"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.

When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as

you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to

Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.

You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to

Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be

brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard

from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet

brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,

was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from

those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was

there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely

to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,

arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to

the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,

when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under

cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the

morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without

loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred

yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and

turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from

the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the

work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of

the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was

captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by

the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important

successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten;

wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the 17th the

enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's

Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire

control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and

Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and

North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force

which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,

I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's

surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other

movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,

not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for

orders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was

assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General

Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This

direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps

reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to

Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send General

A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General

Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its

destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,

and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders

of Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- * * * Your movements are intended as co-operative

with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The

first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will

then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,

or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',

you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place

with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind

you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give

General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,

to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon,

therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or

New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,

you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage

for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of

these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior

as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received

some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing

supplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken, and be

governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores

will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments

in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every

opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a

special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by

telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those

required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative

duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid

Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting

for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing.

The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to

you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already

fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be

looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to

the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be

supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already

been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a

day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,

accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself

the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry

and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army

entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the

Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to

re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture

of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the

rebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that

after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to

include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point

with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and

utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the

great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over

two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might

not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from

where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views

as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a

communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging

the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations

to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also

that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to

Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;

but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of

Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of

January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to

march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my

letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make

preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the

railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating

against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the

23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered

about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight

thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was

captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to

New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points

would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his

movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run

out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came

into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce

Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral

Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort

Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was

occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after

our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the

morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during

the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'

in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and to

repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply

General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became

necessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,

at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred

prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched

position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the

night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,

and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington

reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on

the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from

Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence

moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the

latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General

Schofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march

on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a

severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this

engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater.

On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,

attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it

back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance

ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,

arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited

reinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the

enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our

hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been

occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten

miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got

possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a

junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,

South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th

of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to

send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,

to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the

railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was

able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing

our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter,

however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no

doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could

collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so

late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed

out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed

General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of

last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.

This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the

enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy

being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt

a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the

following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile

and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty

thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent

to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry

already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.

Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave

it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by

the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large

portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the

Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days

since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South

Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not

true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and

leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable,

therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,

and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:

first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure

success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications

and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces

brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the

points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so

important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion

should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,

according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the

objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what

number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five

thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It

is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one

leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do

not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as

I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from

me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as

possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce

the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the

extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with

less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think

you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the

20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the

armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the

city, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy having

withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it

south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce

Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers

to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,

which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly

the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as

follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no

difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From

there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as

to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be

left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information

you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the

streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join

General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from

East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,

one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from

Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,

with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where

Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as

to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,

North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition

he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have

to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I

think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has

passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on

his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be

guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before

you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from

Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one

or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from

his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two

divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st of

March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,

across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered

Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence

he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an

intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a

reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,

and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses

and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with

subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners,

under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.

Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the

railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here

he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and

Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south

forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This

necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.

On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent

one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New

Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.

From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to

obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,

but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned

the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved

down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst

Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,

uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his

pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the

bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South

Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,

the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base

at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market

he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,

destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever

practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the

whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent

through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a

request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the

night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get

possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from

Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,

he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and

many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the

Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the

railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and

fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as

required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about

all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you

in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North

Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets

into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be

caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an

adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General

Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry

expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson

against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East

Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and

assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to

commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's

cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were

confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and

Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of

General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making

preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith

and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was

concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard

against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it

was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the

greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would

leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of

uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or

I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March,

General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at

Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in

front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent

forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement

of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond

will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy

out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success

of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same

time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville

railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first

in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest

where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving

towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under

General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the

Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the

Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.

General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions

which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army

of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military

Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of

service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the

defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of

all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,

subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the

Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present

line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If,

however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the

left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held

by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to the

left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest

notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or

so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the

present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further

orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will

follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored

division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel

will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army

of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the

night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum

number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main

army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be

started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,

under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about

Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and

therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They

should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared

from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses

the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should

Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be

instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads

between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon

being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to

destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south

of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in

haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as

possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'

supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his

commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at

the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of

ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the

transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of

other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to

operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken

with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at

the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation

may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be

massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an

unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready

and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,

without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole

of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the

balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have

rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General

Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all

practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success

north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An

attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has

detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the

enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence

of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north

of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after

a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against

Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only

chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of

advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the

moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon

commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur

without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out

to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive

evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly

enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the

enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding

officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move

promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin

the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of

their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of

following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front

of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our

left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and

left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort

against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the

reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy

loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.

Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,

and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the

other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.

Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched

picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and

thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this

line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two

killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven

missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about

Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them

perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated

that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the

10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should

become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in

co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.

General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,

by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or

thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville

Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies

operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was

directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions

in the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to

commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely

successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the

Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further

supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and

Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report

that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced

that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to

leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive

campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By

moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and

would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the

concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy

to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore

determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the

24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the

25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's

cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing

instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run

on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were

given to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.

to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about

three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the

right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.

Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being

confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest

roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or

through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you

can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched

position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and

attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your

entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army

will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the

field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not

do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched

line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it

practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between

Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not

advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which

I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make

your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then

pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in

like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which

are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this

army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North

Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course,

get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send

orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry

was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended

to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.

The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan,

Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture

of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore

addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having

previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid

contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.

We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road

to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After

getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the

enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker

Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing

about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing

on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before

going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the

enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you

can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry

may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one

army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The

signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a

cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,

taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in

such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except

as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan

advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found

the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line

across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of

getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front

and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and

fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main

line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and

Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of

an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.

The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our

extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be

penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,

therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General

Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and

turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the

enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week

before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The

enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the

lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that

it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at

once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General

Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.

On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting

possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To

accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,

which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the

2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back

upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d

corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with

heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan

advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five

Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced

the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him

back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed

great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the

main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed

his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of

the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of

wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture

he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back

slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one

division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.

Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could

hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions

of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.

Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,

because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and

precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,

General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on

Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his

strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between

five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin

relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report

of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind

lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling

upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from

his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,

General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,

and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the

morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.

General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping

everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing

many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by

two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division

of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near

Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,

and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while

General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General

Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's

main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his

inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,

returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's

lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's

corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the

most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially

shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The

enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,

where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement

ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened

by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station

towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front

of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our

hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main

road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy

evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On

the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed

for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General

Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for

Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along

that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville

Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court

House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of

General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached

Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the

following communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach

Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him

last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at

twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number

one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at

Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,

push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job

with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to

strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able

to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic

points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west

of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his

cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his

reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,

while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon

several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord

advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of

infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General

Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the

head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and

detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.

This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to

get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy

immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan

struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of

artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th

corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,

which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among

whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and

General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except

one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;

the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on

Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon found

that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so

close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common

bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately

crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at

Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I

addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the

hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern

Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my

duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of

blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate

States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville

the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not

entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further

resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate

your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before

considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition

of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,

asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peace

being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon

--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for

taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet

any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable

to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the

surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade

followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the

cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by

General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's

advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was

unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General

Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from

there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,

and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During

this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight

received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of

yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be

frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender

of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object

of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.

I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army

of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the

Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration

of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the

old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and

immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to

treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day

could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am

equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains

the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well

understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that

most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of

millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our

difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I

subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps

reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate

effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown

in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of

hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the

following from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,

whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were

embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender

of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer

contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is

set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the

8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern

Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and

men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be

designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers

as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not

to take up arms against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like

parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public

property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers

appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of

the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each

officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be

disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their

paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms

of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As

they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the

8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper

officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,

and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox

Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,

and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army

immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his

example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately

under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and

their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly

against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,

which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The

day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at

Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and

General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a

suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject

to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the

President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your

instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the

morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your

orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the

termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th

another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,

which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army

upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the

20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the

railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking

it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying

the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually

destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for

Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and

destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between

Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along

it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and

defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen

pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four

prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he

destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.

Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for

a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,

commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps,

Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to

Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved

from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving

thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General

Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from

Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially

invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a

part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the

enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the

9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These

successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to

approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was

evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of

the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting

of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until

March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April,

General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near

Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred

prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the

Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of

Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,

destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast

quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th

he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the

Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to

General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the

14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five

steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on

Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted

and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand five

hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the

navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public

property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four

guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the

20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one

thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General

Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to

make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him

on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby

all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby

Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,

and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on

the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General

Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This

surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the

rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of

first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate

plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the

government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them

arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been

surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had

surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio

Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to

defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting

great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final

triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly

set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and

brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not

as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully

refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have

occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East

fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference

in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in

battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in

the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant

of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of

the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the

Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old

antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid

achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all

sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too

much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have

followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud

record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other

for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over

every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope

for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however

mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.

GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________

FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to

General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to

the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have

more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the

return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,

so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his

services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and

General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a

great many years before the Mexican war to have established in

the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of

the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He

recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his

annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any

hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made

assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied

by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and

appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum

thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,

sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled

the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund

were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded

in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some

$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the

war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to

have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury

of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he

had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the

Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,

Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never

had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,

Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high

office. It made also governors of States, members of the

cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both

in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in

a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican

war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results

to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side

of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort

whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a

Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the

fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few

people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.

W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in

the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from

General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At

the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates

had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's

landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near

Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.

Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might

happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his

position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends

it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg

landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile

west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our

right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises

General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his

letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter

was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the

4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and

suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a

company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at

the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that

they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and

from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has

been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at

the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more

experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,

would take the particular road that he did start upon in the

absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent

dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found

that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front

and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very

much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back

had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up

to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the

road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff

officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am

not competent to say just what order the General actually

received.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at

Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and

a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace

early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the

Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road

which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right

than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote

for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,

who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some

unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because

of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,

also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice

to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a

point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the

6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the

passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep

in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only

marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the

rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of

the second day and did as good service as its position

allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a

conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest

commendation from division commanders in the Army of the

Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes

mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family

which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these

circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook

injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent

one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do

any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I

am always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the

time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my

recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were

promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th

Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,

M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and

John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate

battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,

the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his

vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew

her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.

With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the

New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf

and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade

on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of

Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied

me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that

of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I

proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect

that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river

to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated

on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman

came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would

like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut

the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move

I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position

voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or

a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,

with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points

strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an

axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an

enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would

guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out

all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign

proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to

make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground

could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there

and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being

always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I

said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that

was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad

from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To

this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the

lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election

went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary

enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and

conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far

as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of

supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor

supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us

was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was

lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had

to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,

embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and

asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals

upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I

did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was

not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned

between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I

remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and

consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a

copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of

my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between

us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply

friendly advice which the relations between us fully

justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a

success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered

by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression

which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's

prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to

Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in

person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further

instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly

desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad

between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from

communication with the South, but being confronted by a large

force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is

to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to

Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,

if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above

Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or

thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT

Maj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's

position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being

provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the

mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot

be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you

understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him

strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a

crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of

Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the

heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your

chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern

extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can

concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The

troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your

left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend

fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of

one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This

division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the

most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your

effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your

advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and

moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The

junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will

be at once established between the two armies by roads on the

south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on

those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily

held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have

there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's

corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at

Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday

night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower

down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness

for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will

be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one

hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry

soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see

that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You

will call on the engineer department for such preparations as

you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery

over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform

after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying

the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel

with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel

and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have

instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in

the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will

be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the

rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the

left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's

position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small

force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where

he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with

all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable

road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,

December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga

is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,

my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,

courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great

difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you

all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,

subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General

Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The

scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running

nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the

names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at

Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and

Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the

government at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on

account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be

granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible

that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK

General-in-Chief.

(OFFICIAL.)

(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.

(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me

to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts

of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For

your information I now write you my programme, as at present

determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up

his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to

turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the

navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New

Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to

hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the

number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number

necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less

than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand

men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations

against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him

to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate

against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This

will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.

F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore

the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,

increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five

thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,

wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,

under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the

other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to

move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about

Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will

be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand

men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up

and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as

you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war

resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but

simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave

you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,

as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he

can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the

18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is

concentrating now. None will move from their places of

rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to

move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct

is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have

difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to

where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish

it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do

not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I

can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad

Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move

directly to his front. In this way he must get through to

inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from

one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,

if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one

else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,

Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,

April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations

for the coming campaign, the following is communicated

confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and

towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn

over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the

navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and

to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to

move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other

movements. From the scattered condition of his command,

however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans

before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same

time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army

being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate

aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to

Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of

the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his

front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making

preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south

at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from

ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the

other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under

Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach

the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,

and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and

return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join

you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward

to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries

would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to

within easy hauling distance of every position the army could

occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if

he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather

interior to the one I would have to take in following. A

movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all

that was done would have to be done with the supplies and

ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter

plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies

possible to take with us was considered. The country over which

we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that

we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not

entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West

Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of

four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an

attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he

was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any

part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's

raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,

and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself

into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him

before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at

Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of

the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage

southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and

Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting

Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South

Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000

men into the field directly to his front. The force will be

commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,

Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from

the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous

with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,

there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in

doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above

or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the

other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is

cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on

a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done

whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from

Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the

other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies

until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more

fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce

you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after

the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from

Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable

you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the

front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and

transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall

back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and

yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing

baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a

regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should

be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and

ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division

headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make

arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded

to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this

contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there

is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or

elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made

for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred

rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the

amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of

the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave

our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and

estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and

General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman

the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and

was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of

forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my

two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,

representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and

three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the

enemy."

(*27)

UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.

Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.

First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.

Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.

First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.

Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.

Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.

Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.

First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.

Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.

Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.

Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.

First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.

First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.

First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.

Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.

First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.

Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.

First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.

Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.

Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......

Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.

Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)

Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's "

" Eppa Hunton's "

" Wm. R. Terry's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)

Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade

" E. M. Law's (c) "

" John Bratton's "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)

Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade

" B. G. Humphreys' "

" Goode Bryan's "

" Kershaw's (Old) "

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)

" John Pegram 's " (f)

" Gordon's " (g)

Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.

Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)

Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)

" Geo H. Stewart's " (h)

" L. A. Stafford's " (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.

Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)

" Geo. Dole's " (k)

" S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.

" C. A. Battle's "

" R. D. Johnston's " (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)

Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.

Mahone's "

Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)

" A. R. Wright's "

" Joseph Finegan's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)

" James H. Lane's "

" Sam'l McCowan's "

" Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)

Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.

" John R. Cooke's "

" D. McRae's "

" J. J. Archer's "

" H. H. Walker's "

_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division

Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade

" L. L. Lomax's "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.

" P. M. B. Young's "

" Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.

" J. R. Chambliss's "

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*

Cabell's Battalion.

Manly's Battery.

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.

Carleton's Battery.

Calloway's Battery.

Haskell's Battalion.

Branch's Battery.

Nelson's "

Garden's "

Rowan "

Huger's Battalion.

Smith's Battery.

Moody "

Woolfolk "

Parker's "

Taylor's "

Fickling's "

Martin's "

Gibb's Battalion.

Davidson's Battery.

Dickenson's "

Otey's "

BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

Braxton's Battalion.

Lee Battery.

1st Md. Artillery.

Stafford "

Alleghany "

Cutshaw's Battalion.

Charlotteville Artillery.

Staunton "

Courtney "

Carter's Battalion.

Morris Artillery.

Orange "

King William Artillery.

Jeff Davis "

Nelson's Battalion.

Amherst Artillery.

Milledge "

Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion.

Powhatan Artillery.

2d Richmond Howitzers.

3d " "

Rockbridge Artillery.

Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

Cutt's Battalion.

Ross's Battery.

Patterson's Battery.

Irwin Artillery.

Richardson's Battalion.

Lewis Artillery.

Donaldsonville Artillery.

Norfolk Light "

Huger "

Mclntosh 's Battalion.

Johnson's Battery.

Hardaway Artillery.

Danville "

2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Pegram's Battalion.

Peedee Artillery.

Fredericksburg Artillery.

Letcher "

Purcell Battery.

Crenshaw's Battery.

Poague's Battalion.

Madison Artillery.

Albemarle "

Brooke "

Charlotte "

NOTE.

(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at

above date.

(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also

contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by

Colonel P. D. Bowles.

(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not

indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.

(e) Constituting York's Brigade.

(f) In Ramseur's Division.

(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and

containing 12th Georgia Battalion.

(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's

Division.

(i) Grimes' Brigade.

(k) Cook's "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;

name not indicated.

(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.

(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four

brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not

indicated.

(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,

Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the

artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and

6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in

a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.

will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with

Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and

vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as

close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any

diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any

opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my

mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely

successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been

heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.