

all anxiety as to our passing around Lee's army was removed, and our

ability to cross the North Anna placed beyond doubt. Meanwhile

General Stuart had discovered what we were about, and he set his

cavalry in motion, sending General Fitzhugh Lee to follow and attack

my rear on the Childsburg road, Stuart himself marching by way of

Davenport's bridge, on the North Anna, toward Beaver Dam Station,

near which place his whole command was directed to unite the next

day.

My column having passed the Ta River, Stuart attacked its rear with

considerable vigor, in the hope that he could delay my whole force

long enough to permit him to get at least a part of his command in my

front; but this scheme was frustrated by Davies's brigade, which I

directed to fight as a rear-guard, holding on at one position and

then at another along the line of march just enough to deter the

enemy from a too rapid advance. Davies performed this responsible

and trying duty with tact and good judgment, following the main

column steadily as it progressed to the south, and never once

permitting Fitzhugh Lee's advance to encroach far enough to compel a

halt of my main body. About dark Merritt's division crossed the

North Anna at Anderson's ford, while Gregg and Wilson encamped on the

north side, having engaged the enemy, who still hung on my rear up to

a late hour at night.

After Merritt's division passed the river, Custer's brigade proceeded

on to Beaver Dam Station to cut the Virginia Central railroad.

Before reaching the station he met a small force of the enemy, but

this he speedily drove off, recapturing from it about four hundred

Union prisoners, who had been taken recently in the Wilderness and

were being conducted to Richmond. Custer also destroyed the station,

two locomotives, three trains of cars, ninety wagons, from eight to

ten miles of railroad and telegraph lines, some two hundred thousand

pounds of bacon and other supplies, amounting in all to about a

million and a half of rations, and nearly all they medical stores of

General Lee's army, which had been moved from Orange Court House

either because Lee wished to have them directly in his rear or

because he contemplated falling back to the North Anna.

On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson, while crossing the North

Anna, were again attacked, but were covered by the division on the

south side of the stream; the passage was effected without much loss,

notwithstanding the approach of Stuart on the south bank from the

direction of Davenport's bridge. The possession of Beaver Dam gave

us an important point, as it opened a way toward Richmond by the

Negro-foot road. It also enabled us to obtain forage for our

well-nigh famished animals, and to prepare for fighting the enemy,

who, I felt sure, would endeavor to interpose between my column and

Richmond.

Stuart had hardly united his troops near Beaver Dam when he realized

that concentrating there was a mistake, so he began making

dispositions for remedying his error, and while we leisurely took the

Negro-foot toad toward Richmond, he changed his tactics and hauled

off from my rear, urging his horses to the death in order to get in

between Richmond and my column. This he effected about 10 o'clock on

the morning of the 11th, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six miles

from the city, on the Brook turnpike. His change of tactics left my

march on the 10th practically unmolested, and we quietly encamped

that night on the south bank of the South Anna, near Ground Squirrel

Bridge. Here we procured an abundance of forage, and as the distance

traveled that day had been only fifteen to eighteen miles, men and

horses were able to obtain a good rest during the night.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, May 11, Davies's brigade of Gregg's

division marched for Ashland to cut the Fredericksburg railroad.

Arriving there before the head of the enemy's column, which had to

pass through this same place to reach Yellow Tavern, Davies drove out

a small force occupying the town, burnt a train of cars and a

locomotive, destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined

the main column at Allen's Station on the Fredericksburg and Richmond

railroad. From Allen's Station the whole command moved on Yellow

Tavern, Merritt in the lead, Wilson following, and Gregg in the rear.

The appearance of Davies's brigade at Ashland in the morning had had

the effect of further mystifying the enemy as to my intentions; and

while he held it incumbent to place himself between me and Richmond,

yet he was still so uncertain of my movements that he committed the

same fault that he did the first day, when he divided his force and

sent a part to follow me on the Childsburg road. He now divided his

command again, sending a portion to hang upon my rear, while he

proceeded with the rest to Yellow Tavern. This separation not only

materially weakened the force which might have been thrown across my

line of march, but it also enabled me to attack with almost my entire

corps, while occupying the pursuers with a small rearguard.

By forced marches General Stuart succeeded in reaching Yellow Tavern

ahead of me on May 11; and the presence of, his troops, on the

Ashland and Richmond road becoming known to Merritt as he was

approaching the Brook turnpike, this general pressed forward at once

to the attack. Pushing his division to the front, he soon got

possession of the turnpike and drove the enemy back several hundred

yards to the east of it. This success had the effect of throwing the

head of my column to the east of the pike, and I quickly brought up

Wilson and one of Gregg's brigades to take advantage of the situation

by forming a line of battle on that side or the road. Meanwhile the

enemy, desperate but still confident, poured in a heavy fire from his

line and from a battery which enfiladed the Brook road, and made

Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place. Gibbs's and Devin's

brigades, however, held fast there, while Custer, supported by

Chapman's brigade, attacked the enemy's left and battery in a mounted

charge.

Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank and the rest of Wilson's

division sustaining him, was brilliantly executed. Beginning at a

walk, he increased his gait to a trot, and then at full speed rushed

at the enemy. At the same moment the dismounted troops along my

whole front moved forward, and as Custer went through the battery,

capturing two of the guns with their cannoneers and breaking up the

enemy's left, Gibbs and Devin drove his centre and right from the

field. Gregg meanwhile, with equal success, charged the force in his

rear-Gordon's brigadeand the engagement ended by giving us complete

control of the road to Richmond. We captured a number of prisoners,

and the casualties on both sides were quite severe, General Stuart

himself falling mortally wounded, and General James B. Gordon, one of

his brigade commanders, being killed.

After Custer's charge, the Confederate cavalry was badly broken up,

the main portion of it being driven in a rout toward Ashland and a

small part in the direction of Richmond, which latter force finally

rejoined Fitzhugh Lee near Mechanicsville. A reconnoitring party

being now sent up the Brook turnpike toward the city, dashed across

the South Fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the

enemy's exterior intrenchments and went within them. I followed this

party, and after a little exploration found between the two lines of

works a country road that led across to the pike which runs from

Mechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around within the

outer line of works by this country road across to the Mechanicsville

pike on the south side of the Chickahominy, and encamp the next night

at Fair Oaks; so I determined to make the movement after dark, being

influenced in this to some extent by reports received during the

afternoon from colored people, to the effect that General B. F.

Butler's army had reached a small stream on the south side of the

James, about four miles south of Richmond. If I could succeed in

getting through by this road, not only would I have a shorter line of

march to Haxall's landing, but there was also a possibility that I

could help Butler somewhat by joining him so near Richmond.

Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we

commenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, and

massed the command on the plateau south of the Meadow bridge near

daylight on the 12th.

The enemy, anticipating that I would march by this route, had planted

torpedoes along it, and many of these exploded as the column passed

over them, killing several horses and wounding a few men, but beyond

this we met with no molestation. The torpedoes were loaded shells

planted on each side of the road, and so connected by wires attached

to friction-tubes in the shells, that when a horse's hoof struck a

wire the shell was exploded by the jerk on the improvised lanyard.

After the loss of several horses and the wounding of some of the men

by these torpedoes, I gave directions to have them removed, if

practicable, so about twenty-five of the prisoners were brought up

and made to get down on their knees, feel for the wires in the

darkness, follow them up and unearth the shells. The prisoners

reported the owner of one of the neighboring houses to be the

principal person who had engaged in planting these shells, and I

therefore directed that some of them be carried and placed in the

cellar of his house, arranged to explode if the enemy's column came

that way, while he and his family were brought off as prisoners and

held till after daylight.

Meanwhile the most intense excitement prevailed in Richmond. The

Confederates, supposing that their capital was my objective point,

were straining every effort to put it in a state of defense, and had

collected between four and five thousand irregular troops, under

General Bragg, besides bringing up three brigades of infantry from

the force confronting General Butler south of the James River, the

alarm being intensified by the retreat, after the defeat at Yellow

Tavern, of Stuart's cavalry, now under General Fitzhugh Lee, by way

of Ashland to Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy,

for falling back in that direction, left me between them and

Richmond.

Our march during the night of the 11th was very tedious, on account

of the extreme darkness and frequent showers of rain; but at daylight

on the 12th the head of my column, under Wilson, reached the

Mechanicsville pike. Here Wilson, encountering the enemy's works and

batteries manned by General Bragg's troops, endeavored to pass. In

this he failed, and as soon as I was notified that it was

impracticable to reach Fair Oaks by passing between the works and the

Chickahominy, Custer's brigade was directed to make the crossing to

the north side of the Chickahominy, at the Meadow bridge. Custer

moved rapidly for the bridge, but found it destroyed, and that the

enemy's cavalry was posted on the north side, in front of

Mechanicsville. When this information came back, I ordered Merritt

to take his whole division and repair the bridge, instructing him

that the crossing must be made at all hazards; for, in view of an

impending attack by the enemy's infantry in Richmond, it was

necessary that I should have the bridge as a means of egress in case

of serious disaster.

All the time that Merritt was occupied in this important duty, the

enemy gave great annoyance to the working party by sweeping the

bridge with a section of artillery and a fire from the supporting

troops, so a small force was thrown across to drive them away.

When Merritt had passed two regiments over, they attacked, but

were repulsed. The work on the bridge continued, however,

not-withstanding this discomfiture; and when it was finished, Merritt

crossed nearly all his division, dismounted, and again attacked the

enemy, this time carrying the line, of temporary breastworks, built

with logs and rails, and pursuing his broken troops toward Gaines's

Mills.

While Merritt was engaged in this affair, the Confederates advanced

from behind their works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg.

Wilson's troops were driven back in some confusion at first; but

Gregg, in anticipation of attack, had hidden a heavy line of

dismounted men in a bushy ravine on his front, and when the enemy

marched upon it, with much display and under the eye of the President

of the Confederacy, this concealed line opened a destructive fire

with repeating carbines; and at the same time the batteries of

horse-artillery, under Captain Robinson, joining in the contest,

belched forth shot and shell with fatal effect. The galling fire

caused the enemy to falter, and while still wavering Wilson rallied

his men, and turning some of them against the right flank of the

Confederates, broke their line, and compelled them to withdraw for

security behind the heavy works thrown up for the defense of the city

in 1862.

By destroying the Meadow bridge and impeding my column on the

Mechanicsville, pike, the enemy thought to corner us completely, for

he still maintained the force in Gregg's rear that had pressed it the

day before; but the repulse of his infantry ended all his hopes of

doing us any serious damage on the limited ground between the

defenses of Richmond and the Chickahominy. He felt certain that on

account of the recent heavy rains we could not cross the Chickahominy

except by the Meadow bridge, and it also seemed clear to him that we

could not pass between the river and his intrenchments; therefore he

hoped to ruin us, or at least compel us to return by the same route

we had taken in coming, in which case we would run into Gordon's

brigade, but the signal repulse of Bragg's infantry dispelled these

illusions.

Even had it not been our good fortune to defeat him, we could have

crossed the Chickahominy if necessary at several points that were

discovered by scouting parties which, while the engagement was going

on, I had sent out to look up fords. This means of getting out from

the circumscribed plateau I did not wish to use, however, unless

there was no alternative, for I wished to demonstrate to the Cavalry

Corps the impossibility of the enemy's destroying or capturing so

large a body of mounted troops.

The chances of seriously injuring, us were more favorable to the

enemy this time than ever they were afterward, for with the troops

from Richmond, comprising three brigades of veterans and about five

thousand irregulars on my front and right flank, with Gordon's

cavalry in the rear, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on my left flank,

holding the Chickahominy and Meadow bridge, I was apparently hemmed

in on every side, but relying on the celerity with which mounted

troops could be moved, I felt perfectly confident that the seemingly

perilous situation could be relieved under circumstances even worse

than those then surrounding us. Therefore, instead of endeavoring to

get away without a fight, I concluded that there would be little

difficulty in withdrawing, even should I be beaten, and none whatever

if I defeated the enemy.

In accordance with this view I accepted battle; and the complete

repulse of the enemy's infantry, which assailed us from his

intrenchments, and of Gordon's cavalry, which pressed Gregg on the

Brook road, ended the contest in our favor. The rest of the day we

remained on the battle-field undisturbed, and our time was spent in

collecting the wounded, burying the dead, grazing the horses, and

reading the Richmond journals, two small newsboys with commendable

enterprise having come within our lines from the Confederate capital

to sell their papers. They were sharp youngsters, and having come

well supplied, they did a thrifty business. When their stock in

trade was all disposed of they wished to return, but they were so

intelligent and observant that I thought their mission involved other

purposes than the mere sale of newspapers, so they were held till we

crossed the Chickahominy and then turned loose.

After Merritt had crossed the Chickahominy and reached

Mechanicsville, I sent him orders to push on to Gaines's Mills. Near

the latter place he fell in with the enemy's cavalry again, and

sending me word, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon I crossed the

Chickahominy with Wilson and Gregg, but when we overtook Merritt he

had already brushed the Confederates away, and my whole command went

into camp between Walnut Grove and Gaines's Mills.

The main purposes of the expedition had now been executed. They were

"to break up General Lee's railroad communications, destroy such

depots of supplies as could be found in his rear, and to defeat

General Stuart's cavalry." Many miles of the Virginia Central and of

the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads were broken up, and

several of the bridges on each burnt. At Beaver Dam, Ashland, and

other places, about two millions of rations had been captured and

destroyed. The most important of all, however, was the defeat of

Stuart. Since the beginning of the war this general had

distinguished himself by his management of the Confederate mounted

force. Under him the cavalry of Lee's army had been nurtured, and

had acquired such prestige that it thought itself well-nigh

invincible; indeed, in the early years of the war it had proved to be

so. This was now dispelled by the successful march we had made in

Lee's rear; and the discomfiture of Stuart at Yellow Tavern had

inflicted a blow from which entire recovery was impossible.

In its effect on the Confederate cause the defeat of Stuart was most

disheartening, but his death was even a greater calamity, as is

evidenced by the words of a Confederate writer (Cooke), who says:

"Stuart could be ill spared at this critical moment, and General Lee

was plunged into the deepest melancholy at the intelligence of his

death. When it reached him he retired from those around him, and

remained for some time communing with his own heart and memory. When

one of his staff entered and spoke of Stuart, General Lee said: 'I

can scarcely think of him without weeping.'"

From the camp near Gaines's Mills I resumed the march to Haxall's

Landing, the point on the James River contemplated in my instructions

where I was to obtain supplies from General Butler. We got to the

James on the 14th with all our wounded and a large number of

prisoners, and camped between Haxall's and Shirley. The prisoners,

as well as the captured guns, were turned over to General Butler's

provost-marshal, and our wounded were quickly and kindly cared for by

his surgeons. Ample supplies, also, in the way of forage and

rations, were furnished us by General Butler, and the work of

refitting for our return to the Army of the Potomac was vigorously

pushed. By the 17th all was ready, and having learned by scouting

parties sent in the direction of Richmond and as far as Newmarket

that the enemy's cavalry was returning to Lee's army I started that

evening on my return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's

bridge, and bivouacking on the 19th near Baltimore crossroads.

My uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac in our

absence, and as to where I should find it, made our getting back a

problem somewhat difficult of solution, particularly as I knew that

reinforcements for Lee had come up from the south to Richmond, and

that most likely some of these troops were being held at different

points on the route to intercept my column. Therefore I determined

to pass the Pamunkey River at the White House, and sent to Fort

Monroe for a pontoon-bridge on which to make the crossing. While

waiting for the pontoons I ordered Custer to proceed with his brigade

to Hanover Station, to destroy the railroad bridge over the South

Anna, a little beyond that place; at the same time I sent Gregg and

Wilson to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond as

far as Mechanicsville, so as to cover Custer's movements. Merritt,

with the remaining brigades of his division, holding fast at

Baltimore crossroads to await events.

After Gregg and Custer had gone, it was discovered that the railroad

bridge over the Pamunkey, near the White House, had been destroyed

but partially--the cross-ties and stringers being burned in places

only--and that it was practicable to repair it sufficiently to carry

us over. In view of this information General Merritt's two brigades

were at once put on the duty of reconstructing the bridge. By

sending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man of

which would bring in a board or a plank, Merritt soon accumulated

enough lumber for the flooring, and in one day the bridge was made

practicable. On the 22d Gregg, Wilson, and Custer returned. The

latter had gone on his expedition as far as Hanover Station,

destroyed some commissary stores there, and burned two trestle

bridges over Hanover Creek. This done, he deemed it prudent to

retire to Hanovertown. The next morning he again marched to Hanover

Station, and there ascertained that a strong force of the enemy,

consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was posted at the

South Anna bridges. These troops had gone there from Richmond en

route to reinforce Lee. In the face of this impediment Custer's

mission could not be executed fully, so he returned to Baltimore

crossroads.

The whole command was drawn in by noon of the 22d, and that day it

crossed the Pamunkey by Merritt's reconstructed bridge, marching to

Ayletts, on the Mattapony River, the same night. Here I learned from

citizens, and from prisoners taken during the day by scouting parties

sent toward Hanover Court House, that Lee had been, forced from his

position near Spottsylvania Court House and compelled to retire to

the line of the North Anna. I then determined to rejoin the Army of

the Potomac at the earliest moment, which I did by making for

Chesterfield Station, where I reported to General Meade on the 24th

of May.

Our return to Chesterfield ended the first independent expedition the

Cavalry Corps had undertaken since coming under my command, and our

success was commended highly by Generals Grant and Meade, both

realizing that our operations in the rear of Lee had disconcerted and

alarmed that general so much as to aid materially in forcing his

retrograde march, and both acknowledged that, by drawing off the

enemy's cavalry during the past fortnight, we had enabled them to

move the Army of the Potomac and its enormous trains without

molestation in the manoeuvres that had carried it to the North Anna.

Then, too, great quantities of provisions and munitions of war had

been destroyed--stores that the enemy had accumulated at sub-depots

from strained resources and by difficult means; the railroads that

connected Lee with Richmond broken, the most successful cavalry

leader of the South killed, and in addition to all this there had

been inflicted on the Confederate mounted troops the most thorough

defeat that had yet befallen them in Virginia.

When the expedition set out the Confederate authorities in Richmond

were impressed, and indeed convinced, that my designs contemplated

the capture of that city, and notwithstanding the loss they sustained

in the defeat and death of Stuart, and their repulse the succeeding

day, they drew much comfort from the fact that I had not entered

their capital. Some Confederate writers have continued to hold this

theory and conviction since the war. In this view they were and are

in error. When Stuart was defeated the main purpose of my

instructions had been carried out, and my thoughts then turned to

joining General Butler to get supplies. I believed that I could do

this by cutting across to the Mechanicsville pike and Fair Oaks on

the south side of the Chickahominy, but the failure of Wilson's

column to get possession of the outwork which commanded the pike

necessitated my crossing at Meadow bridge, and then moving by

Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mills instead of by the shorter route.

Moreover, my information regarding General Butler's position was

incorrect, so that even had I been successful in getting to Fair Oaks

by the direct road I should still have gained nothing thereby, for I

should still have been obliged to continue down the James River to

Haxall's.

CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL WILSON'S ADVANCE TOWARD HANOVER COURT HOUSE--CROSSING THE

PAMUNKEY--ENGAGEMENT OF HAWE'S SHOP--FIGHT AT MATADEQUIN CREEK

--CAPTURE OF COLD HARBOR--THE FIGHT TO RETAIN THE PLACE--MOVEMENTS

OF GENERAL WILSON.

When I rejoined the Army of the Potomac, near Chesterfield Station,

the heavy battles around Spottsylvania had been fought, and the

complicated manoeuvres by which the whole Union force was swung

across the North Anna were in process of execution. In conjunction

with these manoeuvres Wilson's division was sent to the right flank

of the army, where he made a reconnoissance south of the North Anna

as far as Little River, crossing the former stream near Jericho

Mills. Wilson was to operate from day to day on that flank as it

swung to the south, covering to New Castle ferry each advance of the

infantry and the fords left behind on the march. From the 26th to

the 30th these duties kept Wilson constantly occupied, and also

necessitated a considerable dispersion of his force, but by the 31st

he was enabled to get all his division together again, and crossing

to the south side of the Pamunkey at New Castle ferry, he advanced

toward Hanover Court House. Near Dr Pride's house he encountered a

division of the enemy's cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee, and drove

it back across Mechamp's Creek, thus opening communication with the

right of our infantry resting near Phillips's Mills. Just as this

had been done, a little before dark, Wilson received an order from

General Meade directing him to push on toward Richmond until he

encountered the Confederates in such strength that he could no longer

successfully contend against them, and in compliance with this order

occupied Hanover Court House that same day. Resuming his march at

daylight on June 1, he went ahead on the Ashland road while sending

Chapman's brigade up the south bank of the South Anna to destroy the

bridges on that stream. Chapman having succeeded in this work,

Wilson re-united his whole command and endeavored to hold Ashland,

but finding the Confederate cavalry and infantry there in strong

force, he was obliged to withdraw to Dr. Price's house. Here he

learned that the army had gone to the left toward Cold Harbor, so on

the 2d of June he moved to Hawe's Shop.

While Wilson was operating thus on the right, I had to cover with

Gregg's and Torbert's divisions the crossing of the army over the

Pamunkey River at and near Hanovertown. Torbert having recovered

from the illness which overtook him in the Wilderness, had now

returned to duty. The march to turn the enemy's right began on the

26th. Torbert and Gregg in advance, to secure the crossings of the

Pamunkey and demonstrate in such manner as to deceive the enemy as

much as possible in the movement, the two cavalry divisions being

supported by General D. A. Russell's division of the Sixth Corps.

To attain this end in the presence of an ever-watchful foe who had

just recently been reinforced in considerable numbers from Richmond

and further south--almost enough to make up the losses he had

sustained in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania--required the most

vigorous and zealous work on the part of those to whom had been

allotted the task of carrying out the initial manoeuvres. Torbert

started for Taylor's ford on the Pamunkey with directions to

demonstrate heavily at that point till after dark, as if the crossing

was to be made there, and having thus impressed the enemy, he was to

leave a small guard, withdraw quietly, and march to Hanovertown ford,

where the real crossing was to be effected. Meanwhile Gregg marched

to Littlepage's crossing of the Pamunkey, with instructions to make

feints in the same manner as Torbert until after dark, when he was to

retire discreetly, leaving a small force to keep up the

demonstration, and then march rapidly to Hanovertown crossing, taking

with him the pontoon-bridge.

At the proper hour Russell took up the march and followed the

cavalry. The troops were in motion all night, undergoing the usual

delays incident to night marches, and, early on the morning of the

27th the crossing was made, Custer's brigade of Torbert's division

driving from the ford about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, and

capturing between thirty and forty prisoners. The remainder of

Torbert's division followed this brigade and advanced to Hanovertown,

where General Gordon's brigade of Confederate cavalry was met.

Torbert attacked this force with Devin's brigade, while he sent

Custer to Hawe's Shop, from which point a road leading to the right

was taken that brought him in rear of the enemy's cavalry; when the

Confederates discovered this manoeuvre, they retired in the direction

of Hanover Court House. Pursuit continued as far as a little stream

called Crump's Creek, and here Torbert was halted, Gregg moving up on

his line meanwhile, and Russell encamping near the crossing of the

river. This completed our task of gaining a foothold south of the

Pamunkey, and on the 28th the main army crossed unharassed and took

up a position behind my line, extending south from the river, with

the Sixth Corps on the right across the Hanover Court House road at

Crump's Creek, the Second Corps on the left of the Sixth, and the

Fifth Corps about two miles in front of Hanovertown, its left

extending to the Tolopotomy.

There was now much uncertainty in General Grant's mind as to the

enemy's whereabouts, and there were received daily the most

conflicting statements as to the nature of Lee's movements. It

became necessary, therefore, to find out by an actual demonstration

what Lee was doing, and I was required to reconnoitre in the

direction of Mechanicsville. For this purpose I moved Gregg's

division out toward this town by way of Hawe's Shop, and when it had

gone about three-fourths of a mile beyond the Shop the enemy's

cavalry was discovered dismounted and disposed behind a temporary

breastwork of rails and logs.

This was the first occasion on which, since the battle of Yellow

Tavern, the Confederate troopers had confronted us in large numbers,

their mounted operations, like ours, having been dependent more or

less on the conditions that grew out of the movements in which Lee's

infantry had been engaged since the 14th of May.

On that date General Lee had foreshadowed his intention of using his

cavalry in connection with the manoeuvres of his infantry by issuing

an order himself, now that Stuart was dead, directing that the "three

divisions of cavalry serving with the army [Lee's] will constitute

separate commands, and will report directly to and receive orders

from the headquarters of the army." The order indicates that since

Stuart's death the Confederate cavalry had been re-organized into

three divisions, that were commanded respectively by General Wade

Hampton, General Fitzhugh Lee, and General W. H. F. Lee, the

additional division organization undoubtedly growing out of the fact,

that General M. C. Butler's brigade of about four thousand men had

joined recently from South Carolina.

When this force developed in Gregg's front, he attacked the moment

his troops could be dismounted; and the contest became one of

exceeding stubborness, for he found confronting him Hampton's and

Fitzhugh Lee's divisions, supported by what we then supposed to be a

brigade of infantry, but which, it has since been ascertained, was

Butler's brigade of mounted troops; part of them armed with

long-range rifles. The contest between the opposing forces was of

the severest character and continued till late in the evening. The

varying phases of the fight prompted me to reinforce Gregg as much as

possible, so I directed Custer's brigade to report to him, sending,

meanwhile, for the other two brigades of Torbert, but these were not

available at the time--on account of delays which occurred in

relieving them from the line at Crump's Creek--and did not get up

till the fight was over. As soon as Custer joined him, Gregg

vigorously assaulted the Confederate position along his whole front;

and notwithstanding the long-range rifles of the South Carolinians,

who were engaging in their first severe combat it appears, and fought

most desperately, he penetrated their barricades at several points.

The most determined and obstinate efforts for success were now made

on both sides, as the position at Hawe's Shop had become of very

great importance on account of the designs of both Lee and Grant.

Lee wished to hold this ground while he manoeuvred his army to the

line of the Tolopotomy, where he could cover the roads to Richmond,

while Grant, though first sending me out merely to discover by a

strong reconnoissance the movements of the enemy, saw the value of

the place to cover his new base at the White House, and also to give

us possession of a direct road to Cold Harbor. Hawe's Shop remained

in our possession finally, for late in the evening Custer's brigade

was dismounted and formed in close column in rear of Gregg, and while

it assaulted through an opening near the centre of his line, the

other two brigades advanced and carried the temporary works. The

enemy's dead and many of his wounded fell into our hands; also a

considerable number of prisoners, from whom we learned that

Longstreet's and Ewell's corps were but four miles to the rear.

The battle was a decidedly severe one, the loss on each side being

heavy in proportion to the number of troops engaged. This fight took

place almost immediately in front of our infantry, which, during the

latter part of the contest, was busily occupied in throwing up

intrenchments. Late in the afternoon I reported to General Meade the

presence of the enemy's infantry, and likewise that Hampton's and

Fitzhugh Lee's divisions were in my front also, and asked, at the

same time; that some of our infantry, which was near at hand, be sent

to my assistance. I could not convince Meade that anything but the

enemy's horse was fighting us, however, and he declined to push out

the foot-troops, who were much wearied by night marches. It has been

ascertained since that Meade's conclusions were correct in so far as

they related to the enemy's infantry; but the five cavalry brigades

far outnumbered my three, and it is to be regretted that so much was

risked in holding a point that commanded the roads to Cold Harbor and

Meadow bridge, when there was at hand a preponderating number of

Union troops which might have been put into action. However, Gregg's

division and Custer's brigade were equal to the situation, all

unaided as they were till dark, when Torbert and Merritt came on the

ground. The contest not only gave us the crossroads, but also

removed our uncertainty regarding Lee's movements, clearly

demonstrating that his army was retiring by its right flank, so that

it might continue to interpose between Grant and the James River; as

well as cover the direct route to Richmond.

General Lee reported this battle to his Government as a Confederate

victory, but his despatch was sent early in the day, long before the

fight ended, and evidently he could not have known the final result

when he made the announcement, for the fight lasted until dark.

After dark, our own and the Confederate dead having been buried, I

withdrew, and moving to the rear of our infantry, marched all night

and till I reached the vicinity of Old Church, where I had been

instructed to keep a vigilant watch on the enemy with Gregg's and

Torbert's divisions. As soon as I had taken position at Old Church

my pickets were pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, and the

fact that the enemy was holding that point in some force was clearly

ascertained. But our occupation of Cold Harbor was of the utmost

importance; indeed, it was absolutely necessary that we should

possess it, to secure our communications with the White House, as

well as to cover the extension of our line to the left toward the

James River. Roads from Bethesda Church, Old Church, and the White

House centred at Cold Harbor, and from there many roads diverged also

toward different crossings of the Chickahominy, which were

indispensable to us.

The enemy too realized the importance of the place, for as soon as he

found himself compelled to take up the line of the Tolopotomy he

threw a body of troops into Cold Harbor by forced marches, and

followed it up by pushing a part of this force out on the Old Church

road as far as Matadequin Creek, where he established a line of

battle, arranging the front of it parallel to the road along the

south bank of the Pamunkey; this for the purpose of endangering our

trains as they moved back and forth between the army and the White

House.

Meanwhile I had occupied Old Church and pushed pickets down toward

Cold Harbor. The outposts struck each other just north of Matadequin

Creek, and a spirited fight immediately took place. At first our

pickets were sorely pressed, but Torbert, who was already preparing

to make a reconnoissance, lost no time in reinforcing them on the

north side of the creek with Devin's brigade. The fight then became

general, both sides, dismounted, stubbornly contesting the ground.

Of the Confederates, General Butler's South Carolinians bore the

brunt of the fight, and, strongly posted as they were on the south

bank of the creek, held their ground with the same obstinacy they had

previously shown at Hawe's Shop. Finally, however, Torbert threw

Merritt's and Custer's brigades into the action, and the enemy

retired, we pursuing to within a mile and a half of Cold Harbor and

capturing a number of prisoners. Gregg's division took no part in

the actual fighting, but remained near Old Church observing the roads

on Torberts flanks, one leading toward Bethesda Church on his right,

the other to his left in the direction of the White House. This

latter road Gregg was particularly instructed to keep open, so as to

communicate with General W. F. Smith, who was then debarking his

corps at the White House, and on the morning of the 31st this

general's advance was covered by a brigade which Gregg had sent him

for the purpose.

Torbert having pursued toward Cold Harbor the troops he fought at

Matadequin Creek, had taken up a position about a mile and a half

from that place, on the Old Church road. The morning of the 31st I

visited him to arrange for his further advance, intending thus to

anticipate an expected attack from Fitzhugh Lee, who was being

reinforced by infantry. I met Torbert at Custer's headquarters, and

found that the two had already been talking over a scheme to capture

Cold Harbor, and when their plan was laid before me it appeared so

plainly feasible that I fully endorsed it, at once giving directions

for its immediate execution, and ordering Gregg to come forward to

Torbert's support with such troops as he could spare from the duty

with which he had been charged.

Torbert moved out promptly, Merritt's brigade first, followed by

Custer's, on the direct road to Cold Harbor, while Devin's brigade

was detached, and marched by a left-hand road that would bring him in

on the right and rear of the enemy's line, which was posted in front

of the crossroads. Devin was unable to carry his part of the

programme farther than to reach the front of the Confederate right,

and as Merritt came into position to the right of the Old Church road

Torbert was obliged to place a part of Custer's brigade on Merritt's

left so as to connect with Devin. The whole division was now in

line, confronted by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Clingman's

brigade from Hoke's division of infantry; and from the Confederate

breastworks, hastily constructed out of logs, rails, and earth, a

heavy fire was already being poured upon us that it seemed impossible

to withstand. None of Gregg's division had yet arrived, and so

stubborn was the enemy's resistance that I began to doubt our ability

to carry the place before reinforcements came up, but just then

Merritt reported that he could turn the enemy's left, and being

directed to execute his proposition, he carried it to a most

successful issue with the First and Second regular cavalry. Just as

these two regiments passed around the enemy's left and attacked his

rear, the remainder of the division assailed him in front. This

manoeuvre of Merritt's stampeded the Confederates, and the defenses

falling into our hands easily, we pushed ahead on the Bottom's bridge

road three-fourths of a mile beyond Cold Harbor.

Cold Harbor was now mine, but I was about nine miles away from our

nearest infantry, and had been able to bring up only Davies's brigade

of cavalry, which arrived after the fight. My isolated position

therefore made me a little uneasy. I felt convinced that the enemy

would attempt to regain the place, for it was of as much importance

to him as to us, and the presence of his infantry disclosed that he

fully appreciated this. My uneasiness increased as the day grew

late, for I had learned from prisoners that the balance of Hoke's

division was en route to Cold Harbor, and Kershaw near at hand,

interposing between the Union left near Bethesda Church and my

position. In view of this state of affairs, I notified General Meade

that I had taken Cold Harbor, but could not with safety to my command

hold it, and forthwith gave directions to withdraw during the night.

The last of my troops had scarcely pulled out, however, when I

received a despatch from Meade directing me to hold Cold Harbor at

every hazard. General Grant had expected that a severe battle would

have to be fought before we could obtain possession of the place; and

its capture by our cavalry not being anticipated, no preparation had

been made for its permanent occupancy. No time was to be lost,

therefore, if the advantages which possession of Cold Harbor gave us

were to be improved, so at the same hour that Meade ordered me to

hold the place at all hazards the Sixth Corps was started on a forced

march, by Grant's directions, to aid in that object, and on arrival

to relieve my cavalry.

The moment Meade's order was received, I directed a reoccupation of

Cold Harbor, and although a large portion of Torbert's command was

already well on its way back to the line we held on the morning of

the 31st, this force speedily retraced its steps, and re-entered the

place before daylight; both our departure and return having been

effected without the enemy being aware of our movements. We now

found that the temporary breastworks of rails and logs which the

Confederates had built were of incalculable benefit to us in

furnishing material with which to establish a line of defense, they

being made available by simply reversing them at some points, or at

others wholly reconstructing them to suit the circumstances of the

ground: The troops, without reserves, were then placed behind our

cover dismounted, boxes of ammunition distributed along the line, and

the order passed along that the place must be held. All this was

done in the darkness, and while we were working away at our cover the

enemy could be distinctly heard from our skirmish-line giving

commands and making preparations to attack.

Just after daylight on the 1st of June the Confederate infantry under

General Kershaw endeavored to drive us out, advancing against my

right from the Bethesda Church road. In his assault he was permitted

to come close up to our works, and when within short range such afire

was opened on him from our horse-artillery and repeating carbines

that he recoiled in confusion after the first onset; still, he seemed

determined to get the place, and after reorganizing, again attacked;

but the lesson of the first repulse was not without effect, and his

feeble effort proved wholly fruitless. After his second failure we

were left undisturbed, and at 9 A.M. I sent the following despatch to

army headquarters:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,

"ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

"Cold Harbor, Va., June 1, 1864--9 A.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS,

"Chief-of-Staff.

"GENERAL: In obedience to your instructions I am holding Cold Harbor.

I have captured this morning more prisoners; they belong to three

different infantry brigades. The enemy assaulted the right of my

lines this morning, but were handsomely repulsed. I have been very

apprehensive, but General Wright is now coming up. I built slight

works for my men; the enemy came up to them, and were driven back.

General Wright has just arrived.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Major-General Commanding."

About 10 o'clock in the morning the Sixth Corps relieved Torbert and

Davies, having marched all night, and these two generals moving out

toward the Chickahominy covered the left of the infantry line till

Hancock's corps took their place in the afternoon. By this time

Gregg had joined me with his two brigades, and both Torbert and Gregg

were now marched to Prospect Church, from which point I moved them to

a position on the north side of the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge.

Here the enemy's cavalry confronted us, occupying the south bank of

the stream, with artillery in position at the fords prepared to

dispute our passage; but it was not intended that we should cross; so

Gregg and Torbert lay quiet in camp at Bottom's bridge and at Old

Church without noteworthy event until the 6th of June.

As before related, Wilson's division struck the enemy's infantry as

well as W. H. F. Lee's cavalry near Ashland on the 1st of June, and

although Chapman destroyed the bridges over the South Anna, which was

his part of the programme, Wilson found it necessary to return to

Price's Store. From this point he continued to cover the right of

the Army of the Potomac, on the 2d of June driving the rear-guard of

the enemy from Hawe's Shop, the scene of the battle of May 28. The

same day he crossed Tolopotomy Creek, and passed around the enemy's

left flank so far that Lee thought his left was turned by a strong

force, and under cover of darkness withdrew from a menacing position

which he was holding in front of the Ninth Corps. This successful

manoeuvre completed, Wilson returned to Hawe's Shop, and on the 4th

went into camp at New Castle ferry, in anticipation of certain

operations of the Cavalry Corps, which were to take place while the

Army of the Potomac was crossing to the south side of the James.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES--THE SECOND EXPEDITION--BATTLE OF

TREVILLIAN STATION--DEFEAT OF GENERAL WADE HAMPTON--MALLORY'S

CROSSROADS--SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED--SECURING THE TRAINS--GENERAL

GREGG'S STUBBORN FIGHT.

By the 6th of June General Grant again determined to continue the

movement of the army by its left flank to the south bank of the James

River, his unsuccessful attack on the enemy's works near Cold Harbor

having demonstrated that Lee's position north of the Chickahominy

could not be carried by assault with results that would compensate

for the enormous loss of life which must follow; therefore a further

attempt to fight a decisive battle north of Richmond was abandoned.

In carrying the army to the James River the hazardous manoeuvres

would be hampered by many obstacles, such as the thick timber,

underbrush, and troublesome swamps to be met in crossing the

Chickahominy. Besides, Lee held an interior line, from which all the

direct roads to Richmond could be covered with his infantry, leaving

his cavalry free to confront our advance on the south bank of the

Chickahominy as far down as Jones's bridge, and thence around to

Charles City Court House. In view of these difficulties it became

necessary to draw off the bulk of the enemy's cavalry while the

movement to the James was in process of execution, and General Meade

determined to do this by requiring me to proceed with two divisions

as far as Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridge over the

Rivanna River near that town, the railroad itself from the Rivanna to

Gordonsville, and, if practicable, from Gordonsville back toward

Hanover Junction also.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"June 5, 1864. 3.30 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps.

"I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish the

following instructions for your guidance in the execution of the duty

referred to in the order for movements and changes of position

to-night, a copy of which order accompanies this communication.

"With two divisions of your corps you will move on the morning of the

7th instant to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad bridge over

the Rivanna near that town; you will then thoroughly destroy the

railroad from that point to Gordonsville, and from Gordonsville

toward Hanover Junction, and to the latter point, if practicable.

The chief engineer, Major Duane, will furnish you a canvas

pontoon-train of eight boats. The chief quartermaster will supply you

with such tools, implements, and materials as you may require for the

destruction of the road. Upon the completion of this duty you will

rejoin this army.

"A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

After Meade's instructions reached me they were somewhat modified by

General Grant, who on the same evening had received information that

General Hunter, commanding the troops in West Virginia, had reached

Staunton and engaged with advantage the Confederate commander,

General Jones, near that place. General Grant informed me orally

that he had directed Hunter to advance as far as Charlottesville,

that he expected me to unite with him there, and that the two

commands, after destroying the James River canal and the Virginia

Central road, were to join the Army of the Potomac in the manner

contemplated in my instructions from General Meade; and that in view

of what was anticipated, it would be well to break up as much of the

railroad as possible on my way westward. A copy of his letter to

Hunter comprised my written instructions. A junction with this

general was not contemplated when the expedition was first conceived,

but became an important though not the paramount object after the

reception of the later information. The diversion of the enemy's

cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy was its main purpose,

for in the presence of such a force as Lee's contracted lines would

now permit him to concentrate behind the Chickahominy, the

difficulties of crossing that stream would be largely increased if he

also had at hand a strong body of horse, to gain the time necessary

for him to oppose the movement at the different crossings with masses

of his infantry.

The order calling for two divisions for the expedition, I decided to

take Gregg's and Torbert's, leaving Wilson's behind to continue with

the infantry in its march to the James and to receive instructions

directly from, the headquarters of the army. All my dismounted men

had been sent to the White House some days before, and they were

directed to report to Wilson as they could be provided with mounts.

"COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1964.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER, Commanding Dept West Virginia.

"General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions to

proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the

destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way as

much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the

canal on James River is of great importance to us. According to the

instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you will

proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great value

to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But that

point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to

get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into the

road or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to General

Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates

that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you

have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The

direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the

valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by

the most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of

the Virginia Central road. From there move eastward along the line

of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join

General Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and

yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac

by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. If any

portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in

your department, you are authorized to send it back. If on receipt

of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to

reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there.

If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and

Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy

the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost many

horses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strength

had also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the same

period of activity. The effective mounted force of my two divisions

was therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousand

officers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry.

Here they were provided with three days' rations, intended to last

five days, and with two days' grain for the horses. The rations and

forty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the persons

of the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and the

reserve ammunition in wagons. One medical wagon and eight ambulances

were also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each division

and brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a small

pontoon-bridge were also provided.

My instructions permitting latitude in the route I should take, I

decided to march along the north bank of the North Anna River, cross

that stream at Carpenter's ford, strike the Virginia Central railroad

at Trevillian Station, destroy it toward Louisa Court House, march

past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, and

destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded west. The

success of the last part of this programme would of course depend on

the location of General Hunter when I should arrive in the region

where it would be practicable for us to communicate with each other.

From my camp at New Castle ferry we crossed the Pamunkey, marched

between Aylett's and Dunkirk on the Mattapony River, and on the 8th

of June encamped at Polecat Station. The next day we resumed the

march along the North Anna--our advance guard skirmishing with a few

mounted men of the enemy, who proved to be irregulars--and bivouacked

on Northeast Creek, near Young's Mills. This day I learned from some

of these irregulars whom we made prisoners that Breckenridge's

division of infantry, en route to the Shenandoah Valley by way of

Gordonsville, was passing slowly up the railroad parallel to me, and

that the enemy's cavalry had left its position on the south side of

the Chickahominy, and was marching on the old Richmond and

Gordonsville road toward Gordonsville, under command of General Wade

Hampton, the information being confirmed by a scouting party sent out

to cut the telegraph wires along the railroad in the night.

Breckenridge had been ordered back to the valley by General Lee as

soon as he heard of Hunter's victory near Staunton, but now that my

expedition had been discovered, the movement of Breckenridge's troops

on the railroad was being timed to correspond with the marches of my

command till Hampton could get more nearly parallel with me.

On the 10th we resumed the march, passing by Twyman's store, crossing

the North Anna at Carpenter's ford and encamping on the road leading

along the south fork of the North Anna to Trevillian Station. During

the evening and night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy's

scouting parties, with which we had been coming into collision more

or less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the

presence of a large force, and evidencing that his shorter line of

march had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry,

although it started from Lee's army nearly two days later than I did

from Grant's. The arrival of this body also permitted Breckenridge

to pass on to Gordonsville, and from there to interpose between

General Hunter and me at either Charlottesville or Waynesboro' as

circumstances might determine.

On the night of the Loth General Hampton's division camped about

three miles northwest of Trevillian, at a place called Green Spring

Valley and Fitzhugh Lee's division not far from Louisa Court House,

some six miles east of Trevillian. Learning that I was at

Carpenter's ford, Hampton marched his division by way of Trevillian

Station toward Clayton's store, on the road from Trevillian to

Carpenter's ford, intending to attack me at Clayton's. Fitzhugh

Lee's division was to join Hampton at Clayton's store from Louisa

Court House; but on the morning of the 11th the two generals were

separated by several miles.

At daylight of the 11th my march, to Trevillian Station was resumed

on the direct road to that point, and engaging the enemy's pickets

and advanced parties soon after setting out, we began to drive them

in. Torbert had the lead with Merritt's and Devin's brigades, and as

he pressed back the pickets he came upon the enemy posted behind a

line of barricades in dense timber about three miles from Trevillian.

Meanwhile Custer's brigade had been sent from where we bivouacked, by

a wood road found on our left, to destroy Trevillian Station. In

following this road Custer got to the rear of Hampton's division,

having passed between its right flank and Fitzhugh Lee's division,

which was at the time marching on the road leading from Louisa Court

House to Clayton's store to unite with Hampton.

Custer, the moment he found himself in Hampton's rear, charged the

led horses, wagons, and caissons found there, getting hold of a vast

number of each, and also of the station itself. The stampede and

havoc wrought by Custer in Hampton's rear compelled him to turn

Rosser's brigade in that direction, and while it attacked Custer on

one side, Fitzhugh Lee's division, which had followed Custer toward

Trevillian, attacked him on the other. There then ensued a desperate

struggle for the possession of the captured property, resulting

finally in its being retaken by the enemy. Indeed, the great number

of horses and vehicles could not be kept on the limited space within

Custer's line, which now formed almost a complete circle; and while

he was endeavoring to remove them to a secure place they, together

with Custer's headquarters wagon and four of his caissons, fell into

the hands of their original owners.

As soon as the firing told that Custer had struck the enemy's rear, I

directed Torbert to press the line in front of Merritt and Devin,

aided by one brigade of Gregg's division on their left, Gregg's other

brigade in the meantime attacking Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa Court

House road. The effect of this was to force Hampton back, and his

division was so hard pushed that a portion of it was driven pell-mell

into Custer's lines, leaving there about five hundred prisoners. The

rest of Hampton's men did not rally till they got some distance west

of Trevillian, while, in the meantime, Gregg had driven Fitzhugh Lee

toward Louisa Court House so far that many miles now intervened

between the two Confederate divisions, precluding their union until

about noon the next day, when Fitzhugh Lee effected the junction

after a circuitous march in the night. The defeat of Hampton at the

point where he had determined to resist my further advance, and his

retreat westward, gave me undisturbed possession of the station; and

after destroying the railroad to some extent toward Gordonsville, I

went into camp.

From prisoners taken during the day, I gathered that General Hunter,

instead of coming toward Charlottesville, as I had reason to expect,

both from the instructions given me and the directions sent him by

General Grant, was in the neighborhood of Lexington--apparently

moving on Lynchburg--and that Breckenridge was at Gordonsville and

Charlottesville. I also heard, from the same source, that Ewell's

corps was on its way to Lynchburg, but this intelligence proved

afterward to be incorrect, for these troops, commanded by General

Early, did not leave Richmond till two days later.

There was no doubt as to the information about Hunter's general

location, however. He was marching toward Lynchburg, away from

instead of toward me, thus making the junction of our commands beyond

all reasonable probability. So in view of this, I made up my mind to

abandon that part of the scheme, and to return by leisurely marches,

which would keep Hampton's cavalry away from Lee while Grant was

crossing the James River. I was still further influenced to this

course by the burden which was thrown on me in the large number of

wounded--there being about five hundred cases of my own--and the five

hundred prisoners that I would probably be forced to abandon, should

I proceed farther. Besides, the recent battle had reduced my supply

of ammunition to a very small amount--not more than enough for one

more respectable engagement; and as the chances were that I would

have to fight a great deal before I could reach Hunter, now that the

enemy's cavalry and Breckenridge's infantry were between us, the

risks of the undertaking seemed too great to warrant it.

The morning of June 12 Gregg's division commenced destroying the

railroad to Louisa Court House, and continued the work during the

day, breaking it pretty effectually. While Gregg was thus occupied,

I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road,

to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna,

to the Catharpen road, as I purposed following that route to

Spottsylvania Court House on my return, and thence via Bowling Green

and Dunkirk to the White House. About a mile beyond Trevillian the

Gordonsville road fork--the left fork leading to Charlottesville--and

about a mile beyond the fork Hampton had taken up and strongly

intrenched a line across both roads, being reinforced by Fitzhugh

Lee, who, as before related, had joined him about noon by a

roundabout march. Torbert soon hotly engaged this line, and by the

impetuosity of his first attack, gained some advantage; but the

appearance of Fitzhugh Lee's troops on the right, and Hampton's

strong resistance in front, rendered futile all efforts to carry the

position; and, although I brought up one of Gregg's brigades to

Torbert's assistance, yet the by-road I coveted was still held by the

enemy when night closed in.

This engagement, like that off the day before around Trevillian, was

mostly fought dismounted by both sides, as had also been the earlier

fights of the cavalry during the summer in the Wilderness, at Todd's

Tavern, Hawe's Shop, and Matadequin Creek. Indeed, they could hardly

have been fought otherwise than on foot, as there was little chance

for mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, the

armament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making it

impracticable to use the sabre with anything like a large force; and

so with the exception of Yellow Tavern the dismounted method

prevailed in almost every engagement.

The losses at Mallory's Crossroads were very heavy on both sides.

The character of the fighting, together with the day's results,

demonstrated that it was impossible to make the passage of the North

Anna at Mallory's ford without venturing another battle the next day.

This would consume the little ammunition left, and though we might

gain the road, yet the possibility of having no ammunition whatever

to get back with was too great a hazard, so I gave orders to withdraw

during the night of the 12th. We retired along the same road by

which we had come, taking with us the prisoners, and all of our

wounded who could be moved. Those who could not be transported, some

ninety in number, and all the Confederate wounded in my hands, were

left at Trevillian in hospitals, under charge of one of our surgeons,

with plenty of medical and other stores.

We recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford the following

morning, and halting there, unsaddled and turned the horses out to

graze, for they were nearly famished, having had neither food nor

water during the preceding forty-eight hours. Late in the afternoon

we saddled up and proceeded to Twyman's Store, while General

Hampton's main body moved down the south bank of the North Anna, with

the purpose of intervening between me and the Army of the Potomac, in

the hope of preventing my return to it; but his movements took no

definite shape beyond watching me, however, till several days later,

near St. Mary's Church, when I was crossing the peninsula to the

James River.

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpen

road, upon which it was originally intended to move if we had been

able to cross at Mallory's ford, and this conducted me to Shady Grove

Church. The next day we passed over the battle-field of

Spottsylvania Court House. The marks of the recent conflicts about

there were visible on every hand, and in the neighboring houses were

found many Union and Confederate wounded, who had been too severely

hurt to be removed from the field-hospitals at the time of the

battles. Such of our wounded as were able to travel were brought

away.

On the 16th I marched from Edge Hill on the Ta River through Bowling

Green to Dr. Butler's, on the north side of the Mattapony. When I

arrived here I was unable to ascertain the position of the Army of

the Potomac, and was uncertain whether or not the base at the White

House had been discontinued. I had heard nothing from the army for

nine days except rumors through Southern sources, and under these

circumstances did not like to venture between the Mattapony and

Pamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with some four hundred wounded,

five hundred prisoners, and about two thousand negroes that had

joined my column in the hope of obtaining their freedom. I therefore

determined to push down the north bank of the Mattapony far enough to

enable me to send these impediments directly to West Point, where I

anticipated finding some of our gunboats and transports, that could

carry all to the North. Following this plan, we proceeded through

Walkerton to King and Queen Court House, and bivouacked in its

vicinity the night of the 18th. Next day I learned that the depot at

the White House had not yet been broken up entirely, and that

supplies were in store for me there; so after sending the wounded,

prisoners, and negroes to West Point under an escort of two

regiments, I turned back to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony, and crossed to

the south side at a place where the stream was narrow enough to

bridge with my pontoon-boats.

In returning from Trevillian, as the most of our wounded were hauled

in old buggies, carts, and such other vehicles as could be made

available in the absence of a sufficient number of ambulances, the

suffering was intense, the heat of the season and dusty roads adding

much to the discomfort. Each day we halted many times to dress the

wounds of the injured and to refresh them as much as possible, but

our means for mitigating their distress were limited. The fortitude

and cheerfulness of the poor fellows under such conditions were

remarkable, for no word of complaint was heard. The Confederate

prisoners and colored people being on foot, our marches were

necessarily made short, and with frequent halts also, but they too

suffered considerably from the heat and dust, though at times the

prisoners were relieved by being mounted on the horses of some of our

regiments, the owners meantime marching on foot. Where all the

colored people came from and what started them was inexplicable, but

they began joining us just before we reached Trevillian--men, women,

and children with bundles of all sorts containing their few worldly

goods, and the number increased from day to day until they arrived at

West Point. Probably not one of the poor things had the remotest

idea, when he set out, as to where he would finally land, but to a

man they followed the Yankees in full faith that they would lead to

freedom, no matter what road they took.

On the morning of the 20th, at an early hour, we resumed our march,

and as the column proceeded sounds of artillery were heard in the

direction of the White House, which fact caused us to quicken the

pace. We had not gone far when despatches from General Abercrombie,

commanding some fragmentary organizations at the White House,

notified me that the place was about to be attacked. I had

previously sent an advance party with orders to move swiftly toward

the cannonading and report to me by couriers the actual condition of

affairs. From this party I soon learned that there was no occasion

to push our jaded animals, since the crisis, if there had been one,

was over and the enemy repulsed, so the increased gait was reduced to

a leisurely march that took us late in the afternoon to the north

bank of the Pamunkey, opposite Abercrombie's camp. When I got to the

river the enemy was holding the bluffs surrounding the White House

farm, having made no effort to penetrate General Abercrombie's line

or do him other hurt than to throw a few shells among the teamsters

there congregated.

Next day Gregg's division crossed the Pamunkey dismounted, and

Torbert's crossed mounted. As soon as the troops were over, Gregg,

supported by Merritt's brigade, moved out on the road to Tunstall's

Station to attack Hampton, posted an the west side of Black Creek,

Custer's brigade meanwhile moving, mounted, on the road to

Cumberland, and Devin's in like manner on the one to Baltimore

crossroads. This offer of battle was not accepted, however, and

Hampton withdrew from my front, retiring behind the Chickahominy,

where his communications with Lee would be more secure.

While at the White House I received orders to break up that depot

wholly, and also instructions to move the trains which the Army of

the Potomac had left there across the peninsula to the pontoon-bridge

at Deep Bottom on the James River. These trains amounted to hundreds

of wagons and other vehicles, and knowing full well the dangers which

would attend the difficult problem of getting them over to

Petersburg, I decided to start them with as little delay as

circumstances would permit, and the morning of the 22d sent Torbert's

division ahead to secure Jones's bridge on the Chickahominy, so that

the wagons could be crossed at that point. The trains followed

Torbert, while Gregg's division marched by a road parallel to the one

on which the wagons were moving, and on their right flank, as they

needed to be covered and protected in that direction only.

The enemy made no effort to attack us while we were moving the trains

that day, and the wagons were all safely parked for the night on the

south side of the Chickahominy, guarded by General Getty, who had

relieved Abercrombie from command of the infantry fragments before we

started off from the White House.

To secure the crossing at Jones's bridge, Torbert had pushed Devin's

brigade out on the Long Bridge road, on the side of the Chickahominy

where, on the morning of the 23d, he was attacked by Chambliss's

brigade of W. H. F. Lee's division. Devin was driven in some little

distance, but being reinforced by Getty with six companies of colored

troops, he quickly turned the tables on Chambliss and re-established

his picket-posts. From this affair I learned that Chambliss's brigade

was the advance of the Confederate cavalry corps, while Hampton

discovered from it that we were already in possession of the Jones's

bridge crossing of the Chickahominy; and as he was too late to

challenge our passage of the stream at this point he contented

himself with taking up a position that night so as to cover the roads

leading from Long Bridge to Westover, with the purpose of preventing

the trains from following the river road to the pontoon-bridge at

Deep Bottom.

My instructions required me to cross the trains over the James River

on this pontoon-bridge if practicable, and to reach it I should be

obliged to march through Charles City Court House, and then by

Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter point being held by

the enemy. In fact, he held all the ground between Long Bridge on

the Chickahominy and the pontoon-bridge except the Tete de pont at

the crossing. Notwithstanding this I concluded to make the attempt,

for all the delays of ferrying the command and trains would be

avoided if we got through to the bridge; and with this object in view

I moved Torbert's division out on the Charles City road to conduct

the wagons. Just beyond Charles City Court House Torbert encountered

Lomax's brigade, which he drove across Herring Creek on the road to

Westover Church; and reporting the affair to me, I surmised, from the

presence of this force in my front, that Hampton would endeavor to

penetrate to the long column of wagons, so I ordered them to go into

park near Wilcox's landing, and instructed Gregg, whose division had

been marching in the morning along the road leading from Jones's

bridge to St. Mary's Church for the purpose of covering the exposed

flank of the train, to hold fast near the church without fail till

all the transportation had passed Charles City Court House.

Meanwhile, General Hampton, who had conjectured that I would try to

get the train across the James by the pontoon-bridge at Deep Bottom,

began concentrating all his troops except Lomax's brigade, which was

to confront the head of my column on the river road, in the vicinity

of Nance's Shop. This was discovered by Gregg at an early hour, and

divining this purpose he had prepared to meet it by constructing

hasty cover for his men before receiving my instructions. About 4

o'clock in the afternoon Hampton got his force in hand, and with

Fitzhugh Lee's division assailed the whole front of Gregg's line, and

his left flank with Chambliss's and Geary's brigades. For two hours

he continued to attack, but made little impression on Gregg--gain at

one point being counterbalanced by failure at another. Because of

the evident strength of Hampton, Gregg had placed all his troops in

line of battle from the first, and on discovery of the enemy's

superior numbers sent message after message to me concerning the

situation, but the messengers never arrived, being either killed or

captured, and I remained in total ignorance till dark of the strait

his division was in.

Toward night it became clear to Gregg that he could maintain the

unequal contest no longer, and he then decided to retreat, but not

until convinced that the time won had enabled all the trains to pass

Charles City Court House in safety. When he had got all his led

horses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could be

transported, he retired by his right flank-in some confusion, it is

true, but stubbornly resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hampton

ceased to press him.

Gregg's losses were heavy, and he was forced to abandon his dead and

most seriously wounded, but the creditable stand made ensured the

safety of the train, the last wagon of which was now parked at

Wilcox's Landing. His steady, unflinching determination to gain time

for the wagons to get beyond the point of danger was characteristic

of the man, and this was the third occasion on which he had exhibited

a high order of capacity and sound judgment since coming under my

command. The firmness and coolness with which he always met the

responsibilities of a dangerous place were particularly strong points

in Gregg's make-up, and he possessed so much professional though

unpretentious ability, that it is to be regretted he felt obliged a

few months later to quit the service before the close of the war.

Gregg's fight fully satisfied me that we could not get the trains up

to the pontoon-bridge, for of course Hampton would now throw all his

cavalry in my front, on the river road, where it could be backed up

by Lee's infantry. Meanwhile, General Meade had become assured of

the same thing, and as he was now growing anxious about the fate of

Wilson's division--which, during my absence, had been sent out to

break the enemy's communications south of Petersburg, by destroying

the Southside and Danville railroads--he sent ferryboats to cross me

over the James. During the night of the 24th, and next morning, the

immense train--which ought never to have been left for the cavalry to

escort, after a fatiguing expedition of three weeks--was moved back

through Charles City Court House to Douthard's landing, and there

ferried over the river, followed by my troops in like manner. When

General Hampton discovered this, he moved to Drury's Bluff, and

there, on the morning of the 27th, crossed the James by the

Confederate pontoon-bridge.

CHAPTER XXII.

GENERAL WILSON'S RAID--DESTROYING RAILROADS--HIS DISCOMFITURE

--RESULTS OF HIS RAID--REMOUNTS--MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THE

JAMES--DECEIVING LEE--MY ISOLATED POSITION--ESTIMATE OF HANCOCK

--SUCCESS OF THE CAVALRY--THEIR CONSTANT DUTIES.

While I was absent on the expedition to Trevillian, the movement of

the Army of the Potomac across the James River was effected, and

Wilson, whom I had left behind for the purpose, was engaged in the

duty of covering its front and rear. Late on the night of June 12

he, with Chapman's brigade, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge,

in advance of the Fifth Corps, and by 7 o'clock next morning had

driven the enemy's pickets up to White Oak bridge, where he waited

for our infantry. When that came up, he pushed on as far as Riddle's

Shop, but late that evening the Confederate infantry forced him to

withdraw to St. Mary's Church; for early in the morning General Lee

had discovered the movement of our army, and promptly threw this

column of infantry south of the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp, with

the design of covering Richmond. From St. Mary's Church Wilson

guarded all the roads toward White Oak Swamp and Riddle's Shop,

McIntosh's brigade joining him on the 14th, by way of Long Bridge, as

the rear of the Army of the Potomac passed the Chickahominy. In the

performance of this duty Wilson did not have to fight any engagement

of magnitude, for the bulk of the enemy's cavalry had followed me to

Trevillian. During the 15th and 16th Wilson drew his troops in

toward the James River, and next day crossed it on the pontoon-bridge

and camped on the Blackwater, near Mt. Sinai Church. Here he

remained till the 22d of June--the same day I reached the White House

with Gregg and Torbert--when, under orders from General Meade, he set

out to cut the enemy's communications to the south and southwest of

Petersburg.

His instructions implied that the breaking up of the Petersburg and

Lynchburg, and Richmond and Danville railroads at Burkeville was the

most important part of his mission, and that when the work of

destruction began, it should be continued till he was driven off by

the enemy. Wilson's force consisted of about 5,500 men, General A.

V. Kautz, with the cavalry of the Army of the James, having joined

him for the expedition. In moving out Wilson crossed the Weldon road

near Ream's Station, first destroying it effectually at that point.

About fourteen miles west of Petersburg he struck the Southside

railroad, and broke it up clear to Burkeville, a distance of thirty

miles. Having destroyed everything at Burkeville Junction, he moved

along the Danville road to Staunton River, completely wrecking about

thirty miles of that line also. At Staunton River he found the

railroad bridge strongly guarded, and seeing that he could not burn

it, he began his return march that night, and reached Nottoway River,

some thirty miles south of Petersburg, at noon of the next day--the

28th.

In this expedition Wilson was closely followed from the start by

Barringer's brigade of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, but the operations

were not interfered with materially, his success being signal till he

reached the vicinity of Stony Creek depot on his return. At this

point General Hampton, with his own and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, got

between Wilson and the Army of the Potomac, there being behind them

at Ream's Station, at the same time, two brigades of infantry under

General Mahone. A severe battle ensued, resulting in Wilson's

defeat, with the loss of twelve guns and all his wagons. In

consequence of this discomfiture he was obliged to fall back across

the Nottoway River with his own division, and rejoined the army by

way of Peter's bridge on that stream, while Kautz's division, unable

to unite with Wilson after the two commands had become separated in

the fight, made a circuit of the enemy's left, and reached the lines

of our army in the night of the 28th.

Neither the presence of Hampton's cavalry at Stony Creek depot, nor

the possession of Ream's Station by the Confederate infantry, seems

to have been anticipated by Wilson, for in the report of the

expedition he states:

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote to

General Meade the evening before starting that I anticipated no

serious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless General

Sheridan was required to keep Hampton's cavalry engaged, and our

infantry to prevent Lee from making detachments, we should probably

experience great difficulty in rejoining the army. In reply to this

note, General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, informed me it was intended

the Army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day,

the Southside road the day after, and that Hampton having followed

Sheridan toward Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him."

I doubt that General Meade's letter of instructions and Wilson's note

of the same evening, warrant what General Wilson here says. It is

true that the Weldon railroad near Ream's Station was not covered by

our infantry, as General Humphreys informed him it would be, but

Wilson is in error when he intimates that he was assured that I would

look after Hampton. I do not think General Meade's instructions are

susceptible of this interpretation. I received no orders requiring

me to detain Hampton. On the contrary, when I arrived at the White

House my instructions required me to break up the depot there, and

then bring the train across the Peninsula as soon as practicable, nor

were these instructions ever modified. I began the duty imposed on

me on the morning of the 23d, totally in the dark as to what was

expected of Wilson, though it seems, from some correspondence between

Generals Grant and Meade, which I never saw till after the war, that

Grant thought Wilson could rely on Hampton's absence from his field

of operations throughout the expedition.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"June 21, 1864. 9:20 A. M.

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILSON,

"Commanding Third Division Cavalry Corps.

"The major-general commanding directs that you move your command at

2 A. M. to-morrow, the 22d instant, in execution of the duty assigned

you of destroying certain railroads. Despatches received from the

White House state that Hampton's cavalry was before that place

yesterday evening, and that General Sheridan had also reached there,

hence it is desirable that you should march at the earliest moment.

In passing Petersburg you will endeavor to avoid the observation of

the enemy, and then move by the shortest routes to the intersection

of the Petersburg and Lynchburg, and the Richmond and Danville

railroads, and destroy both these roads to the greatest extent

possible, continuing their destruction until driven from it by such

attacks of the enemy as you can no longer resist. The destruction of

those roads to such an extent that they cannot be used by the enemy

in connection with Richmond during the remainder of the campaign is

an important part of the plan of campaign. The latest information

from Major-General Hunter represents him to be a few miles west of

Lynchburg. He may endeavor to form a junction with this army; you

will communicate with him if practicable, and have delivered to him

verbally the contents of the following copy of a communication from

Lieutenant-General Grant to the major-general commanding this army.

Lieutenant Brooks, who will accompany your expedition part of the

way, should be informed where General Hunter will probably be found.

"The success of your expedition will depend upon the secrecy with

which it is commenced, and the celerity with which its movements are

conducted; your command will, therefore, have with it the lightest

supplies and smallest number of wheels consistent with the thorough

execution of the duty, the supplies of the section of country you

will operate in being taken into account. Upon the completion of the

work assigned you, you will rejoin this army.

"The chief quartermaster was directed yesterday to supply you with

the implements and material for the destruction of railroads obtained

for General Sheridan.

"[Signed] "A. A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES,

Mount Sinai Church, June 21, 1864--6 P.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS,"

"Chief-of-Staff.

"The instructions of the major-general commanding, of this date, are

received. I shall march in obedience thereto at 2 A. M. to-morrow.

Before starting I would like to know if our infantry forces cover the

Weldon road.

"I propose striking the Southside road first at Sutherland Station,

or some point in that vicinity, tearing up the track sufficiently to

delay railroad communication ten or twelve hours. At this place I

shall detach a force to strike the Richmond and Danville road, by a

rapid march, at the nearest point, tearing up the track at every

practicable point between there and Burkeville.

"From Sutherlands I shall move the main body of my command by the

Great road (breaking the railroad at every convenient point) directly

to Burkeville, which, if we succeed in capturing, will afford us the

opportunity of prosecuting our work with great advantage. As soon as

I have made dispositions for communicating with Hunter and done all

the damage possible, I shall move with all possible rapidity for

Danville and Grenboro'.

"Circumstances must, however, is a great degree control our movements

after leaving Burkeville.

"If Sheridan will look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty, and

hope to be able to do the enemy great damage. The ammunition issued

to my command is very defective. The implements for destroying roads

have not yet arrived, but I learn from General Ingalls that they will

certainly be here early to-morrow.

"[Signed] J. H. WILSON,

"Brigadier-General Commanding."

The moment I received orders from General Meade to go to the relief

of Wilson, I hastened with Torbert and Gregg by way of Prince George

Court House and Lee's Mills to Ream's Station. Here I found the

Sixth Corps, which Meade had pushed out on his left flank immediately

on hearing of Wilson's mishap, but I was too late to render any

material assistance, Wilson having already disappeared, followed by

the enemy. However, I at once sent out parties to gather

information, and soon learned that Wilson had got safe across the

Nottoway at Peter's bridge and was making for the army by way of

Blunt's bridge, on the Blackwater.

The benefits derived from this expedition, in the destruction of the

Southside and Danville railroads, were considered by General Grant as

equivalent for the losses sustained in Wilson's defeat, for the

wrecking of the railroads and cars was most complete, occasioning at

this, time serious embarrassment to the Confederate Government; but I

doubt if all this compensated for the artillery and prisoners that

fell into the hands of the enemy in the swamps of Hatcher's Run and

Rowanty Creek. Wilson's retreat from the perilous situation at

Ream's station was a most creditable performance--in the face of two

brigades of infantry and three divisions of cavalry--and in the

conduct of the whole expedition the only criticism that can hold

against him is that he placed too much reliance on meeting our

infantry at Ream's station, seeing that uncontrollable circumstances

might, and did, prevent its being there. He ought to have marched on

the 28th by Jarrett's Station to Peter's bridge, on the Nottoway, and

Blunts bridge on the Blackwater, to the rear of the Army of the

Potomac.

When the safety of Wilson's command was assured, I was ordered back

to Light House Point, where I had gone into camp after crossing the

James River to rest and recruit my command, now very much reduced in

numbers by reason of casualties to both horses and men. It had been

marching and fighting for fifty consecutive days, and the fatiguing

service had told so fearfully on my animals that the number of

dismounted men in the corps was very large. With the exception of

about four hundred horses that I received at the White House, no

animals were furnished to supply the deficiencies which had arisen

from the wearing marches of the past two months until I got to this

camp at Light House Point; here my needs were so obvious that they

could no longer be neglected.

I remained at Light House Point from the 2d to the 26th of July,

recuperating the cavalry, the intensely warm weather necessitating

almost an entire suspension of hostilities on the part of the Army of

the Potomac. Meanwhile fifteen hundred horses were sent me here, and

these, with the four hundred already mentioned, were all that my

troops received while I held the personal command of the Cavalry

Corps, from April 6 to August 1, 1864. This was not near enough to

mount the whole command, so I disposed the men who could not be

supplied in a dismounted camp.

By the 26th of July our strength was pretty well restored, and as

General Grant was now contemplating offensive operations for the

purpose of keeping Lee's army occupied around Richmond, and also of

carrying Petersburg by assault if possible, I was directed to move to

the north side of the James River in conjunction with General

Hancock's corps, and, if opportunity offered, to make a second

expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, and again destroy

the bridges on the North Anna, the Little and the South Anna rivers.

I started out on the afternoon of the 26th and crossed the Appomattox

at Broadway landing. At Deep Bottom I was joined by Kautz's small

division from the Army of the James, and here massed the whole

command, to allow Hancock's corps to take the lead, it crossing to

the north bank of the James River by the bridge below the mouth of

Bailey's Creek. I moved late in the afternoon, so as not to come

within the enemy's view before dark, and after night-fall Hancock's

corps passed me and began crossing the pontoon-bridge about 2 o'clock

in the morning.

By daylight Hancock was across, the cavalry following. Soon a

portion of his corps attacked the enemy's works on the east side of

Bailey's Creek, and, aided by the cavalry moving on its right,

captured four pieces of artillery. This opened the way for Hancock

to push out his whole corps, and as he advanced by a wheel, with his

left as a pivot, the cavalry joined in the movement, pressing forward

on the New Market and Central or Charles City roads.

We did not go far before we found the enemy's infantry posted across

these two roads behind a strong line of intrenchments on the west

bank of Bailey's Creek. His videttes in front of Ruffin's house on

the New Market road were soon driven in on their main line, and the

high ground before the house was immediately occupied by Torbert and

Gregg, supported by Kautz's division. By the time the cavalry line

was formed the Confederate General Kershaw, with his own division of

infantry and those of Wilcox and Heath, advanced to attack us.

Directing the most of his troops against the cavalry, which was still

mounted, Kershaw drove it back some distance over the high ground.

When it reached the eastern face of the ridge, however, it was

quickly dismounted, and the men directed to lie down in line of

battle about fifteen yards from the crest, and here the onset of the

enemy was awaited. When Kershaw's men reached the crest such a

severe fire was opened on them, and at such close quarters, that they

could not withstand it, and gave way in disorder. They were followed

across the plain by the cavalry, and lost about two hundred and fifty

prisoners and two battle-flags. The counter attack against the

infantry by Torbert and Gregg re-established our line and gave us the

victory of Darbytown, but it also demonstrated the fact that General

Lee had anticipated the movement around his left flank by

transferring to the north side of the James a large portion of his

infantry and W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry.