My effective force in the battle of Stone River was 4,154 officers

and men. Of this number I lost 1,633 killed, wounded, and missing,

or nearly 40 per cent. In the remaining years of the war, though

often engaged in most severe contests, I never experienced in any of

my commands so high a rate of casualties. The ratio of loss in the

whole of Rosecrans's army was also high, and Bragg's losses were

almost equally great. Rosecrans carried into the action about 42,000

officers and men. He lost 13,230, or 31 per cent. Bragg's effective

force was 37,800 officers and men; he lost 10,306, or nearly 28 per

cent.

Though our victory was dearly bought, yet the importance of gaining

the day at any price was very great, particularly when we consider

what might have been the result had not the gallantry of the army and

the manoeuvring during the early disaster saved us from ultimate

defeat. We had started out from Nashville on an offensive campaign,

probably with no intention of going beyond Murfreesboro', in

midwinter, but still with the expectation of delivering a crushing

blow should the enemy accept our challenge to battle. He met us with

a plan of attack almost the counterpart of our own. In the execution

of his plan he had many advantages, not the least of which was his

intimate knowledge of the ground, and he came near destroying us.

Had he done so, Nashville would probably have fallen; at all events,

Kentucky would have been opened again to his incursions, and the

theatre of war very likely transferred once more to the Ohio River.

As the case now stood, however, Nashville was firmly established as a

base for future operations, Kentucky was safe from the possibility of

being again overrun, and Bragg, thrown on the defensive, was

compelled to give his thoughts to the protection of the interior of

the Confederacy and the security of Chattanooga, rather than indulge

in schemes of conquest north of the Cumberland River. While he still

held on in Middle Tennessee his grasp was so much loosened that only

slight effort would be necessary to push him back into Georgia, and

thus give to the mountain region of East Tennessee an opportunity to

prove its loyalty to the Union.

The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyed

the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping

spirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in

Middle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned

the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned the

battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remain

entirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to push

forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro';

and notwithstanding the fact that on the afternoon of December 30

McCook received information that the right of Johnson's division.

resting near the Franklin pike, extended only to about the centre of

the Confederate army, it does not appear that attack from that

quarter was at all apprehended by the Union commanders.

The natural line of retreat of the Confederates was not threatened by

the design of Rosecrans; and Bragg, without risk to his

communications, anticipated it by a counter-attack of like character

from his own left, and demolished his adversary's plan the moment we

were thrown on the defensive. Had Bragg followed up with the spirit

which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on

our right wing--and there seems no reason why he should not have done

so--the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, but

it would have been depleted and demoralized to such a degree as to

unfit it for offensive operations for a long time afterward. Bragg's

intrenchments in front of Stone River were very strong, and there

seems no reason why he should not have used his plain advantage as

explained, but instead he allowed us to gain time, intrench, and

recover a confidence that at first was badly shaken. Finally, to cap

the climax of his errors, he directed Breckenridge to make the

assault from his right flank on January 2, with small chance for

anything but disaster, when the real purpose in view could have been

accomplished without the necessity of any offensive manoeuvre

whatever.

CHAPTER XIV.

APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL--THE SECRET EXPEDITION UNDER CARD THE

SCOUT--HIS CAPTURE BY GUERRILLAS--ESCAPE--A REVENGE PARTY--WOMEN

SOLDIERS--A FIGHT WITH SABRES--TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN--A FOOLISH

ADVENTURE.

On the 6th of January, 1863, my division settled quietly down in its

camp south of Murfreesboro'. Its exhausted condition after the

terrible experiences of the preceding week required attention. It

needed recuperation, reinforcement, and reorganization, and I set

about these matters without delay, in anticipation of active

operations early in the spring. No forward movement was made for

nearly six months, however, and throughout this period drills,

parades, reconnoissances, and foraging expeditions filled in the time

profitably. In addition to these exercises the construction of

permanent fortifications for the security of Murfreesboro' was

undertaken by General Rosecrans, and large details from my troops

were furnished daily for the work. Much attention was also given to

creating a more perfect system of guard and picket duty-a matter that

had hitherto been somewhat neglected in the army, as its constant

activity had permitted scant opportunity for the development of such

a system. It was at this time that I received my appointment as a

major-general of Volunteers. My promotion had been recommended by

General Rosecrans immediately after the battle of Stone River, but

for some reason it was delayed until April, and though a long time

elapsed between the promise and the performance, my gratification was

extreme.

My scout, Card, was exceedingly useful while encamped near

Murfreesboro, making several trips to East Tennessee within the

enemy's lines to collect information as to the condition of the loyal

people there, and to encourage them with the hope of early

liberation. He also brought back from each trip very accurate

statements as to the strength and doings of the Confederate army,

fixing almost with certainty its numbers and the locations of its

different divisions, and enabling my engineer-officer--Major

Morhardt--to construct good maps of the country in our front. On

these dangerous excursions Card was always accompanied by one of his

brothers, the other remaining with me to be ready for duty if any

accident occurred to those who had gone out, or in case I wanted to

communicate with them. In this way we kept well posted, although the

intelligence these men brought was almost always secured at the risk

of their lives.

Early in the spring, before the Tullahoma campaign began, I thought

it would be practicable, by sending out a small secret expedition of

but three or four men, to break the Nashville and Chattanooga

railroad between Chattanooga and the enemy's position at Tullahoma by

burning the bridges in Crow Creek valley from its head to Stevenson,

Alabama, and then the great bridge across the Tennessee River at

Bridgeport. Feeling confident that I could persuade Card to

undertake the perilous duty, I broached the contemplated project to

him, and he at once jumped at the opportunity of thus distinguishing

himself, saying that with one of his brothers and three other loyal

East Tennesseeans, whose services he knew could be enlisted, he felt

sure of carrying out the idea, so I gave him authority to choose his

own assistants. In a few days his men appeared at my headquarters,

and when supplied with money in notes of the State Bank of Tennessee,

current everywhere as gold in those days, the party, composed of

Card, the second brother, and the three East Tennesseeans, started on

their precarious enterprise, their course being directed first toward

the Cumberland Mountains, intending to strike the Nashville and

Chattanooga railroad somewhere above Anderson's station. They

expected to get back in about fifteen days, but I looked for some

knowledge of the progress of their adventure before the expiration of

that period, hoping to hear through Confederate sources prisoners and

the like-of the destruction of the bridges. I waited in patience for

such news, but none came, and as the time Card had allotted himself

passed by, I watched anxiously for his return, for, as there was

scarcely a doubt that the expedition had proved a failure, the fate

of the party became a matter of deep concern to Card's remaining

brother and to me. Finally this brother volunteered to go to his

father's house in East Tennessee to get tidings of the party, and I

consented, for the probabilities were that some of them had made

their way to that point, or at least that some information had

reached there about them. As day after day went by, the time fixed

for this brother's return came round, yet he also remained out; but

some days after the lad was due Card himself turned up accompanied by

the brother he had taken with him, soon explained his delay in

getting back, and gave me the story of his adventures while absent.

After leaving my camp, his party had followed various byways across

the Cumberland Mountains to Crow Creek Valley, as instructed; but

when nearing the railroad above Anderson's Station, they were

captured by some guerrillas prowling about that vicinity, and being

suspected of disloyalty to the Confederacy, were carried to

Chattanooga and imprisoned as Yankee spies. Their prospects now were

decidedly discouraging, for death stared them in the face.

Fortunately, however, some delays occurred relative to the

disposition that should be made of them, and they, meanwhile,

effected their escape from their jailors by way of one of the prison

windows, from which they managed to displace a bar, and by a skiff,

in the darkness of night, crossed the Tennessee River a little below

Chattanooga. From this point the party made their way back to my

camp, traveling only at night, hiding in the woods by day, and for

food depending on loyal citizens that Card had become acquainted with

when preaching and peddling.

Card's first inquiry after relating his story was for the youngest

brother, whom he had left with me. I told him what I had done, in my

anxiety about himself, and that more than sufficient time had elapsed

for his brother's return. His reply was: "They have caught him. The

poor fellow is dead." His surmise proved correct; for news soon came

that the poor boy had been captured at his father's house, and

hanged. The blow to Card was a severe one, and so hardened his heart

against the guerrillas in the neighborhood of his father's home--for

he knew they were guilty of his brother's murder--that it was with

difficulty I could persuade him to continue in the employment of the

Government, so determined was he to avenge his brother's death at the

first opportunity. Finally, however, I succeeded in quieting the

almost uncontrollable rage that seemed to possess him, and he

remained with me during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns; but

when we reached Knoxville the next winter, he took his departure,

informing me that he was going for the bushwhackers who had killed

his brother. A short time after he left me, I saw him at the head of

about thirty well-armed East Tennesseeans--refugees. They were

determined-looking men, seeking revenge for the wrongs and sufferings

that had been put upon them in the last two years, and no doubt

wreaked their vengeance right and left on all who had been in any way

instrumental in persecuting them.

The feeding of our army from the base at Louisville was attended with

a great many difficulties, as the enemy's cavalry was constantly

breaking the railroad and intercepting our communications on the

Cumberland River at different points that were easily accessible to

his then superior force of troopers. The accumulation of reserve

stores was therefore not an easy task, and to get forage ahead a few

days was well-nigh impossible, unless that brought from the North was

supplemented by what we could gather from the country. Corn was

abundant in the region to the south and southwest of Murfreesboro',

so to make good our deficiences in this respect, I employed a brigade

about once a week in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage,

sending out sometimes as many as a hundred and fifty wagons to haul

the grain which my scouts had previously located. In nearly every

one of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagons

were usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running fire,

Often there would occur a respectable brush, with the loss on each

side of a number of killed and wounded. The officer in direct

command always reported to me personally whatever had happened during

the time he was out--the result of his reconnoissance, so to speak,

for that war the real nature of these excursions--and on one occasion

the colonel in command, Colonel Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri,

informed me that he got through without much difficulty; in fact,

that everything had gone all right and been eminently satisfactory,

except that in returning he had been mortified greatly by the conduct

of the two females belonging to the detachment and division train at

my headquarters. These women, he said, had given much annoyance by

getting drunk, and to some extent demoralizing his men. To say that

I was astonished at his statement would be a mild way of putting it,

and had I not known him to be a most upright man and of sound sense,

I should have doubted not only his veracity, but his sanity.

Inquiring who they were and for further details, I was informed that

there certainly were in the command two females, that in some

mysterious manner had attached themselves to the service as soldiers;

that one, an East Tennessee woman, was a teamster in the division

wagon-train and the other a private soldier in a cavalry company

temporarily attached to my headquarters for escort duty. While out

on the foraging expedition these Amazons had secured a supply of

"apple-jack" by some means, got very drunk, and on the return had

fallen into Stone River and been nearly drowned. After they had been

fished from, the water, in the process of resuscitation their sex was

disclosed, though up to this time it appeared to be known only to

each other. The story was straight and the circumstance clear,

so, convinced of Conrad's continued sanity, I directed the

provost-marshal to bring in arrest to my headquarters the two

disturbers of Conrad's peace of mind, After some little search the

East Tennessee woman was found in camp, somewhat the worse for the

experiences of the day before, but awaiting her fate content idly

smoking a cob-pipe. She was brought to me, and put in duress under

charge of the division surgeon until her companion could be secured.

To the doctor she related that the year before she had "refugeed" from

East Tennessee, and on arriving in Louisville assumed men's apparel

and sought and obtained employment as a teamster in the

quartermaster's department. Her features were very large, and so

coarse and masculine was her general appearance that she would readily

have passed as a man, and in her case the deception was no doubt

easily practiced. Next day the "she dragoon" was caught, and proved

to be a rather prepossessing young woman, and though necessarily

bronzed and hardened by exposure, I doubt if, even with these marks of

campaigning, she could have deceived as readily as did her companion.

How the two got acquainted, I never learned, and though they had

joined the army independently of each other, yet an intimacy had

sprung up between them long before the mishaps of the foraging

expedition. They both were forwarded to army headquarters, and, when

provided with clothing suited to their sex, sent back to Nashville,

and thence beyond our lines to Louisville.

On January 9, by an order from the War Department, the Army of the

Cumberland had been divided into three corps, designated the

Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first. This order did not alter the

composition of the former grand divisions, nor change the commanders,

but the new nomenclature was a decided improvement over the clumsy

designations Right Wing, Centre, and Left Wing, which were well

calculated to lead to confusion sometimes. McCook's wing became the

Twentieth Corps, and my division continued of the same organization,

and held the same number as formerly-the Third Division, Twentieth

Corps. My first brigade was now commanded by Brigadier-General

William H. Lytle, the second by Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, and the

third by Colonel Luther P. Bradley.

On the 4th of March I was directed to move in light marching order

toward Franklin and join General Gordon Granger, to take part in some

operations which he was projecting against General Earl Van Dorn,

then at Spring Hill. Knowing that my line of march would carry me

through a region where forage was plentiful, I took along a large

train of empty wagons, which I determined to fill with corn and send

back to Murfreesboro', believing that I could successfully cover the

train by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which had joined me for the

purpose of aiding in a reconnoissance toward Shelbyville. In

marching the column I placed a regiment of infantry at its head, then

the wagon-train, then a brigade of infantry--masking the cavalry

behind this brigade. The enemy, discovering that the train was with

us, and thinking he could capture it, came boldly out with his,

cavalry to attack. The head of his column came up to the crossroads

at Versailles, but holding him there, I passed the train and infantry

brigade beyond toward Eagleville, and when my cavalry had been thus

unmasked, Minty, followed by the balance of my division, which was

still behind, charged him with the sabre. Success was immediate and

complete, and pursuit of the routed forces continued through

Unionville, until we fell upon and drove in the Confederate outposts

at Shelbyville. Here the enemy was taken by surprise evidently,

which was most fortunate for us, otherwise the consequences might

have been disastrous. Minty captured in the charge about fifty

prisoners and a few wagons and mules, and thus enabled me to load my

train with corn, and send it back to Murfreesboro' unmolested. In

this little fight the sabre was freely used by both sides, and I do

not believe that during the whole war I again knew of so large a

percentage of wounds by that arm in proportion to the numbers

engaged.

That night I encamped at Eagleville, and next day reported to Granger

at Franklin, arriving in the midst of much excitement prevailing on

account of the loss of Coburn's brigade, which had been captured the

day before a little distance south of that point, while marching to

form a junction with a column that had been directed on Columbia from

Murfreesboro'. Shortly after Coburn's capture General Granger had

come upon the scene, and the next day he advanced my division and

Minty's troops directly on Spring Hill, with a view to making some

reprisal; but Van Dorn had no intention of accommodating us, and

retired from Spring Hill, offering but little resistance. He

continued to fall back, till finally he got behind Duck River, where

operations against him ceased; for, in consequence of the incessant

rains of the season, the streams had become almost impassable.

Later, I returned by way of Franklin to my old camp at Murfreesboro',

passing over on this march the ground on which the Confederate

General Hood met with such disaster the following year in his attack

on Stanley's corps.

My command had all returned from the Franklin expedition to

Murfreesboro' and gone into camp on the Salem pike by the latter part

of March, from which time till June it took part in only the little

affairs of outposts occurring every now and then on my own front. In

the meanwhile General Rosecrans had been materially reinforced by the

return of sick and wounded men; his army had become well disciplined,

and was tolerably supplied; and he was repeatedly pressed by the

authorities at Washington to undertake offensive operations.

During the spring and early summer Rosecrans resisted, with a great

deal of spirit and on various grounds, these frequent urgings, and

out of this grew up an acrimonious correspondence and strained

feeling between him and General Halleck. Early in June, however,

stores had been accumulated and other preparations made for a move

forward, Resecrans seeming to have decided that he could safely risk

an advance, with the prospect of good results. Before finally

deciding, he called upon most of his corps and division commanders

for their opinions on certain propositions which he presented, and

most of them still opposed the projected movement, I among the

number, reasoning that while General Grant was operating against

Vicksburg, it was better to hold Bragg in Middle Tennessee than to

push him so far back into Georgia that interior means of

communication would give the Confederate Government the opportunity

of quickly joining a part of his force to that of General Johnson in

Mississippi.

At this stage, and in fact prior to it, Rosecrans seemed to manifest

special confidence in me, often discussing his plans with me

independent of the occasions on which he formally referred them for

my views. I recollect that on two different occasions about this

time he unfolded his designs to me in this informal way, outlining

generally how he expected ultimately to force Bragg south of the

Tennessee River, and going into the details of the contemplated move

on Tullahoma. His schemes, to my mind, were not only comprehensive,

but exact, and showed conclusively, what no one doubted then, that

they were original with him. I found in them very little to

criticise unfavorably, if we were to move at all, and Rosecrans

certainly impressed me that he favored an advance at an early day,

though many of his generals were against it until the operations on

the Mississippi River should culminate in something definite. There

was much, fully apparent in the circumstances about his headquarters,

leading to the conviction that Rosecrans originated the Tullahoma

campaign, and the record of his prior performances collaterally

sustains the visible evidence then existing. In my opinion, then,

based on a clear recollection of various occurrences growing out of

our intimacy, he conceived the plan of the Tullahoma campaign and the

one succeeding it; and is therefore entitled to every credit that

attended their execution, no matter what may be claimed for others.

On the 23d of June Bragg was covering his position north of Duck

River with a front extending from McMinnville, where his cavalry

rested, through Wartrace and Shelbyville to Columbia, his depot being

at Tullahoma. Rosecrans, thinking that Bragg would offer strong

resistance at Shelbyville--which was somewhat protected by a spur

of low mountains or hills, offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains

--decided to turn that place; consequently, he directed the mass

of the Union army on the enemy's right flank, about Manchester.

On the 26th of June McCook's corps advanced toward Liberty Gap, my

divisions marching on the Shelbyville pike. I had proceeded but a

few miles when I encountered the enemy's pickets, who fell back to

Christiana, about nine miles from Murfreesboro'. Here I was assailed

pretty wickedly by the enemy's sharpshooters and a section of

artillery, but as I was instructed to do nothing more than cover the

road from Eagleville, over which Brannan's division was to approach

Christiana, I made little reply to this severe annoyance, wishing to

conceal the strength of my force. As soon as the head of Brannan's

column arrived I marched across-country to the left, and encamped

that night at the little town of Millersburg, in the vicinity of

Liberty Gap. I was directed to move from Millersburg, on Hoover's

Gap--a pass in the range of hills already referred to, through which

ran the turnpike from Murfreesboro' to Manchester--but heavy rains

had made the country roads almost impassable, and the last of my

division did not reach Hoover's Gap till the morning of June 27,

after its abandonment by the enemy. Continuing on to Fairfield, the

head of my column met, south of that place, a small force of

Confederate infantry and cavalry, which after a slight skirmish

Laiboldt's brigade drove back toward Wartrace. The next morning I

arrived at Manchester, where I remained quiet for the day. Early on

the 29th I marched by the Lynchburg road for Tullahoma, where the

enemy was believed to be in force, and came into position about six

miles from the town.

By the 31st the whole army had been concentrated, in spite of many

difficulties, and though, on account of the heavy rains that had

fallen almost incessantly since we left Murfreesboro', its movements

had been slow and somewhat inaccurate, yet the precision with which

it took up a line of battle for an attack on Tullahoma showed that

forethought and study had been given to every detail. The enemy had

determined to fall back from Tullahoma at the beginning of the

campaign, however, and as we advanced, his evacuation had so far

progressed that when, on July 1. We reached the earthworks thrown.

up early in the year for the defense of the place, he had almost

wholly disappeared, carrying off all his stores and munitions of war

except some little subsistence and eleven pieces of artillery. A

strong rearguard remained to cover the retreat, and on my front the

usual encounters between advancing and retreating forces took place.

Just before reaching the intrenchments on the Lynchburg road, I came

upon an open space that was covered by a network of fallen trees and

underbrush, which had been slashed all along in front of the enemy's

earthworks. This made our progress very difficult, but I shortly

became satisfied that there were only a few of the enemy within the

works, so moving a battalion of cavalry that had joined me the day

before down the road as rapidly as the obstructions would permit, the

Confederate pickets quickly departed, and we gained possession of the

town. Three siege guns, four caissons, a few stores, and a small

number of prisoners fell into my hands.

That same evening orders were issued to the army to push on from

Tullahoma in pursuit, for, as it was thought that we might not be

able to cross Elk River on account of its swollen condition, we could

do the enemy some damage by keeping close as possible at his heels.

I marched on the Winchester road at 3 o'clock on the 2d of July and

about 8 o'clock reached Elk River ford. The stream was for the time

truly an impassable torrent, and all hope of crossing by the

Winchester ford had to be abandoned. Deeming that further effort

should be made, however, under guidance of Card, I turned the head of

my column in the direction of Alisona, marching up the river and

nearly parallel with it till I came to Rock Creek. With a little

delay we got across Rock Creek, which was also much swollen, and

finding a short distance above its mouth a ford on Elk River that

Card said was practicable, I determined to attempt it: Some of the

enemy's cavalry were guarding this ford, but after a sharp little

skirmish my battalion of cavalry crossed and took up a strong

position on the other bank. The stream was very high and the current

very swift, the water, tumbling along over its rocky bed in an

immense volume, but still it was fordable for infantry if means could

be devised by which the men could keep their feet. A cable was

stretched across just below the ford as a lifeline for the weaker

ones, and then the men of the entire division having secured their

ammunition by placing the cartridge-boxes on their shoulders, the

column pushed cheerfully into the rushing current. The men as they

entered the water joined each other in sets of four in a close

embrace, which enabled them to retain a foothold and successfully

resist the force of the flood. When they were across I turned the

column down the left bank of Elk River, and driving the enemy from

some slight works near Estelle Springs, regained the Winchester road.

By this time it was clear that Bragg intended to fall back behind the

Tennessee River, and our only chance of accomplishing anything of

importance was to smash up his rear-guard before it crossed the

Cumberland Mountains, and in pursuance of this idea I was directed to

attack such of his force as was holding on to Winchester. At 4

o'clock on the morning of July 2 I moved on that town, and when we

got close to it directed my mounted troops to charge a small force of

Confederate cavalry that was picketing their front. The Confederates

resisted but little, and our men went with them in a disorderly chase

through the village to Boiling Fork, a small stream about half a mile

beyond. Here the fleeing pickets, rallying behind a stronger force,

made a stand, and I was directed by McCook to delay till I

ascertained if Davis's division, which was to support me, had made

the crossing of Elk River, and until I could open up communication

with Brannan's division, which was to come in on my left at Decherd.

As soon as I learned that Davis was across I pushed on, but the delay

had permitted the enemy to pull his rear-guard up on the mountain,

and rendered nugatory all further efforts to hurt him materially, our

only returns consisting in forcing him to relinquish a small amount

of transportation and forage at the mouth of the pass just beyond

Cowan, a station on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga

railroad.

At Cowan, Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, reported to

me with twelve hundred mounted men. Having heard during the night

that the enemy had halted on the mountain near the University--an

educational establishment on the summit--I directed Watkins to make a

reconnoissance and find out the value of the information. He learned

that Wharton's brigade of cavalry was halted at the University to

cover a moderately large force of the enemy's infantry which had not

yet got down the mountain on the other side, so I pushed Watkins out

again on the 5th, supporting him by a brigade of infantry, which I

accompanied myself. We were too late, however, for when we arrived

at the top of the mountain Wharton had disappeared, and though

Watkins pursued to Bridgeport, he was able to do nothing more, and on

his return reported that the last of the enemy had crossed the

Tennessee River and burned the railroad bridge.

Nothing further could now be done, so I instructed Watkins to rejoin

the division at Cowan, and being greatly fatigued by the hard

campaigning of the previous ten days, I concluded to go back to my

camp in a more comfortable way than on the back of my tired horse.

In his retreat the enemy had not disturbed the railway track at all,

and as we had captured a hand-car at Cowan, I thought I would have it

brought up to the station near the University to carry me down the

mountain to my camp, and, desiring company, I persuasively invited

Colonel Frank T. Sherman to ride with me. I sent for the car by a

courier, and for a long time patiently awaited its arrival, in fact,

until all the returning troops had passed us, but still it did not

come. Thinking it somewhat risky to remain at the station without

protection, Sherman and myself started our horses to Cowan by our

orderlies, and set out on foot to meet the car, trudging along down

the track in momentary expectation of falling in with our private

conveyance. We had not gone very far before night overtook us, and

we then began to realize the dangers surrounding us, for there we

were alone and helpless, tramping on in the darkness over an unknown

railroad track in the enemy's country, liable on the one hand to go

tumbling through some bridge or trestle, and on the other, to

possible capture or death at the hands of the guerrillas then

infesting these mountains. Just after dark we came to a little cabin

near the track, where we made bold to ask for water, notwithstanding

the fact that to disclose ourselves to the inmates might lead to

fatal consequences. The water was kindly given, but the owner and

his family were very much exercised lest some misfortune might befall

us near their house, so they encouraged us to move on with a frankness

inspired by fear of future trouble to themselves.

At every turn we eagerly hoped to meet the hand-car, but it never

came, and we jolted on from tie to tie for eleven weary miles,

reaching Cowan after midnight, exhausted and sore in every muscle

from frequent falls on the rough, unballasted road-bed. Inquiry.

developed that the car had been well manned, and started to us as

ordered, and nobody could account for its non-arrival. Further

investigation next day showed, however, that when it reached the foot

of the mountain, where the railroad formed a junction, the improvised

crew, in the belief no doubt that the University was on the main line

instead of near the branch to Tracy City, followed the main stem

until it carried them clear across the range down the Crow Creek

Valley, where the party was captured.

I had reason to remember for many a day this foolish adventure, for

my sore bones and bruised muscles, caused me physical suffering until

I left the Army of the Cumberland the next spring; but I had still

more reason to feel for my captured men, and on this account I have

never ceased to regret that I so thoughtlessly undertook to rejoin my

troops by rail, instead of sticking to my faithful horse.

CHAPTER XV.

ORDERED TO OCCUPY BRIDGEPORT--A SPY--THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

--GENERAL THOMAS--TREATED TO COFFEE--RESULTS OF THE BATTLE.

The Tullahoma campaign was practically closed by the disappearance of

the enemy from the country north of the Tennessee River. Middle

Tennessee was once more in the possession of the National troops, and

Rosecrans though strongly urged from Washington to continue on,

resisted the pressure until he could repair the Nashville and

Chattanooga railroad, which was of vital importance in supplying his

army from its secondary base at Nashville. As he desired to hold

this road to where it crossed the Tennessee, it was necessary to push

a force beyond the mountains, and after a few days of rest at Cowan

my division was ordered to take station at Stevenson, Alabama, the

junction of the Memphis and Charleston road with the Nashville and

Chattanooga, with instructions to occupy Bridgeport also.

The enemy had meanwhile concentrated most of his forces at

Chattanooga for the twofold purpose of holding this gateway of the

Cumberland Mountains, and to assume a defensive attitude which would

enable him to take advantage of such circumstances as might arise in

the development of the offensive campaign he knew we must make. The

peculiar topography of the country was much to his advantage, and

while we had a broad river and numerous spurs and ridges of the

Cumberland Mountains to cross at a long distance from our base, he

was backed up on his depots of supply, and connected by interior

lines of railway with the different armies of the Confederacy, so

that he could be speedily reinforced.

Bridgeport was to be ultimately a sub-depot for storing subsistence

supplies, and one of the points at which our army would cross the

Tennessee, so I occupied it on July 29 with two brigades, retaining

one at Stevenson, however, to protect that railway junction from

raids by way of Caperton's ferry. By the 29th of August a

considerable quantity of supplies had been accumulated, and then

began a general movement of our troops for crossing the river. As

there were not with the army enough pontoons to complete the two

bridges required, I was expected to build one of them of trestles;

and a battalion of the First Michigan Engineers under Colonel Innis

was sent me to help construct the bridge. Early on the 31st I sent

into the neighboring woods about fifteen hundred men with axes and

teams, and by nightfall they had delivered on the riverbank fifteen

hundred logs suitable for a trestle bridge. Flooring had been

shipped to me in advance by rail, but the quantity was insufficient,

and the lack had to be supplied by utilizing planking and

weather-boarding taken from barns and houses in the surrounding

country. The next day Innis's engineers, with the assistance of the

detail that had felled the timber, cut and half-notched the logs, and

put the bridge across; spanning the main channel, which was swimming

deep, with four or five pontoons that had been sent me for this

purpose. On the 2d and 3d of September my division crossed on the

bridge in safety, though we were delayed somewhat because of its

giving way once where the pontoons joined the trestles. We were

followed by a few detachments from other commands, and by nearly

all the transportation of McCook's corps.

After getting to the south side of the Tennessee River I was ordered

to Valley Head, where McCook's corps was to concentrate. On the 4th

of September I ascended Sand Mountain, but had got only half way

across the plateau, on top, when night came, the march having been a

most toilsome one. The next day we descended to the base, and

encamped near Trenton. On the 10th I arrived at Valley Head, and

climbing Lookout Mountain, encamped on the plateau at Indian Falls.

The following day I went down into Broomtown Valley to Alpine.

The march of McCook's corps from Valley Head to Alpine was in

pursuance of orders directing it to advance on Summerville, the

possession of which place would further threaten the enemy's

communications, it being assumed that Bragg was in full retreat

south, as he had abandoned Chattanooga on the 8th. This assumption

soon proved erroneous, however, and as we, while in Broomtown Valley,

could not communicate directly with Thomas's corps, the scattered

condition of the army began to alarm us all, and McCook abandoned the

advance to Summerville, ordering back to the summit of Lookout

Mountain such of the corps trains as had got down into Broomtown

Valley.

But before this I had grown uneasy in regard to the disjointed

situation of our army, and, to inform myself of what was going on,

determined to send a spy into the enemy's lines. In passing Valley

Head on the 10th my scout Card, who had been on the lookout for some

one capable to undertake the task, brought me a Union man with whom

he was acquainted, who lived on Sand Mountain, and had been much

persecuted by guerrillas on account of his loyal sentiments. He knew

the country well, and as his loyalty was vouched for I asked him to

go into the enemy's camp, which I believed to be near Lafayette, and,

bring me such information as he could gather. He said such a journey

would be at the risk of his life, and that at best he could not

expect to remain in that section of country if he undertook it, but

that he would run all the chances if I would enable him to emigrate

to the West at the end c f the "job," which I could do by purchasing

the small "bunch" of stock he owned on the mountain. To this I

readily assented, and he started on the delicate undertaking. He

penetrated the enemy's lines with little difficulty, but while

prosecuting his search for information was suspected, and at once

arrested and placed under guard. From this critical situation he

escaped; however, making his way through the enemy's picket-line in

the darkness by crawling on his belly and deceiving the sentinels by

imitating the grunts of the half-wild, sand-colored hogs with which

the country abounded. He succeeded in reaching Rosecrans's

headquarters finally, and there gave the definite information that

Bragg intended to fight, and that he expected to be reinforced by

Longstreet.

By this time it was clear that Bragg had abandoned Chattanooga with

the sole design of striking us in detail as we followed in pursuit;

and to prevent his achieving this purpose orders came at 12 o'clock,

midnight, for McCook to draw in toward Chattanooga. This could be

done only by recrossing Lookout Mountain, the enemy's army at

Lafayette now interposing between us and Thomas's corps. The

retrograde march began at once. I moved back over the mountain on

the 13th and 14th to Stevens's Mills, and on the 15th and 16th

recrossed through Stevens's Gap, in the Lookout range, and encamped

at its base in McLamore's cove. The march was made with all possible

celerity, for the situation was critical and demanded every exertion.

The ascent and descent of the mountains was extremely exhausting, the

steep grades often rendering it necessary to drag up and let down by

hand both the transportation and artillery. But at last we were in

conjunction with the main army, and my division breathed easier.

On the 17th I remained in line of battle all day and night in front

of McLamore's cove, the enemy making slight demonstrations against me

from the direction of Lafayette. The main body of the army having

bodily moved to the left meanwhile, I followed it on the 18th,

encamping at Pond Spring. On the 19th I resumed the march to the

left and went into line of battle at Crawfish Springs to cover our

right and rear. Immediately after forming this line, I again became

isolated by the general movement to the left, and in consequence was

directed to advance and hold the ford of Chickamauga Creek at Lee and

Gordon's Mills, thus coming into close communication with the balance

of our forces. I moved into this position rapidly, being compelled,

though, first to drive back the enemy's cavalry skirmishers, who,

having crossed to the west side of the creek, annoyed the right flank

of my column a good deal while en route.

Upon arrival at Lee and Gordon's Mills I found the ford over

Chickamauga Creek temporarily uncovered, through the hurried movement

of Wood to the assistance of Davis's division. The enemy was already

present in small force, with the evident intention of taking

permanent possession, but my troops at once actively engaged him and

recovered the ford with some slight losses. Scarcely had this been

done when I was directed to assist Crittenden. Leaving Lytle's

brigade at the ford, I proceeded with Bradley's and Laiboldt's to

help Crittenden, whose main line was formed to the east of the

Chattanooga and Lafayette road, its right trending toward a point on

Chickamauga Creek about a mile and a half north of Lee and Gordon's

Mills. By the time I had joined Crittenden with my two brigades,

Davis had been worsted in an attack Rosecrans had ordered him to make

on the left of that portion of the enemy's line which was located

along the west bank of the Chickamauga, the repulse being so severe

that one of Davis's batteries had to be abandoned. Bradley's brigade

arrived on the ground first and was hastily formed and thrown into

the fight, which up to this moment had been very doubtful, fortune

inclining first to one side, then to the other. Bradley's brigade

went in with steadiness, and charging across an open corn-field that

lay in front of the Lafayette road, recovered Davis's guns and forced

the enemy to retire. Meanwhile Laiboldt's brigade had come on the

scene, and forming it on Bradley's right, I found myself at the end

of the contest holding the ground which was Davis's original

position. It was an ugly fight and my loss was heavy, including

Bradley wounded. The temporary success was cheering, and when

Lytle's brigade joined me a little later I suggested to Crittenden

that we attack, but investigation showed that his troops, having been

engaged all day, were not in condition, so the suggestion could not

be carried out.

The events of the day had indicated that Bragg's main object was to

turn Rosecrans's left; it was therefore still deemed necessary that

the army should continue its flank movement to the left, so orders

came to draw my troops in toward the widow Glenn's house. By

strengthening the skirmish line and shifting my brigades in

succession from right to left until the point designated was reached,

I was able to effect the withdrawal without much difficulty, calling

in my skirmish line after the main force had retired.

My command having settled down for the night in this new line I rode

to army headquarters, to learn if possible the expectations for the

morrow and hear the result of the battle in General Thomas's front.

Nearly all the superior officers of the army were at headquarters,

and it struck me that much depression prevailed, notwithstanding the

fact that the enemy's attempts during the day to turn our left flank

and also envelop our right had been unsuccessful. It was now

positively known, through prisoners and otherwise, that Bragg had

been reinforced to such an extent as to make him materially outnumber

us, consequently there was much apprehension for the future.

The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent, and the next

day the drifting in that direction was to be continued. This

movement in the presence of the enemy, who at all points was actively

seeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a column

between its right and left, was most dangerous. But the necessity

for shifting the army to the left was obvious, hence only the method

by which it was undertaken is open to question. The move was made by

the flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers, and was

a violation of a simple and fundamental military principle. Under

such circumstances columns naturally stretch out into attenuated

lines, organizations become separated, and intervals occur, all of

which we experienced; and had the orders for the movement been

construed properly I doubt if it could have been executed without

serious danger. Necessity knows no law, however, and when all the

circumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible that

justification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army was

thus drifted to the left. We were in a bad strait unquestionably,

and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be applied

rather than the rule.

At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscured

everything; consequently both armies were passive so far as fighting

was concerned. Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrange

his right, and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn's house to

a strong position, where I threw together some rails and logs as

barricades, but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by a

considerable interval. Here I awaited the approach of the enemy, but

he did not disturb me, although about 9 o'clock in the forenoon he

had opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavy

cannonade. Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that the

interval between the main army and me was widening, and he ordered me

to send Laiboldt's brigade to occupy a portion of the front that had

been covered by Negley's division. Before getting this brigade into

place, however, two small brigades of Davis's division occupied the

ground, and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on the

crest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin's brigade, so as to prevent

Davis's right flank from being turned. The enemy was now feeling

Davis strongly, and I was about sending for Lytle's and Bradley's

brigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to the

extreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas. I rode

hastily back toward their position, but in the meanwhile, they had

been notified by direct orders from McCook, and were moving out at a

double-quick toward the Lafayette road. By this time the enemy had

assaulted Davis furiously in front and flank, and driven him from his

line, and as the confused mass came back, McCook ordered Laiboldt to

charge by deploying to the front. This he did through Davis's broken

ranks, but failed to check the enemy's heavy lines, and finally

Laiboldt's brigade broke also and fell to the rear. My remaining

troops, headed by Lytle, were now passing along the rear of the

ground where this disaster took place--in column on the road--en

route to Thomas, and as the hundreds of fugitives rushed back, McCook

directed me to throw in Lytle's and Bradley's brigades. This was

hastily done, they being formed to the front under a terrible fire.

Scarcely were they aligned when the same horde of Confederates that

had overwhelmed Davis and Laiboldt poured in upon them a deadly fire

and shivered the two brigades to pieces. We succeeded in rallying

them, however, and by a counter attack regained the ridge that

Laiboldt had been driven from, where we captured the colors of the

Twenty-fourth Alabama. We could not hold the ridge, though, and my

troops were driven back with heavy loss, including General Lytle

killed, past the widow Glenn's house, and till I managed to establish

them in line of battle on a range of low hills behind the Dry Valley

road.

During these occurrences General Rosecrans passed down the road

behind my line, and sent word that he wished to see me, but affairs

were too critical to admit of my going to him at once, and he rode on

to Chattanooga. It is to be regretted that he did not wait till I

could join him, for the delay would have permitted him to see that

matters were not in quite such bad shape as he supposed; still, there

is no disguising the fact that at this juncture his army was badly

crippled.

Shortly after my division had rallied on the low hills already

described, I discovered that the enemy, instead of attacking me in

front, was wedging in between my division and the balance of the

army; in short, endeavoring to cut me off from Chattanooga. This

necessitated another retrograde movement, which brought me back to

the southern face of Missionary Ridge, where I was joined by Carlin's

brigade of Davis's division. Still thinking I could join General

Thomas, I rode some distance to the left of my line to look for a way

out, but found that the enemy had intervened so far as to isolate me

effectually. I then determined to march directly to Rossville, and

from there effect a junction with Thomas by the Lafayette road. I

reached Rossville about o'clock in the afternoon, bringing with me

eight guns, forty-six caissons, and a long ammunition train, the

latter having been found in a state of confusion behind the widow

Glenn's when I was being driven back behind the Dry Valley road.

The head of my column passed through Rossville, appearing upon

Thomas's left about 6 o'clock in the evening, penetrated without any

opposition the right of the enemy's line, and captured several of his

field-hospitals. As soon as I got on the field I informed Thomas of

the presence of my command, and asked for orders. He replied that

his lines were disorganized, and that it would be futile to attack;

that all I could do was to hold on, and aid in covering his

withdrawal to Rossville.

I accompanied him back to Rossville, and when we reached the skirt of

the little hamlet General Thomas halted and we dismounted. Going

into one of the angles of a worm fence near by I took a rail from the

top and put it through the lower rails at a proper height from the

ground to make a seat, and General Thomas and I sat down while, my

troops were moving by. The General appeared very much exhausted,

seemed to forget what he had stopped for, and said little or nothing

of the incidents of the day. This was the second occasion on which I

had met him in the midst of misfortune, for during the fight in the

cedars at Stone River, when our prospects were most disheartening, we

held a brief conversation respecting the line he was then taking up

for the purpose of helping me. At other times, in periods of

inactivity, I saw but little of him. He impressed me, now as he did

in the cedars, his quiet, unobtrusive: demeanor communicating a

gloomy rather than a hopeful view of the situation. This apparent

depression was due no doubt to the severe trial through which he had

gone in the last forty-eight hours, which, strain had exhausted him

very much both physically and mentally. His success in maintaining

his ground was undoubtedly largely influenced by the fact that

two-thirds of the National forces had been sent to his succor, but his

firm purpose to save the army was the mainstay on which all relied

after Rosecrans left the field. As the command was getting pretty

well past, I rose to go in order to put my troops into camp. This

aroused the General, when, remarking that he had a little flask of

brandy in his saddle-holster, he added that he had just stopped for

the purpose of offering me a drink, as he knew I must be very tired.

He requested one of his staff-officers to get the flask, and after

taking a sip himself, passed it to me. Refreshed by the brandy, I

mounted and rode off to supervise the encamping of my division, by no

means an easy task considering the darkness, and the confusion that

existed among the troops that had preceded us into Rossville.

This done, I lay down at the foot of a tree, with my saddle for a

pillow, and saddle-blanket for a cover. Some soldiers near me having

built a fire, were making coffee, and I guess I must have been

looking on wistfully, for in a little while they brought me a

tin-cupful of the coffee and a small piece of hard bread, which I

relished keenly, it being the first food that had passed my lips

since the night before. I was very tired, very hungry, and much

discouraged by what had taken place since morning. I had been

obliged to fight my command under the most disadvantageous

circumstances, disconnected, without supports, without even

opportunity to form in line of battle, and at one time contending

against four divisions of the enemy. In this battle of Chickamauga,

out of an effective strength Of 4,000 bayonets, I had lost 1,517

officers and men, including two brigade commanders. This was not

satisfactory indeed, it was most depressing--and then there was much

confusion prevailing around Rossville; and, this condition of things

doubtless increasing my gloomy reflections, it did not seem to me

that the outlook for the next day was at all auspicious, unless the

enemy was slow to improve his present advantage. Exhaustion soon

quieted all forebodings, though, and I fell into a sound sleep, from

which I was not aroused till daylight.

On the morning of the 21st the enemy failed to advance, and his

inaction gave us the opportunity for getting the broken and

disorganized army into shape. It took a large part of the day to

accomplish this, and the chances of complete victory would have been

greatly in Bragg's favor if he could have attacked us vigorously at

this time. But he had been badly hurt in the two days' conflict, and

his inactivity on the 21st showed that he too had to go through the

process of reorganization. Indeed, his crippled condition began to

show itself the preceding evening, and I have always thought that,

had General Thomas held on and attacked the Confederate right and

rear from where I made the junction with him on the Lafayette road,

the field of Chickamauga would have been relinquished to us; but it

was fated to be otherwise.

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden passed out of the battle when they

went back to Chattanooga, and their absence was discouraging to all

aware of it. Doubtless this had much to do with Thomas's final

withdrawal, thus leaving the field to the enemy, though at an immense

cost in killed and wounded. The night of the 21st the army moved

back from Rossville, and my division, as the rearguard of the

Twentieth Corps, got within our lines at Chattanooga about 8 o'clock

the morning of the 22d. Our unmolested retirement from Rossville

lent additional force to the belief that the enemy had been badly

injured, and further impressed me with the conviction that we might

have held on. Indeed, the battle of Chickamauga was somewhat like

that of Stone River, victory resting with the side that had the grit

to defer longest its relinquishment of the field.

The manoeuvres by which Rosecrans had carried his army over the

Cumberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River, and possessed

himself of Chattanooga, merit the highest commendation up to the

abandonment of this town by Bragg on the 8th of September; but I have

always fancied that that evacuation made Rosecrans over-confident,

and led him to think that he could force Bragg south as far as Rome.

After the Union army passed the river and Chattanooga fell into our

hands; we still kept pressing the enemy's communications, and the

configuration of the country necessitated more or less isolation of

the different corps. McCook's corps of three divisions had crossed

two difficult ridges--Sand and Lookout mountains--to Alpine in

Broomtown Valley with intentions against Summerville. Thomas's corps

had marched by the way of Stevens's Gap toward Lafayette, which he

expected to occupy. Crittenden had passed through Chattanooga, at

first directing his march an Ringgold. Thus the corps of the army

were not in conjunction, and between McCook and Thomas there

intervened a positive and aggressive obstacle in the shape of Bragg's

army concentrating and awaiting reinforcement at Lafayette. Under

these circumstances Bragg could have taken the different corps in

detail, and it is strange that he did not, even before receiving his

reinforcements, turn on McCook in Broomtown Valley and destroy him.

Intelligence that Bragg would give battle began to come to us from

various sources as early as the 10th of September, and on the 11th

McCook found that he could not communicate with Thomas by the direct

road through Broomtown Valley; but we did not begin closing in toward

Chattanooga till the 13th, and even then the Twentieth Corps had

before it the certainty of many delays that must necessarily result

from the circuitous and difficult mountain roads which we would be

obliged to follow. Had the different corps, beginning with McCook's,

been drawn in toward Chattanooga between the 8th and 12th of

September, the objective point of the campaign would have remained in

our hands without the battle of Chickamauga, but, as has been seen,

this was not done. McCook was almost constantly on the march day and

night between the 13th and the 19th, ascending and descending

mountains, his men worried and wearied, so that when they appeared on

the battle-field, their fatigued condition operated greatly against

their efficiency. This delay in concentration was also the original

cause of the continuous shifting toward our left to the support of

Thomas, by which manoeuvre Rosecrans endeavored to protect his

communications with Chattanooga, and out of which grew the intervals

that offered such tempting opportunities to Bragg. In addition to

all this, much transpired on the field of battle tending to bring

about disaster. There did not seem to be any well-defined plan of

action in the fighting; and this led to much independence of judgment

in construing orders among some of the subordinate generals. It also

gave rise to much license in issuing orders: too many people were

giving important directions, affecting the whole army, without

authority from its head. In view, therefore, of all the errors that

were committed from the time Chattanooga fell into our hands after

our first crossing the Tennessee, it was fortunate that the Union

defeat was not more complete, that it left in the enemy's possession

not much more than the barren results arising from the simple holding

of the ground on which the engagement was fought.

CHAPTER XVI.

AT CHATTANOOGA--THE ENEMY FORTIFIES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARY

RIDGE--REORGANIZING THE ARMY--REMOVAL OF GENERAL ROSECRANS

--PUNISHMENT OF DESERTERS--GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA--THE FIGHT ON LOOKOUT

MOUNTAIN--A BRAVE COLOR-BEARER--BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

By 9 o'clock on the morning of September 22 my command took up a

position within the heavy line of intrenchments at Chattanooga, the

greater part of which defenses had been thrown up since the army

commenced arriving there the day before. The enemy, having now

somewhat recovered from the shock of the recent battle, followed

carefully, and soon invested us close into our lines with a parallel

system of rifle-pits. He also began at once to erect permanent lines

of earthworks on Missionary Ridge and to establish himself strongly

on Lookout Mountain. He then sent Wheeler's cavalry north of the

Tennessee, and, aided greatly by the configuration of the ground,

held us in a state of partial siege, which serious rains might

convert into a complete investment. The occupation of Lookout

Mountain broke our direct communication with Bridgeport--our

sub-depot--and forced us to bring supplies by way of the Sequatchie

Valley and Waldron's Ridge of the Cumberland Mountains, over a road

most difficult even in the summer season, but now liable to be

rendered impassable by autumn rains. The distance to Bridgeport by

this circuitous route was sixty miles, and the numerous passes,

coves, and small valleys through which the road ran offered tempting

opportunities, for the destruction of trains, and the enemy was not

slow to take advantage of them. Indeed, the situation was not

promising, and General Rosecrans himself, in communicating with the

President the day succeeding the battle of Chickamauga, expressed

doubts of his ability to hold the gateway of the Cumberland

Mountains.

The position taken up by my troops inside the lines of Chattanooga

was near the old iron-works, under the shadow of Lookout Mountain.

Here we were exposed to a continual fire from the enemy's batteries

for many days, but as the men were well covered by secure though

simple intrenchments, but little damage was done. My own

headquarters were established on the grounds of Mr. William

Crutchfield, a resident of the place, whose devotion to the Union

cause knew no bounds, and who rendered me--and, in fact, at one time

or another, nearly every general officer in the Army of the

Cumberland--invaluable service in the way of information about the

Confederate army. My headquarters camp frequently received shots

from the point of Lookout Mountain also, but fortunately no

casualties resulted from this plunging fire, though, I am free to

confess, at first our nerves were often upset by the whirring of

twenty-pounder shells dropped inconsiderately into our camp at

untimely hours of the night.

In a few days rain began to fall, and the mountain roads by which our

supplies came were fast growing impracticable. Each succeeding train

of wagons took longer to make the trip from Bridgeport, and the draft

mules were dying by the hundreds. The artillery horses would soon go

too, and there was every prospect that later the troops would starve

unless something could be done. Luckily for my division, a company

of the Second Kentucky Cavalry had attached itself to my

headquarters, and, though there without authority, had been left

undisturbed in view of a coming reorganization of the army incidental

to the removal of McCook and Crittenden from the command of their

respective corps, a measure that had been determined upon immediately

after the battle of Chickamauga. Desiring to remain with me, Captain

Lowell H. Thickstun, commanding this company, was ready for any duty

I might find, for him, so I ordered him into the Sequatchie Valley

for the purpose of collecting supplies for my troops, and sent my

scout, Card along to guide him to the best locations. The company

hid itself away in a deep cove in the upper end of the valley, and by

keeping very quiet and paying for everything it took from the people,

in a few days was enabled to send me large quantities of corn for my

animals and food for the officers and men, which greatly supplemented

the scanty supplies we were getting from the sub-depot at Bridgeport.

In this way I carried men and animals through our beleaguerment in

pretty fair condition, and of the turkeys, chickens, ducks, and eggs

sent in for the messes of my officers we often had enough to divide

liberally among those at different headquarters. Wheeler's cavalry

never discovered my detached company, yet the chances of its capture

were not small, sometimes giving much uneasiness; still, I concluded

it was better to run all risks than to let the horses die of

starvation in Chattanooga. Later, after the battle of Missionary

Ridge, when I started to Knoxville, the company joined me in

excellent shape, bringing with it an abundance of food, including a

small herd of beef cattle.

The whole time my line remained near the iron-mills the shelling from

Lookout was kept up, the screeching shots inquisitively asking in

their well-known way, "Where are you? Where are you?" but it is

strange to see how readily, soldiers can become accustomed to the

sound of dangerous missiles under circumstances of familiarity, and

this case was no exception to the rule. Few casualties occurred, and

soon contempt took the place of nervousness, and as we could not

reply in kind on account of the elevation required for our guns, the

men responded by jeers and imprecations whenever a shell fell into

their camp.

Meantime, orders having been issued for the organization of the army,

additional troops were attached to my command, and it became the

Second Division of the Fourth Army Corps, to which Major-General

Gordon Granger was assigned as commander. This necessitated a change

of position of the division, and I moved to ground behind our works,

with my right resting on Fort Negley and my left extending well over

toward Fort Wood, my front being parallel to Missionary Ridge. My

division was now composed of twenty-five regiments, classified into

brigades and demi-brigades, the former commanded by Brigadier-General

G. D. Wagner, Colonel C. G. Harker, and Colonel F. T. Sherman; the

latter, by Colonels Laiboldt, Miller, Wood, Walworth, and Opdyke.

The demi-brigade was an awkward invention of Granger's; but at this

time it was necessitated--perhaps by the depleted condition of our

regiments, which compelled the massing of a great number of

regimental organizations into a division to give it weight and force.

On October 16, 1863, General Grant had been assigned to the command

of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," a geographical area

which embraced the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the

Tennessee, thus effecting a consolidation of divided commands which

might have been introduced most profitably at an earlier date. The

same order that assigned General Grant relieved General Rosecrans,

and placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland.

At the time of the reception of the order, Rosecrans was busy with

preparations for a movement to open the direct road to Bridgeport

--having received in the interval, since we came back to Chattanooga,

considerable reinforcement by the arrival in his department of the

Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under General Hooker, from the Army of

the Potomac. With this force Rosecrans had already strengthened

certain important points on the railroad between Nashville and

Stevenson, and given orders to Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeport

such portions of his command as were available, and to hold them in

readiness to advance toward Chattanooga.

On the 19th of October, after turning the command over to Thomas,

General Rosecrans quietly slipped away from the army. He submitted

uncomplainingly to his removal, and modestly left us without fuss or

demonstration; ever maintaining, though, that the battle of

Chickamauga was in effect a victory, as it had ensured us, he said,

the retention of Chattanooga. When his departure became known

deep and almost universal regret was expressed, for he was

enthusiastically esteemed and loved by the Army of the Cumberland,

from the day he assumed command of it until he left it,

notwithstanding the censure poured upon him after the battle of

Chickamauga.

The new position to which my division had been moved, in consequence

of the reorganization, required little additional labor to strengthen

it, and the routine of fatigue duty and drills was continued as

before, its monotony occasionally broken by the excitement of an

expected attack, or by amusements of various kinds that were

calculated to keep the men in good spirits. Toward this result much

was contributed by Mr. James E. Murdock, the actor, who came down

from the North to recover the body of his son, killed at Chickamauga,

and was quartered with me for the greater part of the time he was

obliged to await the successful conclusion of his sad mission. He

spent days, and even weeks, going about through the division giving

recitations before the camp-fires, and in improvised chapels, which

the men had constructed from refuse lumber and canvas. Suiting his

selections to the occasion, he never failed to excite intense

interest in the breasts of all present, and when circumstances

finally separated him from us, all felt that a debt of gratitude was

due him that could never be paid. The pleasure he gave, and the

confident feeling that was now arising from expected reinforcements,

was darkened, however, by one sad incident. Three men of my division

had deserted their colors at the beginning of the siege and made

their way north. They were soon arrested, and were brought back to

stand trial for the worst offense that can be committed by a soldier,

convicted of the crime, and ordered to be shot. To make the example

effective I paraded the whole division for the execution, and on the

13th of November, in the presence of their former comrades, the

culprits were sent, in accordance with the terms of their sentence,

to render their account to the Almighty. It was the saddest

spectacle I ever witnessed, but there could be no evasion, no

mitigation of the full letter of the law; its timely enforcement was

but justice to the brave spirits who had yet to fight the rebellion

to the end.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on October 23, and began at once

to carry out the plans that had been formed for opening the shorter

or river road to Bridgeport. This object was successfully

accomplished by the moving of Hooker's command to Rankin's and

Brown's ferries in concert with a force from the Army of the

Cumberland which was directed on the same points, so by the 27th of

October direct communication with our depots was established. The

four weeks which followed this cheering result were busy with the

work of refitting and preparing for offensive operations as soon as

General Sherman should reach us with his troops from West Tennessee.

During this period of activity the enemy committed the serious fault

of detaching Longstreet's corps--sending it to aid in the siege of

Knoxville in East Tennessee--an error which has no justification

whatever, unless it be based on the presumption that it was

absolutely necessary that Longstreet should ultimately rejoin Lee's

army in Virginia by way of Knoxville and Lynchburg, with a chance of

picking up Burnside en route. Thus depleted, Bragg still held

Missionary Ridge in strong force, but that part of his line which

extended across the intervening valley to the northerly point of.

Lookout Mountain was much attenuated.

By the 18th of November General Grant had issued instructions

covering his intended operations. They contemplated that Sherman's

column, which was arriving by the north bank of the Tennessee, should

cross the river on a pontoon bridge just below the mouth of

Chickamauga Creek and carry the northern extremity of Missionary

Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel; that the Army of the Cumberland

--the centre--should co-operate with Sherman; and that Hooker with a

mixed command should continue to hold Lookout Valley and operate on

our extreme right as circumstances might warrant. Sherman crossed on

the 24th to perform his alloted part of the programme, but in the

meantime Grant becoming impressed with the idea that Bragg was

endeavoring to get away, ordered Thomas to make a strong

demonstration in his front, to determine the truth or falsity of the

information that had been received. This task fell to the Fourth

Corps, and at 12 o'clock on the 23d I was notified that Wood's

division would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point in its

front called Orchard Knob, and that I was to support it with my

division and prevent Wood's right flank from being turned by an

advance of the enemy on Moore's road or from the direction of

Rossville. For this duty I marched my division out of the works

about 2 p.m., and took up a position on Bushy Knob. Shortly after we

reached this point Wood's division passed my left flank on its

reconnoissance, and my command, moving in support of it, drove in the

enemy's picket-line. Wood's took possession of Orchard Knob easily,

and mine was halted on a low ridge to the right of the Knob, where I

was directed by General Thomas to cover my front by a strong line of

rifle-pits, and to put in position two batteries of the Fourth

regular artillery that had joined me from the Eleventh Corps. After

dark Wood began to feel uneasy about his right flank, for a gap

existed between it and my left, so I moved in closer to him, taking

up a line where I remained inactive till the 25th, but suffering some

inconvenience from the enemy's shells.

On the 24th General Sherman made an attack for the purpose of

carrying the north end of Missionary Ridge. His success was not

complete, although at the time it was reported throughout the army to

be so. It had the effect of disconcerting Bragg, however, and caused

him to strengthen his right by withdrawing troops from his left,

which circumstance led Hooker to advance on the northerly face of

Lookout Mountain. At first, with good glasses, we could plainly see

Hooker's troops driving the Confederates up the face of the mountain.

All were soon lost to view in the dense timber, but emerged again on

the open ground, across which the Confederates retreated at a lively

pace, followed by the pursuing line, which was led by a color-bearer,

who, far in advance, was bravely waving on his comrades. The

gallantry of this man elicited much enthusiasm among us all, but as

he was a considerable distance ahead of his comrades I expected to

see his rashness punished at any moment by death or capture. He

finally got quite near the retreating Confederates, when suddenly

they made a dash at him, but he was fully alive to such a move, and

ran back, apparently uninjured, to his friends. About this time a

small squad of men reached the top of Lookout and planted the Stars

and Stripes on its very crest. Just then a cloud settled down on the

mountain, and a heavy bank of fog obscured its whole face.

After the view was lost the sharp rattle of musketry continued some

time, but practically the fight had been already won by Hooker's men,

the enemy only holding on with a rear-guard to assure his retreat

across Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge. Later we heard very

heavy cannonading, and fearing that Hooker was in trouble I sent a

staff-officer to find out whether he needed assistance, which I

thought could be given by a demonstration toward Rossville. The

officer soon returned with the report that Hooker was all right, that

the cannonading was only a part of a little rear-guard fight, two

sections of artillery making all the noise, the reverberations from

point to point in the adjacent mountains echoing and reechoing till

it seemed that at least fifty guns were engaged.

On the morning of the 25th of November Bragg's entire army was

holding only the line of Missionary Ridge, and our troops, being now

practically connected from Sherman to Hooker, confronted it with the

Army of the Cumberland in the centre--bowed out along the front of

Wood's division and mine. Early in the day Sherman, with great

determination and persistence, made an attempt to carry the high

ground near the tunnel, first gaining and then losing advantage, but

his attack was not crowned with the success anticipated. Meanwhile

Hooker and Palmer were swinging across Chattanooga Valley, using me

as a pivot for the purpose of crossing Missionary Ridge in the

neighborhood of Rossville. In the early part of the day I had driven

in the Confederate pickets in my front, so as to prolong my line of

battle on that of Wood, the necessity of continuing to refuse my

right having been obviated by the capture of Lookout Mountain and the

advance of Palmer.

About 2 o'clock orders came to carry the line at the foot of the

ridge, attacking at a signal of six guns. I had few changes or new

dispositions to make. Wagner's brigade, which was next to Wood's

division, was formed in double lines, and Harker's brigade took the

same formation on Wagner's right. Colonel F. T. Sherman's brigade

came on Harker's right, formed in a column of attack, with a front of

three regiments, he having nine. My whole front was covered with a

heavy line of skirmishers. These dispositions made, my right rested

a little distance south of Moore's road, my left joined Wood over

toward Orchard Knob, while my centre was opposite Thurman's house

--the headquarters of General Bragg--on Missionary Ridge. A small

stream of water ran parallel to my front, as far as which the ground

was covered by a thin patch of timber, and beyond the edge of the

timber was an open plain to the foot of Missionary Ridge, varying in

width from four to nine hundred yards. At the foot of the ridge was

the enemy's first line of rifle-pits; at a point midway up its face,

another line, incomplete; and on the crest was a third line, in which

Bragg had massed his artillery.

The enemy saw we were making dispositions for an attack, and in plain

view of my whole division he prepared himself for resistance,

marching regiments from his left flank with flying colors; and

filling up the spaces not already occupied in his intrenchments.

Seeing the enemy thus strengthening himself, it was plain that we

would have to act quickly if we expected to accomplish much, and I

already began to doubt the feasibility of our remaining in the first

line of rifle-pits when we should have carried them. I discussed the

order with Wagner, Harker, and Sherman, and they were similarly

impressed, so while anxiously awaiting the signal I sent Captain

Ransom of my staff to Granger, who was at Fort Wood, to ascertain if

we were to carry the first line or the ridge beyond. Shortly after

Ransom started the signal guns were fired, and I told my brigade

commanders to go for the ridge.

Placing myself in front of Harker's brigade, between the line of

battle and the skirmishers, accompanied by only an orderly so as not

to attract the enemy's fire, we moved out. Under a terrible storm of

shot and shell the line pressed forward steadily through the timber,

and as it emerged on the plain took the double-quick and with fixed

bayonets rushed at the enemy's first line. Not a shot was fired from

our line of battle, and as it gained on my skirmishers they melted

into and became one with it, and all three of my brigades went over

the rifle-pits simultaneously. They then lay down on the face of the

ridge, for a breathing-spell and for protection' from the terrible

fire, of canister and musketry pouring over us from the guns on the

crest. At the rifle-pits there had been little use for the bayonet,

for most of the Confederate troops, disconcerted by the sudden rush,

lay close in the ditch and surrendered, though some few fled up the

slope to the next line. The prisoners were directed to move out to

our rear, and as their intrenchments had now come under fire from the

crest, they went with alacrity, and without guard or escort, toward

Chattanooga.

After a short pause to get breath the ascent of the ridge began, and

I rode, into the ditch of the intrenchments to drive out a few

skulkers who were hiding there. Just at this time I was joined by

Captain Ransom, who, having returned from Granger, told me that we

were to carry only the line at the base, and that in coming back,

when he struck the left of the division, knowing this interpretation

of the order, he in his capacity as an aide-de-camp had directed

Wagner, who was up on the face of the ridge, to return, and that in

consequence Wagner was recalling his men to the base. I could not

bear to order the recall of troops now so gallantly climbing the hill

step by step, and believing we could take it, I immediately rode to

Wagner's brigade and directed it to resume the attack. In the

meantime Harker's and F. T. Sherman's troops were approaching the

partial line of works midway of the ridge, and as I returned to the

centre of their rear, they were being led by many stands of

regimental colors. There seemed to be a rivalry as to which color

should be farthest to the front; first one would go forward a few

feet, then another would come up to it, the color-bearers vying with

one another as to who should be foremost, until finally every

standard was planted on the intermediate works. The enemy's fire

from the crest during the ascent was terrific in the noise made, but

as it was plunging, it over-shot and had little effect on those above

the second line of pits, but was very uncomfortable for those below,

so I deemed it advisable to seek another place, and Wagner's brigade

having reassembled and again pressed up the ridge, I rode up the face

to join my troops.

As soon as the men saw me, they surged forward and went over the

works on the crest. The parapet of the intrenchment was too high for

my horse to jump, so, riding a short distance to the left, I entered

through a low place in the line. A few Confederates were found

inside, but they turned the butts of their muskets toward me in token

of surrender, for our men were now passing beyond them on both their

flanks.

The right and right centre of my division gained the summit first,

they being partially sheltered by a depression in the face of the

ridge, the Confederates in their immediate front fleeing down the

southern face. When I crossed the rifle-pits on the top the

Confederates were still holding fast at Bragg's headquarters, and a

battery located there opened fire along the crest; making things most

uncomfortably hot. Seeing the danger to which I was exposed, for I

was mounted, Colonel Joseph Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, ran up

and begged me to dismount. I accepted his excellent advice, and it

probably saved my life; but poor Conrad was punished for his

solicitude by being seriously wounded in the thigh at the moment he

was thus contributing to my safety.

Wildly cheering, the men advanced along the ridge toward Bragg's

headquarters, and soon drove the Confederates from this last

position, capturing a number of prisoners, among them Breckenridge's

and Bates's adjutant-generals, and the battery that had made such

stout resistance on the crest-two guns which were named "Lady

Breckenridge" and "Lady Buckner" General Bragg himself having barely

time to escape before his headquarters were taken.

My whole division had now reached the summit, and Wagner and Harker

--the latter slightly wounded--joined me as I was standing in the

battery just secured. The enemy was rapidly retiring, and though

many of his troops, with disorganized wagon-trains and several pieces

of artillery, could be distinctly seen in much confusion about half a

mile distant in the valley below, yet he was covering them with a

pretty well organized line that continued to give us a desultory

fire. Seeing this, I at once directed Wagner and Harker to take up

the pursuit along Moore's road, which led to Chickamauga Station

--Bragg's depot of supply--and as they progressed, I pushed Sherman's

brigade along the road behind them. Wagner and Harker soon overtook

the rearguard, and a slight skirmish caused it to break, permitting

nine guns and a large number of wagons which were endeavoring to get

away in the stampede to fall into our hands.

About a mile and a half beyond Missionary Ridge, Moore's road passed

over a second ridge or high range of hills, and here the enemy had

determined to make a stand for that purpose, posting eight pieces of

artillery with such supporting force as he could rally. He was

immediately attacked by Harker and Wagner, but the position was

strong, the ridge being rugged and difficult of ascent, and after the

first onset our men recoiled. A staff-officer from Colonel Wood's

demi-brigade informing me at this juncture that that command was too

weak to carry the position in its front, I ordered the Fifteenth

Indiana and the Twenty-Sixth Ohio to advance to Wood's aid, and then

hastening to the front I found his men clinging to the face of the

ridge, contending stubbornly with the rear-guard of the enemy.

Directing Harker to put Opdyke's demi-brigade in on the right, I

informed Wagner that it was necessary to flank the enemy by carrying

the high bluff on our left where the ridge terminated, that I had

designated the Twenty-Sixth Ohio and Fifteenth Indiana for the work,

and that I wished him to join them.

It was now dusk, but the two regiments engaged in the flanking

movement pushed on to gain the bluff. Just as they reached the crest

of the ridge the moon rose from behind, enlarged by the refraction of

the atmosphere, and as the attacking column passed along the summit

it crossed the moon's disk and disclosed to us below a most

interesting panorama, every figure nearly being thrown out in full

relief. The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned his

ground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons.

After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than mine

were pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become too

much isolated. Having previously studied the topography of the

country thoroughly, I knew that if I pressed on my line of march

would carry me back to Chickamauga station, where we would be in rear

of the Confederates that had been fighting General Sherman, and that

there was a possibility of capturing them by such action; but I did

not feel warranted in marching there alone, so I rode back to

Missionary Ridge to ask for more troops, and upon arriving there I

found Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back to

Chattanooga.

Granger was at Braggy's late headquarters in bed. I informed him of

my situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of the

Cumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done well

enough. I still insisting, he told me finally to push on to the

crossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I, encountered the enemy he

would order troops to my support. I returned to my division about

12 o'clock at night, got it under way, and reached the crossing,

about half a mile from the station, at 2 o'clock on the morning of

the 26th, and there found the bridge destroyed, but that the creek

was fordable. I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but feared

to go farther without assistance. This I thought I might bring up by

practicing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulate

an engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Granger

and oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed. General

Granger afterward told me that he had heard the volleys, but

suspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by a

fight, since they were too regular in their delivery.

I was much disappointed that my pursuit had not been supported, for I

felt that great results were in store for us should the enemy be

vigorously followed. Had the troops under Granger's command been

pushed out with mine when Missionary Ridge was gained, we could have

reached Chickamauga Station by 12 o'clock the night of the 25th; or

had they been sent even later, when I called for them, we could have

got there by daylight and worked incalculable danger to the

Confederates, for the force that had confronted Sherman did not pass

Chickamauga Station in their retreat till after daylight on the

morning of the 26th.

My course in following so close was dictated by a thorough knowledge

of the topography of the country and a familiarity with its roads,

bypaths, and farm-houses, gained with the assistance of Mr.

Crutchfield; and sure my column was heading in the right direction,

though night had fallen I thought that an active pursuit would almost

certainly complete the destruction of Bragg's army. When General

Grant came by my bivouac at the crossing of Chickamauga Creek on the

26th, he realized what might have been accomplished had the

successful assault on Missionary Ridge been supplemented by vigorous

efforts on the part of some high officers, who were more interested

in gleaning that portion of the battle-field over which my command

had passed than in destroying a panic-stricken enemy.

Although it cannot be said that the result of the two days'

operations was reached by the methods which General Grant had

indicated in his instructions preceding the battle, yet the general

outcome was unquestionably due to his genius, for the manoeuvring of

Sherman's and Hooker's commands created the opportunity for Thomas's

corps of the Army of the Cumberland to carry the ridge at the centre.

In directing Sherman to attack the north end of the ridge, Grant

disconcerted Bragg--who was thus made to fear the loss of his depot

of supplies at Chickamauga Station--and compelled him to resist

stoutly; and stout resistance to Sherman meant the withdrawal of the

Confederates from Lookout Mountain. While this attack was in process

of execution advantage was taken of it by Hooker in a well-planned

and well-fought battle, but to my mind an unnecessary one, for our

possession of Lookout was the inevitable result that must follow from

Sherman's threatening attitude. The assault on Missionary Ridge by

Granger's and Palmer's corps was not premeditated by Grant, he

directing only the line at its base to be carried, but when this fell

into our hands the situation demanded our getting the one at the top

also.

I took into the action an effective force of 6,000, and lost 123

officers and 1,181 men killed and wounded. These casualties speak

louder than words of the character of the fight, and plainly tell

where the enemy struggled most stubbornly for these figures comprise

one-third the casualties of the entire body of Union troops

--Sherman's and all included. My division captured 1,762 prisoners

and, in all, seventeen pieces of artillery. Six of these guns I

turned over with caissons complete; eleven were hauled off the field

and appropriated by an officer of high rank--General Hazen. I have

no disposition to renew the controversy which grew out of this

matter. At the time the occurrence took place I made the charge in a

plain official report, which was accepted as correct by the corps and

army commanders, from General Granger up to General Grant. General

Hazen took no notice of this report then, though well aware of its

existence. Nearly a quarter of a century later, however, he

endeavored to justify his retention of the guns by trying to show

that his brigade was the first to reach the crest of Missionary

Ridge, and that he was therefore entitled to them. This claim of

being the first to mount the ridge is made by other brigades than

Hazen's, with equal if not greater force, so the absurdity of his

deduction is apparent:

NOTE: In a book published by General Hazen in 1885, he endeavored to

show, by a number of letters from subordinate officers of his

command, written at his solicitation from fifteen to twenty years

after the occurrence, that his brigade was the first to mount

Missionary Ridge, and that it was entitled to possess these guns.

The doubtful character of testimony dimmed by the lapse of many years

has long been conceded, and I am content to let the controversy stand

the test of history, based on the conclusions of General Grant, as he

drew them from official reports made when the circumstances were

fresh in the minds of all.

General Grant says: "To Sheridan's prompt movement, the Army of the

Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of

prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt

pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished."

General Thomas says: "We captured all their cannon and ammunition

before they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a few

moments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered

in the assault of the hill, General Sheridan pushed forward in

pursuit, and drove those in his front who had escaped capture across

Chickamauga Creek."

REPORT OF COLONEL FRANCIS T. SHERMAN, COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE:

"When within ten yards of the crest, our men seemed to be thrown

forward as if by some powerful engine, and the old flag was planted

firmly and surely on the last line of works of the enemy, followed by

the men, taking one battery of artillery."

REPORT OF COLONEL MICHAEL GOODING, TWENTY-SECOND INDIANA:

...."I pushed men up to the second line of works as fast as possible;

on and on, clear to the top, and over the ridge they went, to the

hollow beyond, killing and wounding numbers of the enemy as we

advanced, and leaving the rebel battery in our rear. We captured

great numbers of prisoners, and sent them to the rear without guards,

as we deemed the pursuit of the enemy of greater importance....

"I cannot give too much praise to Captain Powers, Company "H,"

Lieutenant Smith, Company "K," Lieutenant Gooding, Company "A," and

Second Lieutenant Moser, Company "G," for their assistance, and for

the gallant manner in which they encouraged their men up the side of

the mountain, and charging the enemy's works right up to the muzzles

of their guns."

REPORT OF COLONEL JASON MARSH, SEVENTY-FOURTH ILLINOIS:

...."The first on the enemy's works, and almost simultaneously, were

Lieutenant Clement, Company "A," Captain Stegner, Company "I,"

Captain Bacon, Company "G," and Captain Leffingwell, with some of

their men. The enemy was still in considerable force behind their

works; but, for some unaccountable reason, they either fled or

surrendered instantly upon the first few of our men reaching them

--not even trying to defend their battery, which was immediately

captured by Captain Stegner."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PORTER C. OLSON, THIRTY-SIXTH ILLINOIS:

...."In connection with other regiments of this brigade, we assisted

in capturing several pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, and a

great quantity of small-arms."

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN Q. LANE:

...."At the house known as Bragg's headquarters, the enemy were

driven from three guns, which fell into our hands."

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. D. WAGNER, SECOND BRIGADE:

...."I ordered the command to storm the ridge, bringing up the

Fifteenth Indiana and Ninety-seventh Ohio, which had not yet been

engaged, although suffering from the enemy's artillery. The result

is a matter of history, as we gained the ridge, capturing artillery,

prisoners, and small-arms; to what amount, however, I do not know, as

we pushed on after the enemy as soon as I had re-formed the command.

....Captain Tinney, with his usual gallantry, dashed up the line with

the first troops, and with the aid of an orderly (George Dusenbury,

Fifteenth Indiana), turned the loaded gun of the enemy on his

retreating ranks."

REPORT OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN F. HEGLER, FIFTEENTH INDIANA:

...."Our captures amounted to prisoners not counted, representing

many different regiments; several pieces of artillery, and some

wagons."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ELIAS NEFF, FORTIETH INDIANA:

...."As the regiment reached the top of the ridge and swept for.

ward, the right passed through, without stopping to take possession,

the battery at General Bragg's headquarters that had fired so

venomously during the whole contest."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. MOORE, FIFTY-EIGHTH INDIANA:

...."In passing to the front from Missionary Ridge, we saw several

pieces of artillery which had been abandoned by the enemy, though I

did not leave any one in charge of them."

REPORT OF MAJOR C, M. HAMMOND, ONE HUNDREDTH ILLINOIS:

...."I immediately organized my regiment, and while so doing

discovered a number of pieces of artillery in a ravine on my left. I

sent Lieutenant Stewart, of Company A, to see if these guns which the

enemy had abandoned could not be turned upon them. He returned and

reported them to be four ten-pound Parrotts and two brass Napoleons;

also that it would require a number of men to place them in position.

I ordered him to report the same to General Wagner, and ask

permission, but before receiving a reply was ordered by you to move

forward my regiment on the left of the Fifty-Eighth Indiana

Volunteers."

REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES G. HARKER, THIRD BRIGADE:

...."My right and Colonel Sherman's left interlocked, so to speak, as

we approached the summit, and it was near this point that I saw the

first part of my line gain the crest. This was done by a few brave

men of my own and Colonel Sherman's command driving the enemy from

his intrenchments. The gap thus opened, our men rushed rapidly in,

and the enemy, loth to give up their position, still remained, firing

at my command toward the left, and the battery in front of the house

known as General Bragg's headquarters was still firing at the troops,

and was captured by our men while the gunners were still at their

posts....

...."We captured and sent to division and corps headquarters 503

prisoners and a large number of small-arms. In regard to the number

of pieces of artillery, it will probably be difficult to reconcile

the reports of my regimental commanders with the reports of other

regiments and brigades who fought so nobly with my own command, and

who alike are entitled to share the honors and glories of the day.

More anxious to follow the enemy than to appropriate trophies already

secured, we pushed to the front, while the place we occupied on

ascending the hill was soon occupied by other troops, who, I have

learned, claim the artillery as having fallen into their own hands.

It must therefore remain with the division and corps commanders, who

knew the relative position of each brigade and division, to accord to

each the trophies to which they are due.

...."From my personal observation I can claim a battery of six guns

captured by a portion of my brigade."

REPORT OF COLONEL EMERSON OPDYKE, FIRST DEMI-BRIGADE:

...."My command captured Bragg's headquarters, house, and the six

guns which were near there; one of these I ordered turned upon the

enemy, which was done with effect."

REPORT OF COLONEL H. C. DUNLAP, THIRD KENTUCKY:

...."The point at which the centre of my regiment reached the crest

was at the stable to the left of the house said to be Bragg's

headquarters, and immediately in front of the road which leads down

the southern slope of the ridge. One piece of the abandoned battery,

was to the left of this point, the remainder to the right, near by."

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. A. BULLITT, SIXTY-FIFTH OHIO:

...."The position in which my regiment found itself was immediately

in front of a battery, which belched forth a stream of canister upon

us with terrible rapidity. In addition to this, the enemy, whenever

driven from other points, rallied around this battery, and defended

it with desperation. It cost a struggle to take it; but we finally

succeeded, and the colors of the Sixty-fifth Ohio were the first

planted upon the yet smoking guns. Captain Smith, of my regiment,

was placed in charge of the captured battery, which consisted of 5

guns, 3 caissons, and 17 horses."

REPORT OF CAPTAIN E. P. BATES, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH OHIO:

...."Perceiving that the ridge across which my regiment extended was

commanded to the very crest by a battery in front, also by those to

right and left, I directed the men to pass up the gorges on either

side. About forty men, with Captain Parks and Lieutenant Stinger,

passed to the left, the balance to the right, and boldly charged on,

till, foremost with those of other regiments, they stood on the

strongest point of the enemy's works, masters alike of his guns and

position.... Captain Parks reports his skirmish-line to have charged

upon and captured one gun, that otherwise would have been hauled

off."

REPORT OF COLONEL ALLEN BUCKNER, SEVENTY-NINTH ILLINOIS:

...."The right of the regiment rested on the left of the road, where

it crossed the rebel fortification, leading up the hill toward

Bragg's headquarters. We took a right oblique direction through a

peach orchard until arriving at the woods and logs on the side of the

ridge, when I ordered the men to commence firing, which they did with

good effect, and continued it all the way up until the heights were

gained. At this point the left of the regiment was near the right of

the house, and I claim that my officers and men captured two large

brass pieces, literally punching the cannoniers from their guns.

Privates John Fregan and Jasper Patterson, from Company "A," rushed

down the hill, captured one caisson, with a cannonier and six horses,

and brought them back."

REPORT OF COLONEL J. R. MILES, TWENTY-SEVENTH ILLINOIS:

...."The regiment, without faltering, finally, at about 4.30 P.M.,

gained the enemy's works in conjunction with a party of the

Thirty-sixth Illinois, who were immediately on our right. The

regiment, or a portion of it, proceeded to the left, down the ridge,

for nearly or quite a quarter of a mile capturing three or four pieces

of cannon, driving the gunners from them."

CHAPTER XVII.

ORDERED TO RETURN TO CHATTANOOGA--MARCH TO KNOXVILLE--COLLECTING

SUBSISTENCE STORES--A CLEVER STRATAGEM--A BRIDGE OF WAGONS--LOOKING

OUT FOR THE PERSONAL COMFORT OF THE SOLDIERS-A LEAVE OF ABSENCE

--ORDERED TO WASHINGTON--PARTING WITH SHERIDAN'S DIVISION.

The day after the battle of Missionary Ridge I was ordered in the

evening to return to Chattanooga, and from the limited supply of

stores to be had there outfit my command to march to the relief of

Knoxville, where General Burnside was still holding out against the

besieging forces of General Longstreet. When we left Murfreesboro'

in the preceding June, the men's knapsacks and extra clothing, as

well as all our camp equipage, had been left behind, and these

articles had not yet reached us, so we were poorly prepared for a

winter campaign in the mountains of East Tennessee. There was but

little clothing to be obtained in Chattanooga, and my command

received only a few overcoats and a small supply of India-rubber

ponchos. We could get no shoes, although we stood in great need of

them, for the extra pair with which each man had started out from

Murfreesboro' was now much the worse for wear. The necessity for

succoring Knoxville was urgent, however, so we speedily refitted as

thoroughly as was possible with the limited means at hand. My

division teams were in very fair condition in consequence of the

forage we had procured in the Sequatchie Valley, so I left the train

behind to bring up clothing when any should arrive in Chattanooga.

Under these circumstances, on the 29th of November the Fourth Corps

(Granger's) took up the line of march for Knoxville, my men carrying

in their haversacks four days' rations, depending for a further

supply of food on a small steamboat loaded with subsistence stores,

which was to proceed up the Tennessee River and keep abreast of the

column.

Not far from Philadelphia, Tennessee, the columns of General

Sherman's army, which had kept a greater distance from the river than

Granger's corps, so as to be able to subsist on the country, came in

toward our right and the whole relieving force was directed on

Marysville, about fifteen miles southwest of Knoxville. We got to

Marysville December 5, and learned the same day that Longstreet had

shortly before attempted to take Knoxville by a desperate assault,

but signally failing, had raised the siege and retired toward Bean's

Station on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading to

Virginia. From Marysville General Sherman's troops returned to

Chattanooga, while Granger's corps continued on toward Knoxville, to

take part in the pursuit of Longstreet.

Burnside's army was deficient in subsistence, though not to the

extent that we had supposed before leaving Chattanooga. It had eaten

out the country in the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, however;

therefore my division did not cross the Holstein River, but was

required, in order to maintain itself, to proceed to the region of

the French Broad River. To this end I moved to Sevierville, and

making this village my headquarters, the division was spread out over

the French Broad country, between Big Pigeon and Little Pigeon

rivers, where we soon had all the mills in operation, grinding out

plenty of flour and meal. The whole region was rich in provender

of all kinds, and as the people with rare exceptions were

enthusiastically loyal, we in a little while got more than enough

food for ourselves, and by means of flatboats began sending the

surplus down the river to the troops at Knoxville.

The intense loyalty of this part of Tennessee exceeded that of any

other section I was in during the war. The people could not do too

much to aid the Union cause, and brought us an abundance of

everything needful. The women were especially loyal, and as many of

their sons and husbands, who had been compelled to "refugee" on

account of their loyal sentiments, returned with us, numbers of the

women went into ecstasies of joy when this part of the Union army

appeared among them. So long as we remained in the French Broad

region, we lived on the fat of the land, but unluckily our stay was

to be of short duration, for Longstreet's activity kept the

department commander in a state of constant alarm.

Soon after getting the mills well running, and when the shipment of

their surplus product down the river by flatboats had begun, I was

ordered to move to Knoxville, on account of demonstrations by

Longstreet from the direction of Blain's crossroads. On arriving at

Knoxville, an inspection of my command, showed that the shoes of many

of the men were entirely worn out, the poor fellows having been

obliged to protect their feet with a sort of moccasin, made from

their blankets or from such other material as they could procure.

About six hundred of the command were in this condition, plainly not

suitably shod to withstand the frequent storms of sleet and snow.

These men I left in Knoxville to await the arrival of my train, which

I now learned was en route from Chattanooga with shoes, overcoats,

and other clothing, and with the rest of the division proceeded to

Strawberry Plains, which we reached the latter part of December.

Mid-winter was now upon us, and the weather in this mountain region

of East Tennessee was very cold, snow often falling to the depth of

several inches. The thin and scanty clothing of the men afforded

little protection, and while in bivouac their only shelter was the

ponchos with which they had been provided before leaving Chattanooga;

there was not a tent in the command. Hence great suffering resulted,

which I anxiously hoped would be relieved shortly by the arrival of

my train with supplies. In the course of time the wagons reached

Knoxville, but my troops derived little comfort from this fact, for

the train was stopped by General Foster, who had succeeded Burnside

in command of the department, its contents distributed pro rata to

the different organizations of the entire army, and I received but a

small share. This was very disappointing, not to say exasperating,

but I could not complain of unfairness, for every command in the army

was suffering to the same extent as mine, and yet it did seem that a

little forethought and exertion on the part of some of the other

superior officers, whose transportation was in tolerable condition,

might have ameliorated the situation considerably. I sent the train

back at once for more clothing, and on its return, just before

reaching Knoxville, the quartermaster in charge, Captain Philip

Smith, filled the open spaces in the wagons between the bows and load

with fodder and hay, and by this clever stratagem passed it through

the town safe and undisturbed as a forage train. On Smith's arrival

we lost no time in issuing the clothing, and when it had passed into

the hands of the individual soldiers the danger of its appropriation

for general distribution, like the preceding invoice, was very

remote.

General Foster had decided by this time to move his troops to

Dandridge for the twofold purpose of threatening the enemy's left and

of getting into a locality where we could again gather subsistence

from the French Broad region. Accordingly we began an advance on the

15th of January, the cavalry having preceded us some time before.

The Twenty-third Corps and Wood's division of the Fourth Corps

crossed the Holstein River by a bridge that had been constructed at

Strawberry Plains. My division being higher up the stream, forded

it, the water very deep and bitter cold, being filled with slushy

ice. Marching by way of New Market, I reached Dandridge on the 17th,

and here on my arrival met General Sturgis, then commanding our

cavalry. He was on the eve of setting out to, "whip the enemy's

cavalry," as he said, and wanted me to go along and see him do it. I

declined, however, for being now the senior officer present, Foster,

Parke, and Granger having remained at Knoxville and Strawberry

Plains, their absence left me in command, and it was necessary that I

should make disposition of the infantry when it arrived. As there

were indications of a considerable force of the enemy on the

Russellville road I decided to place the troops in line of battle, so

as to be prepared for any emergency that might arise in the absence

of the senior officers, and I deemed it prudent to supervise

personally the encamping of the men. This disposition necessarily

required that some of the organizations should occupy very

disagreeable ground, but I soon got all satisfactorily posted with

the exception of General Willich, who expressed some discontent at

being placed beyond the shelter of the timber, but accepted the

situation cheerfully when its obvious necessity was pointed out to

him.

Feeling that all was secure, I returned to my headquarters in the

village with the idea that we were safely established in ease of

attack, and that the men would now have a good rest if left

undisturbed; and plenty to eat, but hardly had I reached my own camp

when a staff-officer came post-haste from Sturgis with the

information that he was being driven back to my lines, despite the

confident invitation to me (in the morning) to go out and witness the

whipping which was to be given to the enemy's cavalry. Riding to the

front, I readily perceived that the information was correct, and I

had to send a brigade of infantry out to help Sturgis, thus relieving

him from a rather serious predicament. Indeed, the enemy was present

in pretty strong force, both cavalry and infantry, and from his

vicious attack on Sturgis it looked very much as though he intended

to bring on a general engagement.

Under such circumstances I deemed it advisable that the responsible

commanders of the army should be present, and so informed them. My

communication brought Parke and Granger to the front without delay,

but Foster could not come, since the hardships of the winter had

reopened an old wound received during the Mexican War, and brought on

much suffering. By the time Parke and Granger arrived, however, the

enemy, who it turned out was only making a strong demonstration to

learn the object of our movement on Dandridge, seemed satisfied with

the results of his reconnoissance, and began falling back toward

Bull's Gap. Meanwhile Parke and Granger concluded that Dandridge was

an untenable point, and hence decided to withdraw a part of the army

to Strawberry Plains; and the question of supplies again coming up,

it was determined to send the Fourth Corps to the south side of the

French Broad to obtain subsistence, provided we could bridge the

river so that men could get across the deep and icy stream without

suffering.

I agreed to undertake the construction of a bridge on condition that

each division should send to the ford twenty-five wagons with which

to make it. This being acceded to, Harker's brigade began the work

next morning at a favorable point a few miles down the river. As my

quota of wagons arrived, they were drawn into the stream one after

another by the wheel team, six men in each wagon, and as they

successively reached the other side of the channel the mules were

unhitched, the pole of each wagon run under the hind axle of the one

just in front, and the tailboards used so as to span the slight space

between them. The plan worked well as long as the material lasted,

but no other wagons than my twenty-five coming on the ground, the

work stopped when the bridge was only half constructed. Informed of

the delay and its cause, in sheer desperation I finished the bridge

by taking from my own division all the wagons needed to make up the

deficiency.

It was late in the afternoon when the work was finished, and I began

putting over one of my brigades; but in the midst of its crossing

word came that Longstreet's army was moving to attack us, which

caused an abandonment of the foraging project, and orders quickly

followed to retire to Strawberry Plains, the retrograde movement to

begin forthwith. I sent to headquarters information of the plight I

was in--baggage and supplies on the bank and wagons in the stream

--begged to know what was to become of them if we were to hurry off at

a moment's notice, and suggested that the movement be delayed until I

could recover my transportation. Receiving in reply no assurances

that I should be relieved from my dilemma--and, in fact, nothing

satisfactory--I determined to take upon myself the responsibility of

remaining on the ground long enough to get my wagons out of the river;

so I sent out a heavy force to watch for the enemy, and with the

remainder of the command went to work to break up the bridge. Before

daylight next morning I had recovered everything without interference

by Longstreet, who, it was afterward ascertained, was preparing to

move east toward Lynchburg instead of marching to attack us; the small

demonstration against Dandridge, being made simply to deceive us as to

his ultimate object. I marched to Strawberry Plains unmolested, and

by taking the route over Bay's Mountain, a shorter one than that

followed by the main body of our troops, reached the point of

rendezvous as soon as the most of the army, for the road it followed

was not only longer, but badly cut up by trains that had recently

passed over it.

Shortly after getting into camp, the beef contractor came in and

reported that a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had captured my

herd of beef cattle. This caused me much chagrin at first, but the

commissary of my division soon put in an appearance, and assured me

that the loss would not be very disastrous to us nor of much benefit

to the enemy, since the cattle were so poor and weak that they could

not be driven off. A reconnoissance in force verified the

Commissary's statement. From its inability to travel, the herd,

after all efforts to carry it off had proved ineffectual, had been

abandoned by its captors.

After the troops from Chattanooga arrived in the vicinity of

Knoxville and General Sherman had returned to Chattanooga, the

operations in East Tennessee constituted a series of blunders,

lasting through the entire winter; a state of affairs doubtless due,

in the main, to the fact that the command of the troops was so

frequently changed. Constant shifting of responsibility from one to

another ensued from the date that General Sherman, after assuring

himself that Knoxville was safe, devolved the command on Burnside.

It had already been intimated to Burnside that he was to be relieved,

and in consequence he was inactive and apathetic, confining his

operations to an aimless expedition whose advance extended only as

far as Blain's crossroads, whence it was soon withdrawn. Meanwhile

General Foster had superseded Burnside, but physical disabilities

rendered him incapable of remaining in the field, and then the chief

authority devolved on Parke. By this time the transmission of power

seemed almost a disease; at any rate it was catching, so, while we

were en route to Dandridge, Parke transferred the command to Granger.

The latter next unloaded it on me, and there is no telling what the

final outcome would have been had I not entered a protest against a

further continuance of the practice, which remonstrance brought

Granger to the front at Dandridge.

While the events just narrated were taking place, General Grant had

made a visit to Knoxville--about the last of December--and arranged

to open the railroad between there and Chattanooga, with a view to

supplying the troops in East Tennessee by rail in the future, instead

of through Cumberland Gap by a tedious line of wagon-trains. In

pursuance of his plan the railroad had already been opened to Loudon,

but here much delay occurred on account of the long time it took to

rebuild the bridge over the Tennessee. Therefore supplies were still

very scarce, and as our animals were now dying in numbers from

starvation, and the men were still on short allowance, it became

necessary that some of the troops east of Knoxville should get nearer

to their depot, and also be in a position to take part in the coming

Georgia campaign, or render assistance to General Thomas, should

General Johnston (who had succeeded in command of the Confederate

army) make any demonstration against Chattanooga. Hence my division

was ordered to take station at Loudon, Tennessee, and I must confess

that we took the road for that point with few regrets, for a general

disgust prevailed regarding our useless marches during the winter.

At this time my faithful scout Card and his younger brother left me,

with the determination, as I have heretofore related, to avenge their

brother's death. No persuasion could induce Card to remain longer,

for knowing that my division's next operation would be toward

Atlanta, and being ignorant of the country below Dalton, he

recognized and insisted that his services would then become

practically valueless.

At Loudon, where we arrived January 27, supplies were more plentiful,

and as our tents and extra clothing reached us there in a few days,

every one grew contented and happy. Here a number of my regiments,

whose terms of service were about to expire, went through the process

of "veteranizing," and, notwithstanding the trials and hardships of

the preceding nine months, they re-enlisted almost to a man.

When everything was set in motion toward recuperating and refitting

my troops, I availed myself of the opportunity during a lull that

then existed to take a short leave of absence--a privilege I had not

indulged in since entering the service in 1853. This leave I spent

in the North with much benefit to my physical condition, for I was

much run down by fatiguing service, and not a little troubled by

intense pain which I at times still suffered from my experience in

the unfortunate hand-car incident on the Cumberland Mountains the

previous July. I returned from leave the latter part of March,

rejoining my division with the expectation that the campaign in that

section would begin as early as April.

On the 12th of March, 1864, General Grant was assigned to the command

of the armies of the United States, as general-in-chief. He was

already in Washington, whither he had gone to receive his commission

as lieutenant-general. Shortly after his arrival there, he commenced

to rearrange the different commands in the army to suit the plans

which he intended to enter upon in the spring, and out of this grew a

change in my career. Many jealousies and much ill-feeling, the

outgrowth of former campaigns, existed among officers of high grade

in the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1864, and several general

officers were to be sent elsewhere in consequence. Among these,

General Alfred Pleasonton was to be relieved from the command of the

cavalry, General Grant having expressed to the President

dissatisfaction that so little had hitherto been accomplished by that

arm of the service, and I was selected as chief of the cavalry corps

of the Army of the Potomac, receiving on the night of the 23d of

March from General Thomas at Chattanooga the following telegram:

"MARCH 23, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Chattanooga

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that Major-General Sheridan

immediately repair to Washington and report to the Adjutant-General

of the Army.

"H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

I was not informed of the purpose for which I was to proceed to

Washington, but I conjectured that it meant a severing of my

relations with the Second Division, Fourth Army Corps. I at once set

about obeying the order, and as but little preparation was necessary,

I started for Chattanooga the next day, without taking any formal

leave of the troops I had so long commanded. I could not do it; the

bond existing between them and me had grown to such depth of

attachment that I feared to trust my emotions in any formal parting

from a body of soldiers who, from our mutual devotion, had long

before lost their official designation, and by general consent within

and without the command were called "Sheridan's Division." When I

took the train at the station the whole command was collected on the

hill-sides around to see me off. They had assembled spontaneously,

officers and men, and as the cars moved out for Chattanooga they

waved me farewell with demonstrations of affection.

A parting from such friends was indeed to be regretted. They had

never given me any trouble, nor done anything that could bring aught

but honor to themselves. I had confidence in them, and I believe

they had in me. They were ever steady, whether in victory or in

misfortune, and as I tried always to be with them, to put them into

the hottest fire if good could be gained, or save them from

unnecessary loss, as occasion required, they amply repaid all my care

and anxiety, courageously and readily meeting all demands in every

emergency that arose.

In Kentucky, nearly two years before, my lot had been cast with about

half of the twenty-five regiments of infantry that I was just

leaving, the rest joining me after Chickamauga. It was practically a

new arm of the service to me, for although I was an infantry officer,

yet the only large command which up to that time I had controlled was

composed of cavalry, and most of my experience had been gained in

this arm of the service. I had to study hard to be able to master

all the needs of such a force, to feed and clothe it and guard all

its interests. When undertaking these responsibilities I felt that

if I met them faithfully, recompense would surely come through the

hearty response that soldiers always make to conscientious exertion

on the part of their superiors, and not only that more could be

gained in that way than from the use of any species of influence, but

that the reward would be quicker. Therefore I always tried to look

after their comfort personally; selected their camps, and provided

abundantly for their subsistence, and the road they opened for me

shows that my work was not in vain. I regretted deeply to have to

leave such soldiers, and felt that they were sorry I was going, and

even now I could not, if I would, retain other than the warmest

sentiments of esteem and the tenderest affection for the officers and

men of "Sheridan's Division," Army of the Cumberland.

On reaching Chattanooga I learned from General Thomas the purpose for

which I had been ordered to Washington. I was to be assigned to the

command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. The

information staggered me at first, for I knew well the great

responsibilities of such a position; moreover, I was but slightly

acquainted with military operations in Virginia, and then, too, the

higher officers of the Army of the Potomac were little known to me,

so at the moment I felt loth to undergo the trials of the new

position. Indeed, I knew not a soul in Washington except General

Grant and General Halleck, and them but slightly, and no one in

General Meade's army, from the commanding general down, except a few

officers in the lower grades, hardly any of whom I had seen since

graduating at the Military Academy.

Thus it is not much to be wondered at that General Thomas's

communication momentarily upset me. But there was no help for it, so

after reflecting on the matter a little I concluded to make the best

of the situation. As in Virginia I should be operating in a field

with which I was wholly unfamiliar, and among so many who were

strangers, it seemed to me that it would be advisable to have, as a

chief staff-officer, one who had had service in the East, if an

available man could be found. In weighing all these considerations

in my mind, I fixed upon Captain James W. Forsyth, of the Eighteenth

Infantry, then in the regular brigade at Chattanooga--a dear friend

of mine, who had served in the Army of the Potomac, in the Peninsula

and Antietam campaigns. He at once expressed a desire to accept a

position on my staff, and having obtained by the next day the

necessary authority, he and I started for Washington, accompanied by

Lieutenant T. W. C. Moore, one of my aides, leaving behind Lieutenant

M. V. Sheridan, my other aide, to forward our horses as soon as they

should be sent down to Chattanooga from Loudon, after which he was to

join me.

CHAPTER XVIII.

AT WASHINGTON--MEETING SECRETARY STANTON--INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT

LINCOLN--MADE COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE

POTOMAC--ITS OFFICERS--GENERAL MEADE's METHOD OF USING CAVALRY

--OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN--SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.--A DIFFERENCE WITH

GENERAL MEADE--PREPARING TO FIGHT STUART'S CAVALRY.

Accompanied by Captain Forsyth and Lieutenant Moore, I arrived in

Washington on the morning of April, 4, 1864, and stopped at Willard's

Hotel, where, staying temporarily, were many officers of the Army of

the Potomac en route to their commands from leave at the North.

Among all these, however, I was an entire stranger, and I cannot now

recall that I met a single individual whom I had ever before known.

With very little delay after reaching my hotel I made my way to

General Halleck's headquarters and reported to that officer, having

learned in the meantime that General Grant was absent from the city.

General Halleck talked to me for a few minutes, outlining briefly the

nature and duties of my new command, and the general military

situation in Virginia. When he had finished all he had to say about

these matters, he took me to the office of the Secretary of War, to

present me to Mr. Stanton. During the ceremony of introduction, I

could feel that Mr. Stanton was eying me closely and searchingly,

endeavoring to form some estimate of one about whom he knew

absolutely nothing, and whose career probably had never been called

to his attention until General Grant decided to order me East, after

my name had been suggested by General Halleck in an interview the two

generals had with Mr. Lincoln. I was rather young in appearance

--looking even under than over thirty-three years--but five feet five

inches in height, and thin almost to emaciation, weighing only one

hundred and fifteen pounds. If I had ever possessed any

self-assertion in manner or speech, it certainly vanished in the

presence of the imperious Secretary, whose name at the time was the

synonym of all that was cold and formal. I never learned what Mr.

Stanton's first impressions of me were, and his guarded and rather

calculating manner gave at this time no intimation that they were

either favorable or unfavorable, but his frequent commendation in

after years indicated that I gained his goodwill before the close of

the war, if not when I first came to his notice; and a more intimate

association convinced me that the cold and cruel characteristics

popularly ascribed to him were more mythical than real.