The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was

not so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of the

leaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time during

the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration

in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in

favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Even

in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off

from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North

at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up

in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. The

condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of

anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores by

compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to

remain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to a

settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo

Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,

but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our

shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions

of people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her

fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there

to quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it that the colored

people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states

governed by their own race. They would still be States of the Union,

and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens

would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory

almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that

the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to

settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were

scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important

points of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when

so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found

they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of

the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountains

first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and

productive grazing and farming lands were there. This territory, the

geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is

now as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse it

in every direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked.

The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural

lands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of the

volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control of

these lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude,

therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to

remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an immense majority of

the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they

move among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into small

communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost

tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new

territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with

others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,

would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat,

and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread

and vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping would

furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for

necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey,

tobacco and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles of

luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea,

two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if

anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements

of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit

of independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth must

cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the

world. There is now such a commingling of the people that particular

idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;

the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";

railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,

nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the

student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have

but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,

and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us the

necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great

harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a

living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within

me that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for me

at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed

to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section

of the country, nor to a division of the people. They came from

individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the

Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of

the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics did

not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given

because I was the object of it. But the war between the States was a

very bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yield

principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an

end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious

side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative

of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying

fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous

move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES

1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,

1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations

of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to

command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea

that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be

brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary

to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his

numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,

we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to

garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to

protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,

like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to

use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for

transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most

vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of

inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of

producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether

our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by

these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had

that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both

North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely

broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops

practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from

using the same force at different seasons against first one and then

another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and

producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to

hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his

resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be

nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of

our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and

campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better

in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of

friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I

can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the

best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests

of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending

forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly

garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.

The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession

of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in

Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together

with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the

balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in

the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably

not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been

brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have

brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so

that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in

garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with

the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along

the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the

population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep

navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the

west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with

the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to

include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a

small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East

Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.

West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the

exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about

the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort

Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along

the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast

footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in

North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort

Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.

Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our

possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.

The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and

other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory

occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of

the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was

proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large

population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard

every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South,

a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy

capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in

the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.

This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the

field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the

Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.

Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee

occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run

westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the

rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston

occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and

defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad

centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In

addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in

North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the

Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme

eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,

and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the

main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the

Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and

territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the

Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate

command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of

the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements

of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break

it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he

could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If

the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to

the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration

of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do

so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason

that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was

satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest

extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against

Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my

appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the

importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest

possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy

from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his

troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the

time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of

the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was

necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his

expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River

with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of

his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for

the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then

held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring

campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops

enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other

movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an

expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move

from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a

demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and

directions, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you

turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold

upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they

will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At

least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken

from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to

guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand

men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the

rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can

again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this

would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which

to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from

Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold

the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say

concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command

for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can

give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be

followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be

ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval

fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with

the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.

My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,

from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about

the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative

with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I

would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at

once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start

at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his

objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his

movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below

Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.

Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.

By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring

Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we

did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;

besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed

how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be

used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or

James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower

route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.

Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence

at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative

action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be

accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large

ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding

on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally

speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to

the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to

guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy

and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to

guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of

the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and

Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be

directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we

can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of

the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it

impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I

propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems

practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,

Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces

from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say

not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south

side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force

you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South

Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.

Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the

troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,

with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon

thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time

to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as

you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to

be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as

possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all

your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point

directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be

your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your

force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates

the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River

as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments

in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of

transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your

direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry

south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time

of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable

day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the

execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the

19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of

General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort

Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact

time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would

not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight

Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,

however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction

with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be

certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to

have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the

junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable

anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up

the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after

the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he

should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was

desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments

remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in

the background for the protection of our extended lines between the

loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so

held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland

and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant

fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small

bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give

better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement

they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection

of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force

into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command

of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own

request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up

the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General

Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the

Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the

Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the

infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as

could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the

Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook

would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down

the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the

New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were

delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and

the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the

armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and

capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General

Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would

tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,

to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my

determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to

so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and

still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well

understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the

campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the

James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort

Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of

getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication

as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of

capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective

point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move

simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,

and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of

the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as

far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the

Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through

him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the

execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the

right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of

an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that

public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he

would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning

of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of

Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole

army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at

Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under

Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its

trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight

opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was

about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed

from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of

crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and

ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through

a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps

(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the

enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged

furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast

as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density

of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable

promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the

Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the

Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to

Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a

crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as

such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the

afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was

leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his

troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the

Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,

probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,

unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,

this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the

morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set

in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on

the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to

turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating

considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was

personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it

and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed

that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to

the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was

evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his

inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,

notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an

attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my

whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for

a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march was

commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on

the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our

movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.

On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent

out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line

taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the

main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable

fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the

9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of

communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in

manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on

the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John

Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright

succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general

attack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps,

Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,

capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces

of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage

gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and

18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of

reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any

further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were

issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to

commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the

afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our

extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy

loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the

21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter

line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach

the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifth

corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely

followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the

same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying

between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the

same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after

getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy

with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army

of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,

having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four

trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of

railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to

Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at

Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but

finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed

to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,

and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he

communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing

off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy

to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of

instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with

the tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight

hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him

wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,

under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of

Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,

both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete

surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and

commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the

Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some

fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand

seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the

Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.

These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets

towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same

day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the

railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into

Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of

railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold

out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the

cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached

Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,

and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to

Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion

of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,

with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the

benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,

enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and

South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the

16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of

Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments

between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy

intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the

city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in

a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further

operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle

strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the

enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid

against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,

and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight

trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary

and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at

Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the

road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he

reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the

enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,

attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our

gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by

assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat

Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed

itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,

if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard

against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a

very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was

obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the

western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was

difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore,

to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure

what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they

be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the

Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.

Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time

forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of

his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank

of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's

position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,

and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at

Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two

divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the

enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy

skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and

developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the

evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but

was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately

ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in

driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad

bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.

General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it

until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had

just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps

and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in

readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our

carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the

right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During the

attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged

in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.

That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the

day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for

an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's

works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt

our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,

was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the

Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to

compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that

all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished

as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy

severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of

the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was

impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the

city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and

invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right

flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been

better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground

satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and

east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,

vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and

that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open

to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the

James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of

Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of

communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the

south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he

should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that

the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the

army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,

or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in

case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater

sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be

accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore

determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then

occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might

present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville

and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between

Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry

got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by

the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of

supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on

the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions

to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his

forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was

thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down

in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under

General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture

Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges

across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side,

and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.

General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and

deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without

attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back

to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via

the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.

This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the

enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the

12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,

crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak

Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps

reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,

on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia

had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more

desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two

armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of

either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was

displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture

Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,

assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.

Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been

fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for

them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only

be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of

the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and

terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,

and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the

offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the

fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the

attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The

details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of

the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of

Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James

River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by

wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack

of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge

vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the

quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency

displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief

quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to

occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and

but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,

commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate

command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,

giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the

mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and

Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and

depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at

Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met

the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was

defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding

the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal

from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His

instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General

H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * * "The enemy are

evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the

branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think

it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach

Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too

much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he

will be doing good service. * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should

do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be

destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he

could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville

join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the

Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,

after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the

field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of

artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the

same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from

which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he

reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was

very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him

sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile

country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,

point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was

very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee

sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached

Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the

17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give

battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of

ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of

Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from

the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of

Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a

position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should

the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would

have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main

line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its

defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General

Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no

doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his

instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his

movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of

his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing

the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's

Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight

of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly

pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda

Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of

Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send

General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give

him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I

would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and

throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be

done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the

enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,

and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next

morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to

satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines

until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the

assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the

Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing

fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about

seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no

other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced

Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear

the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. General

Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just

after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might

wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed

knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But

instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he

requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured

works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack

was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under

Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th

corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and

the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock

the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of

the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously

captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four

hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in

with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the

enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The

advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then

proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far

as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of

his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to

get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn

before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,

at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.

As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I

ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that

were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to

report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was

notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his

present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the

line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with

his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,

the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.

But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold

them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of

his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy

attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected

by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of

the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda

Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against

the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the

enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The

result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's

cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom

he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in

complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our

hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On

the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa

Court House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced

in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by

infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the

latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme

right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and

was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not

having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals

being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and

hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the

north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching

White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at

that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after

heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,

without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army

of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of

the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.

Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot

and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen

miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and

defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station

on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville

Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he

found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not

dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met

the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony

Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he

made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station

(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the

enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the

loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General

Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way

into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,

succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our

left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than

compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by

railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the

Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the

Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of

his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine

that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's

lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and

two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to

the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler

had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched

position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our

lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting

this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting

lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.

The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large

force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the

diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force

back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of

the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to

relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the

assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and

Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved

in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and

five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a

regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th

corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,

and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a

detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance

promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason

to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were

immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up

enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),

and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus

held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were

withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what

promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was

retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the

Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he

returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement

of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the

Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river

and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of

navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great

delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,

to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this

purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against

Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning

to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued

immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River

expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time

made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments

from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,

of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions

of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to

Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.

General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across

the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's

Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards

Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own

command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from

Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the

Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not

sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and

although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,

and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two

division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before

him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance

reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a

reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the

enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost

about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss

was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.

Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by

telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the

assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the

troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the

enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all

the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright

commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken

at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;

and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of

the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and

several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,

I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies

operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement

against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;

and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between

any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much

as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the

fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave

Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to

return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon

Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was

ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved

down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the

30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,

towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and

with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.

From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down

between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit

messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to

thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be

received showing a different state of facts from those on which they

were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that

must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and

rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise

would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that

some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the

Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle

Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to

Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his

assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time

the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our

forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the

crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy

Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I

hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at

Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the

4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for

myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after

consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following

instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the

vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and

garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this

concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From

Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the

Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him

wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as

it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a

small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,

detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after

the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,

the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville

may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best

cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be

instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south

side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In

pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to

go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite

the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for

the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not

desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be

protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army

can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and

we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this

you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the

course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country

through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached

Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to

be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then

at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders

to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on

General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of

instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on

the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to

military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of

Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West

Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle

Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to

temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were

sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at

Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September

were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many

severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were

generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two

armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon

Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that

either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open

to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances

before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these

circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.

Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake

and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so

indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving

Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so

great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to

telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of

General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I

left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his

headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.

I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army

lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such

confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of

instructions necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the

teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him

if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on

the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before

daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,

that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to

visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General

Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary

and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated

him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to

Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of

artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at

Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss

on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through

Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping

the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel

army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of

Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again

returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry

encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with

the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty

prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains

which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,

and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and

the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries

which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss

and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and

Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when

the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in

time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming

the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was

defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and

trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of

his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton

and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the

enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I

was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and

to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and

another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the

sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force

for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had

detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the

Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division

of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's

army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the

north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,

if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six

pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that

were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division

(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this

movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the

18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he had

considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made

repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great

loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the

James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at

Petersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,

while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and

after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces

of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City

Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to

supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of

Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the

enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops

north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the

28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,

Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to

the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,

carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below

Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of

artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments. This success was

followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front

of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy

loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of

this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was

unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so

threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy made

several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were

unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th,

General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the

enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of

troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held

the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troops

moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy

in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces

holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,

but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the

James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and

prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. This

he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was

repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent

out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new

works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to

hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d

corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in

advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,

and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until

the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road

where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant

from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to

reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the

enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful

assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to

withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly.

Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected

with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left

the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals

Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a

desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock

immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove

the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the

north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg

Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he was

unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was

afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former

positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and

Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the

defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for

crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his

detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February,

our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had

been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the

Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,

by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at

Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering

Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through

Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it

in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston,

finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified

position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.

A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south.

Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and

heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again

disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville

on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.

While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's

division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts

and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman,

having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in

motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass

at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General

Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope

Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.

The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General

McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New

Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and

Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and

concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and

McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of

the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,

and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of

this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the

Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and

get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,

crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to

Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood

succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming

the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman

in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which

was on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of this day the brave,

accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan

succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this

desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,

on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized

him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it

impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing

his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main

force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon

roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded,

and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and

Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September

occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted

to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and

driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,

Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the

Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined

General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a

successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its

branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,

Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with

Atlanta. The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,

skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles

during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest

unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying

it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track

railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This

passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of

it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under

Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to

advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat

disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility

of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he

supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West

Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send

Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.

On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near

Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout

and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly

pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his

designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with

which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for

rest and repairs necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,

with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by

General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return

from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was

directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against

Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has

characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he met

the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting

continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of

the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General

Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest

annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City,

Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded

by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., having

but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he

repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General

Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but

received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,

that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold

his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the

question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,

garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment

Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought

bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy

carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,

proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before

Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,

were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan.

With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State

through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June they

attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th

he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy

loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerilla

was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his

command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River

expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent

by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the

date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two

divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left

Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red

River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel

forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the

14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the

enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort

de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with

its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of

artillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th

he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On

the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in

which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four

pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel

General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembled

his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the

morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the

7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him

from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight

miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the

8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and

defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an

immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, General

Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the

9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, General

Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to

Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious

difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the

expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they

passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now

Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were

constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet

passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable

skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point

Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this

expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the

carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the

capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th

army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red

River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after

driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in

Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.

After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,

General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of

April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red

River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas

County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.

He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d

of May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing

Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable

loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the

"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to

send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,

and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be

necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then

occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General

Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was

collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated

this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about

forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon

Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with

Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of

August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.

Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,

surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousand

four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces

of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General

Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,

on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en

route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry

force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of

Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those

of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price

and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,

would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attacked

Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to

the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General

Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such

forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General

Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the

loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of

prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The

impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri

for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how

little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why

General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten

and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the

Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison

at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.

Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and

after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the

railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,

skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day

cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.

On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under

Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the

garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the

vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its

surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He

withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,

and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without

success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was

handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of

the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved

towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every

exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest

before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his

escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy

the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of

October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into

his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he

was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command

and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies

in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting

and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from

Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,

allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which

was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the

whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General

Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that

an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt

at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the

army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to

the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded

in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of

his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the

constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he

attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and

destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and

telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,

twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and

Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by

Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in

Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the

reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I

quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be

reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for

Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi

River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of

the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put

my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,

to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city

of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of

mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing

substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a

proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,

etc.

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood

was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile

and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the

Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought

to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If

you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but

would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such

railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike

for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater

damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there

is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must

trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force

from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will

be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.

I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could

not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all

your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive

than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and

Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one

corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta

with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This

reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain

here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold

cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely

prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga

to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and

worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing

things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I

believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the

defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he

means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war

is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the

mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the

sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,

you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or

Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to

the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east

and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.

In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had

been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.

General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed

movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.

Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand

Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley

commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back

to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he

had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save

the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with

through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was

little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,

or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and

beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman

should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he

commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out

point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as

he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force

inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could

reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,

however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only

considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi

River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,

and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the

condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of

Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah

on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's

admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two

expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,

Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of

communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General

Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via

Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.

The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General

E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on

the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad

bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles

of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The

expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The

expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command

of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand

men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad

River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it

moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about

three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a

strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in

our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,

wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the

6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the

Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and

Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which

seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I

had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the

orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the

advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but

failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,

in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of

the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached the

Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.

On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,

on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight

transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,

and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats

becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to

prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and

a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in

storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and

crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,

moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of

the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached

Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and

was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch

the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general

engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from

Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas,

retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the

purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of

reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by

General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works

repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every

instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven

hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three

thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general

officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two

thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy

met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.

During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This

left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily

abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought

together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his

line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee

River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was

ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's

command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this

reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in

position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from

the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his

artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it

appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased

upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the

Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and

give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the

necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to

superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I

received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,

and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.

All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but

that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before

Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with

his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his

cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it

impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of

Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that

distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by

cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon

many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of

December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his

escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North

Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,

General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee

River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th

Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,

capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's

pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found

clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from

Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured

Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and

pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large

amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and

captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of

fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the

Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and

large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public

property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under

General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November

he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and

several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command,

retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to

near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.

Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated

the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to

operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia

--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia

as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of

December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's

forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under

Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,

capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight

prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and

the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force

under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of

Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to

attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He

then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works

at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of

artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he

returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left

to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton

and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of

great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to

seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature

of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for

so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New

Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close

the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a

land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the

assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most

formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.

This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that

of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and

very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of

the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers

both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.

This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of

November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant

Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and

went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,

where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required

and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was

regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely

arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,

if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone

to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I

deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its

destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to

make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who

had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might

not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is

to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this,

the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable

grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of

the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in

Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of

the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where

they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object

of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land

between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to

the river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds

Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then

the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the

navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our

hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would

be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is

built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it

will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and

surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the

expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer

immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or

near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against

Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for

this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,

military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go

through him. They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since

officially informed me that he never received the foregoing

instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General

Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my

indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General

Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off

from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel

had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather

formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness

the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was

detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the

powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any

delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General

Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at

the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening

of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having

put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming

rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and

coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to

replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to

the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on

the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from

Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern

newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of

the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a

reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards

the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this

reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions

given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the

expedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the

27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet

Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,

First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,

First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George

Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when

recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could

have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the

Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me

that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction

that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural

supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,

the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on

the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I

would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This

time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to

command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same

that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,

numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. The

latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to

the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out

to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington

ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little

delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and

report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,

commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should

exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore,

that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part

to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may

be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid

down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you

can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I

would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own

responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm

position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which

you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the

practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself

against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open

to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort

Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or

another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a

portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it

operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut

it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession

of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in

readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be

drawn from Beaufort as you need them.