are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true?
Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means,
when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this
express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for
example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must
put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot
but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No,
he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a
free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they
can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put
forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given
manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and
opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and
opposite manner from what they do.
VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the _practical
tendencies_ of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the
Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which
they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place
ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To
this I reply:
1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances
which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself.
For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over
which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered
necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its
force.
2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our
being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not
necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such
circumstances, and not to place himself there again?
GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE
OF ABILITY.
VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians
of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability.
It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground,
that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is
absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act,
differently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do
it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they
do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong.
If men have not power to _will_ differently from what they do, it is
undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently:
because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions
and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes
away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what
he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to _act_
differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes
of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us
to find for it a "local habitation or a name." As honest men,
Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to
proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under
influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of
all sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them
absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not
performing such impossibilities.
The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them
at all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because, they
might do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only
thing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we
have already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what
is right, because if they should will what is right, they would will
what is right.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT
SCHOOLS.
VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one
class, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and
holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine
agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and
actions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can
arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine
efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others.
According to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce
volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in
creatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to
influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they
do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large
portion of this school, God, either by his own direct agency, or by
sustaining their laws of natural generation, produces in men the
peculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite
guilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful
feelings, volitions, and actions.
Such are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they
perfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects,
external and internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, cannot
but be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of
God, in the one instance producing these effects directly and
immediately, and in the other producing the same results, mediately, by
giving existence to a constitution and influences from which such
results cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the _immediate_
ground of this necessity, the power of God, according to the former,
producing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly.
According to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation
to the Divine Will, that of Necessity.
Now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential
particulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as
involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God to
produce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions,
and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has
produced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate
of constitutional depravity. For God to create in men a sinful nature,
and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created,
together with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a
sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine
efficiency, in his turn.
The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most
distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He
knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God
produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and
influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves
injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add,
that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards
the sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed
(unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which
is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either
theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is
thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of
condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in
which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth,
that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon
this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one
he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he
will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which
vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal
reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her
universal horror at a system which
"Binding nature fast in fate,
Enslaves the human Will."
Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was
ever conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal
Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid
absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one?
CHAPTER IV.
EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL.
WHILE it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding
chapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects,
it is not free at all. It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in
the respects in which the Will is subject to the law of Liberty, its
liberty is absolute. It is in no sense subject to the law of Necessity.
So far, also, as it is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no
sense free. What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the
Will?
1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act at all. To suppose the
opposite would involve a contradiction. It would suppose the action of
the Will in the direction of some object, in the absence of all objects
towards which such action can be directed.
2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Motives presented shall
be, in view of which its determinations shall be formed. Motives exist
wholly independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all upon the Will,
what Motives shall be presented for its election. It is free only in
respect to the particular determinations it shall put forth, in
reference to the Motives actually presented.
3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is presented to the mind, the
Will is necessitated, by the presentation of the object, to act in some
direction. It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But such
refusal is itself a positive act. So far, therefore, the Will is wholly
subject to the law of Necessity. It is free, not in respect to whether
it shall, or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented; but in
respect to _what_ it shall choose. I, for example, offer a merchant a
certain sum, for a piece of goods. Now while it is equally possible for
him to receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he
_must_ form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he
is not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all
objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to
act in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it
leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations
equally possible to the mind.
4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other, and
what may be termed _general_, determinations. For example, a
determination to pursue a particular course of conduct, may render
necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general
purpose into accomplishment. It renders them necessary in this sense,
that if the former does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for
example, determines to pass from Boston to New York with all possible
expedition. This determination remaining unchanged, all the particular
volitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. The general
and controlling determination, however, may, at any moment, be
suspended. To perpetuate or suspend it, is always in the power of the
Will.
5. I will here state a conjecture, viz.: that there are in the primitive
developments of mind, as well as in all primary acts of attention,
certain necessary spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers
of the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, that the mind
becomes first conscious of the power of volition, and is it not now
necessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of
attention to phenomena which appear within and around us? My own
convictions are, that such circumstances often do occur. Nor is such a
supposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this
Treatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Accountability, in other
words, Free, and Moral Agency, are co-extensive.
6. Nor does Liberty, as here defined, imply, that the mind, antecedently
to all acts of Will, shall be in a state of _indifference_, unimpelled
by feeling, or the affirmations of the Intelligence, more strongly in
one direction than another. The Will exists in a tri-unity with the
Intelligence and Sensibility. Its determinations may be in harmony with
the Sensibility, in opposition to Intelligence, or with the Intelligence
in opposition to the Sensibility. But while it follows either in
distinction from the other, under the same identical influences,
different and opposite determinations are equally possible. However the
Will may be influenced, whether its determinations are in the direction
of the strongest impulse, or opposed to it, it never, in deliberate
moral determination, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these
circumstances, no others are possible. In instances comparatively few,
can we suppose that the mind, antecedently to acts of Will, is in a
state of indifference, unimpelled in one direction in distinction from
others, or equally impelled in the direction of different and opposite
determinations. Indifference is in no such sense an essential or
material condition of Liberty. How ever strongly the Will may be
impelled in the direction of particular determinations, it is still in
the possession of the highest conceivable freedom, if it is not thereby
_necessitated_ to act in one direction in distinction from all others.
7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the
Will is always necessitated to act. It is the law of _habit_. Action in
any one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in
the same direction under similar influences. This tendency may be
increased, till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same
direction in all future time really, although contingently, certain. The
certainty thus granted will always be of such a nature as consists fully
with the relation of Liberty. It can never, while moral agency
continues, come under the relation of Necessity. Still the certainty is
real. Thus the mind, by a continued course of well or ill doing, may
generate such fixed habits, as to render subsequent action in the same
direction perfectly certain, during the entire progress of its future
being. Every man, while conscious of freedom, should be fully aware of
the existence of this law, and it should surely lead him to walk
thoughtfully along the borders of "the undiscovered country," his
location in which he is determining by the habits of thought, feeling,
and action, he is now generating.
STRONGEST MOTIVE--REASONING IN A CIRCLE.
A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of
Necessitarians, in respect to what they call the _strongest Motive_,
demands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of
their doctrine is based upon the assumption, that the action of the Will
is always in the direction of the strongest Motive. When, however, we
ask them, which is the strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that
it is the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. "The
strength of a _Motive_," says President Day, "is not its prevailing, but
the power by which it prevails. Yet we may very properly _measure_ this
power by the actual result." Again, "We may measure the comparative
strength of Motives of different kinds, from the results to which they
lead; just as we learn the power of different causes, from the effects
which they produce:" that is, we are not to determine, _a priori_, nor
by an appeal to consciousness, which of two or more Motives presented is
the strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and then assume
that the Motive, in the direction of which it acts, is the strongest.
From the action of the Will in the direction of that particular Motive,
we are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. The
strongest Motive, according to the above definition, is the motive to
which the Will does yield. The argument based upon the truism, that the
Will always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, the Motive
towards which it does act, the argument, I say, put into a logical form,
would stand thus. If the action of the Will is always in the direction
of the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the Motive it
does follow, it is governed by the law of Necessity. Its action is
always in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the
Motive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of
Necessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become "rooted and
grounded" in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this
sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as
true, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth.
CHAPTER V.
THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD.
SECTION I.
WE now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing
upon our personal investigations--the proposition maintained by
Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that "_the Will
always is as the greatest apparent good_."
PHRASE DEFINED.
The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper
meaning of this proposition?
In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things.
1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the
dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the
Intelligence affirms to be best. Or,
2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the
impulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the
direction of the strongest feeling. Or,
3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of
the Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all,
except when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the
same direction.
MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.
The following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning
which Edwards attaches to the phrase, "the greatest apparent good." "I
have chosen," he says, "rather to express myself thus, that the Will
always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most
agreeable, than to say, that the Will is _determined_ by the greatest
apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing
most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and
choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct." Here
undeniably, the words, choosing, preferring, "appearing most agreeable
or pleasing," and "the greatest apparent good," are defined as identical
in their meaning. Hence in another place, he adds, "If strict propriety
of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the
_voluntary action_ which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the
mind's volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most
agreeable, than by the preference or choice itself." The reason is
obvious. Appearing most agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice,
had been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To say, therefore, that
preference or choice is determined by "what appears most agreeable or
pleasing," would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice
determines choice. "The act of volition itself," he adds, "is always
determined by that in or about the mind's view of an object, which
causes it to appear most agreeable," or what is by definition the same
thing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, "the greatest apparent
good," and "appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind," and the
words, choosing, preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards,
identical in their meaning. The proposition, "the Will is always as the
greatest apparent good," really means nothing more nor less than this,
that Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon
this proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus
expressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is,
if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of
Necessity. The Will is as the greatest apparent good, that is, it always
chooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this
very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity
has been established with all the distinctness and force of
demonstration.
The question now returns, Is "the Will always as the greatest apparent
good," in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined?
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
I. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that
all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the
Intelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in
opposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful
or holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that
he ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer,
1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has
followed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of his
Intelligence. What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has
not said, and cannot say with truth, "I know the good, and approve it;
yet follow the bad?" Take a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during
the early progress of the Reformation, became fully convinced, that the
faith of the Reformers was true, and his own false, and that his
salvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other.
Yet martyrdom would be the result of such a change. While balancing this
question, in the depths of his own mind, he trembled with the greatest
agitation. His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. The reply
was, "the martyr's crown is before me, and I have not Christian
fortitude enough to take it." He died a few weeks subsequent, without
confessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility
there? Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter
prevail? In John 12: 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men were
convinced of the truth, and yet, because "they loved the praise of men
more than the praise of God," they did not confess, but denied the
truth, a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, in
opposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The Will then is not
"always as the greatest apparent good," in this sense, that its action
is always in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence.
2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary
result of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? Is it so? Can the
Intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a
state of moral rectitude? How easy it would be, in every instance, to
"convert a sinner from the error of his way," if all that is requisite
is to carry his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness? Who does
not know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will
to a depraved Sensibility?
3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in harmony with the
Intellect, then I affirm that there is not, and never has been, any such
thing as sin, or ill desert, in the universe. What more can be said of
God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his
Intellect affirmed to be best? What if the devil, and all creatures
called sinners, had always done the same thing? Where is the conceivable
ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them?
4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect harmony with the
Intelligence, and in this sense, "as the greatest apparent good," then,
when the Intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of
preference between two objects, there can be no choice between them. But
we are, in fact, putting forth every day just such acts of Will,
selecting one object in distinction from another, when the Intellect
affirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely, that there is and
can be no perceived ground of preference between them. I receive a
letter, I will suppose, from a friend, informing me that he has just
taken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of the same value, that
one now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer,
that I may have one and only one of them, the one that I shall name by
return of mail, and that I must designate one or the other, or have
neither. Here are present to my Intelligence two objects absolutely
equal. Their location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. Now
if as the proposition "the Will is _always_ as the greatest apparent
good," affirms, I cannot select one object in distinction from another,
without a perceived ground for such selection, I could not possibly, in
the case supposed, say which bill I would have. Yet I make the selection
without the least conceivable embarrassment. I might mention numberless
cases, of daily occurrence, of a nature precisely similar. Every child
that ever played at "odd or even," knows perfectly the possibility of
selecting between objects which are, to the Intelligence, absolutely
equal.
I will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake.
Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in
all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God
determined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its
centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At
that moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite
number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither
point could have been selected, because it was better than any other:
for all were equal. So they must have appeared to God. Now if the "Will
is always as the greatest apparent good," in the sense under
consideration, God could not in this case make the selection, and
consequently could not create the universe. He did make the selection,
and did create. The Will, therefore, is not, in this sense, "always as
the greatest apparent good."
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE.
II. Is the "Will always as the greatest apparent good" in this sense,
that it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse
of the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence,
in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in
opposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then--
1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary
acceptation of the term. What is self-denial but placing the Will with
the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? How often in moral
reformations do we find almost nothing else but this, an inflexible
purpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide
of feeling and desire?
2. When the Will is impelled in different directions, by conflicting
feelings, it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision, unless
we suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength
up to the moment of decision. Who believes that? Who believes that his
feelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to
the moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite
courses? This _must_ be the case, if the action of the Will is always as
the strongest feeling, and in this sense as the "greatest apparent
good." How can Necessitarians meet this argument? Will they pretend
that, in all instances, up to the moment of decisive action, the
feelings impelling the Will in different directions are always
absolutely equal in strength? This must be, if the Will is always as the
strongest feeling.
3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can
possibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often
are, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in
some direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents
an example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely
equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the
Will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to
suppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is
governed by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in
all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will
towards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is
not? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe
above supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was
in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with
all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of
one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God's
Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which
none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When,
therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the
others, that determination could not have been either in the direction
of what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest
feeling. The proposition, therefore, that "the Will _always_ is as the
greatest apparent good," is in both the senses above defined
demonstrably false.
4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own
Consciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not
know that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences,
should yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He
can pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose
directly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals
affirm, "If I should follow my _feelings_, I should do this; if I should
follow my _judgment_, I should do that." In all such instances, we have
the direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is
not always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action
is sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in
opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of
such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter,
undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued.
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED.
III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense,
that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the
Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is
not, I argue for two reasons.
1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are
opposed to each other--a fact of very frequent occurrence,--there could
be no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state
of absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their
differences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular
direction. But we know that the Will can, and often does, act in the
direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of
one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each
other.
2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited,
are alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts
of Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will
does act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground.
I conclude, then, that the proposition, "the Will is always as the
greatest apparent good," is either a mere truism, having no bearing at
all upon our present inquiries, or that it is false.
In the discussion of the above propositions, the doctrine of Liberty has
received a full and distinct illustration. The action of the Will is
sometimes in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the
Sensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sensibility, in
opposition to the Intelligence, and never in the direction of either,
because it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and
Intelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the
Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not
necessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor
the strongest desire.
SEC. II--MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS.
NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.
I. We are now prepared to appreciate the Necessitarian argument, based
upon the assumption, that "the Will always is as the greatest apparent
good." This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests.
Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a
circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his
doctrine. His answer is, because "the Will _always_ is as the greatest
apparent good." Cite now such facts as those stated above in
contradiction of his assumption, and his answer is ready. There must be,
in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there
could be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example,
some point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the
universe, and this must have been the reason why God selected the one he
did. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because "the
Will is always as the greatest apparent good." Thus this assumption
becomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based
upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an
assumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain.
But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle?
To assume the proposition, "the Will always is as the greatest apparent
good," in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and
then to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the
explanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is
reasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to assume this
proposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed
by all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to
explain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a
circle, but to beg the question at issue.
MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.
II. We are also prepared to notice another assumption of President
Edwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true,
necessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the
determination of the Will is always _caused_ by the Motive present to
the mind for putting forth that determination. "It is that motive," he
says, "which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest
which determines the Will." Again, "that every act of the Will has some
cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a
necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity
of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of
Will, whatsoever, is excited by some motive." "But if every act of the
Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that
act of the Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their
motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives."
If we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of
necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain
to each other the relation of cause and effect. _The presence and action
of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as
it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular
direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction,
in opposition to every other_. Now the action of one power may cause the
action of another, in one or both these ways.
1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in
opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the
sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in
that one direction. Or,
2. One power may necessitate the _action_ of another power, but not
necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all
others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the
action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to
act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from
another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these
two senses of the word _cause_. He assumes that when one power causes
the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is
readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the
Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular
choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but
in the power of willing itself.
OBJECTION--PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.
III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of
Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is
asked, shall we account, on this theory, for _particular_ volitions? The
power to will only accounts for acts of Will in _some_ direction, but
not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be
accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I
reply,
1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be
consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular
antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents
in distinction from all others.
2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to
assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production
of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now
under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a
cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable,
under the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for
the existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an
antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those
consequents.
3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no
perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other,
is equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as
impossible for us to _conceive_ of the former as of the latter. We
cannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of
an act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that
particular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an
event without a cause. But we _can_ conceive of the mind's selecting
odd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility
impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act,
therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection
under consideration is consequently wholly baseless.
FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.
IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for
acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and
felt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are
before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at
all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly
equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire
equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in
distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it
is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection
instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at
all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To
determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction
from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the
Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains
to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it,
by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state
of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only
by falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the
Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity.
CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL--HOW TREATED BY
NECESSITARIANS.
V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit,
choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a
passing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the
other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal
to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty
and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental
science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted
receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect
clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The
former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in
the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is
possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or
of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which,
from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of
perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in
distinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of
Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these
circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore
is overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So
important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True
philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon
facts of any kind.
PALPABLE MISTAKE.
VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which
Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of
the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can
and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal.
"The reason why some metaphysical writers," says President Day, "have
laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is
probably the _inference_ which they propose to draw from the position
which they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or
the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly
equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all _other_ cases, even
though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on
what ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely
indifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he
will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether
to possess an estate or a trinket?" The advocates of the doctrine of
Liberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under
consideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that,
because the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and
felt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in
distinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action,
impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally
strong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject
to the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is
subject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by
Motives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more
act in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy
body can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by
forces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity,
then, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be
equal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many
of them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circumstances,
selection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory,
or admit the dogma, of events without causes.
CHAPTER VI.
CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
THE argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine
of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the
Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of
the Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God.
This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves
certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot
foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument
has already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience
is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the
philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the
obvious reason, that of the _mode_, _nature_, and _degree_, of the
Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we
must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any
certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the
doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration,
and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a
truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as
affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that
these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we
know but that, if we understood the _mode_, to say nothing of the nature
and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the
utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the
doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity.
If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they
are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary
he foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of
the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined,
that God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our
mind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such
conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former
are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter.
I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain
acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not
necessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with
present freedom. How do I know but that God's foreknowledge of future
acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts.
Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than
in the following extract from Jouffroy's "Introduction to Ethics." The
extract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive
perusal.
DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT
OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
"To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that
foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk
of forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a
contradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether
had we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty
for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in
cases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past.
This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability.
It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with
necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes
in given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can
predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with
entire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain
in force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical
occurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight
would extend much further, were it not for unexpected circumstances
which come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond
probability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for
the very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise
from such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably
follow the same antecedent circumstances. Where the question is, then,
as to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with
certainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability.
Such is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our
minds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can
never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects
connected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are
to be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight
must be merely conjecture."
MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
"If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of
foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict
consequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to
which all the necessary causes in nature are subject--laws which change
only according to his will,--he can foresee with absolute certainty all
events which will take place in future. The certain foresight of
effects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases,
and which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual
laws of nature are not modified,--this foresight, which, even when most
sure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty
in God, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours.
But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot
foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we
can; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of
the laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely
this, that their volitions are not necessary, God cannot calculate, any
more than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any
given case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no
further than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never
amounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must,
therefore, say either that God can foresee, certainly, the future
volitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that
man is free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than we can,
foresee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and
human free-will are brought into direct contradiction.
But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we
suppose that God foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee
it; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask,
such an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea
as even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we
any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own
feebleness? I think not.
Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may
be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we
not from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of
perception--of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we
not imagine a third to exist in God--the faculty of perceiving the
future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This:
that God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human
beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them
simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such
perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those
actions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that
effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce
them; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not
whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is
merely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect
perceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced.
I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of
which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of
what we have never experienced; but I do assert, that the power of
seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing
what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving
of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to
my reason, the mystery is the same.
But whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine
foreknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to
form of it, it always, I say,--and this is the only point I am desirous
of proving,--it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be
removed, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or
not; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction
that there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge
and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right
to assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that
human reason should choose between them."
SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.
There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent
reverence, upon the truth, that "secret things belong to God," and those
and those only, "that are revealed to us;" that "none by searching can
find out God;" that "as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His
ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;" and that it
is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God's mode
of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in
religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless
true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge,
against the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is
based entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully
understand the _mode_ of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that
they have so measured and determined the "ways and thoughts" of God,
that they _know_ that he cannot foresee any but _necessary_ events; that
among many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them
necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact,
will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained
this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus "found out the
Almighty to perfection?" To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears
more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which
becomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has
not been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can
foresee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee
events free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the "secret
things" which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of
the _mode_ of God's fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare
deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire
argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor
of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once.
NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.
To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection
which he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free
in the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are
uncertain. If they are still certainly known to God, they are both
certain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the
same sense. As far as the _powers_ of the agent are concerned, the
action may be uncertain, while God at the same time may know certainly
how he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the _powers_ of the
agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of God, who
knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is
certain.
CHAPTER VII.
BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD,
IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT.
ALL truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must
be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be
assumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God's purposes
and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other
hand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a
different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the
remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth
of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine
Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the
light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes
and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose,
preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To
this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths
before us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines
himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him
to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this,
knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to
bear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or
causes human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of
eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness,
preordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the _motives_
and _influences_ under which moral agents do act, and in the light of
which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.
GODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.
1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God's purposes and agency with
human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do
act, do not destroy their free agency,--a fact which must be true from
the nature of the Will,--then God's purposes to give existence, and his
agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in
any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident
truth.
SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.
2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of
moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the
motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would
render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But
when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do
exist, we then perceive the reason why God gave existence to these
motives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, constitutes
no part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine
Mind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was
overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The
good which results from creation and providence is the great and
exclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, God always
regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible
with the existence of the best possible system.
DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.
3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which
represent God as, on the whole, _purposing_ the death of incorrigible
transgressors, and yet as not _willing_ it, but as willing the opposite.
The purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of
the transgressor,--a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence,
in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself,
however, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which
God never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils
which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can
will. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures
represent God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the
death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact
that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature
to do, as affirming, that He is not "willing that any should perish, but
that all should come to a knowledge of the truth."
GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.
4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally
purposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of
his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are
in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these:
(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor
which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently,
and which was not best adapted to secure that end.
(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the _object_ of God in
creation and providence, the opposite of this being true.
(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to
produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent
happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this
end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.--Now if creatures
perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault.
SIN A MYSTERY.
5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in
which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That
all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a
fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any
circumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever
refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience
of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for
ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real
reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with
such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite
course.
CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.
One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine
government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of
that government which results from this view of the subject commends
itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe.
_Mysteries_ we do and must find in it; but _absurdities_ and
_contradictions_, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned
for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While
"God sits on no precarious throne,
Nor borrows leave to be,"
the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice
of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government
"commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God."
CHAPTER VIII.
OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.
SECTION I.
THE Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the
Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the
different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following
propositions:
1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the
action of the Will.
2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far
forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon
the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that
we are accountable. This I argue because,
1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the
phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of
their occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability,
therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are,
accountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and
character depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are
voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind.
2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really
corresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction
is expressed in two ways.
(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or
Sensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: "You have no right to
_entertain_ such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right _indulge_
such feeling's." In other words, praise or blame is never directly
predicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will
relatively to them.
(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all
states of mind whatever; depends upon _intention_. In no point is there
a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to
this. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that
exclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is
predicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the
race.
3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the
moment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of
a warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary
chill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute
blame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or
perceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in
opposition to its determinations.
4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to
be, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rectitude,
it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or
thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We
can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can
conceive of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to the
consciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders
demonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only
of the Will.
5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of
Inspiration. For example. "Lust, when it is _conceived_, bringeth forth
sin." The involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the
action of the Will in harmony with that feeling.
6. A single supposition will place this whole subject in a light
perfectly conspicuous before the mind. We can readily conceive that the
Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the
moral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are opposed to
it. We can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition, to
wit, that the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with
the law, while the determinations of the Will are all opposed to it.
What shall we think of these two states? Let us suppose a case of no
unfrequent occurrence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of the
mind, are in perfect harmony with the law, while the action of this
Will, or the voluntary states, are in determined opposition to the law,
the individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, and
act in opposition to them. Is there any virtue at all in such a state of
mind? Who would dare to say that there is? Is not the guilt of the
individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the
feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? Now if, as all will admit,
there is no virtue at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in
harmony with the law, and the determinations of the Will, or voluntary
states of the mind, are opposed to it, how can there be guilt when the
Will, or voluntary states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the
Sensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it
demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame
are predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind.
7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the
point. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either
directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most
High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this
nature? The answer, perhaps, would be, that he is not a rational being,
and is therefore not responsible for anything.
Let us suppose, then, that with this nature, God had associated
Intelligence and Free-Will, such as man possesses. Why should the animal
now be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature, any more
than in the first instance, when the effect, in both instances, exists,
alike independent of his knowledge, choice, and agency? A greater
absurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theologian, that the
mere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible
for what God himself produces in connection with that rationality, and
produces wholly independent of the knowledge, choice, and agency of that
subject.
Let us suppose, further, that the animal under consideration, as soon as
he becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature, holds
all its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, and never
suffers them, in a single instance, to induce a voluntary act contrary
to that law. Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of
that creature? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in
proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to
the Moral law? The above illustration renders two conclusions
demonstrably evident:
1. For the mere _existence_ of any constitutional propensity whatever,
the creature is not and cannot be responsible.
2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary power, are in perfect
harmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full
subjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the
discharge of his duty to God and Man. For the involuntary and necessary
actings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible.
It is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their
progenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that,
for the mere _existence_ of these propensities, together with their
necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty.
SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY.
Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above illustrated
here claim our attention.
MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.
I. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held
responsible, even as "deserving God's wrath and curse, not only in this
life, but in that which is to come," not merely for their own voluntary
acts of disobedience, nor for their involuntary exercises, but for the
act of a progenitor, performed when they had no existence. If God holds
creatures responsible for such an act, we may safely affirm that it is
absolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a
principle; and that God has so constituted them, as to render it
impossible for them to form such a conception. Can a being who is not a
_moral_ agent sin? Is not _existence_ necessary to moral agency? How
then can creatures "sin _in_ and _through_ another" six thousand years
before their own existence commenced? We cannot conceive of creatures as
guilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds.
How can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being,--an
act of which they had, and could have, no knowledge, choice, or agency
whatever? How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and hold it as a
revelation from Him who has declared with an oath, that the "son shall
not bear the iniquity of the father," but that "every man shall die for
his own sins?"
CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.
II. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind
derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders
obedience to the commands of God impossible, and disobedience necessary,
and that for the mere _existence_ of this nature, men "deserve God's
wrath and curse, not only in this world, but in that which is to come."
If the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evident, that this
corrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge, choice, or
agency of the creature, who, for its existence, is pronounced deserving
of, and "bound over to the wrath of God." Equally evident is it, that
this corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of God. He
proclaims himself the Maker of "every soul of man." As its Maker, He
must have imparted to that soul the constitution or nature which it
actually possesses. It does not help the matter at all, to say, that
this nature is derived from our progenitor: for the laws of generation,
by which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor, are
sustained and continued by God himself. It is a truth of reason as well
as of revelation, that, even in respect to plants, derived "by ordinary
generation" from the seed of those previously existing, it is GOD who
"giveth them a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own
body." If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of the soul of
man.
If, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first place, is held as
deserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent
of his knowledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or indirect.
He is also held responsible for the result, not of his own agency, but
for that which results from the agency of God. On this dogma, I remark,
1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive
it to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that
which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for
that which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another.
The Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than
it can conceive of an event without a cause.
2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race.
Present the proposition to any mind, that, under the Divine government,
the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states
of minds only, and such a principle "commends itself to every man's
conscience in the sight of God." Present the dogma, on the other hand,
that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature
which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of God himself,
independently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such
creature is justly "bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the
law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual,
temporal, and eternal," and there is not a conscience in the universe
which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The
intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it.
3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary
acts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real _growth_
or _confirmation_ in holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning.
All that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to
develope the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm
the soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think
of the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the
habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing,
with the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute
impossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this
dogma, commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but
sinful acts, and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones.
Now, Necessity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. How then
can a mind, thus constituted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning?
What, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration, "How can
ye, who are _accustomed_ to do evil, learn to do well?" All such
declarations are without meaning, if this dogma is true.
4. If God imputes guilt to the creature, for the existence of the nature
under consideration, he must have required the creature to prevent its
existence. For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both,
that as "sin is a transgression of the law;" that "where there is no law,
there is no transgression;" and that "sin is not imputed where there is
no law," that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does or can
exist, and consequently no guilt is imputed. The existence of the nature
under consideration, then, is not and cannot be sin to the creature,
unless it is a transgression of the law; and it cannot be a
transgression of the law, unless the law required the creature to
prevent its existence, and prevent it when that existence was the
exclusive result of God's agency, and when the creature could have no
knowledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what God was to produce. Can
we conceive of a greater absurdity than that? God is about to produce a
certain nature by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of
natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not
preventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely
opposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required
of him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a
true exposition of the Government of God?
PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED.
III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that the Moral law
demands of us, as sinners, not what is now possible to us on the ground
of natural powers and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had
we never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have not now a capacity
for that degree of virtue which would be possible to us, had we always
developed our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. Still it is
maintained, that this degree of virtue, notwithstanding our present
total incapacity to exercise it, is demanded of us. For not rendering
it, we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In reply, I
remark:
1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express
teachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any
direct or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the
world to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that either directly or
indirectly asserts any such thing.
2. This dogma is opposed not only to the _spirit_, but to the _letter_
of the _law_. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers now
are, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love
God with all their "mind and strength," that is, not with the power they
would have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now
actually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the
law expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes
another, and different demand? In such an assertion, is he not wise, not
only _above_, but _against_ what is written?
3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of
Inspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every
one that exercises love, "hath fulfilled the law," hath done all that
the law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a
degree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x.
12, it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of his
creatures but to "love him with all the heart and with all the soul,"
that is, with all the powers they actually possess. This could not be
true, if the dogma under consideration is true.
4. If we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral
obligations of every kind, to the full extent of his present capacities,
it is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he
really ought to do. No person would ever think of exhorting him to do
more, nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly
blame him for the past, but as far as the present is concerned, he
stands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both.
5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin.
He is then truly converted, and immediately after dies. All admit that
he enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one supposes
that he now exercises, or has the capacity to exercise, as high a degree
of holiness, as he would, had he spent those fifty years in obedience,
instead of disobedience to God. This shows that even those who
theoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically
believe it themselves.
The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a
voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar
violation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness.
Nothing else is or can be sin.
CHAPTER IX.
THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND,
OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED.
IN the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I
shall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two
positions for granted:
1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of
Will.
2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated _Intentions_, and of
course ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are
predicable.
In this last position, as I have already said, there is a universal
agreement among moral philosophers. We may also safely assume the same
as a first truth of the universal Intelligence. The child, the
philosopher, the peasant, men of all classes, ages, and conditions,
agree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention, and of
ultimate intention only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to
those acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to which all other
mental determinations are subordinate, and by which they are controlled.
Thus, when an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine glory, and
the highest good of universal being, as the end of his existence; or, on
the other, his own personal gratification; and subordinates to one or
the other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, here we find
his ultimate intention. In this exclusively all mankind agree in finding
the moral character of all mental acts and states.
Now an important question arises, By what _standard_ shall we judge of
the moral character of intentions? Of course, they are to be placed in
the light of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which we are
required to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves.
But two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above
precepts, presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment.
According to one, the precept requiring us to love God with _all our
heart and strength_, requires a certain degree of _intensity_ of
intention and feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love God
with _all_ the heart.
According to the other explanation, the precept requiring us to love God
with _all_ the heart, &c., means, that we devote our entire powers and
interests to the glory of God and the good of his creatures, with the
sincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the
accomplishment of these objects in the _best possible manner_. When all
our powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this,
we then, it is affirmed, love God according to the letter and spirit of
the above precept, "with all our heart, and with all our strength."
SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.
My object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and
presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and
states of mind. This I argue from the following considerations.
1. If _intensity_ be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it,
so as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with
_all_ the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of
intensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which
our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree,
consistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree
consistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable
indefinable degree, nobody knows what. It cannot include all, and may
and must mean some one of the above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare
to tell us which. Has God given, or does our own reason give us, a
standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or
give us a definition?
2. No one could practically apply this standard, if he could define it,
as a test of moral action. The reason is obvious. No one, but
Omniscience, can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is
capable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible with life, or with
the most perfect health. If intensity, then, is the standard by which we
are required to determine definitely the character of moral actions, we
are in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown
quantity, to wit: moral action, by a standard of which we are, and of
necessity must be, most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find the
definite by means of the indefinite; the plain by means of the "palpable
obscure." Has God, or our own reason, placed us in such a predicament as
this, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the
determination of our true moral character and deserts?
3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to
us, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity
of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from
that which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that
which is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that "the judge
of all the earth" requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for
not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and
which is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed?
4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle,
in reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be
the standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual
becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that God requires him to
walk or travel a given distance, or for a time to compose himself for
the purpose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his heart to perform
the duty before him. What if he should judge himself bound to will to
sleep, for example, and to will it with all possible intensity, or with
as great an intensity as consists with his health? How long would it
take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? What if he should
with all possible intensity will to walk? What if, when with all
sincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best manner, the duty
devolved upon him, he should inquire whether the intention possessed the
requisite intensity? It would be just as rational to apply this standard
in the instances under consideration, as in any other.
5. That _Sincerity_, and not intensity of intention, presents the true
standard of moral judgment, is evident from the fact, that the former
commends itself to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible, of
ready definition in itself, and of consequently ready application, in
determining the character and moral desert of all moral actions. We can
readily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the
Will of God, and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them
in the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest
good. We can conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and
interests under the control of such an intention. We can also perceive
with perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the
supreme control of such an intention. If we are bound to yield to God at
all, we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control. If
we are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any
good at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good.
This principle also is equally applicable in, determining the character
and deserts of all moral actions. Every honest mind can readily
determine the fact, whether it is or is not acting under the supreme
control of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this
principle, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love
with _all_ the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we
adopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law.
6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony
with the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to
conceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire duty. What more
ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish?
Should it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of
intensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and
act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end
to be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not
this loving with all the heart?
7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent
energy of action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing
tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the
attempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like
the attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the
greatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an
individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand
principle of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize
with the greatest freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the
standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed,
Sincerity, and nothing else, is that standard.
8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the
Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not
"turning to the Lord with _the whole heart_, but feignedly," that is,
with insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to
this passage, have done it with the _whole heart_. The whole heart,
then, according to the express teachings of the Bible, is synonymous
with Sincerity and Sincerity according to the above definition of the
term. This is the true standard, according to revelation as well as
reason. I have other arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to
present, but these are sufficient. The importance of the subject,
together with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be
discussed in the next Chapter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon
it.
CHAPTER X.
INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY
RIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG.
WE are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or
exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words,
whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or
perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or
intuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some
definite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of
course, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of
individual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the
question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as
sin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter
into one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is
virtuous at all, unless he _intends_ obedience to the moral law. The
question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in
one and the same act? On this question I remark,
1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the
question. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity
is concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few,
if any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual
can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same
time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost
universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then
another test is applied--that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least,
it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of
intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective.
On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be
pronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might
possess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established
in the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral
actions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation.
Sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and
deserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it
is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory
and opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention
to obey and to disobey the moral law.
2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and
theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the
doctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same
act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and
holiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element
constituting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition
to the other element which is opposed to the law.
Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special
attention. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose the same individual Will
to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be
opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of
two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." Does not
the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and
holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious
intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not
this, in the language of Edwards, as "absurd as it is to talk of two
contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time."
Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having
shown that mankind are divided into two classes, the morally good and
the morally evil; that the distinguishing characteristic of the former
is, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that
it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law;
and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he
adds, "The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent
relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil." Then
follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. "In like
manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good,
while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point
good, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious
intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but
is he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to]
these, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars,
it is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and
universal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the
maxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and
particular, which is a contradiction;" (that is, it would be his
intention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey
it in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions
conceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of
demonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at
all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This
being his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full
demands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law
require more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony
with its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere
intention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there
can be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the
same time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that
is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention,
therefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace
these two contradictory elements--a serious determination to obey the
law universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time,
to disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it
universally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed
Moral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can.