On my arrival at St. Louis I felt somewhat forlorn and disheartened

at the turn affairs had taken. I did not know where I should be

assigned, nor what I should be required to do, but these

uncertainties were dispelled in a few days by General Halleck, who,

being much pressed by the Governors of some of the Western States to

disburse money in their sections, sent me out into the Northwest with

a sort of roving commission to purchase horses for the use of the

army. I went to Madison and Racine, Wis., at which places I bought

two hundred horses, which were shipped to St. Louis. At Chicago I

bought two hundred more, and as the prices paid at the latter point

showed that Illinois was the cheapest market--it at that time

producing a surplus over home demands--I determined to make Chicago

the centre of my operations.

While occupied in this way at Chicago the battle of Shiloh took

place, and the desire for active service with troops became uppermost

in my thoughts, so I returned to St. Louis to see if I could not get

into the field. General Halleck having gone down to the Shiloh

battle-field, I reported to his Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel

John C. Kelton, and told him of my anxiety to take a hand in active

field-service, adding that I did not wish to join my regiment, which

was still organizing and recruiting at Jefferson Barracks, for I felt

confident I could be more useful elsewhere. Kelton knew that the

purchasing duty was but temporary, and that on its completion,

probably at no distant date, I should have to join my company at the

barracks; so, realizing the inactivity to which that situation of

affairs would subject me, he decided to assume the responsibility of

sending me to report to General Halleck at Shiloh, and gave me an

order to that effect.

This I consider the turning-point in my military career, and shall

always feel grateful to Colonel Kelton for his kindly act which so

greatly influenced my future. My desire to join the army at Shiloh

had now taken possession of me, and I was bent on getting there by

the first means available. Learning that a hospital-boat under

charge of Dr. Hough was preparing to start for Pittsburg Landing, I

obtained the Doctor's consent to take passage on it, and on the

evening of April 15, I left St. Louis for the scene of military

operations in northeastern Mississippi.

At Pittsburg Landing I reported to General Halleck, who, after some

slight delay, assigned me to duty as an assistant to Colonel George

Thom, of the topographical engineers. Colonel Thom put me at the

work of getting the trains up from the landing, which involved the

repair of roads for that purpose by corduroying the marshy places.

This was rough, hard work, without much chance of reward, but it, was

near the field of active operations, and I determined to do the best

I could at it till opportunity for something better might arise.

General Halleck did not know much about taking care of himself in the

field. His camp arrangements were wholly inadequate, and in

consequence he and all the officers about him were subjected to much

unnecessary discomfort and annoyance. Someone suggested to him to

appoint me quartermaster for his headquarters, with a view to

systematizing the establishment and remedying the defects complained

of, and I was consequently assigned to this duty. Shortly after this

assignment I had the satisfaction of knowing that General Halleck was

delighted with the improvements made at headquarters, both in camp

outfit and transportation, and in administration generally. My

popularity grew as the improvements increased, but one trifling

incident came near marring it. There was some hitch about getting

fresh beef for General Halleck's mess, and as by this time everybody

had come to look to me for anything and everything in the way of

comfort, Colonel Joe McKibben brought an order from the General for

me to get fresh beef for the headquarters mess. I was not caterer

for this mess, nor did I belong to it even, so I refused point-blank.

McKibben, disliking to report my disobedience, undertook persuasion,

and brought Colonel Thom to see me to aid in his negotiations, but I

would not give in, so McKibben in the kindness of his heart rode

several miles in order to procure the beef himself, and thus save me

from the dire results which he thought would follow should Halleck

get wind of such downright insubordination. The next day I was made

Commissary of Subsistence for the headquarters in addition to my

other duties, and as this brought me into the line of fresh beef,

General Halleck had no cause thereafter to complain of a scarcity of

that article in his mess.

My stay at General Halleck's headquarters was exceedingly agreeable,

and my personal intercourse with officers on duty there was not only

pleasant and instructive, but offered opportunities for improvement

and advancement for which hardly any other post could have afforded

like chances. My special duties did not occupy all my time, and

whenever possible I used to go over to General Sherman's division,

which held the extreme right of our line in the advance on Corinth,

to witness the little engagements occurring there continuously during

the slow progress which the army was then making, the enemy being

forced back but a short distance each day. I knew General Sherman

very well. We came from near the same section of country in Ohio,

and his wife and her family had known me from childhood. I was

always kindly received by the General, and one day he asked me if I

would be willing to accept the colonelcy of a certain Ohio regiment

if he secured the appointment. I gladly told him yes, if General

Halleck would let me go; but I was doomed to disappointment, for in

about a week or so afterward General Sherman informed me that the

Governor of Ohio would not consent, having already decided to appoint

some one else.

A little later Governor Blair, of Michigan, who was with the army

temporarily in the interest of the troops from his State, and who

just at this time was looking around for a colonel for the Second

Michigan Cavalry, and very anxious to get a regular officer, fixed

upon me as the man. The regiment was then somewhat run down by

losses from sickness, and considerably split into factions growing

out of jealousies engendered by local differences previous to

organization, and the Governor desired to bridge over all these

troubles by giving the regiment a commander who knew nothing about

them. I presume that some one said to the Governor about this time,

"Why don't you get Sheridan?" This, however, is only conjecture. I

really do not know how my name was proposed to him, but I have often

been told since that General Gordon Granger, whom I knew slightly

then, and who had been the former colonel of the regiment, first

suggested the appointment. At all events, on the morning of May 27,

1862, Captain Russell A. Alger--recently Governor of Michigan

--accompanied by the quartermaster of the regiment, Lieutenant Frank

Walbridge, arrived at General Halleck's headquarters and delivered to

me this telegram:

(By Telegraph.)

"MILITARY DEPT OF MICHIGAN,

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

"DETROIT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 148.

"Captain Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. Army, is hereby appointed

Colonel of the Second Regiment Michigan Cavalry, to rank from

this date.

"Captain Sheridan will immediately assume command of the

regiment.

"By order of the Commander-in-Chief,

"JNO. ROBERTSON,

"Adjutant-General."

I took the order to General Halleck, and said that I would like to

accept, but he was not willing I should do so until the consent of

the War Department could be obtained. I returned to my tent much

disappointed, for in those days, for some unaccountable reason, the

War Department did not favor the appointment of regular officers to

volunteer regiments, and I feared a disapproval at Washington. After

a further consultation with Captain Alger and Lieutenant Walbridge, I

determined to go to the General again and further present the case.

Enlarging on my desire for active service with troops, and urging the

utter lack of such opportunity where I was, I pleaded my cause until

General Halleck finally resolved to take the responsibility of

letting me go without consulting the War Department. When I had

thanked him for the kindness, he said that inasmuch as I was to leave

him, he would inform me that the regiment to which I had just been

appointed was ordered out as part of a column directed to make a raid

to the south of the enemy, then occupying Corinth, and that if I

could turn over my property, it would probably be well for me to join

my command immediately, so that I could go with the expedition. I

returned to my tent, where Alger and Walbridge were still waiting,

and told them of the success of my interview, at the same time

notifying them that I would join the regiment in season to accompany

the expedition of which Halleck had spoken.

In the course of the afternoon I turned over all my property to my

successor, and about 8 o'clock that evening made my appearance at the

camp of the Second Michigan Cavalry, near Farmington, Mississippi.

The regiment was in a hubbub of excitement making preparations for

the raid, and I had barely time to meet the officers of my command,

and no opportunity at all to see the men, when the trumpet sounded to

horse. Dressed in a coat and trousers of a captain of infantry, but

recast as a colonel of cavalry by a pair of well-worn eagles that

General Granger had kindly given me, I hurriedly placed on my saddle

a haversack, containing some coffee, sugar, bacon, and hard bread,

which had been prepared, and mounting my horse, I reported my

regiment to the brigade commander as ready for duty.

CHAPTER IX.

EXPEDITION TO BOONEVILLE--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--CONFEDERATE

STRAGGLERS--SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION--A RECONNOISSANCE--THE

IMPORTANCE OF BODILY SUSTENANCE--THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE

--RECOMMENDED FOR APPOINTMENT AS A BRIGADIER-GENERAL.

The expedition referred to by General Halleck in his parting

conversation was composed of the Second Michigan and Second Iowa

regiments of cavalry, formed into a brigade under command of Colonel

Washington L. Elliott, of the Second Iowa. It was to start on the

night of the 27th of May at 12 o'clock, and proceed by a circuitous

route through Iuka, Miss., to Booneville, a station on the Mobile and

Ohio Railroad, about twenty-two miles below Corinth, and accomplish

all it could in the way of destroying the enemy's supplies and

cutting his railroad communications.

The weather in that climate was already warm, guides unobtainable,

and both men and horses suffered much discomfort from the heat, and

fatigue from the many delays growing out of the fact that we were in

almost total ignorance of the roads leading to the point that we

desired to reach. In order that we might go light we carried only

sugar, coffee, and salt, depending on the country for meat and bread.

Both these articles were scarce, but I think we got all there was,

for our advent was so unexpected by the people of the region through

which we passed that, supposing us to be Confederate cavalry, they

often gave us all they had, the women and servants contributing most

freely from their, reserve stores.

Before reaching Booneville I had the advance, but just as we arrived

on the outskirts of the town the brigade was formed with the Second

Iowa on my right, and the whole force moved forward, right in front,

preceded by skirmishers. Here we encountered the enemy, but forced

him back with little resistance. When we had gained possession of

the station, Colonel Elliott directed me to take the left wing of my

regiment, pass to the south, and destroy a bridge or culvert supposed

to be at a little distance below the town on the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad. The right wing, or other half of the regiment, was to be

held in reserve for my support if necessary. I moved rapidly in the

designated direction till I reached the railroad, and then rode down

it for a mile and a half, but found neither bridge nor culvert. I

then learned that there was no bridge of any importance except the

one at Baldwin, nine miles farther down, but as I was aware, from

information recently received, that it was defended by three

regiments and a battery, I concluded that I could best accomplish the

purpose for which I had been detached--crippling the road--by tearing

up the track, bending the rails, and burning the cross-ties. This

was begun with alacrity at four different points, officers and men

vieing with one another in the laborious work of destruction. We had

but few tools, and as the difficulties to overcome were serious, our

progress was slow, until some genius conceived the idea that the

track, rails and ties, might be lifted from its bed bodily, turned

over, and subjected to a high heat; a convenient supply of dry

fence-rails would furnish ample fuel to render the rails useless.

In this way a good deal of the track was effectively broken up, and

communication by rail from Corinth to the south entirely cut off.

While we were still busy in wrecking the road, a dash was made at my

right and rear by a squadron of Confederate cavalry. This was

handsomely met by the reserve under Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of

the Second Michigan, who, dismounting a portion of his command,

received the enemy with such a volley from his Colt's repeating

rifles that the squadron broke and fled in all directions. We were

not molested further, and resumed our work, intending to extend the

break toward Baldwin, but receiving orders from Elliott to return to

Booneville immediately, the men were recalled, and we started to

rejoin the main command.

In returning to Booneville, I found the railroad track above where I

had struck it blocked by trains that we had thus cut off, and the

woods and fields around the town covered with several thousand

Confederate soldiers. These were mostly convalescents and

disheartened stragglers belonging to General Beauregard's army, and

from them we learned that Corinth was being evacuated. I spent some

little time in an endeavor to get these demoralized men into an open

field, with a view to some future disposition of them; but in the

midst of the undertaking I received another order from Colonel

Elliott to join him at once. The news of the evacuation had also

reached Elliott, and had disclosed a phase of the situation so

different from that under which he had viewed it when we arrived at

Booneville, that he had grown anxious to withdraw, lest we should be

suddenly pounced upon by an overwhelming force from some one of the

columns in retreat. Under such circumstances my prisoners would

prove a decided embarrassment, so I abandoned further attempts to get

them together--not even paroling them, which I thought might have

been done with but little risk.

In the meantime the captured cars had been fired, and as their

complete destruction was assured by explosions from those containing

ammunition, they needed no further attention, so I withdrew my men

and hastened to join Elliott, taking along some Confederate officers

whom I had retained from among four or five hundred prisoners

captured when making the original dash below the town.

The losses in my regiment, and, in fact, those of the entire command,

were insignificant. The results of the expedition were important;

the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rolling

stock north of Booneville, and to place at the service of General

Halleck's army the cars and locomotives of which the retreating

Confederates were now so much in need. In addition, we burned

twenty-six cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, three

pieces of artillery, a great quantity of clothing, a heavy supply of

ammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk. A

large number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fell

into our hands; but as we could not carry them with us--such a hurried

departure was an immediate necessity, by reason of our critical

situation--the process of paroling them was not completed, and they

doubtless passed back to active service in the Confederacy, properly

enough unrecognized as prisoners of war by their superiors.

In returning, the column marched back by another indirect route to

its old camp near Farmington, where we learned that the whole army

had moved into and beyond Corinth, in pursuit of Beauregard, on the

13th of May, the very day we had captured Booneville. Although we

had marched about one hundred and eighty miles in four days, we were

required to take part, of course, in the pursuit of the Confederate

army. So, resting but one night in our old camp, we were early in

the saddle again on the morning of the 2d of June. Marching south

through Corinth, we passed on the 4th of June the scene of our late

raid, viewing with much satisfaction, as we took the road toward

Blackland, the still smoldering embers of the burned trains.

On the 4th of June I was ordered to proceed with my regiment along

the Blackland road to determine the strength of the enemy in that

direction, as it was thought possible we might capture, by a

concerted movement which General John Pope had suggested to General

Halleck, a portion of Beauregard's rear guard. Pushing the

Confederate scouts rapidly in with a running fire for a mile or more,

while we were approaching a little stream, I hoped to gobble the main

body of the enemy's pickets. I therefore directed the sabre

battalion of the regiment, followed by that portion of it armed with

revolving rifles, to dash forward in column, cut off these videttes

before they could cross the stream, and then gather them in. The

pickets fled hastily, however, and a pell-mell pursuit carried us

over the stream at their heels by a little bridge, with no thought of

halting till we gained a hill on the other side, and suddenly found

ourselves almost in the camp of a strong body of artillery and

infantry. Captain Campbell being in advance, hurriedly dismounted

his battalion for a further forward movement on foot, but it was

readily seen that the enemy was present in such heavy force as almost

to ensure our destruction, and I gave orders for a hasty withdrawal.

We withdrew without loss under cover of thick woods, aided much,

however, by the consternation of the Confederates, who had hardly

recovered from their surprise at our sudden appearance in their camp

before we had again placed the stream between them and us by

recrossing the bridge. The reconnoissance was a success in one way

--that is, in finding out that the enemy was at the point supposed by,

General Pope; but it also had a tendency to accelerate Beauregard's

retreat, for in a day or two his whole line fell back as far south as

Guntown, thus rendering abortive the plans for bagging a large

portion of his army.

General Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth and retreat southward were

accomplished in the face of a largely superior force of Union troops,

and he reached the point where he intended to halt for reorganization

without other loss than that sustained in the destruction of the cars

and supplies at Booneville, and the capture of some stragglers and

deserters that fell into our hands while we were pressing his rear

from General Pope's flank. The number of these was quite large, and

indicated that the enemy was considerably demoralized. Under such

circumstances, an energetic and skillfully directed pursuit might not

have made certain the enemy's destruction, but it would largely have

aided in disintegrating his forces, and I never could quite

understand why it was not ordered. The desultory affairs between

rear and advance guards seemed as a general, thing to have no

particular purpose in view beyond finding out where the enemy was,

and when he was found, since no supporting colums were at hand and no

one in supreme control was present to give directions, our

skirmishing was of little avail and brought but small reward.

A short time subsequent to these occurrences, Colonel Elliott was

made a brigadier-general, and as General Pope appointed him his

Chief-of-Staff, I, on the 11th of June, 1862, fell in command of the

brigade by seniority. For the rest of the month but little of moment

occurred, and we settled down into camp at Booneville on the 26th of

June, in a position which my brigade had been ordered to take up some

twenty miles, in advance of the main army for the purpose of covering

its front. Although but a few days had elapsed from the date of my

appointment as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of my

succeeding to the command of the brigade, I believe I can say with

propriety that I had firmly established myself in the confidence of

the officers and men of the regiment, and won their regard by

thoughtful care. I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed and

well clothed, had personally looked after the selection of their

camps, and had maintained such a discipline as to allay former

irritation.

Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all the hardships that

fall to the lot of soldiers in the field, in order to do vigorous

work must have the best bodily sustenance, and every comfort that can

be provided. I knew from practical experience on the frontier that

my efforts in this direction would not only be appreciated, but

requited by personal affection and gratitude; and, further, that such

exertions would bring the best results to me. Whenever my authority

would permit I saved my command from needless sacrifices and

unnecessary toil; therefore, when hard or daring work was to be done

I expected the heartiest response, and always got it. Soldiers are

averse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results,

and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that often

takes place on the field of battle. They want some tangible

indemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset the value

of which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed their

blood, but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who command

them. My regiment had lost very few men since coming under my

command, but it seemed, in the eyes of all who belonged to it, that

casualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaid

every sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only their

confidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and love as men, and to

a degree far beyond what I then realized.

As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville, I began

to scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's

whereabouts and learn the ground about me. My standing in drawing at

the Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the belief

that I could ever prove myself an expert, but a few practical lessons

in that line were impressed on me there, and I had retained enough to

enable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood, and

which would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines of

northern Mississippi, with which at this time we were scantily

furnished; so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myself

and my regimental commanders an information map of the surrounding

country. This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams,

farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographical

features as would be useful. I must confess that my crude sketch did

not evidence much artistic merit, but it was an improvement on what

we already possessed in the way of details to guide the command, and

this was what I most needed; for it was of the first importance that

in our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thorough

knowledge of the section in which we were operating, so as to be

prepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from the

disorganizing effects of his recent retreat.

In the immediate vicinity of Booneville the country was covered with

heavy forests, with here and there clearings or intervening fields

that had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn. The

ground was of a low character, typical of northeastern Mississippi,

and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even in

short periods of drought, but became flooded with muddy water under

the outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi-tropical climate. In such

a region there were many chances of our being surprised, especially

by an enemy who knew the country well, and whose ranks were filled

with local guides; and great precautions as well as the fullest

information were necessary to prevent disaster. I therefore

endeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings, but scarcely had

matters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilation

was attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry.

On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five and

six thousand-men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers,

advanced on two roads converging near Booneville. The head of the

enemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contact

with my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville. These

pickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the Second

Michigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree or

other cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where the

converging roads joined. At this junction there was a strong

position in the protecting timber, and here Scranton made a firm

stand, being reinforced presently by the few men he had out as

pickets on the road to his left, a second company I had sent him from

camp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded by

Captain Campbell. This force was dismounted and formed in line, and

soon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers. Up to

this time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns, and we

had doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced him

to deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road, it became

apparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to lose

in preparing to repel his attack.

Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and I

directed Campbell to hold fast, if possible, till I could support

him, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly,

taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong the

fighting. Before this I had stationed one battalion of the Second

Iowa in Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding that

regiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection of

our camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balance

of the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two sabre

companies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell, to protect

his flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break his

dismounted line.

While these preparations were being made, the Confederates attempted

to drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through an

open field. In this they failed, however, for our men, reserving

their fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, then

opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's rifles

that it soon became too hot for him, and he was repulsed with

considerable loss. Foiled in this move, Chalmers hesitated to attack

again in front, but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's line

by force of numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strong

position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make our

main resistance. As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again

charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the first

assault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate as

to have the character of a hand-to-hand conflict, several groups of

friend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns. At this

juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowa

gave a breathing-spell to Campbell, and made the Confederates so

chary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and at

the same time I found opportunity to make disposition of the

reinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa

on the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its right

with all the men available.

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in his

ability to overcome us, and in a little while again began his

flanking movements, his right passing around my left flank some

distance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I had

forbidden to be moved out to the rear. Fearing that he would envelop

us and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take the

offensive. Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become

familiar with while making the map heretofore mentioned, I concluded

that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around

the enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by a

mounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his

front. I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardous

undertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had the

condition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved, only

by a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selected

four sabre companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from the

Second Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, in

command of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick and

desperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope.

To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger to

follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy's

advancing forces, to a point where 'it joined the Blackland road,

about three miles from Booneville, and directed him, upon reaching

the Blackland road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear of

the enemy's line. Under no circumstances was he to deploy the

battalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon,

and report to me in front of Booneville, if at all possible for him

to get there. If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he was

to go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left,

and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he had

taken on his way out. To conduct him on this perilous service I sent

along a thin, sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom I

had employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account of

his intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfares

down to the insignificant by-paths of the neighboring swamps. With

such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired

point without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost or

misled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the dense

forests through which it would be obliged to pass. I also informed

Alger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in front

of Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force,

and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struck

the enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous with

his.

I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, and

when he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve,

to put everything I had into the fight. This meant an inestimable

advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety

demanded the hazard. All along our attenuated line the fighting was

now sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strength

that fear of disaster to Alger increased my anxiety terribly as the

time set for his cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard.

Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roads

would prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger's

determination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soon

as the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward. Fortunately,

just as this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain for

my horses ran into Booneville from Corinth. I say fortunately,

because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning,

when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had called

for assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had

arrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry was

encamped, and inspirated by this belief, advanced with renewed

confidence and wild cheering. Meantime I had the engineer of the

locomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might also

learn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few moments

he began to give way before our small force, I thought that this

strategem had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmost

disorder over the country in every direction. I found later,

however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on his

left from the Second Iowa, in concert with the front attack of the

Second Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger,

who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition,

though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hear

the signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville.

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackland road, the first

thing he came across was the Confederate headquarters; the officers

and orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance to

a farm-house. Continuing on a gallop, he soon struck the rear of the

enemy's line, but was unable to get through; nor did he get near

enough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distance

he was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine were

almost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front

and rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to capture

Alger's command, which might readily have been done. Alger's

troopers soon rejoined me at Booneville, minus many hats, having

returned by their original route. They had sustained little loss

except a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing. Among these

was Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of a

tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank.

The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run over

by the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none the

worse except for a few scratches and bruises.

My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger's

command comprised ninety officers and men. Chalmers's force was

composed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have been

unable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers,

yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtained

from citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he had

in the action not less than five-thousand men. Our casualties were

not many--forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded was

considerable, his most severely wounded--forty men--falling into our

hands, having been left at farm-houses in the vicinity of the

battlefield.

The victory in the face of such odds was most gratifying, and as it

justified my disinclination--in fact, refusal--to retire from

Booneville without fighting (for the purpose of saving my

transportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied in

the morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful.

It was also very valuable in, view of the fact that it increased the

confidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, and

gave us for the balance of the month not only comparative rest, but

entire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble my

isolated outpost. In addition to all this, commendation from my

immediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and written

congratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battle

took definite form a few days later, in the following application for

my promotion, when, by an expedition to Ripley, Miss., most valuable

information as to the enemy's location and plans was captured:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"JULY 30, 1862.--3.05 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

"Washington, D. C.

"Brigadiers scarce; good ones scarce. Asboth goes on the month's

leave you gave him ten months since; Granger has temporary command.

The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion

of Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold. His Ripley expedition

has brought us captured letters of immense value, as well as

prisoners, showing the rebel plans and dispositions, as you will

learn from District Commander.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General.

"C. C. SULLIVAN, " "

"G. GRANGER, " "

"W. L. ELLIOTT, " "

"A. ASBOTH, " " "

CHAPTER X.

IN CAMP NEAR RIENZI--GENERAL GRANGER--A VALUABLE CAPTURE AT RIPLEY

--RAIDING A CORNFIELD--REPULSING AN ATTACK--PRESENTED WITH THE BLACK

HORSE "RIENZI"--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL.

After the battle of Booneville, it was decided by General Rosecrans,

on the advice of General Granger, that my position at Booneville was

too much exposed, despite the fact that late on the evening of the

fight my force had been increased by the addition of, a battery of

four guns and two companies of infantry, and by the Third Michigan

Cavalry, commanded by Colonel John K. Mizner; so I was directed to

withdraw from my post and go into camp near Rienzi, Mississippi,

where I could equally well cover the roads in front of the army, and

also be near General Asboth's division of infantry, which occupied a

line in rear of the town. This section of country, being higher and

more rolling than that in the neighborhood of Booneville, had many

advantages in the way of better camping-grounds, better grazing and

the like, but I moved with reluctance, because I feared that my

proximity to Asboth would diminish to a certain extent my

independence of command.

General Asboth was a tall, spare, handsome man, with gray mustache

and a fierce look. He was an educated soldier, of unquestioned

courage, but the responsibilities of outpost duty bore rather heavily

on him, and he kept all hands in a state of constant worry in

anticipation of imaginary attacks. His ideas of discipline were not

very rigid either, and as by this time there had been introduced into

my brigade some better methods than those obtaining when it first

fell to my command, I feared the effect should he, have any control

over it, or meddle with its internal affairs. However, there was

nothing to do but to move to the place designated, but General

Granger, who still commanded the cavalry division to which the

brigade belonged, so arranged matters with General Rosecrans, who had

succeeded to the command of the Army of the Mississippi, that my

independence was to be undisturbed, except in case of a general

attack by the enemy.

We went into camp near Rienzi, July 22, sending back to the general

field-hospital at Tuscumbia Springs all our sick--a considerable

number--stricken down by the malarial influences around Booneville.

In a few days the fine grazing and abundance of grain for our

exhausted horses brought about their recuperation; and the many large

open fields in the vicinity gave opportunity for drills and parades,

which were much needed. I turned my attention to those disciplinary

measures which, on account of active work in the field, had been

necessarily neglected since the brigade had arrived at Pittsburg

Landing, in April; and besides, we had been busy in collecting

information by scouting parties and otherwise, in prosecution of the

purpose for which we were covering the main army.

I kept up an almost daily correspondence with General Granger,

concerning the information obtained by scouts and reconnoitring

parties, and he came often to Rienzi to see me in relation to this

and other matters. Previously I had not had much personal

association with Granger. While I was at Halleck's headquarters we

met on one or two occasions, and the day I joined the Second Michigan

at Farmington I saw him for a few moments, but, with such slight

exception, our intercourse had been almost exclusively official. He

had suggested my name, I was told, to Governor Blair, when the

Governor was in search of an officer of the regular army to appoint

to the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry, but his

recommendation must have been mainly based on the favorable opinions

he had heard expressed by General Halleck and by some of the officers

of his staff, rather than from any personal knowledge of my capacity.

Of course I was very grateful for this, but some of his

characteristics did not impress me favorably, and I sometimes wished

the distance between our camps greater. His most serious failing was

an uncontrollable propensity to interfere with and direct the minor

matters relating to the command, the details for which those under

him were alone responsible. Ill-judged meddling in this respect

often led to differences between us, only temporary it is true, but

most harassing to the subordinate, since I was compelled by the

circumstances of the situation not only invariably to yield my own

judgment, but many a time had to play peacemaker--smoothing down

ruffled feelings, that I knew had been excited by Granger's freaky

and spasmodic efforts to correct personally some trifling fault that

ought to have been left to a regimental or company commander to

remedy. Yet with all these small blemishes Granger had many good

qualities, and his big heart was so full of generous impulses and

good motives as to far outbalance his short-comings; and

not-withstanding the friction and occasional acerbity of our official

intercourse, we maintained friendly relations till his death.

In pursuance of the fatal mistake made by dispersing Halleck's forces

after the fall of Corinth, General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the

Ohio had been started some time before on its march eastward toward

Chattanooga; and as this movement would be followed of course by a

manoeuvre on the part of the enemy, now at Tupelo under General

Braxton Bragg, either to meet Buell or frustrate his designs by some

counter-operation, I was expected to furnish, by scouting and all

other means available, information as to what was going on within the

Confederate lines. To do the work required, necessitated an increase

of my command, and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry was therefore added to

it, and my picket-line extended so as to cover from Jacinto

southwesterly to a point midway between Rienzi and Booneville, and

then northwesterly to the Hatchie River. Skirmishes between outposts

on this line were of frequent occurrence, with small results to

either side, but they were somewhat annoying, particularly in the

direction of Ripley, where the enemy maintained a considerable

outpost. Deciding to cripple if not capture this outpost, on the

evening of July 27, I sent out an expedition under Colonel Hatch,

which drove the enemy from the town of Ripley and took a few

prisoners, but the most valuable prize was in the shape of a package

of thirty-two private letters, the partial reading of which disclosed

to me the positive transfer from Mississippi of most of Bragg's army,

for the purpose of counteracting Buell's operations in northern

Alabama and East Tennessee. This decisive evidence was of the utmost

importance, and without taking time to read all the letters, I

forwarded them to General Granger July 28, in a despatch which

stated: "I deem it necessary to send them at once; the enemy is

moving in large force on Chattanooga." Other than this the results

of the expedition were few; and the enemy, having fled from Ripley

with but slight resistance, accompanied by almost all the

inhabitants, re-occupied the place next day after our people had

quitted it, and resumed in due time his annoying attacks on our

outposts, both sides trying to achieve something whenever occasion

offered.

The prevalence of a severe drought had resulted in drying up many of

the streams within the enemy's lines, and, in consequence, he was

obliged to shift his camps often, and send his beef-cattle and mules

near his outposts for water. My scouts kept me well posted in regard

to the movements of both camps and herds; and a favorable opportunity

presenting itself, I sent an expedition on August 14 to gather in

some animals located on Twenty-Mile Creek, a stream always supplied

with water from a source of never-failing, springs. Our side met

with complete success in this instance, and when the expedition

returned, we were all made happy by an abundance of fresh beef, and

by some two hundred captured mules, that we thus added to our trains

at a time when draft animals were much needed.

Rations for the men were now supplied in fair quantities, and the

only thing required to make us wholly contented was plenty of grain

for our animals. Because of the large number of troops then in West

Tennessee and about Corinth, the indifferent railroad leading down

from Columbus, Ky., was taxed to its utmost capacity to transport

supplies. The quantity of grain received at Corinth from the north

was therefore limited, and before reaching the different outposts, by

passing through intermediate depots of supply, it had dwindled to

insignificance. I had hopes, however, that this condition of things

might be ameliorated before long by gathering a good supply of corn

that was ripening in the neighborhood, and would soon, I thought, be

sufficiently hard to feed to my animals. Not far from my

headquarters there was a particularly fine field, which, with this

end in view, I had carefully protected through the milky stage, to

the evident disappointment of both Asboth's men and mine. They bore

the prohibition well while it affected only themselves, but the trial

was too great when it came to denying their horses; and men whose

discipline kept faith with my guards during the roasting-ear period

now fell from grace. Their horses were growing thin, and few could

withstand the mute appeals of their suffering pets; so at night the

corn, because of individual foraging, kept stealthily and steadily

vanishing, until the field was soon fringed with only earless stalks.

The disappearance was noticed, and the guard increased, but still the

quantity of corn continued to grow less, the more honest troopers

bemoaning the loss, and questioning the honor of those to whose

safekeeping it had been entrusted. Finally, doubtless under the

apprehension that through their irregularities the corn would all

disappear and find its way to the horses in accordance with the

stealthy enterprise of their owners, a general raid was made on the

field in broad daylight, and though the guard drove off the

marauders, I must admit that its efforts to keep them back were so

unsuccessful that my hopes for an equal distribution of the crop were

quickly blasted. One look at the field told that it had been swept

clean of its grain. Of course a great row occurred as to who was to

blame, and many arrests and trials took place, but there had been

such an interchanging of cap numbers and other insignia that it was

next to impossible to identify the guilty, and so much crimination

and acrimony grew out of the affair that it was deemed best to drop

the whole matter.

On August 27 about half of the command was absent reconnoitring, I

having sent it south toward Tupelo, in the hope of obtaining some

definite information regarding a movement to Holly Springs of the

remainder of the Confederate army, under General Price, when about

mid-day I was suddenly aroused by excited cries and sounds of firing,

and I saw in a moment that the enemy was in my camp. He had come in

on my right flank from the direction of the Hatchie River, pell-mell

with our picket-post stationed about three miles out on the Ripley

road. The whole force of the enemy comprised about eight hundred,

but only his advance entered with my pickets, whom he had charged and

badly stampeded, without, on their part, the pretense of a fight in

behalf of those whom it was their duty to protect until proper

dispositions for defense could be made. The day was excessively hot,

one of those sultry debilitating days that had caused the suspending

of all military exercises; and as most of the men were lounging or

sleeping in their tents, we were literally caught napping. The alarm

spread instantly through the camp, and in a moment the command turned

out for action, somewhat in deshabille it is true, but none the less

effective, for every man had grabbed his rifle and cartridge-box at

the first alarm. Aided by a few shots from Captain Henry Hescock's

battery, we soon drove the intruders from our camp in about the same

disorder in which they had broken in on us. By this time Colonel

Hatch and Colonel Albert L. Lee had mounted two battalions each, and

I moved them out at a lively pace in pursuit, followed by a section

of the battery. No halt was called till we came upon the enemy's

main body, under Colonel Faulkner, drawn up in line of battle near

Newland's store. Opening on him with the two pieces of artillery, I

hurriedly formed line confronting him, and quickly and with but

little resistance drove him in confusion from the field. The sudden

turning of the tables dismayed Faulkner's men, and panic seizing

them, they threw away every loose article of arms or clothing of

which they could dismember themselves, and ran in the wildest

disorder in a mad effort to escape. As the chase went on the panic

increased, the clouds of dust from the road causing an intermingling

of friend and foe. In a little while the affair grew most ludicrous,

Faulkner's hatless and coatless men taking to the woods in such

dispersed order and so demoralized that a good many prisoners were

secured, and those of the enemy who escaped were hunted until dark.

When the recall was sounded, our men came in loaded down with plunder

in the shape of hats, haversacks, blankets, pistols, and shotguns, in

a quantity which amply repaid for the surprise of the morning, but

did not excuse the delinquent commander of our picket-guard, who a

few days later was brought to a realizing sense of his duty by a

court-martial.

Shortly after this affair Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of the

Second Michigan Cavalry, presented me with the black horse called

Rienzi, since made historical from having been ridden by me in many

battles, conspicuously in the ride from Winchester to Cedar Creek,

which has been celebrated in the poem by T. Buchanan Read. This

horse was of Morgan stock, and then about three years old. He was

jet black, excepting three white feet, sixteen hands high, and

strongly built, with great powers of endurance. He was so active

that he could cover with ease five miles an hour at his natural

walking gait. The gelding had been ridden very seldom; in fact,

Campbell had been unaccustomed to riding till the war broke out, and,

I think, felt some disinclination to mount the fiery colt. Campbell

had an affection for him, however, that never waned, and would often

come to my headquarters to see his favorite, the colt being cared for

there by the regimental farrier, an old man named John Ashley, who

had taken him in charge when leaving Michigan, and had been his groom

ever since. Seeing that I liked the horse--I had ridden him on

several occasions--Campbell presented him to me on one of these

visits, and from that time till the close of the war I rode him

almost continuously, in every campaign and battle in which I took

part, without once finding him overcome by fatigue, though on many

occasions his strength was severely tested by long marches and short

rations. I never observed in him any vicious habit; a nervousness

and restlessness and switch of the tail, when everything about him

was in repose, being the only indication that he might be

untrustworthy. No one but a novice could be deceived by this,

however, for the intelligence evinced in every feature, and his

thoroughbred appearance, were so striking that any person accustomed

to horses could not misunderstand such a noble animal. But Campbell

thought otherwise, at least when the horse was to a certain degree

yet untrained, and could not be pursuaded to ride him; indeed, for

more than a year after he was given to me, Campbell still retained

suspicions of his viciousness, though, along with this mistrust, an

undiminished affection. Although he was several times wounded, this

horse escaped death in action; and living to a ripe old age, died in

1878, attended to the last with all the care and surrounded with

every comfort due the faithful service he had rendered.

In moving from Corinth east toward Chattanooga, General Buell's army

was much delayed by the requirement that he should repair the Memphis

and Charleston railroad as he progressed. The work of repair obliged

him to march very slowly, and was of but little use when done, for

guerrillas and other bands of Confederates destroyed the road again

as soon as he had passed on. But worst of all, the time thus

consumed gave General Bragg the opportunity to reorganize and

increase his army to such an extent that he was able to contest the

possession of Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Consequently, the

movement of this army through Tennessee and Kentucky toward the Ohio

River--its objective points being Louisville and Cincinnati--was now

well defined, and had already rendered abortive General Buell's

designs on Chattanooga and East Tennessee. Therefore extraordinary

efforts on the part of the Government became necessary, and the

concentration of National troops at Louisville and Cincinnati to meet

the contingency of Bragg's reaching those points was an obvious

requirement. These troops were drawn from all sections in the West

where it was thought they could be spared, and among others I was

ordered to conduct thither--to Louisville or Cincinnati, as

subsequent developments might demand--my regiment, Hescock's battery,

the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, and the Thirty-sixth and

Forty-fourth Illinois regiments of infantry, known as the "Pea Ridge

Brigade." With this column I marched back to Corinth on the 6th of

September, 1862, for the purpose of getting railroad transportation

to Columbus, Kentucky.

At Corinth I met General Grant, who by this time had been

reestablished in favor and command somewhat, General Halleck having

departed for Washington to assume command of the army as

General-in-Chief. Before and during the activity which followed his

reinstatement, General Grant had become familiar with my services

through the transmission to Washington of information I had furnished

concerning the enemy's movements, and by reading reports of my fights

and skirmishes in front, and he was loth to let me go. Indeed, he

expressed surprise at seeing me in Corinth, and said he had not

expected me to go; he also plainly showed that he was much hurt at

the inconsiderate way in which his command was being depleted. Since

I was of the opinion that the chief field of usefulness and

opportunity was opening up in Kentucky, I did not wish him to retain

me, which he might have done, and I impressed him with my conviction,

somewhat emphatically, I fear. Our conversation ended with my wish

gratified. I afterward learned that General Granger, whom General

Grant did not fancy, had suggested that I should take to Cincinnati

the main portion of Granger's command--the Pea Ridge Brigade--as well

as the Second Michigan Cavalry, of which I was still colonel.

We started that night, going by rail over the Mobile and Ohio road to

Columbus, Ky., where we embarked on steamboats awaiting us. These

boats were five in number, and making one of them my flag-ship,

expecting that we might come upon certain batteries reported to be

located upon the Kentucky shore of the Ohio, I directed the rest to

follow my lead. Just before reaching Caseyville, the captain of a

tin-clad gunboat that was patrolling the river brought me the

information that the enemy was in strong force at Caseyville, and

expressed a fear that my fleet could not pass his batteries.

Accepting the information as correct, I concluded to capture the

place before trying to pass up the river. Pushing in to the bank as

we neared the town, I got the troops ashore and moved on Caseyville,

in the expectation of a bloody fight, but was agreeably surprised

upon reaching the outskirts of the village by an outpouring of its

inhabitants--men, women, and children--carrying the Stars and

Stripes, and making the most loyal professions. Similar

demonstrations of loyalty had been made to the panic-stricken captain

of the gunboat when he passed down the river, but he did not stay to

ascertain their character, neither by landing nor by inquiry, for he

assumed that on the Kentucky bank of the river there could be no

loyalty. The result mortified the captain intensely; and deeming his

convoy of little further use, he steamed toward Cairo in quest of

other imaginary batteries, while I re-embarked at Caseyville, and

continued up the Ohio undisturbed. About three miles below

Cincinnati I received instructions to halt, and next day I was

ordered by Major-General H. G. Wright to take my troops back to

Louisville, and there assume command of the Pea Ridge Brigade,

composed of the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, Thirty-sixth and

Forty-fourth Illinois infantry, and of such other regiments as might

be sent me in advance of the arrival of General Buell's army.

When I reached Louisville I reported to Major-General William Nelson,

who was sick, and who received me as he lay in bed. He asked me why

I did not wear the shoulder-straps of my rank. I answered that I was

the colonel of the Second Michigan cavalry, and had on my appropriate

shoulder-straps. He replied that I was a brigadier-general for the

Booneville fight, July 1, and that I should wear the shoulder-straps

of that grade. I returned to my command and put it in camp; and

as I had no reluctance to wearing the shoulder-straps of a

brigadier-general, I was not long in procuring a pair, particularly

as I was fortified next day by receiving from Washington official

information of my appointment as a brigadier-general, to date from

July 1, 1862, the day of the battle of Booneville.

CHAPTER XI.

GOOD ADVICE FROM GENERAL NELSON--HIS TRAGIC DEATH--PUTTING LOUISVILLE

IN A STATE OF DEFENSE--ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ELEVENTH

DIVISION--CAPTURE OF CHAPLIN HEIGHTS--BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--REPORTED

AMONG THE KILLED--A THRILLING INCIDENT--GENERAL BUELL RELIEVED BY

GENERAL ROSECRANS.

I reported to Major-General Nelson at the Galt House in Louisville,

September 14, 1862, who greeted me in the bluff and hearty fashion of

a sailor--for he had been in the navy till the breaking out of the

war. The new responsibilities that were now to fall upon me by

virtue of increased rank caused in my mind an uneasiness which, I

think, Nelson observed at the interview, and he allayed it by giving

me much good advice, and most valuable information in regard to

affairs in Kentucky, telling me also that he intended I should retain

in my command the Pea Ridge Brigade and Hescock's battery. This

latter assurance relieved me greatly, for I feared the loss of these

troops in the general redistribution which I knew must soon take

place; and being familiar with their valuable service in Missouri,

and having brought them up from Mississippi, I hoped they would

continue with me. He directed me to take position just below the

city with the Pea Ridge Brigade, Hescock's battery, and the Second

Michigan Cavalry, informing me, at the same time, that some of the

new regiments, then arriving under a recent call of the President for

volunteers, would also be assigned to my command. Shortly after the

interview eight new regiments and an additional battery joined me,

thus making good his promise of more troops.

A few days later came Nelson's tragic end, shocking the whole

country. Those of us in camp outside of the city were startled on

the morning of September 29 by the news that General Jefferson C.

Davis, of the Union Army, had shot General Nelson at the Galt House,

and the wildest rumors in regard to the occurrence came thick and

fast; one to the effect that Nelson was dead, another having it that

he was living and had killed Davis, and still others reflecting on

the loyalty of both, it being supposed by the general public at first

that the difficulty between the two men had grown out of some

political rather than official or personal differences. When the

news came, I rode into the city to the Galt House to learn the

particulars, reaching there about 10 o'clock in the forenoon. Here I

learned that Nelson had been shot by Davis about two hours before, at

the foot of the main stairway leading from the corridor just beyond

the office to the second floor, and that Nelson was already dead. It

was almost as difficult to get reliable particulars of the matter at

the hotel as it had been in my camp, but I gathered that the two men

had met first at an early hour near the counter of the hotel office,

and that an altercation which had begun several days before in

relation to something official was renewed by Davis, who, attempting

to speak to Nelson in regard to the subject-matter of their previous

dispute, was met by an insulting refusal to listen. It now appears

that when Nelson made this offensive remark, Davis threw a small

paper ball that he was nervously rolling between his fingers into

Nelson's face, and that this insult was returned by Nelson slapping

Davis (Killed by a Brother Soldier.--Gen. J. B. Fry.) in the face.

But at the time, exactly what had taken place just before the

shooting was shrouded in mystery by a hundred conflicting stories,

the principal and most credited of which was that Davis had demanded

from Nelson an apology for language used in the original altercation,

and that Nelson's refusal was accompanied by a slap in the face, at

the same moment denouncing Davis as a coward. However this may be,

Nelson, after slapping Davis, moved toward the corridor, from which a

stairway led to the second floor, and just as he was about to ascend,

Davis fired with a pistol that he had obtained from some one near by

after the blow had been struck. The ball entered Nelson's breast

just above the heart, but his great strength enabled him to ascend

the stairway notwithstanding the mortal character of the wound, and

he did not fall till he reached the corridor on the second floor. He

died about half an hour later. The tragedy cast a deep gloom over

all who knew the men, for they both had many warm personal friends;

and affairs at Louisville had hardly recovered as yet from the

confused and discouraging condition which preceded the arrival of

General Buell's army. General Buell reported the killing of Nelson

to the authorities at Washington, and recommended the trial of Davis

by court-martial, but no proceedings were ever instituted against him

in either a civil or military court, so to this day it has not been

determined judicially who was the aggressor. Some months later Davis

was assigned to the command of a division in Buell's army after that

officer had been relieved from its command.

Two Confederate armies, under General Kirby Smith and General Braxton

Bragg, had penetrated into Kentucky, the one under Smith by the way

of Cumberland Gap, the other and main army under Bragg by way of the

Sequatche Valley, Glasgow, and Mumfordsville. Glasgow was captured

by the enemy on the 17th of September, and as the expectation was

that Buell would reach the place in time to save the town, its loss

created considerable alarm in the North, for fears were now

entertained that Bragg would strike Louisville and capture the city

before Buell could arrive on the ground. It became necessary

therefore to put Louisville in a state of defense, and after the

cordon of principal works had been indicated, my troops threw up in

one night a heavy line of rifle-pits south of the city, from the

Bardstown pike to the river. The apprehended attack by Bragg never

came, however, for in the race that was then going on between him and

Buell on parallel roads, the Army of the Ohio outmarched the

Confederates, its advance arriving at Louisville September 25.

General Buell immediately set about reorganizing the whole force, and

on September 29 issued an order designating the troops under my

command as the Eleventh Division, Army of the Ohio, and assigning

Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle to command the division, and me to

command one of its brigades. To this I could not object, of course,

for I was a brigadier-general of very recent date, and could hardly

expect more than a brigade. I had learned, however, that at least

one officer to whom a high command had been given--a corps--had not

yet been appointed a general officer by the President, and I

considered it somewhat unfair that I should be relegated to a

brigade, while men who held no commissions at all were being made

chiefs of corps and divisions; so I sought an interview with General

Buell's chief-of-staff, Colonel Fry, and, while not questioning

Buell's good intentions nor his pure motives, insisted that my rights

in the matter should be recognized. That same evening I was assigned

to the command of the Eleventh Division, and began preparing it at

once for a forward movement, which I knew must soon take place in the

resumption of offensive operations by the Army of the Ohio.

During the interval from September 25 till October 1 there was among

the officers much criticism of General Buell's management of the

recent campaign, which had resulted in his retirement to Louisville;

and he was particularly censured by many for not offering battle to

General Bragg while the two armies were marching parallel to each

other, and so near that an engagement could have been brought on at

any one of several points--notably so at Glasgow, Kentucky, if there

had been a desire to join issue. It was asserted, and by many

conceded, that General Buell had a sufficient force to risk a fight.

He was much blamed for the loss of Mumfordsville also. The capture

of this point, with its garrison, gave Bragg an advantage in the race

toward the Ohio River, which odds would most likely have ensured the

fall of Louisville had they been used with the same energy and skill

that the Confederate commander displayed from Chattanooga to Glasgow;

but something always diverted General Bragg at the supreme moment,

and he failed to utilize the chances falling to him at this time,

for, deflecting his march to the north toward Bardstown, he left open

to Buell the direct road to Louisville by way of Elizabethtown.

At Bardstown Bragg's army was halted while he endeavored to establish

a Confederate government in Kentucky by arranging for the

installation of a provisional governor at Lexington. Bragg had been

assured that the presence of a Confederate army in Kentucky would so

encourage the secession element that the whole State could be forced

into the rebellion and his army thereby largely increased; but he had

been considerably misled, for he now found that though much latent

sympathy existed for his cause, yet as far as giving active aid was

concerned, the enthusiasm exhibited by the secessionists of Kentucky

in the first year of the war was now replaced by apathy, or at best

by lukewarmness. So the time thus spent in political machinations

was wholly lost to Bragg; and so little reinforcement was added to

his army that it may be said that the recruits gained were not enough

to supply the deficiencies resulting from the recent toilsome marches

of the campaign.

In the meanwhile Buell had arrived at Louisville, system had been

substituted for the chaos which had previously obtained there, and

orders were issued for an advance upon the enemy with the purpose of

attacking and the hope of destroying him within the limits of the

"blue grass" region, and, failing in that, to drive him from

Kentucky. The army moved October 1, 1862, and my division, now a

part of the Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, marched

directly on Bardstown, where it was thought the enemy would make a

stand, but Bragg's troops retreated toward Perryville, only resisting

sufficiently to enable the forces of General Kirby Smith to be drawn

in closer--they having begun a concentration at Frankfort--so they

could be used in a combined attack on Louisville as soon as the

Confederate commander's political projects were perfected.

Much time was consumed by Buell's army in its march on Perryville,

but we finally neared it on the evening of October 7. During the

day, Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell's division of Gilbert's

corps was in the advance on the Springfield pike, but as the enemy

developed that he was in strong force on the opposite side of a small

stream called Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, my

division was brought up and passed to the front. It was very

difficult to obtain water in this section of Kentucky, as a drought

had prevailed for many weeks, and the troops were suffering so for

water that it became absolutely necessary that we should gain

possession of Doctor's Creek in order to relieve their distress.

Consequently General Gilbert, during the night, directed me to push

beyond Doctor's Creek early the next morning. At daylight on the 8th

I moved out Colonel Dan McCook's brigade and Barnett's battery for

the purpose, but after we had crossed the creek with some slight

skirmishing, I found that we could not hold the ground unless we

carried and occupied a range of hills, called Chaplin Heights, in

front of Chaplin River. As this would project my command in the

direction of Perryville considerably beyond the troops that were on

either flank, I brought up Laiboldt's brigade and Hescock's battery

to strengthen Colonel McCook. Putting both brigades into line we

quickly carried the Heights, much to the surprise of the enemy, I

think, for he did not hold on to the valuable ground as strongly as

he should have done. This success not only ensured us a good supply

of water, but also, later in the day, had an important bearing in the

battle of Perryville. After taking the Heights, I brought up the

rest of my division and intrenched, without much difficulty, by

throwing up a strong line of rifle-pits, although the enemy's

sharpshooters annoyed us enough to make me order Laiboldt's brigade

to drive them in on the main body. This was successfully done in a

few minutes, but in pushing them back to Chaplin River, we discovered

the Confederates forming a line of battle on the opposite bank, with

the apparent purpose of an attack in force, so I withdrew the brigade

to our intrenchments on the crest and there awaited the assault.

While this skirmishing was going on, General Gilbert--the corps

commander--whose headquarters were located on a hill about a mile

distant to the rear, kept sending me messages by signal not to bring

on an engagement. I replied to each message that I was not bringing

on an engagement, but that the enemy evidently intended to do so, and

that I believed I should shortly be attacked. Soon after returning

to the crest and getting snugly fixed in the rifle-pits, my attention

was called to our left, the high ground we occupied affording me in

that direction an unobstructed view. I then saw General A. McD.

McCook's corps--the First-advancing toward Chaplin River by the

Mackville road, apparently unconscious that the Confederates were

present in force behind the stream. I tried by the use of signal

flags to get information of the situation to these troops, but my

efforts failed, and the leading regiments seemed to approach the

river indifferently prepared to meet the sudden attack that speedily

followed, delivered as it was from the chosen position of the enemy.

The fury of the Confederate assault soon halted this advance force,

and in a short time threw it into confusion, pushed it back a

considerable distance, and ultimately inflicted upon it such loss of

men and guns as to seriously cripple McCook's corps, and prevent for

the whole day further offensive movement on his part, though he

stoutly resisted the enemy's assaults until 4 o'clock in the

afternoon.

Seeing McCook so fiercely attacked, in order to aid him I advanced

Hescock's battery, supported by six regiments, to a very good

position in front of a belt of timber on my extreme left, where an

enfilading fire could be opened on that portion of the enemy

attacking the right of the First Corps, and also on his batteries

across Chaplin River. But at this juncture he placed two batteries

on my right and began to mass troops behind them, and General

Gilbert, fearing that my intrenched position on the heights might be

carried, directed me to withdraw Hescock and his supports and return

them to the pits. My recall was opportune, for I had no sooner got

back to my original line than the Confederates attacked me furiously,

advancing almost to my intrenchments, notwithstanding that a large

part of the ground over which they had to move was swept by a heavy

fire of canister from both my batteries. Before they had quite

reached us, however, our telling fire made them recoil, and as they

fell back, I directed an advance of my whole division, bringing up my

reserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hills; Colonel William

P. Carlin's brigade of Mitchell's division meanwhile moving forward

on my right to cover that flank. This advance pressed the enemy to

Perryville, but he retired in such good order that we gained nothing

but some favorable ground that enabled me to establish my batteries

in positions where they could again turn their attention to the

Confederates in front of McCook, whose critical condition was shortly

after relieved, however, by a united pressure of Gilbert's corps

against the flank of McCook's assailants, compelling them to retire

behind Chaplin River.

The battle virtually ended about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, though

more or less desultory firing continued until dark. Considering the

severity of the engagement on McCook's front, and the reverses that

had befallen him, I question if, from that part of the line, much

could have been done toward retrieving the blunders of the day, but

it did seem to me that, had the commander of the army been able to be

present on the field, he could have taken advantage of Bragg's final

repulse, and there would have remained in our hands more than the

barren field. But no attempt was made to do anything more till next

morning, and then we secured little except the enemy's killed and

most severely wounded.

The operations of my division during the engagement pleased. General

Gilbert very much, and he informed me that he would relax a rigidly

enforced order which General Buell had issued some days before,

sufficiently to permit my trains to come to the front and supply my

almost starving troops with rations. The order in question was one

of those issued, doubtless with a good intent, to secure generally

the safety of our trains, but General Gilbert was not elastic, and on

the march he had construed the order so illiberally that it was next

to impossible to supply the men with food, and they were particularly

short in this respect on the eve of the battle. I had then

endeavored to persuade him to modify his iron-clad interpretation of

the order, but without effect, and the only wagons we could bring up

from the general parks in rear were ambulances and those containing

ammunition. So to gain access to our trains was a great boon, and at

that moment a more welcome result than would have been a complete

victory minus this concession.

When the battle ceased General Gilbert asked me to join him at

Buell's headquarters, which were a considerable distance to the rear,

so after making some dispositions for the evening I proceeded there

as requested. I arrived just as Buell was about to sit down to his

supper, and noticing that he was lame, then learned that he had been

severely injured by a recent fall from his horse. He kindly invited

me to join him at the table, an invitation which I accepted with

alacrity, enjoying the meal with a relish known only to a very-hungry

man, for I had eaten nothing since morning. Of course the events of

the day were the chief topic of discussion--as they were during my

stay at headquarters--but the conversation indicated that what had

occurred was not fully realized, and I returned to my troops

impressed with the belief that General Buell and his staff-officers

were unconscious of the magnitude of the battle that had just been

fought.

It had been expected by Buell that he would fight the enemy on the

9th of October, but the Confederates disposed of that proposition by

attacking us on the 8th, thus disarranging a tactical conception

which, with our superior numbers, would doubtless have proved

successful had it not been anticipated by an enterprising foe.

During the battle on the 8th the Second Corps, under General Thomas

L. Crittenden, accompanied by General George H. Thomas, lay idle the

whole day for want of orders, although it was near enough to the

field to take an active part in the fight; and, moreover, a large

part of Gilbert's corps was unengaged during the pressure on McCook.

Had these troops been put in on the enemy's left at any time after he

assaulted McCook, success would have been beyond question; but there

was no one on the ground authorized to take advantage of the

situation, and the battle of Perryville remains in history an example

of lost opportunities. This was due in some measure probably to

General Buell's accident, but is mainly attributable to the fact that

he did not clearly apprehend Bragg's aim, which was to gain time to

withdraw behind Dick's River all the troops he had in Kentucky, for

the Confederate general had no idea of risking the fate of his army

on one general battle at a place or on a day to be chosen by the

Union commander.

Considering the number of troops actually engaged, the losses to

Buell were severe, amounting to something over five thousand in

killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed were two brigade

commanders of much promise--General James S. Jackson and General

William R. Terrill. McCook's corps lost twelve guns, some of which

were recovered next day. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded we

never learned, but it must have equalled ours; and about four

thousand prisoners, consisting principally of sick and wounded, fell

into our hands. In the first report of the battle sent North to the

newspapers I was reported among the killed; but I was pleased to

notice, when the papers reached us a few days later, that the error

had been corrected before my obituary could be written.

The enemy retired from our front the night of the 8th, falling back

on Harrodsburg to form a junction with Kirby Smith, and by taking

this line of retreat opened to us the road to Danville and the chance

for a direct march against his depot of supplies at Bryantsville. We

did not take advantage of this opening, however, and late in the day

--on the 9th--my division marched in pursuit, in the direction of

Harrodsburg, which was the apex of a triangle having for its base a

line from Perryville to Danville. The pursuit was slow, very slow,

consuming the evening of the 9th and all of the 10th and 11th. By

cutting across the triangle spoken of above, just south of the apex,

I struck the Harrodsburg-Danville road, near Cave Springs, joining

there Gilbert's left division, which had preceded me and marched

through Harrodsburg. Here we again rested until the intention of the

enemy could be divined, and we could learn on which side of Dick's

River he would give us battle. A reconnoissance sent toward the

Dickville crossing developed to a certainty that we should not have

another engagement, however; for it disclosed the fact that Bragg's

army had disappeared toward Camp Dick Robinson, leaving only a small

rear-guard at Danville, which in turn quickly fled in the direction

of Lancaster, after exchanging a few shots with Hescock's battery.

While this parting salute of deadly projectiles was going on, a

little, daughter of Colonel William J. Landram, whose home was in

Danville, came running out from his house and planted a small

national flag on one of Hescock's guns. The patriotic act was so

brave and touching that it thrilled all who witnessed the scene; and

until the close of the war, when peace separated the surviving

officers and men of the battery, that little flag was protected and

cherished as a memento of the Perryville campaign.

Pursuit of the enemy was not continued in force beyond Crab Orchard,

but some portions of the army kept at Bragg's heels until he crossed

the Cumberland River, a part of his troops retiring to Tennessee by

way of Cumberland Gap, but the major portion through Somerset. As

the retreat of Bragg transferred the theatre of operations back to

Tennessee, orders were now issued for a concentration of Buell's army

at Bowling Green, with a view to marching it to Nashville, and my

division moved to that point without noteworthy incident. I reached

Bowling Green with a force much reduced by the losses sustained in

the battle of Perryville and by sickness. I had started from

Louisville on October 1 with twelve regiments of infantry--four old

and eight new ones--and two batteries, but many poor fellows,

overcome by fatigue, and diseases induced by the heat, dust, and

drought of the season, had to be left at roadside hospitals. This

was particularly the case with the new regiments, the men of which,

much depressed by homesickness, and not yet inured to campaigning,

fell easy victims to the hardships of war.

At Bowling Green General Buell was relieved, General W. S. Rosecrans

succeeding him. The army as a whole did not manifest much regret at

the change of commanders, for the campaign from Louisville on was

looked upon generally as a lamentable failure, yet there were many

who still had the utmost confidence in General Buell, and they

repelled with some asperity the reflections cast upon him by his

critics. These admirers held him blameless throughout for the

blunders of the campaign, but the greater number laid every error at

his door, and even went to the absurdity of challenging his loyalty

in a mild way, but they particularly charged incompetency at

Perryville, where McCook's corps was so badly crippled while nearly

30,000 Union troops were idle on the field, or within striking

distance. With these it was no use to argue that Buell's accident

stood in the way of his activity, nor that he did not know that the

action had assumed the proportions of a battle. The physical

disability was denied or contested, but even granting this, his

detractors claimed that it did not excuse his ignorance of the true

condition of the fight, and finally worsted his champions by pointing

out that Bragg's retreat by way of Harrodsburg beyond Dick's River so

jeopardized the Confederate army, that had a skillful and energetic

advance of the Union troops been made, instead of wasting precious

time in slow and unnecessary tactical manoeuvres, the enemy could

have been destroyed before he could quit the State of Kentucky.

CHAPTER XII.

MOVING TO BOWLING GREEN--JAMES CARD, THE SCOUT AND GUIDE--GENERAL

SILL--COLONEL SCHAEFER--COLONEL G. W. ROBERTS--MOVEMENT ON

MURFREESBORO'--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.

My division had moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green by easy

marches, reaching this place November 1. General Rosecrans assumed

command of the department October 30, at Louisville, and joined the

army November 2. There had been much pressure brought to bear on

General Buell to induce him to take measures looking to the occupancy

of East Tennessee, and the clamor to this end from Washington still

continued; but now that Bragg was south of the Cumberland River, in a

position threatening Nashville, which was garrisoned by but a small

force, it was apparent to every one at all conversant with the

situation that a battle would have to be fought somewhere in Middle

Tennessee. So, notwithstanding the pressure from Washington, the

army was soon put in motion for Nashville, and when we arrived there

my division went into camp north of the river, on a plateau just

outside the little town of Edgefield, until the movements of the

enemy should be further developed.

While in this camp, on the plantation of Mr. Hobson, there came to my

headquarters one morning an East Tennessean named James Card, who

offered to the Union cause his services in any capacity in which they

might be made useful. This offer, and the relation of his personal

history, were given with such sincerity of speech and manner that in

a short time I became convinced of his honesty of purpose. He was a

small, active, busy man, with a determined way about him, and his

countenance indicated great intelligence. He gave minute information

that was of inestimable value to me regarding East and Middle

Tennessee and northern Georgia, for, with a view to the army's future

movements, I was then making a study of the topography of this

region, and posting myself as to Middle Tennessee, for all knew this

would be the scene of active operations whenever the campaign was

resumed. This man, like most of the East Tennesseans whom I had met,

was intensely loyal and patriotic, and the interview led in a few

days to his employment as a scout and guide, and subsequently to the

engaging in the same capacity of two of his brothers, who were good

men; but not quite as active nor so intelligent as he was. Card had

been a colporter, having pedled books, especially religious tracts,

over all Middle and East Tennessee and Georgia, assisted by his

brothers at times, and was therefore thoroughly familiar with these

regions, their roads and inhabitants. He also preached to country

congregations occasionally, when ministers were scarce, and I have no

doubt often performed the functions of family physician in the

mountain district. Thus his opportunities were great; and the loyal

people in every section of the country being well known to him and

his brothers, the three began, at this time, a system of scouting and

investigation which bore its first-fruits in specifically locating

the different divisions of Bragg's army, with statements of their

strength and condition, and all with so much accuracy that I

thereafter felt reasonably sure that I could at all times procure

such knowledge of the enemy's operations as would well equip me for

any contingency that might arise.

By the middle of November the enemy, having assembled his forces in

Middle Tennessee, showed considerable boldness, and it became

necessary to rearrange the Union lines; so my troops were moved to

the south side of the river, out on the Murfreesboro' pike, to Mill

Creek, distant from Nashville about seven miles. While we were in

camp on Mill Creek the army was reorganized, and General Joshua W.

Sill, at his own request, was assigned to my division, and took

command of Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade. My division became at

the same time the Third Division, Right Wing, Fourteenth Army Corps,

its three brigades of four regiments each being respectively

commanded by General Sill, Colonel Frederick Schaefer and Colonel Dan

McCook; but a few days later Colonel George W. Roberts's brigade,

from the garrison at Nashville, was substituted for McCook's.

General Sill was a classmate of mine at the Military Academy, having

graduated in 1853. On graduating he was appointed to the Ordnance

Corps, and served in that department at various arsenals and ordnance

depots throughout the country till early in 1861, when he resigned to

accept a professorship of mathematics and civil engineering at the

Brooklyn Collegiate and Polytechnic Institute. At the breaking out

of the war he immediately tendered his services to the Government,

and soon rose to the colonelcy of the Thirty-Third Ohio Volunteers,

and afterward to the rank of brigadier-general. I knew him well, and

was glad that he came to my division, though I was very loth to

relieve Colonel Greusel, of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois, who had

already indicated much military skill and bravery, and at the battle

of Perryville had handled his men with the experience of a veteran.

Sill's modesty and courage were exceeded only by a capacity that had

already been demonstrated in many practical ways, and his untimely

death, almost within a month of his joining me, abruptly closed a

career which, had it been prolonged a little more, not only would

have shed additional lustre on his name, but would have been of

marked benefit to his country.

Colonel Schaefer, of the Second Missouri Infantry, had been absent on

sick-leave during the Kentucky campaign, but about this date he

returned to duty, and by seniority fell in command of the second

brigade. He was of German birth, having come from Baden, where,

prior to 1848, he had been a non-commissioned officer in the service

of his State. He took part as an insurgent in the so-called

revolution which occurred at Baden in that year, and, compelled to

emigrate on the suppression of the insurrection, made his way to this

country and settled in St. Louis. Here the breaking out of the war

found him, and through the personal interest which General Sigel took

in him he was commissioned a colonel of volunteers. He had had a

pretty fair education, a taste for the military profession, and was

of tall and slender build, all of which gave him a student-like

appearance. He was extremely excitable and nervous when anticipating

a crisis, but always calmed down to cool deliberation when the

critical moment came. With such a man I could not be less than well

satisfied, although the officer whom he replaced--Colonel Laiboldt

--had performed efficient service and shown much capacity in the

recent campaign.

Colonel G. W. Roberts, of the Forty-Second Illinois Infantry, also

came to me in the reorganization. He was an ideal soldier both in

mind and body. He was young, tall, handsome, brave, and dashing, and

possessed a balance-wheel of such good judgment that in his sphere of

action no occasion could arise from which he would not reap the best

results. But he too was destined to lay, down his life within a few

days, and on the same fatal field. His brigade had been performing

garrison duty in Nashville during the siege of that city while

Buell's army was in Kentucky, but disliking the prospect of

inactivity pending the operations opening before us, Roberts had

requested and obtained a transfer to the army in the field. His

brigade relieved Colonel Dan McCook's, the latter reluctantly joining

the garrison at Nashville, every one in it disappointed and disgusted

that the circumstances existing at this time should necessitate their

relegation to the harassing and tantalizing duty of protecting our

depots and line of supply.

I was fortunate in having such brigade commanders, and no less

favored in the regimental and battery commanders. They all were not

only patriots, but soldiers, and knowing that discipline must be one

of the most potent factors in bringing to a successful termination,

the mighty contest in which our nation was struggling for existence,

they studied and practiced its methods ceaselessly, inspiring with

the same spirit that pervaded themselves the loyal hearts of their

subordinate officers and men. All worked unremittingly in the camp

at Mill Creek in preparing for the storm, which now plainly indicated

its speedy coming. Drills, parades, scouts, foraging expeditions,

picket and guard duty, made up the course in this school of

instruction, supplemented by frequent changes in the locations of the

different brigades, so that the division could have opportunity to

learn to break camp quickly and to move out promptly on the march.

Foraging expeditions were particularly beneficial in this respect,

and when sent out, though absent sometimes for days, the men went

without tents or knapsacks, equipped with only one blanket and their

arms, ammunition, and rations, to teach them to shift for themselves

with slender means in the event of necessity. The number of

regimental and headquarters wagons was cut down to the lowest

possible figure, and everything made compact by turning into the

supply and ammunition trains of the division all surplus

transportation, and restricting the personal baggage of officers to

the fewest effects possible.

My own staff also was somewhat reorganized and increased at Mill

Creek, and though it had been perfectly satisfactory before, yet, on

account of the changes of troops that had occurred in the command, I

found it necessary to replace valuable officers in some instances,

and secure additional ones in others. The gathering of information

about the enemy was also industriously pursued, and Card and his

brothers were used constantly on expeditions within the Confederate

lines, frequently visiting Murfreesboro', Sparta, Tullahoma,

Shelbyville, and other points. What they learned was reported to

army headquarters, often orally through me or personally communicated

by Card himself, but much was forwarded in official letters,

beginning with November 24, when I transmitted accurate information

of the concentration of Bragg's main force at Tullahoma. Indeed,

Card kept me so well posted as to every movement of the enemy, not

only with reference to the troops in my immediate front, but also

throughout his whole army, that General Rosecrans placed the most

unreserved reliance on all his statements, and many times used them

to check and correct the reports brought in by his own scouts.

Slight skirmishes took place frequently during this period, and now

and then heavy demonstrations were made in the neighborhood of

Nolensville by reconnoitring parties from both armies, but none of

these ever grew into a battle. These affairs sprung from the desire

of each side to feel his antagonist, and had little result beyond

emphasizing the fact that behind each line of pickets lay a massed

and powerful army busily preparing for the inevitable conflict and

eager for its opening. So it wore on till the evening of December

25, 1862; then came the order to move forward.

General Rosecrans, in the reorganization of the army, had assigned

Major-General A. McD. McCook to command the right wing, Major-General

George H. Thomas the centre, and Major-General T. L. Crittenden the

left wing. McCook's wing was made up of three divisions,

commanded in order of rank by Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis;

Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan.

Although the corps nomenclature established by General Buell was

dropped, the grand divisions into which he had organized the army at

Louisville were maintained, and, in fact, the conditions established

then remained practically unaltered, with the exception of the

interchange of some brigades, the transfer of a few general officers

from one wing or division to another, and the substitution of General

Thomas for Gilbert as a corps commander. The army was thus compact

and cohesive, undisturbed by discord and unembarrassed by jealousies

of any moment; and it may be said that under a commander who, we

believed, had the energy and skill necessary to direct us to success,

a national confidence in our invincibility made us all keen for a

test of strength with the Confederates. We had not long to wait.

Early on the morning of December 26, 1862, in a heavy rain, the army

marched, the movement being directed on Murfreesboro', where the

enemy had made some preparation to go into winter-quarters, and to

hold which town it was hoped he would accept battle. General Thomas

moved by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, General Crittenden by the

Murfreesboro' pike, through Lavergne, and General McCook by the

Nolensville pike--Davis's division in advance. As McCook's command

neared Nolensville, I received a message from Davis informing me that

the Confederates were in considerable force, posted on a range of

hills in his front, and requesting me to support him in an attack he

was about to make. When the head of my column arrived at Nolensville

I began massing my troops on the right of the road, and by the time

this formation was nearly completed Davis advanced, but not meeting

with sufficient resistance to demand active assistance from me, he

with his own command carried the hills, capturing one piece of

artillery. This position of the Confederates was a strong one,

defending Knob's Gap, through which the Nolensville and Triune pike

passed. On the 27th Johnson's division, followed by mine, advanced

to Triune, and engaged in a severe skirmish near that place, but my

troops were not called into action, the stand made by the enemy being

only for the purpose of gaining time to draw in his outlying troops,

which done, he retired toward Murfreesboro'. I remained inactive at

Triune during the 28th, but early on the 29th moved out by the Bole

Jack road to the support of, Davis in his advance to Stewart's Creek,

and encamped at Wilkinson's crossroads, from which point to

Murfreesboro', distant about six miles, there was a good turnpike.

The enemy had sullenly resisted the progress of Crittenden and McCook

throughout the preceding three days, and as it was thought probable

that he might offer battle at Stewart's Creek, Thomas, in pursuance

of his original instructions looking to just such a contingency, had

now fallen into the centre by way of the Nolensville crossroads.

On the morning of the 30th I had the advance of McCook's corps on the

Wilkinson pike, Roberts's brigade leading. At first only slight

skirmishing took place, but when we came within about three miles of

Murfreesboro' the resistance of the enemy's pickets grew serious, and

a little further on so strong that I had to put in two regiments to

push them back. I succeeded in driving them about half a mile, when

I was directed by McCook to form line of battle and place my

artillery in position so that I could act in concert with Davis's

division, which he wished to post on my right in the general line he

desired to take up. In obedience to these directions I deployed on

the right of, and oblique to the Wilkinson pike, with a front of four

regiments, a second line of four regiments within short supporting

distance, and a reserve of one brigade in column of regiments to the

rear of my centre. All this time the enemy kept up a heavy artillery

and musketry fire on my skirmishers, he occupying, with his

sharpshooters, beyond some open fields, a heavy belt of timber to my

front and right, where it was intended the left of Davis should

finally rest. To gain this point Davis was ordered to swing his

division into it in conjunction with a wheeling movement of my right

brigade, until our continuous line should face nearly due east. This

would give us possession of the timber referred to, and not only rid

us of the annoying fire from the skirmishers screened by it, but also

place us close in to what was now developing as Bragg's line of

battle. The movement was begun about half-past 2, and was

successfully executed, after a stubborn resistance. In this

preliminary affair the enemy had put in one battery of artillery,

which was silenced in a little while, however, by Bush's and

Hescock's guns. By sundown I had taken up my prescribed position,

facing almost east, my left (Roberts's brigade) resting on the

Wilkinson pike, the right (Sill's brigade) in the timber we had just

gained, and the reserve brigade (Schaefer's) to the rear of my

centre, on some rising ground in the edge of a strip of woods behind

Houghtaling's and Hescock's batteries. Davis's division was placed

in position on my right, his troops thrown somewhat to the rear, so

that his line formed nearly a right angle with mine, while Johnson's

division formed in a very exposed position on the right of Davis,

prolonging the general line just across the Franklin pike.

The centre, under Thomas, had already formed to my left, the right of

Negley's division joining my left in a cedar thicket near the

Wilkinson pike, while Crittenden's corps was posted on the left of

Thomas, his left resting on Stone River, at a point about two miles

and a half from Murfreesboro'.

The precision that had characterized every manoeuvre of the past

three days, and the exactness with which each corps and division fell

into its allotted place on the evening of the 30th, indicated that at

the outset of the campaign a well-digested plan of operations had

been prepared for us; and although the scheme of the expected battle

was not known to subordinates of my grade, yet all the movements up

to this time had been so successfully and accurately made as to give

much promise for the morrow, and when night fell there was general

anticipation of the best results to the Union army.

CHAPTER XIII.

ASSAULT ON OUR RIGHT FLANK--OCCUPYING A NEW POSITION--THE ENEMY

CHECKED--TERRIBLE LOSS OF OFFICERS--AMMUNITION GIVES OUT

--RECONSTRUCTING THE LINE--COLLECTING THE WOUNDED AND BURYING

THE DEAD--DEALING WITH COWARDS--RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.

The enemy under Bragg lay between us and stone River in order of

battle, his general line conforming to the course of that stream. In

my immediate front he appeared to be established in strong force in a

dense cedar wood, just beyond an open valley, which varied from two

hundred to four hundred yards in width, the cedars extending the

entire length of the valley. From the events of the day and evening

of the 3oth, it was apparent that the two armies were in close

proximity, and orders received during the night revealed the fact

that Rosecrans intended to attack by throwing his left on the enemy's

right, with the expectation of driving it in toward Murfreesboro', so

that the right of Crittenden's corps could attack Bragg's centre in

reverse, while Thomas supported Crittenden by a simultaneous front

assault; and from the movements of the enemy at daylight next

morning, it was plainly indicated that Bragg had planned to swing his

left on our right by an exactly similar manoeuvre, get possession of

the railroad and the Nashville pike, and if possible cut us off from

our base at Nashville. The conceptions in the minds of the two

generals were almost identical; but Bragg took the initiative,

beginning his movement about an hour earlier than the time set by

Rosecrans, which gained him an immense advantage in execution in the

earlier stages of the action.

During the evening, feeling keenly all the solicitude which

attends one in anticipation of a battle, I examined my position with

great care, inspecting its whole length several times to remedy any

defects that might exist, and to let the men see that I was alive to

their interests and advantages. After dark, I went back to the rear

of my reserve brigade, and establishing my headquarters behind the

trunk of a large fallen tree, which would shelter me somewhat from

the cold December wind, lay down beside a small camp-fire to get some

rest.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st General Sill came back to me

to report that on his front a continuous movement of infantry and

artillery had been going on all night within the Confederate lines,

and that he was convinced that Bragg was massing on our right with

the purpose of making an attack from that direction early in the

morning. After discussing for a few minutes the probabilities of

such a course on the part of the enemy, I thought McCook should be

made acquainted with what was going on, so Sill and I went back to

see him at his headquarters, not far from the Griscom House, where we

found him sleeping on some straw in the angle of a worm-fence. I

waked him up and communicated the intelligence, and our consequent

impressions. He talked the matter over with us for some little time,

but in view of the offensive-defensive part he was to play in the

coming battle, did not seem to think that there was a necessity for

any further dispositions than had already been taken. He said that

he thought Johnson's division would be able to take care of the

right, and seemed confident that the early assault which was to be

made from Rosecrans's left would anticipate and check the designs

which we presaged. We two then returned to my little camp-fire

behind the log, and as we continued talking of what might be expected

from the indications on the right, and Sill becoming more anxious, I

directed two regiments from the reserve to report to him, that they

might be placed within very short supporting distance of his line.

He then rejoined his brigade, better satisfied, but still adhering to

the belief he had expressed when first making his report.

Long before dawn my division breakfasted, and was assembled under

arms, the infantry in line, the cannoneers at their pieces, but while

we were thus preparing, all the recent signs of activity in the

enemy's camp were hushed, a death-like stillness prevailing in the

cedars to our front. Shortly after daylight General Hardee opened

the engagement, just as Sill had predicted, by a fierce attack on

Johnson's division, the extreme right of the Union line. Immediate

success attending this assault, Hardee extended the attack gradually

along in front of Davis, hip movement taking the form of a wheel to

the right, the pivot being nearly opposite the left of my division.

Johnson's division soon gave way, and two of Davis's brigades were

forced to fall back with it, though stubbornly resisting the

determined and sweeping onset.

In the meantime the enemy had also attacked me, advancing across an

old cotton-field in Sill's front in heavy masses, which were

furiously opened upon by Bush's battery from Sill's line, and by

Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire on

the field from a commanding position in rear of my centre. The

effect of this fire on the advancing column was terrible, but it

continued on till it reached the edge of the timber where Sill's

right lay, when my infantry opened at a range of not over fifty

yards. For a short time the Confederates withstood the fire, but

then wavered, broke, and fell back toward their original line. As

they retired, Sill's brigade followed in a spirited charge, driving

them back across the open ground and behind their intrenchments. In

this charge the gallant Sill was killed; a rifle ball passing through

his upper lip and penetrating the brain. Although this was a heavy

loss, yet the enemy's discomfiture was such as to give us an hour's

time, and as Colonel Greusel, Thirty-sixth Illinois, succeeded to

Sill's command, I directed him, as he took charge, to recall the

brigade to its original position, for the turning-column on my

extreme right was now assuming the most menacing attitude, and it was

urgently necessary to prepare for it.

When that portion of the enemy driven back by Sill recovered from its

repulse it again advanced to the attack, this time directing its

efforts chiefly upon my extreme right, and the front of Woodruff's

brigade of Davis's division, which brigade still held on in its first

position. In front of my centre the Confederates were again driven

back, but as the assault on Woodruff was in conjunction with an

advance of the column that had forced Johnson to retire, Woodruff was

compelled unfortunately to give way, and two regiments on the right

of my line went with him, till they rallied on the two reserve

regiments which, in anticipation of the enemy's initiatory attack I

had sent to Sill's rear before daylight.

Both Johnson's and Davis's divisions were now practically gone from

our line, having retired with a loss of all formation, and they were

being closely pursued by the enemy, whose columns were following the

arc of a circle that would ultimately carry him in on my rear. In

consequence of the fact that this state of things would soon subject

me to a fire in reverse, I hastily withdrew Sill's brigade and the

reserve regiments supporting it, and ordered Roberts's brigade, which

at the close of the enemy's second repulse had changed front toward

the south and formed in column of regiments, to cover the withdrawal

by a charge on the Confederates as they came into the timber where my

right had originally rested. Roberts made the charge at the proper

time, and was successful in checking the enemy's advance, thus giving

us a breathing-spell, during which I was able to take up a new

position with Schaefer's and Sill's brigades on the commanding ground

to the rear, where Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries had been

posted all the morning.

The general course of this new position was at right angles with my

original line, and it took the shape of an obtuse angle, with my

three batteries at the apex. Davis, and Carlin of his division,

endeavored to rally their men here on my right, but their efforts

were practically unavailing,--though the calm and cool appearance of

Carlin, who at the time was smoking a stumpy pipe, had some effect,

and was in strong contrast to the excited manner of Davis, who seemed

overpowered by the disaster that had befallen his command. But few

could be rallied, however, as the men were badly demoralized, and

most of them fell back beyond the Wilkinson pike, where they

reorganized behind the troops of General Thomas.

At this juncture the enemy's turning-column began advancing again in

concert with Cheatham's division, and as the extreme left of the

Confederates was directed on Griscom's house, and their right on the

Blanton house, my new position was in danger of envelopment. No hope

of stemming the tide at this point seemed probable, but to gain time

I retained my ground as long as possible, and until, under directions

from General McCook, I moved to the front from my left flank and

attached myself to the right of Negley's division, which up to this

hour had been left almost undisturbed by the enemy in the line it had

taken up the night before. Under a heavy fire we succeeded in this

manoeuvre, Schaefer's brigade marching first, then the batteries, and

Roberts's and Sill's brigades following. When my division arrived on

this new ground, I posted Roberts on Negley's right, with Hescock's

and Bush's guns, the brigade and guns occupying a low rocky ridge of

limestone, which faced them toward Murfreesboro', nearly south. The

rest of my division was aligned facing west, along the edge of a

cedar thicket, the rear rank backed up on the right flank of Roberts,

with Houghtaling's battery in the angle. This presented Sill's and

Schaefer's brigades in an almost opposite direction to the line we

had so confidently taken up the night before, and covered Negley's

rear. The enemy, in the meantime, had continued his wheeling

movement till he occupied the ground that my batteries and reserve

brigade had held in the morning, and I had now so changed my position

that the left brigade of my division approached his intrenchments in

front of Stone River, while Sill's and Schaeffer's brigades, by

facing nearly west, confronted the successful troops that had smashed

in our extreme right.

I had hardly got straightened out in this last place when I was

attacked by Cheatham's'division, which, notwithstanding the

staggering blows it had previously received from Sill and Roberts,

now again moved forward in conjunction with the wheeling movement

under the immediate command of Hardee. One of the most sanguinary

contests of the day now took place. In fulfillment of Bragg's

original design no doubt, Cheatham's division attacked on my left,

while heavy masses under Hardee, covered by batteries posted on the

high ground formerly occupied by my guns, assaulted my right, the

whole force advancing simultaneously. At the same time the enemy

opened an artillery fire from his intrenchments in front of

Murfreesboro', and it seemed that he was present on every side. My

position was strong, however, located in the edge of a dense cedar

thicket and commanding a slight depression of open ground that lay in

my front. My men were in good spirits too, notwithstanding they had

been a good deal hustled around since daylight, with losses that had

told considerably on their numbers. Only a short distance now

separated the contending lines, and as the batteries on each side

were not much more than two hundred yards apart when the enemy made

his assault, the artillery fire was fearful in its effect on the

ranks of both contestants, the enemy's heavy masses staggering under

the torrent of shell and canister from our batteries, while our lines

were thinned by his ricochetting projectiles, that rebounded again

and again over the thinly covered limestone formation and sped on to

the rear of Negley. But all his efforts to dislodge or destroy us

were futile, and for the first time since daylight General Hardee was

seriously checked in the turning movement he had begun for the

purpose of getting possession of the Nashville pike, and though

reinforced until two-fifths of Bragg's army was now at his command,

yet he met with repulse after repulse, which created great gaps in

his lines and taught him that to overwhelm us was hopeless.

As the enemy was recoiling from his first attack, I received a

message from Rosecrans telling me that he was making new

dispositions, and directing me to hold on where I was until they were

completed. From this I judged that the existing conditions of the

battle would probably require a sacrifice of my command, so I

informed Roberts and Schaefer that we must be prepared to meet the

demand on us by withstanding the assault of the enemy, no matter what

the outcome. Every energy was therefore bent to the simple holding

of our ground, and as ammunition was getting scarce, instructions

were given throughout the command to have it reserve its fire till

the most effective moment. In a little while came a second and a

third assault, and although they were as daring and furious as the

first, yet in each case the Confederates were repulsed, driven back

in confusion, but not without deadly loss to us, for the noble

Roberts was killed, and Colonel Harrington, of the Twenty-Seventh

Illinois, who succeeded to his brigade, was mortally wounded a few

minutes later. I had now on the death-roll three brigade commanders,

and the loss of subordinate officers and men was appalling, but their

sacrifice had accomplished the desired result; they had not fallen in

vain. Indeed, the bravery and tenacity of my division gave to

Rosecrans the time required to make new dispositions, and exacted

from our foes the highest commendations.

A lull followed the third fierce assault, and an investigation showed

that, with the exception of a few rounds in my brigade, our

ammunition was entirely exhausted; and while it was apparent that the

enemy was reluctant to renew the conflict in my front, yet I was

satisfied I could not hold on much longer without the danger of

ultimate capture, so I prepared to withdraw as soon as the troops of

Rousseau's division, which had been ordered to take up a line on my

right, came into position. Schaefer's and Sill's brigades being

without a cartridge, I directed them to fix bayonets for a charge,

and await any attempt of the enemy to embarrass my retreat, while

Roberts's brigade, offering such resistance as its small quantity of

ammunition would permit, was pulled slowly in toward the Nashville

pike. Eighty of the horses of Houghtaling's battery having been

killed, an attempt was made to bring his guns back by hand over the

rocky ground, but it could not be done, and we had to abandon them.

Hescock also had lost most of his horses, but all his guns were

saved. Bush's battery lost two pieces, the tangled underbrush in the

dense cedars proving an obstacle to getting them away which his

almost superhuman exertions could not surmount. Thus far the bloody

duel had cost me heavily, one-third of my division being killed or

wounded. I had already three brigade commanders killed; a little

later I lost my fourth--Colonel Schaefer.

The difficulties of withdrawing were very great, as the ground was

exceptionally rocky, and the growth of cedars almost impenetrable for

wheeled carriages. Retiring sullenly under a heavy fire, while the

general line was reformed to my right and rear, my division was at

length drawn through the cedars and debouched into an open space near

the Murfreesboro' pike, behind the right of Palmer's division. Two

regiments of Sill's brigade, however, on account of the conformation

of the ground, were obliged to fall back from the point where

Woodruff's brigade of Davis's division had rallied after the disaster

of the early morning. The division came out of the cedars with

unbroken ranks, thinned by only its killed and wounded--but few

missing. When we came into the open ground, McCook directed

Roberts's brigade--now commanded by Colonel Luther P. Bradley--to

proceed a short distance to the rear on the Nashville pike, to repel

the enemy's threatening attempt at our communications. Willingly and

cheerfully the brigade again entered the fight under these new

conditions, and although it was supplied with but three or four

cartridges to the man now, it charged gallantly and recaptured two

pieces of artillery which the Union troops had had to abandon at that

point.

Shortly after we debouched from the cedars I was directed by

Rosecrans to send some aid to the right of General Palmer's division;

and two of Schaefer's regiments, having obtained ammunition, were

pushed up on Palmer's right, accompanied by four of Hescock's guns;

but the advance of the enemy here had already been checked by Palmer,

and only a desultory contest ensued. Rosecrans, whom I now met in

the open ground west of the railroad, behind Palmer, directed that my

command should relieve Wood's division, which was required to fall

back and take up the new line that had been marked out while I was

holding on in the cedars. His usually florid face had lost its ruddy

color, and his anxious eyes told that the disasters of the morning

were testing his powers to the very verge of endurance, but he seemed

fully to comprehend what had befallen us. His firmly set lips and,

the calmness with which his instructions were delivered inspired

confidence in all around him; and expressing approbation of what my

division had done, while deliberately directing it to a new point, he

renewed in us all the hope of final victory, though it must be

admitted that at this phase of the battle the chances lay largely

with the enemy.

Withdrawing the two regiments and Hescock's battery, that I had

posted on the right of Palmer, I moved as directed by Rosecrans into

the position to the east of the railroad, and formed immediately to

the right of Wood, who was now being attacked all along his front,

but more particularly where his right rested near the railroad.

Under a storm of shot and shell that came in torrents my troops took

up the new ground, advancing through a clump of open timber to Wood's

assistance. Forming in line in front of the timber we poured a

telling fire into the enemy's ranks, which were then attacking across

some cleared fields; but when he discovered additional troops

confronting him, he gave up the attempt to carry Wood's position. It

was here that I lost Schaefer, who was killed instantly, making my

fourth brigade commander dead that day. The enemy in front of Wood

having been checked, our whole line east of the railroad executed

undisturbed its retrograde movement to a position about three hundred

yards to its rear. When I fell back to the edge of the clump of

timber, where when first coming on the ground I had formed to help

Wood, I was ordered by Rosecrans to prepare to make a charge should

the enemy again assault us. In anticipation of this work I massed my

troops in close column. The expected attack never came, however, but

the shot and shell of a furious cannonade told with fatal effect upon

men and officers as they lay on their faces hugging the ground. The

torments of this trying situation were almost unbearable, but it was

obvious to all that it was necessary to have at hand a compact body

of troops to repel any assault the enemy might make pending the

reconstruction of the extreme right of our line, and a silent

determination to stay seemed to take hold of each individual soldier;

nor was this grim silence interrupted throughout the cannonade,

except in one instance, when one of the regiments broke out in a

lusty cheer as a startled rabbit in search of a new hiding-place

safely ran the whole length of the line on the backs of the men.

While my troops were still lying here, General Rosecrans, with a part

of his staff and a few orderlies, rode out on the rearranged line to

supervise its formation and encourage the men, and in prosecution of

these objects moved around the front of my column of attack, within

range of the batteries that were shelling us so viciously. As he

passed to the open ground on my left, I joined him. The enemy seeing

this mounted party, turned his guns upon it, and his accurate aim was

soon rewarded, for a solid shot carried away the head of Colonel

Garesche, the chief-of-staff, and killed or wounded two or three

orderlies. Garesche's appalling death stunned us all, and a

momentary expression of horror spread over Rosecrans's face; but at

such a time the importance of self-control was vital, and he pursued

his course with an appearance of indifference, which, however, those

immediately about him saw was assumed, for undoubtedly he felt most

deeply the death of his friend and trusted staff-officer.

No other attacks were made on us to the east of the railroad for the

rest of the afternoon, and just before dark I was directed to

withdraw and take up a position along the west side of the Nashville

pike, on the extreme right of our new line, where Roberts's brigade

and the Seventy-third and Eighty-eighth Illinois had already been

placed by McCook. The day had cost me much anxiety and sadness, and

I was sorely disappointed at the general result, though I could not

be other than pleased at the part taken by my command. The loss of

my brigade commanders--Sill, Roberts, Schaefer, and Harrington-and a

large number of regimental and battery officers, with so many of

their men, struck deep into my heart: My thinned ranks told the

woeful tale of the fierce struggles, indescribable by words, through

which my division had passed since 7 o'clock in the morning; and

this, added to our hungry and exhausted condition, was naturally

disheartening. The men had been made veterans, however, by the

fortunes and misfortunes of the day, and as they went into their new

places still confident of final success, it was plain to see that

they felt a self-confidence inspired by the part they had already

played.

My headquarters were now established on the Nashville pike, about

three miles and a half from Murfreesboro'; my division being aligned

to the west of the pike, bowed out and facing almost west, Cleburn's

division of the Confederates confronting it. Davis's division was

posted on my right, and Walker's brigade of Thomas's corps, which had

reported to me, took up a line that connected my left with Johnson's

division.

Late in the evening General Rosecrans, accompanied by General McCook,

and several other officers whose names I am now unable to recall,

rode by my headquarters on their way to the rear to look for a new

line of battle--on Overall's creek it was said--that would preserve

our communications with Nashville and offer better facilities for

resistance than the one we were now holding. Considerable time had

elapsed when they returned from this exploration and proceeded to

their respective commands, without intimating to me that anything had

been determined upon by the reconnoissance, but a little later it was

rumored through the different headquarters that while the party was

looking for a new position it discovered the enemy's troops moving

toward our right and rear, the head of his columns being conducted in

the darkness by the aid of torches, and that no alternative was left

us but to hold the lines we then occupied. The torches had been seen

unquestionably, and possibly created some alarm at first in the minds

of the reconnoitring party, but it was soon ascertained that the

lights came from a battalion of the Fourth regular cavalry that was

picketing our flank and happened to be starting its bivouac fires at

the moment. The fires and the supposed movements had no weight,

therefore, in deciding the proposition to take up a line at Overall's

creek, but General Rosecrans, fortunately for the army, decided to

remain where he was. Doubtless reflections during his ride caused

him to realize that the enemy must be quite as much crippled as

himself. If it had been decided to fall back to Overall's creek, we

could have withdrawn without much difficulty very likely, but such a

retrograde movement would have left to the enemy the entire

battle-field of Stone River and ultimately compelled our retreat

to Nashville.

In the night of December 3rd several slight demonstrations were made

on my front, but from the darkness neither party felt the effect of

the other's fire, and when daylight came again the skirmishers and

lines of battle were in about the same position they had taken up the

evening before. Soon after daybreak it became evident that the

conflict was to be renewed, and a little later the enemy resumed the

offensive by an attack along my left front, especially on Walker's

brigade. His attempt was ineffectual, however, and so easily

repulsed as to demonstrate that the desperate character of his

assaults the day before had nearly exhausted his strength. About 3

o'clock in the afternoon he made another feeble charge on my front,

but our fire from the barricades and rifle-pits soon demoralized his

advancing lines, which fell back in some confusion, thus enabling us

to pick up about a hundred prisoners. From this time till the

evening of January 3 Bragg's left remained in our front, and

continued to show itself at intervals by weak demonstrations, which

we afterward ascertained were directly intended to cover the

desperate assault he made with Breckenridge on the left of Rosecrans,

an assault that really had in view only a defensive purpose, for

unless Bragg dislodged the troops which were now massing in front of

his right he would be obliged to withdraw General Polk's corps behind

Stone River and finally abandon Murfreesboro'. The sequel proved

this to be the case; and the ill-judged assault led by Breckenridge

ending in entire defeat, Bragg retired from Murfreesboro' the night

of January 3.

General Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro' on the 4th and 5th, having

gained a costly victory, which was not decisive enough in its

character to greatly affect the general course of the war, though it

somewhat strengthened and increased our hold on Middle Tennessee.

The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far--only behind Duck

River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma--and but little endeavor was made

to follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even if

it had been the intention at the outset of the campaign.

As soon as possible after the Confederate retreat I went over the

battle-field to collect such of my wounded as had not been carried

off to the South and to bury my dead. In the cedars and on the

ground where I had been so fiercely assaulted when the battle opened,

on the morning of the 31st, evidences of the bloody struggle appeared

on every hand in the form of broken fire-arms, fragments of

accoutrements, and splintered trees. The dead had nearly all been

left unburied, but as there was likelihood of their mutilation by

roving swine, the bodies had mostly been collected in piles at

different points and inclosed by rail fences. The sad duties of

interment and of caring for the wounded were completed by the 5th,

and on the 6th I moved my division three miles, south of

Murfreesboro' on the Shelbyville pike, going into camp on the banks

of Stone River. Here the condition of my command was thoroughly

looked into, and an endeavor made to correct such defects as had been

disclosed by the recent battle.

During the engagement there had been little straggling, and my list

of missing was small and legitimate; still, it was known that a very

few had shirked their duty, and an example was necessary. Among this

small number were four officers who, it was charged, had abandoned

their colors and regiments. When their guilt was clearly

established, and as soon as an opportunity occurred, I caused the

whole division to be formed in a hollow square, closed in mass, and

had the four officers marched to the centre, where, telling them that

I would not humiliate any officer or soldier by requiring him to

touch their disgraced swords, I compelled them to deliver theirs up

to my colored servant, who also cut from their coats every insignia

of rank. Then, after there had been read to the command an order

from army headquarters dismissing the four from the service, the

scene was brought to a close by drumming the cowards out of camp. It

was a mortifying spectacle, but from that day no officer in that

division ever abandoned his colors.