3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral

law could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by

which to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us

to love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not

conformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would,

in the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just

as much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not

present two scales, according to one of which actions are classed as

conformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly

conformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown

in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one

scale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts

down as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy

or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law.

4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by

the law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total

disobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely

sinful. While the law requires us to love with _all_ the heart, it

positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual,

therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act

as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally

sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total

disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of

ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance

required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other

determines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total

disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop

short of loving with all the heart.

5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that

regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the

existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can

exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual

who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally

in all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields

to the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full

measure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one

demand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed

from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of

holiness in any degree. This leads me to remark,

6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise

from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention

conceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind--a

state of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience,

and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience.

By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in

the last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have

been his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to

moral rectitude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total

obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the

reward of holiness and the "pleasures of sin"--a most selfish and wicked

state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention

combining the elements of holiness and sin--is as great an absurdity as

the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any

of its properties as a circle.

7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is

contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. "Whosoever cometh

after me," says Christ, "and forsaketh not _all_ that he hath, he cannot

be my disciple." The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not

disciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above

named are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are

not His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any

degree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has

surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart. What other

meaning can we attach to the phrase, "forsaketh all that he hath?" All

persons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be

wholly without the circle of discipleship. What is this, but a positive

assertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility?

Again. "No man can serve two masters." "Ye cannot serve God and mammon."

Let us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed

character--intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far as they are

in harmony with the law, we serve God. So far as they are not in harmony

with the law, we serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises can be of

a mixed character, then it is true that, at every period of our lives,

we can serve God and Mammon. The service which we can render also to

each, may be in every conceivable degree. We may render, for example,

ninety-nine degrees of service to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine

to Mammon and one to God. Or our service may be equally divided between

the two. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this?

What also is the meaning of such declarations as this, "no fountain can

send forth both sweet water and bitter," if the heart of man may

exercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness?

Declarations of a similar kind abound in the Bible. They are surely

without meaning, if the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true.

8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the whole range of error

presents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed

Moral Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all

their moral exercises, and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with

them to secure acceptance with the "Judge of all the earth." A man who

has adopted such a principle will almost never, whatever his course of

life may be, seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will

always seem to himself to possess enough of it, to render his acceptance

with God certain. The kind of virtue which can mingle itself with

selfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be

possessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on earth. If this be

assumed as real holiness--that holiness which will stand the ordeal of

eternity, who will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title to

heaven? Here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for

ever. Let it ever be borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at

the same time and place, "send forth both sweet water and bitter." "Ye

cannot serve God and Mammon."

OBJECTIONS.

Two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a

passing notice here.

AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES.

1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great

variety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention,

therefore, may be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a

consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark,

that when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the

good and rejects the bad, alike in _all_ the motives presented. The

opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard

or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to

reject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in

respect to one motive, will induce the same in respect to all other

motives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result

from a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can

result in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it

from different directions.

LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER.

2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving

God, with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another.

Yet our love, in all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be

real, and yet be greatly defective--that is, it may be real, and embrace

elements morally wrong. It is true, that love may exist in different

degrees, as far as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is not

so, however, with love in the form of intention--intention in harmony

with moral obligation, the only form of love demanded by the moral law.

Such intention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under the same

identical influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The

Will always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral

obligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable

of, or the nature of the case demands.

MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER.

3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good

and perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any

definite period of time. This consequence, to say nothing of what is

likely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibility is concerned,

follow from this theory. But let us contemplate it, for a moment, in the

light of an example or two. An individual, from regard to moral

obligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up to a given

period of time. Then, under the influence of temptation, he tells a

deliberate falsehood. Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into

that lie, as to make it partly good and partly bad?--as to make it

anything else than a _total_ falsehood? Did the prior goodness of David

make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? Let the

advocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness

from these acts if he can. He can just as well find these elements here,

as in any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. "The

righteousness of the righteous cannot save him" from total sinfulness,

any more than from condemnation "in the day of his transgression."

CHAPTER XI.

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR

STATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG.

THE Will, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and

Sensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of

these departments of our nature. In all acts and states morally right,

the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral

obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the

impulses of the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all

acts morally wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility,

irrespective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Impulse, and not a

regard to the just, the right, the true and the good, is the law of its

action. In all such cases, as the impulses which control the Will are

various, the external forms through which the internal acts, or

intentions, will manifest themselves, will be equally diversified. Yet

the _spring_ of action is in all instances one and the same, impulse

instead of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being controlled

by _amiable_, instead of _dissocial_ and _malign_ impulses, and in a

consequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness. It

consists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just, the right,

the true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation, instead

of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the

principle above illustrated, I remark:

THOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED.

1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and

those who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all

instances, in the mere exterior _form_ of action, but in the _spring_ or

_intention_ from which all such action proceeds. In most persons, and in

all, at different periods, the amiable and social propensities

predominate over the dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior

will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely. In

many, also, the impulsive power of conscience--that department of the

Sensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and

impels to obedience to the Moral law--is strongly developed, and may

consequently take its turn in controlling the Will. In all such

instances, there will be the external forms of real virtue. It is one

thing, however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse, and

quite another, to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred

regard for duty.

How many individuals, who may be now wearing the fairest forms of

virtue, will find within them, as soon as present impulses are

supplanted by the strong action of others, in opposition to rectitude,

no maxims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, to resist and

subject such impulses. Their conduct is in conformity to the

requirements of virtue, not from any internal intention to be in

universal harmony with moral obligation, but simply because, for the

time being, the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction. No

individual, it should ever be kept in mind, makes any approach to real

virtue, whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, by a sealing

act of moral election, the Will is placed in harmony with the universal

law of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from

this internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and

fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those

who are not.

SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE.

2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference between

_Selfishness_ and _Benevolence_. The latter expresses and comprehends

all the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree. The former

comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. Benevolence consists

in the full harmony of the Will or intention with the just, the right,

the true, and the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Selfishness

consists in voluntary subjection to _impulse_, irrespective of such

obligation. Whenever self-gratification is the law of action, there is

pure selfishness, whatever the character or direction of the impulse may

be. Selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined, as a

supreme regard to our own interest or happiness. If this is a correct

definition, the drunkard is not selfish at all; for he sacrifices his

present and future happiness, to gratify a beastly appetite, and

destroys present peace in the act of self-gratification. If selfishness,

however, consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme his

selfishness at once appears! A mother who does not act from moral

obligation, when under the strong influence of maternal affection,

appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now

let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that

she must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will

selfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift

is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection

uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish,

that is, as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when

under the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when

under that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike,

impulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required

to be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse.

COMMON MISTAKE.

3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear

to have fallen, in judging of the moral character of individuals. As we

have seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sensibility

irrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive department of conscience

takes its turn, among the other propensities, in controlling the action

of the voluntary power. Now because, in all such instances, there are

the exterior forms of virtue, together with an apparently sincere

internal regard for the same, the presence of real virtue is

consequently inferred. Now before such a conclusion can be authorized,

one question needs to be determined, the _spring_ from which such

apparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral

obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result

purely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in

the direction of the forms of virtue.

DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.

4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a

passing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a

consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or

more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal

disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has

its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with

great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they

rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a

regard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of

self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal

rectitude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight

observation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right,

the true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this one principle.

Still, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in

a very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first

approach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together

with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department

of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise

their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire

range of moral obligation.

SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.

In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that

the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only,

and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the

voluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence

and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From

this, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and

breadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the

sphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself:

By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full

harmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may

perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral

Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer,

however, demand its introduction here.

The Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts.

Yet, a moment's reflection will convince us that both these precepts

have their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the

enunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound

to love God with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as

ourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After

speaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, "the second is

like unto it," that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first.

Now the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which

implies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the

principle which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and

of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one

common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This

principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different

philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that

I notice is this.

_It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and

treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived

intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their

intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral

obligation._

Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct

enunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the

fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is

binding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love God

with _all the heart_, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the

object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and

Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves,

is the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the

same value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under

consideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met.

God will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature

his. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will

intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and

relative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation

infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and

no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than

this.

The same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by

Kant, to wit: "So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become

law in a system of universal moral obligation"--that is, let your

controlling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly

be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention.

By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: "The moral principle

being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may

be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of

not erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or

resolution, into a maxim of universal legislation"--that is, we cannot

but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the

same motive or intention.

It will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really

identical with that above announced and illustrated. It is only when we

are conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and

treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and

relative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in

conformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will

might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are

conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us

not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that

all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same

intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on

this point.

COMMON MISTAKE.

1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in

treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very

commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the

Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as

consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most

distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this

proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy,

that "everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively

of right or wrong _feelings_"--feelings as distinguished from volitions

as phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition

is true, to wit: that _nothing_ right or wrong, in a moral agent,

consists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of

the Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions,

desires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further

claim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings?

Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all

moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If

the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the

Sensibility--which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral

agents, consists of right or wrong feelings--then all moral agents, at

all times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same

feelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all

times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the

theory under consideration.

LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.

2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the _nature_ of that _love_

which is the "fulfilling of the law." It does not, as all admit, consist

in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally

obvious and universally admitted, in any mere _convictions_ of the

Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it does not consist in any

states of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such

feelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all

circumstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be

true, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But

when, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily

consecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good

and when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to

esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic

and relative importance; _here_ is the love which is the fulfilling of

the law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference

to all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled,

and which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in

every system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in

the exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently,

is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent

Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject

presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a

necessary truth of the universal Intelligence.

IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.

3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral

character, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their

occupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal

convictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one

omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one

and identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention,

in the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and

treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and

relative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue,

in all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In

this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of

character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time,

precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all

times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control

of the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of

character in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this

reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral

agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all

obligation of every kind.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.

SECTION I.

EVERY perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within

the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion,

every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the

action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will's

activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless

range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the

phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly

destitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction

of such phenomena, constitutes _complex_ states of mind, which have a

positive moral character. In all instances, the _moral_ and _voluntary_

elements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration

has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians,

and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy,

but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the

subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined

to the action of the Will in the direction of the _natural propensities_

and _religious affections_.

ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL

PROPENSITIES.--EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.

1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural

propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c.,

I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly

explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting

this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed

necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of

sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of

the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a

_sensation_ or _emotion_. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to

seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive

state of the Sensibility is called a _desire_. When the Will concurs

with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a _wish_. Wish

is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is

cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the

desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the

action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish

morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction,

and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the

desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds

true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of

the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire--a

feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the

Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a

complex state of mind morally right or wrong.

ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c.

Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere

_feeling_ of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed,

perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the

surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting

from malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere _desire_ of esteem. It

consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and

admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere

desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the

control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to

all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility,

irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the

action of the Will in respect to such states--action which must arise in

some direction under such circumstances--moral guilt, or

praiseworthiness, arises.

I might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle;

as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not

consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the

appetite--that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence

of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the

quantity partaken of--excess considered as an external act. It consists,

on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the

control of the appetite. The excess referred to is the _consequent_ and

_index_ of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are

abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle.

RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.

2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex

phenomena denominated _religious affections_. The position which I here

assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and

praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections

are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The

voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only

on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily

results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or

we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that

all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action

of the Will.

SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.

My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is

really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three

cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The

question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as

mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are

they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or

as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such

acts?

REPENTANCE.

In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used

at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed

to express the same thing; as for example, "Turn ye;" "Let the wicked

forsake his way;" "Let him turn unto the Lord;" "He that confesseth and

forsaketh his sins shall find mercy," &c. In all such passages

repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of

voluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore,

fully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is

distinguished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which

accompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the

Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the

Old Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with

those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as

committed against God and man, this is the repentance recognized and

required as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mere

_conviction_ of sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would

be truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility

which attend such convictions; else Repentance would be Godly Sorrow,

from which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It

must consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those

convictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from

selfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the

service of God.

LOVE.

A single passage will distinctly set before us the nature of _Love_ as

required in the Bible--that love which comprehends all other virtues,

and the exercise of which is the "fulfilling of the law." "Hereby," says

the sacred writer, "we perceive the love of God." The phrase "_of God_"

is not found in the original. The passage, as it there stands, reads

thus: "By this we know _love;_" that is, we know the nature of the love

which the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that "love is the

fulfilling of the law." What is that in which, according to the express

teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? "Because he

laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the

brethren." In the act of "laying down his life for us," we are here

told, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the

nature of this love? I answer,

1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of

the Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to.

2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or

intention. "He laid down his life for us." What is this but a voluntary

act? Yet this is love, the "love which is the fulfilling of the law."

3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary

devotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal

being, from a regard to the idea of duty. "He laid down his life for

us." "We _ought_ to lay down our lives for the brethren." In each

particular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and

revealed. Christ "laid down his life for us," because he was in a state

of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular

act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration

to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that "we

ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." When, therefore, the

Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of

particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the

Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being

and interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of

consecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests,

under the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully

discharge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved

upon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with

particular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly

required in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the

latter does exist, the former will of course exist.

OF FAITH.

But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is

everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with _trust_, reposing

confidence, committing our interests to God as to a "faithful Creator."

Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. "I know," says Paul,

"in whom I have believed," that is, exercised faith, "that he is able to

keep that which I have _committed_ to him against that day." Here the

act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than

an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does

not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a

voluntary act, _entrusting_ our interests to God as to a faithful

Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious

affections of every kind.

SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILLUSTRATED IN THE

PRECEDING SECTION.

Few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the

preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of

certain important questions which require elucidation.

CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS--WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED.

1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of

the Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself,

irrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are

specifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such

precepts the _effect_ is put for the _cause_. These acts and states are

required, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right

or wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and

prohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but the _cause_ of

such acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will.

Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily

result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit

the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might

specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit

the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this

disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same

thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the

intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the

relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in

respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and

Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited.

OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.

2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the

existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings.

Whatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or

may be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we

may properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and

internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to

us, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the

Will. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence.

For this reason we are held responsible for the effect.

FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.

3. We now notice the _power of control_ which the Will has over the

feelings.

(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the

control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence.

(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent

or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will

either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example,

when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry

feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they

appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great

extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds

true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they

are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly

modified, or totally disappear.

(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an

indirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is

in full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the

true and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with

"whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good

report," and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects,

will mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of

the Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility

will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the

other hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual

impulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become.

In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of

Goodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of

the Intelligence and Sensibility both.

(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of the

_affections_ demands special attention. A husband, for example, has

pledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control

of those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage

union. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that

pledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command

her appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circumstances

whatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The

same holds true of every department of the affections, not only in

respect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the

Creator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless

law.

Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true

that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of

the action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and

sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the

voluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be

regarded.

RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.

4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love,

repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their

fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will

now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different

exercises to one another, especially the relation of _Faith_ to other

exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been

demonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same

time put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and

holiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts

of a homogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit

obedience to God, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact,

that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience,

at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may

exercise implicit trust, or faith for "grace whereby we may serve God

acceptably with reverence and godly fear." Now, such is our condition as

sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never

purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence

of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and

perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace;

and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been

formed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and

received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and

perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really

conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance

upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all

acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself

perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally

pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by

faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than

as a revealed truth of inspiration.

CHAPTER XIII.

INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.

MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.

IT is an old maxim, that the Will governs the understanding. It becomes

a very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is

this maxim true? It is undeniable, that, in many important respects,

mankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments, and therefore,

responsible for them. We often hear the declaration, "You ought, or

ought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to form such and such

judgments." "You are bound to admit, or have no right to admit, such and

such things as true." Men often speak, also, of _pre-judging_ particular

cases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked

here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments,

&c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they

exclusively phenomena of the Will?

ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.

The proposition which I lay down is this, _that the Intelligence, in its

appropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make wrong affirmations; that

wrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all

instances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions of Will_. If the

Intelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine

in what department of its action such affirmations may be found.

PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.

Let us first contemplate the action of the _primary_ intellectual

faculties--Sense, or the faculty of _external_ perception;

Consciousness, the faculty of _internal_ observation; and Reason, the

faculty which gives us _necessary_ and _universal truths_. The two

former faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter

gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and

affirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the

action of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible.

SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.

Let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the

Understanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the

three primary faculties into _notions_ of particular objects. The latter

classifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also,

we find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only

combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The

Judgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived.

Thus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show,

that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong

affirmations.

ERROR, WHERE FOUND.--ASSUMPTION.

Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and

pre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are

observing some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given

but those common to a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c.

The perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given

nothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of

it, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can

only affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different

classes of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made

as to what class the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence,

therefore, makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round.

"What is it?" One answers, "It is a man." That is my opinion. Another:

"It is a horse." That is my judgment. Another still says, "I differ from

you all. It is an ox." That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions,

judgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence?

By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such

circumstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere _assumptions_ of

the Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judgments,

and notions among men, and all where _error_ is found, are nothing but

assumptions of the Will.

Assumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the

Intelligence, and sometimes not. Suppose the individuals above referred

to approach the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar to

the horse. The Judgment at once classifies the object accordingly. As

soon as this takes place, they all exclaim, "well, it is a horse." Here

are assumptions again, but assumptions based upon real affirmations of

the Intelligence. In the former instance we had assumptions based upon

no such affirmations.

False assumptions do not always imply moral guilt. Much of the necessary

business of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent

_guessing_. When the farmer, for example, casts any particular seed into

the ground, it is only by balance of probabilities that he often

determines, as far as he does or can determine, what is best; and not

unfrequently is he necessitated to assume and act, when all

probabilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no reasons at

all for taking one course in distinction from another. Yet no moral

guilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction, and

when all available light has been sought and employed to determine the

direction which is best.

As false assumptions, however, often involve very great moral guilt, it

may be important to develope some of the distinguishing characteristics

of assumptions of this class.

1. All assumptions involve moral guilt, which are in opposition to the

real and positive affirmations of the Intelligence. As the Will may

assume in the absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of

them, so it may in opposition to them. When you have carried a man's

Intellect in favor of a given proposition, it is by no means certain

that you have gained his assent to its truth. He may still assume, that

all the evidence presented is inadequate, and consequently refuse to

admit its truth. When the Will thus divorces itself from the

Intelligence, guilt of no ordinary character is incurred. Men often

express their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying to

individuals, "You are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true.

You are already convinced. What excuse have you for not yielding to that

conviction?" Yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their

intellectual and moral nature, by holding on to assumptions, in reality

known to be false.

2. Assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing

ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our

assumptions. For us to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true

or false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the

basis of such assumptions, when adequate light is available, involves

the same criminality, as assumptions in opposition to the Intelligence.

Hence we often have the expression in common life, "You had no right to

form a judgment under such circumstances. You were bound, before doing

it, to avail yourself of all the light within your reach."

3. _Positive_ assumptions, without intellectual affirmations as their

basis, equally positive, involve moral guilt of no ordinary character.

As remarked above, we are often placed in circumstances in which we are

necessitated to act in some direction, and to select some particular

course without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in

distinction from another. Now while _action_ is proper in such a

condition, it is not proper to make a positive assumption that the

course selected is the best. Suppose, that all the facts before my mind

bearing upon the character of a neighbor, are equally consistent with

the possession, on his part, of a character either good or bad. I do

violence to my intellectual and moral nature, if, under such

circumstances, I make the assumption that his character is either the

one or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the

former. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in

such instances!

PRE-JUDGMENTS.

A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an

assumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the

facts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions are

generally classed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of

individuals, that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain

persons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is,

that individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another,

prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such

facts.

INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS.

It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre-judgments, blind the

mind to facts of one class, and render it quick to discern those of the

other, and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This I

think is not a correct statement of the case. Pre-judgments may, and

often do, prevent all proper investigation of a subject. In this case,

the Intelligence is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, it

can make no positive affirmations whatever.

So far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon

one side of a question, and to those bearing upon the other, the

Intelligence is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true

bearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not

presented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole

case, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a

partial hearing, that opinion is a mere assumption of Will, and nothing

else.

THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS.

But the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the

hearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments,

or assumptions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably

included, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one

side of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing

upon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do

not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of

all the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a

given subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts

and arguments they shall meet with, according to previous assumptions.

Let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the

reply is, "After all, I am not convinced," while the most trivial

circumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized

upon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the

operations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a "deceived heart," that

is, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying its own

unauthorized, pre-formed assumptions. Such assumptions can withstand any

degree of evidence whatever. The Intelligence did not give them

existence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are exclusively creatures

of Will, and by an act of Will, they must be dissolved, or they will

remain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll

against them.

INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.

The influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions, are

found in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the

appetites, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the

love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion,

&c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a

particular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or

assumption, that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in

such cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the

Intelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the

Intelligence really affirms.

CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE

INTELLIGENCE.

As there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their

characteristics. Among these I cite the following:

1. The qualities of a particular object, actually perceived, as in the

case above cited, may be common to a variety of classes which we know,

and also to others which we do not know. On the perception of such

qualities, the Intelligence will suggest those classes only which we

know, while the particular object perceived may belong to a class

unknown. If, in such circumstances, a positive assumption, as to what

class it does belong, is made, a wrong assumption must of necessity be

made. The _Intelligence_ in this case is not deceived. It places the

Will, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive

assumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner,

multitudes of wrong assumptions arise.

2. When facts are before the mind, an _explanation_ of them is often

desired. In such circumstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in

explanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike

false. If a positive assumption is made in such a case, it must of

necessity be a false one; because it must be in the direction of some

one hypothesis before the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelligence

necessitates a wrong assumption, if any is made. Yet it is not itself

deceived; because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of

positive assumptions. In such circumstances, error very frequently

arises.

3. _Experience_ often occasions wrong assumptions, which are attributed

incorrectly to real affirmations of the Intelligence. A friend, for

example, saw an object which presented the external appearance of the

apple. He had never before seen those qualities, except in connection

with that class of objects. He assumed, at once, that it was a real

apple; but subsequently found that it was an artificial, and not a real

one. Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? By no means. That

faculty had never affirmed, that those qualities which the apple

presents to the eye, never exist in connection with any other object,

and consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance

given. _Experience_, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence,

led to the wrong assumption in this instance. The same principle holds

true, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named.

4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in

the presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm _hypothetically_,

that is, when a given proposition is _assumed_ as true, the Intelligence

may and will present the logical _antecedents_ and _consequents_ of that

assumption. If the assumption is false, such will be the character of

the antecedents and consequents following from it. An individual, in

tracing out these antecedents and consequents, however, may mistake the

hypothetical, for the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong

assumption in theology or philosophy, for example, may give an entire

system, all of the leading principles of which are likewise false. In

tracing out, and perfecting that system, how natural the assumption,

that one is following the _real_, and not the _hypothetical_,

affirmations of the Intelligence! From this one source an infinity of

error exists among men.

In an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the subject of the present

chapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be

given to it in this connection. Few subjects would throw more clear

light over the domains of truth and error than this, if fully and

distinctly elucidated.

In conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of the highest

attainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to

make, consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the

Intelligence in search of the right, the just, the true, and the good,

in all departments of human investigation; and in a rigid discipline of

the Will, to receive and treat, as true and sacred, whatever the

Intelligence may present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the

full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized

assumptions.

CHAPTER XIV.

LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.

LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.

THERE are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to

be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it

stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral

Servitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the

subject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to

Moral Servitude? _It is that state in which the action of Will is in

harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the

true, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect

subordination--a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the

law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into

accomplishment_. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of

moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in

servitude to any propensity whatever. He "rules his own spirit." He is

the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He

resolves against the evil, and avoids it. "Greater," says the maxim of

ancient wisdom, "is such a man than he that taketh a city."

Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is _a state in which the Will is so

ensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the

propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that

it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with

any rational expectation of keeping that resolution_. The individual in

this condition "knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the

bad." "The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the

evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does." All men

agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an

individual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any other propensity,

by common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his

propensities.

The reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter

Servitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally

regarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen.

Servitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two

evils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself.

Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important

sense, against his Will. The _state_ in which he is, is regarded as in

itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a

vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom.

The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude.

When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising

to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime

harmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude, as revealed in the

Intelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most

to be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state,

and to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the

idea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to

impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the

loss of the high prerogative of "ruling our own spirits," on the other

hand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and

least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot

but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself.

Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and

effort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others

of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man

is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice--that is, from choice of

the state as a good in itself. The _state_ he regards as an evil in

itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he

submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom.

REMARKS.

MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.

1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians,

especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty

of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and

not as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very

little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the

foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from

Necessity. "A free Will," says Kant, "and a Will subjected to the Moral

Law, are one and identical." A more capital error in philosophy is not

often met with than this.

MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.

2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms

all men to be, until they are emancipated by the influence of the

Remedial System therein revealed--a truth affirmed by what every man

experiences in himself, and by the entire mass of facts which the

history of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by

an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his

own spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can

resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with

any rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature;

to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the

Scriptures, with great propriety, call the "bondage of corruption," is a

fundamental design of the Remedial System.

CHAPTER XV.

LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.

COMMON IMPRESSION.

A VERY common impression exists,--an impression universal among those

who hold the doctrine of Necessity,--that the doctrine of Liberty, as

maintained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most important

respects, independent of his Creator, and therefore, tends to induce in

the mind, that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite

and antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at

the basis of all true piety and virtue. If this is the real tendency of

this doctrine, it certainly constitutes an important objection against

it. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of this doctrine,

essential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and

self-confidence, and tending most strongly to induce the opposite

spirit,--a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in

the Remedial System; if we find, also, that the doctrine of Necessity,

in many fundamental particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have,

in such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine,

and against the latter. The object of the present Chapter, therefore, is

to _elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the

spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the

spirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace_.

SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.

Before proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle

definitely the meaning of the phrase _spirit of dependence_. The

_conviction_ of our dependence is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence

is quite another. What is this spirit? In its exercise, the mind _rests

in voluntary dependence upon the grace of God_. The heart is fully set

upon doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the mind is in the

voluntary exercise of _trust_ in God for "grace whereby we may serve Him

acceptably." The _spirit_ of dependence, then, implies obedience

actually commenced. The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of

Liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? In

this respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of

Necessity?

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE.

1. In accomplishing my object, I will first consider the tendency, in

this one respect, of the doctrine of Necessity. An individual, we will

suppose, finds himself under influences which induce him to sin, and

which consequently, if this doctrine is true, render it impossible for

him, without the interposition of Divine power, not to sin. A

consideration of his condition tends to _convince_ him, that is, to

induce the intellectual conviction, of his entire dependence upon Divine

grace. But the intellectual _conviction_ of our dependence, as above

shown, is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence, which, as there stated,

consists in actually trusting the Most High for grace to do what he

requires, and implies actual obedience already commenced, is quite

another thing. Now the doctrine of Necessity has a tendency to produce

this _conviction_, but none to induce the _spirit_ of dependence:

inasmuch as with this conviction, it produces another equally strong, to

wit: that the creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, and

cannot, exercise the _spirit_ of dependence. In thus producing the

conviction, that, under present influences, the subject does not, and

cannot exercise that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the

annihilation of that Spirit.

When an individual is in a state of actual obedience, the tendency of

this doctrine upon him is no better; since it produces the conviction,

that while a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, produces in

us a spirit of dependence, we shall and must exercise it; and that while

it does not produce that spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where

is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction?

According to the doctrine of Necessity, nothing but the actual

interposition of Divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of

dependence. The _belief_ of this doctrine has no such tendency whatever.

The grand mistake of the Necessitarian here, consists in the assumption,

that, because his _doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce the_

CONVICTION _of dependence, it has a tendency equally manifest to induce

the_ SPIRIT _of dependence;_ when, in fact, it has no such tendency

whatever.

2. We will now contemplate the intrinsic tendencies of the doctrine of

Liberty to induce the spirit of humility and dependence. Every one will

see, at once, that the consciousness of Liberty cannot itself be a

ground of dependence, in respect to action, in favor of the right and in

opposition to the wrong: for the possession of such Liberty, as far as

the power itself is concerned, leaves us, at all times, equally liable

to do the one as the other. How can an equal liability to two distinct

and opposite courses, be a ground of assurance, that we shall choose the

one, and avoid the other? Thus the consciousness of Liberty tends

directly and intrinsically to a total annihilation of the spirit of

self-dependence.

Let us now contemplate our relation to the Most High. He knows perfectly

in what direction we shall, in our self-determination, exert our powers

under any influence and system of influences brought to bear upon us. It

is also in His power to subject us to any system of influences he

pleases. He has revealed to us the great truth, that if, in the exercise

of the spirit of dependence, we will trust Him for grace to do the good

and avoid the evil which He requires us to do and avoid, He will subject

us to a Divine influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, and

against the other. The conviction, therefore, rises with full and

perfect distinctness in the mind, that, in the exercise of the spirit of

dependence, action in all future time, in the direction of purity and

bliss, is secure; and that, in the absence of this spirit, action, in

the opposite direction, is equally certain. In the belief of the

doctrine of Liberty, another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our

minds, that the _exercise_ of this spirit, thus rendering our "calling

and election sure," is, at all times, practicable to us. What then is

the exclusive tendency of this doctrine? To destroy the spirit of

self-dependence, on the one hand, and to induce the exercise of the

opposite spirit, on the other. The doctrine of Necessity reveals the

_fact_ of dependence, but destroys the _spirit_, by the production of

the annihilating conviction, that we neither shall nor can exercise that

spirit, till God, in his sovereign dispensations, shall subject us to an

influence which renders it impossible for us not to exercise it. The

doctrine of Liberty reveals, with equal distinctness, the _fact_ of

dependence; and then, while it produces the hallowed conviction of the

perfect practicability of the exercise of the _spirit_ of dependence,

presents motives infinitely strong, not only to induce its exercise, but

to empty the mind wholly of everything opposed to it.

GOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREATURES DO ACT.

3. While the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency

depend wholly upon the Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with

entire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our powers, under all

influences, and systems of influences, brought to bear upon us, all

these influences are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have such

convictions, together with the consciousness of Liberty, and ability to

exercise, or not to exercise, the spirit of dependence, but to induce

us, in the exercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into the

petition, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil?" If

God knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the

direction of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influences at

his own control, what attitude becomes us in the presence of the "High

and lofty One," but dependence and prayer?

DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL.

4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral Servitude, together with

the conviction, that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can

rise to the "Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God;" that in the absence

of this spirit, our Moral Servitude is perfectly certain; all these,

together with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty

induces (to wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is always

practicable to us), tends only to one result, to induce the exercise of

that spirit, and to the total annihilation of the opposite spirit.

While, therefore, the doctrine of Liberty sanctifies, in the mind, the

feeling of obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong, a feeling

which the doctrine of Necessity tends to annihilate, the former (an

effect which the latter cannot produce) tends only to the annihilation

of the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and to induce that spirit of

filial dependence which cries "Abba, Father!"

CHAPTER XVI.

FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

ELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

CHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.

IN accounting for the existence and formation of peculiarities of

character, individual, social, and national, two elements only are

commonly taken into consideration, the _natural propensities_, and the

_circumstances and influences_ under which those propensities are

developed and controlled. The doctrine of Necessity permits us to take

nothing else into the account. Undoubtedly, these elements have very

great efficacy in determining character. In many instances, little else

need to be taken into consideration, in accounting for peculiarities of

character, as they exist around us, in individuals, communities, and

nations.

THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT.

In a vast majority of cases, however, another, and altogether a

different element, that of the Will, or voluntary element, must be taken

into the reckoning, or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account

for peculiarities of mental and moral development, everywhere visible

around us. It is an old maxim, that "every man is the arbiter of his own

destiny." As character determines destiny, so the Will determines

character; and man is the arbiter of his own destiny, only as he is the

arbiter of his own character. The element of Free Will, therefore, must

be taken into the reckoning, if we would adequately account for the

peculiarities of character which the individual, social, and national

history of the race presents. Even where mental and moral developments

are as the propensities and external influences, still the voluntary

element must be reckoned in, if we would account for facts as they

exist. In a majority of instances, however, if the two elements under

consideration, and these only, are taken into the account, we shall find

our conclusions very wide from the truth.

AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION.

I will take, in illustration of the above remarks, a single example--a

case with which I became so familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly

safe in vouching for the truth of the statements which I am about to

make. I knew a boy who, up to the age of ten or twelve years, was under

the influence of a most ungovernable temper--a temper easily and quickly

excited, and which, when excited, rendered him perfectly desperate.

Seldom, if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, however superior

in strength his antagonist might be. Death was always deliberately

preferred to submission. During this period, he often reflected upon his

condition, and frequently wished that it was otherwise. Still, with

melancholy deliberation, he as often said to himself, I never can and

never shall subdue this temper. At the close of this period, as he was

reflecting upon the subject again, he made up his mind, with perfect

fixedness of purpose, that, to the control of that temper, he would

never more yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its power, and

assumed the reins of self-government, in the respect under

consideration. From that moment, that temper almost never, even under

the highest provocations, obtained the control of the child. A total

revolution of mental developments resulted. He afterwards became as

distinguished for natural amiability and self-control, in respect to his

temper, as before he had been for the opposite spirit. This total

revolution took place from mere prudential considerations, without any

respect whatever to moral obligation.

Now suppose we attempt to account for these distinct and opposite

developments of character--developments exhibited by the same

individual, in these two periods--by an exclusive reference to natural

propensities and external influences. What a totally inadequate and

false account should we give of the facts presented! That individual is

just as conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that produced

this revolution, and that when he formed the determination which

resulted in that revolution, he might have determined differently, as he

is, or ever has been, of any mental states whatever. All the facts,

also, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate, that if we leave out

of the account the voluntary element, those facts must remain wholly

unexplained, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given.

The same principle holds true in all other instances. Though natural

propensities and external influences greatly _modify_ mental

developments, still, the _distinguishing_ peculiarities of character, in

all instances, receive their form and coloring from the action of the

voluntary power. This is true, of the peculiarities of character

exhibited, not only by individuals, but communities and nations. We can

never account for facts as they are, until we contemplate man, not only

as possessed of Intelligence and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All

the powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account, if men

would know man as he is.

DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER.

A few important definitions will close this Chapter.

A _decisive_ character exists, where the Will acts in harmony with

propensities strongly developed. When a number of propensities of this

kind exist, action, and consequently character, may be changeable, and

yet decisive.

_Unity_ and _decision_ of character result, when the Will steadily acts

in harmony with some one over-shadowing propensity.

Character is _fluctuating_ and _changeable_, when the Will surrenders

itself to the control of different propensities, each easily and highly

excited in the presence of its appropriate objects, and yet the

excitement but temporary. Thus, different propensities, in rapid

succession, take their turn in controlling the Will.

_Indecision_ and _feebleness_ of character result, when the Will

uniformly acts under the influence of the principle of _fear_ and

_caution_. To such a mind, in all important enterprises especially,

there is always "a lion in the way." Such a mind, therefore, is

continually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action

is necessary to success.

CHAPTER XVII.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

A FEW reflections of a general nature will conclude this Treatise.

OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.

1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view of the subject

presented in this Treatise, demands a passing notice here. All things in

existence, it is said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by

_Laws_. It is readily admitted, that all things have their laws, and

that the Will is not without law. It is jumping a very long distance to

a conclusion, however, to infer from such a fact, that Necessity is the

only law throughout the entire domain of existence, physical and mental.

What if, from the fact, that the Will has its law, it should be assumed

that Liberty is that law? This assumption would be just as legitimate as

the one under consideration.

OBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY

IS TRUE.

2. Another objection of a general nature, is the assumption, that the

doctrine of Liberty destroys the Divine supremacy in the realm of mind.

"If man," says Dr. Chalmers, "is not a necessary agent, God is a

degraded sovereign." A sentiment more dishonorable to God, more fraught

with fatal error, more revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by

a false theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a moment,

contemplate the question, whether the doctrine of Liberty admits a

Divine government in the realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as

stated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency in creatures,

depend wholly upon the Divine Will. With a perfect knowledge of the

direction in which they will exert their powers, under every kind and

degree of influence to which they may be subjected, He holds all these

influences at his sovereign disposal. With such knowledge and resources,

can God exercise no government, but that of a degraded sovereignty in

the realm of mind? Can He not exercise the very sovereignty which

infinite wisdom and love desire? Who would dare affirm the contrary? If

the doctrine of Liberty is true, God certainly does not sit upon the

throne of iron destiny, swaying the sceptre of stern fate over myriads

of subjects, miscalled moral agents; subjects, all of whom are

commanded, under infinite sanctions, to do the right and avoid the

wrong, while subjected to influences by the Most High himself, which

render obedience in some, and disobedience in others, absolute

impossibilities. Still, in the light of this doctrine, God has a

government in the domain of mind, a government wisely adapted to the

nature of moral agents--agents capable of incurring the desert of praise

or blame; a government which all approve, and under the benign influence

of which, all who have not forfeited its protection by crime, may find

"quietness and assurance for ever."

OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the _tendencies_ of the

doctrine of Necessity, the fact will doubtless be adduced, that the

greatest and best of men have held this doctrine, without a development

of these tendencies in their experience. My answer is, that the goodness

of such men, their sense of moral obligation, &c., did not result from

their theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. They

held this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a _consciousness_ of

Liberty, they practically adopted the opposite doctrine. Here, we have

the source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the

intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their _Theory_, even in them, was to

weaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling. The difference between such

men and sceptics is this: The piety of the former prevents their

carrying out their theory to its legitimate results; while the impiety

of the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results--a fearless

denial of moral obligation in every form.

LAST RESORT.

4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who may feel themselves

wholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in

favor of the opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed in

their opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is an assumption which

may be expressed in language somewhat like the following: "After all,

the immortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, when those of

his opponents will be lost in oblivion. That work still remains

unanswered." A sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of

disposing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise know what to do

with. Let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been

undeniably established in reference to this immortal work.

(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in

philosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole

work--the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus

confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty

with those of the phenomena of the latter.

(2.) His whole work is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness,

the only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case. Thus

his reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his subject.

(3.) All his fundamental conclusions have been shown to stand in direct

contradiction to the plainest and most positive testimony of universal

Consciousness.

(4.) His main arguments have been shown to be nothing else but reasoning

in a circle. He defines, for example, the phrase "Greatest apparent

good," as synonymous with _choosing_, and then argues, from the fact

that the "Will always is as the greatest apparent good," that is, that

it always chooses as it chooses, that it is subject to the law of

Necessity.

So in respect to the argument from the Strongest Motive, which, by

definition, is fixed upon as the Motive in the direction of which the

Will, in each particular instance, acts. From the fact that the action

of the Will is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, in the

direction of the Motive towards which it does act, the conclusion is

gravely drawn, that the Will is and must be subject, in all its

determinations, to the law of Necessity. I find my mind acted upon by

two opposite Motives. I cannot tell which is the strongest, from a

contemplation of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, nor from

their effects upon my Intelligence or Sensibility. I must wait till my

Will has acted. From the fact of its action in the direction of one

Motive, in distinction from the other, I must then draw two important

conclusions. 1. The Motive, in the direction of which my Will did act,

is the strongest. The evidence is, the _fact_ of its action in that

direction. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The

proof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest

Motive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage

argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th

century, as possessing the elements of immortality!

(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be

wholly based upon an _assumption_ unauthorized by reason, or revelation

either, to wit: that he understands the _mode_ of that Fore-knowledge,--

an assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance, as was true

in his case, without the greatest impiety and presumption.

(6.) The theory which Edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred,

in all minds that hold it, the great idea of _duty_, of moral

obligation; while the validity of that idea has never, in any age or

nation, been denied, excepting on the avowed authority of his Theory.

(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the

single exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge--an argument

resting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,--involve

a begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with

this one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at

all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it,

be assumed as the basis of that argument. Shall we pretend that a

Theory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the

errors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been

answered?

WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES.

5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers

have been somewhat divided in opinion--the question, whether the Will

can act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities? The

true answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may _will_ the

occurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never _aim_ to produce

such an occurrence.

The Mind, for example, while it regards the non-existence of God as that

which cannot possibly occur, may come into such a relation to the Most

High, that the _desire_ shall arise that God were not. With this desire,

the Will may concur, in the _wish_, that there were no God. Here the

Mind wills a known impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind may will

its own non-existence, while it regards its occurrence, on account of

its relation to the Divine Will, as impossible.

But while the Mind may thus _will_ the occurrence of an impossibility,

it never can, nor will aim, that is, intend, to produce what it regards

as an impossibility. A creature may will the non-existence of God; but

even a fallen Spirit, regarding the occurrence as an absolute

impossibility, never did, nor will aim to annihilate the Most High. To

suppose the Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as

impossible, involves a contradiction.

For the same reason, the Will will never set itself upon the

accomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall

accomplish, however sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All

such results are, to the Mind, _practical_ impossibilities. Extinguish

totally in the Mind the _hope_ of obtaining the Divine favor, and the

Divine favor will never be sought. Produce in the Mind the conviction,

that should it aim at the attainment of a certain end, there is an

infallible certainty that it will not attain it, and the subject of that

conviction will no more aim to attain that end, than he will aim to

cause the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be.

In reply, it is sometimes said, that men often aim at what they regard

even as an impossible attainment. The painter, for example, aims to

produce a _perfect_ picture, while he knows well that he cannot produce

one. I answer, the painter is really aiming at no such thing. He is not

aiming to produce a perfect picture, which he knows he cannot, and will

not produce, but to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as he can. This is

what he is really aiming at. Question the individual critically, and he

will confirm what is here affirmed. Remind him of the fact, that he

cannot produce a perfect picture. I know that, he replies. I am

determined, however, to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as possible.

Here his real aim stands revealed. The same principle holds true in all

other instances.

THOUGHT AT PARTING.

6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply say, that if he has

distinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in

this Work, and has happily come to an agreement with the author in

respect to it, the following hallowed impression has been left very

distinctly upon his mind. While he finds himself in a state of profound

and most pleasing dependence upon the Author of his being, in the Holy

of Holies of the inner sanctuary of his mind, one idea, the great

over-shadowing idea of the human Intelligence, has been fully

sanctified--the idea of _duty_, of _moral obligation_. With the

consciousness of Liberty, that idea must be to the mind an omnipresent

reality. From it we can never escape and in all states, and in all

worlds, it must and will be to us, as a guardian angel, or an avenging

fiend. But one thing remains, and that is, through the grace proffered

in the Remedial System, to "live and move, and have our being," in

harmony with that idea, thus securing everlasting "quietness and

assurance" in the sanctuary of our minds, and ever enduring peace and

protection under, the over-shadowing perfections of the Author of our

existence, and amid all the arrangements and movements of his eternal

government.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Upham on the Will, pp. 32-35.

[2] The above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous distinction

between natural and moral ability made by Necessitarians. The sinner is

under obligation to do right, they say, because he might do what is

required of him, if he chose to do it. He has, therefore, _natural_ but

not _moral_ power to obedience. But the choice which the sinner wants,

the absence of which constitutes his moral inability, is the very thing

required of him. When, therefore, the Necessitarian says, that the

sinner is under obligation to obey, because he might obey if he chose to

do it, the real meaning is, that the sinner is under obligation to

obedience, because if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey.

In other words he is under obligation to obedience, because, if he did

obey, he would obey.