CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.--Objection, The Will has its Laws--Objection,
God dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Liberty is
true--Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Necessity--Last
Resort--Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities--Thought at
Parting
DEDICATORY PREFACE.
To one whose aim is, to "serve his generation according to the Will of
God," but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming
the attention of the public in the capacity of an author--the existence
in the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief,
that the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under
the influence of these two considerations, the following Treatise is
presented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not,
it is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with
the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether
any work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever
published with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was
unworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him
entirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a work which he regards
as so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls dead from the
press. Many an author, thus disappointed, has had occasion to be
reminded of the admonition, "Ye have need of patience." Whether the
following Treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear, or not, one
consolation will remain with the writer, the publication of the work has
satisfied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates in the
Institution over which he presides, Associates with whose approbation
and counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion
publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important
suggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its
preparation.
Having said thus much, he would simply add, that, TO THE LOVERS OF
TRUTH, THE WORK IS NOW RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, WITH THE KIND REGARDS OF
THE AUTHOR.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.
IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.
THE doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as
of mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the
great central points, from which the various different and conflicting
systems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure.
To determine a man's sentiments in respect to the Will, is to determine
his position, in most important respects, as a theologian, and mental
and moral philosopher. If we turn our thoughts inward, for the purpose
of knowing what we are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we
shall become, as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought
not, this doctrine presents itself at once, as one of the great pivots
on which the resolution of all these questions turns.
If, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from ourselves, to a study
of the character of God, and of the nature and character of the
government which He exercises over rational beings, all our
apprehensions here, all our notions in respect to the nature and desert
of sin and holiness, will, in many fundamental particulars, be
determined by our notions in respect to the Will. In other words, our
apprehensions of the nature and character of the Divine government, must
be determined, in most important respects, by our conceptions of the
nature and powers of the subjects of that government. I have no wish to
conceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries. I
wish him distinctly to understand, that in fixing his notions in respect
to the doctrine of the Will, he is determining a point of observation
from which, and a medium through which, he shall contemplate his own
character and deserts as a moral agent, and the nature and character of
that Divine government, under which he must ever "live, and move, and
have his being."
TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.
Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question
arises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon
our investigations in this department of mental science It should not
surely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and
philosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in
the light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science
of the Will, as well as that of all ether departments of mental
philosophy, "does not come by observation," but by internal reflection.
Because our doctrine of the Will, whether true or false, will have a
controlling influence in determining the character of our theology, and
the meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, that
doctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclusively psychological
character. Every legitimate question pertaining to it, still remains
purely and exclusively a psychological question. The mind has but one
eye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness.
This, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our
inquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more
exclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example,
that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of
Astronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his
theory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly
analogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine
his theory of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a system
of theology formed without such reflection. Suppose again, that the
science of Geometry had the same influence in theology, that that of the
Will now has. This fact would not change at all the nature of that
science, nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect
to it. It would still remain a science of demonstration, with all its
principles and rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doctrine of
the Will. Whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be, it still
remains no less exclusively a psychological science. It has its own
principles and laws of investigation, principles and laws as independent
of systems of theology, as the principles and laws of the science of
optics are of those of Astronomy. In pursuing our investigations in all
other departments of mental science, we, for the time being, cease to be
theologians. We become mental philosophers. Why should the study of the
Will be an exception?
The question now returns--what should be the bearing of the fact, that
our theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important
influence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be
its influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our
investigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the
foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into
the heart of man to conceive--an edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and
proportions of which, we are required most sedulously to conform to the
"pattern shown us in the mount." Under such circumstances, who should
not be admonished, that he should "dig deep, and lay his foundation upon
a rock?" I will therefore, in view of what has been said above,
earnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise.
1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer after truth.
2. That he give that degree of attention to the work, that is requisite
to an _understanding_ of it.
3. That when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles, he will
distinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent,
and carefully investigate its validity. If these principles are wrong,
such an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the
mind, confirm the mind in the truth, and furnish it with means to
overturn the opposite error.
4. That he pursue his investigations with _implicit confidence in the
distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this
subject_. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in
respect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will.
Here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines
been accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of
phenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the
eye of consciousness only. Having been so long under the influence of
this pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an effort for the
mind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself, for the purpose of
correctly reporting to itself, what is really passing in that inner
sanctuary. Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a fixed
determination to abandon all theories formed from external observation,
and to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally.
This method we must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all
real science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other
departments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on
_colors_, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations
of the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about
which he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The
moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties,
in respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties, all reasoning
about those objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in respect to
the mind. If we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of
consciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental
operations, mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reasoning in
respect to the mind perfectly absurd. Implicit confidence in the
distinct affirmations of consciousness, is a fundamental law of all
correct philosophizing in every department of mental science. Permit me
most earnestly to bespeak this confidence, as we pursue our
investigations in respect to the Will.
COMMON FAULT.
It may be important here to notice a common fault in the method
frequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this
department of mental science. In the most celebrated treatise that has
ever appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recollect to have
met with a single appeal to _consciousness_, the only adequate witness
in the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of
syllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms
pertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole,
the facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances
not a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an
appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give
testimony in the case, has been formally denied. Would it be at all
strange, if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of
investigations conducted after such a method, should be wholly
inapplicable to _the_ Will, the phenomena of which lie under the eye of
consciousness, or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus
affirmed? What, from the method adopted, we see is very likely to take
place, we find, from experience, to be actually true of the treatise
above referred to. This is noticed by the distinguished author of The
Natural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on
the Will. "Even the reader," he says, "who is scarcely at all familiar
with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be
perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion,
that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although
the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in
strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the
form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their
apparently necessary connection with the premises." What should we
expect from a treatise on mental science, from which the affirmations of
consciousness should be formally excluded, as grounds of any important
conclusions? Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above named
treatise on the Will; to wit: all its fundamental conclusions positively
contradicted by such affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts
of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material
witnesses has been formally excluded? Who would look to such decisions
as the exponents of truth and justice? Yet all the elements in those
decisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually
assumed. Such decisions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that
the data which ought to be assumed in the case, were excluded. The same
will, almost of necessity, be true of all treatises, in every department
of mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness.
PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL
PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.
By what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the
propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible.
Though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the Bible,
some one system is therein pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that
the Scriptures are a revelation from God, we must suppose that the
system of mental science assumed in the sacred writings, is the true
system. If we could find the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should
have an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any
conclusions to which we have arrived, as the results of psychological
investigation. It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and
profitable inquiry--what is the system of mental science assumed as true
in the Bible? We may very properly turn our attention to the solution of
such a question. In doing this, however, two things should be kept
distinctly in mind.
1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely,
and enter that of theology. In the latter we are to be guided by
principles entirely distinct from those demanded in the former.
2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of mental philosophy
pre-supposed in the Scriptures, we are in danger of assuming wrong data
as the basis of our conclusions that is, we are in danger of drawing our
inferences from those truths of Scripture which have no legitimate
bearing upon the subject, and of overlooking those which do have such a
bearing. While there are truths of inspiration from which we may
properly reason to the theory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible,
there are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason.
Now suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of
inspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, truths
which, if we do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong
conclusions; suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have
explained the facts of consciousness, assuming that such must be their
true character, else we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost
inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error?
The following principles may be laid down as universally binding, if we
would reason correctly, as philosophers and theologians, on the subject
under consideration.
1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine ourselves strictly and
exclusively to the laws of psychological investigation, without
reference to any system of theology.
2. In the domain of theology, when we would reason from the truths of
inspiration to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we
should be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which
have a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject, and not from those
which have no such bearing.
3. We should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived
in each of these domains, assuming that if they do not harmonize, we
have erred either as philosophers or theologians.
4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our independent
investigations in each domain, for the purpose of detecting the error
into which we have fallen.
In conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with
almost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays
of light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will.
ERRORS OF METHOD.
Two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have
fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now
under consideration, here demand a passing notice.
1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological,
which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have
unhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive
a proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of
philosophy.
2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will
pre-supposed in the same, _the wrong truth_ has been adduced as the
basis of such reasoning, to wit: _the fact of the Divine foreknowledge_.
As all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves,
it is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a
particular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such
conclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to
it we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not
revealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to
wit: the _mode_, the _nature_, and the _degree_ of the Divine
foreknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions
perfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His
foreknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then
see with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as
consistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and
divines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily
to result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then, is not the truth
from which we should reason to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in
the Bible.
There are truths of inspiration, however, which appear to me to have a
direct and decisive bearing upon this subject, and upon which we may
therefore safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man is
addressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of
obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and
punishment. Now when we have determined the powers which an agent must
possess, to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition, of
obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and
punishment, we have determined the philosophy of the Will, really
pre-supposed in the Scriptures. Beneath these truths, therefore, and not
beneath that of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be
sought for. This I argue--
1. Because the former has a _direct_, while the latter has only an
_indirect_ bearing upon the subject.
2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of
the mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are
profoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of
commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of
reward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear
and distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from
those that we do not understand, and which at the utmost have only an
indirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at
all, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The
reader is now put in possession of the _method_ that will be pursued in
the following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the
investigation of the subject before us.
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.
EVERY individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the
operations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes
of mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of
the others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of
the mind, and which may be expressed by the terms _thinking_, _feeling_,
and _willing_, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally
distinct from one another. These faculties are denominated the
Intellect, the Sensibility or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first,
all intellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, judging,
knowing, &c., are referred. To the second, we refer all sensitive
states, all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, &c. To the
Will, or the active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental
determinations, such as purposes, intentions, resolutions, choices and
volitions.
CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.
1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental
powers is indicated, differ from one another, not in _degree_, but in
_kind_. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains
equally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of
every class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the
phenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain,
in their nature and essential characteristics, equally distinct from
thought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The
same holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example,
in one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or
desire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all
degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature
and essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the
operations of the Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility
on the other.
2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for
example, one speaks of _thinking_ of any particular object, then of
_desiring_ it, and subsequently of _determining_ to obtain the object,
for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly
recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and
understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental
operations. No person, under such circumstances, ever confounds one of
these states with either of the others. So clearly marked and
distinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under
consideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of universal
consciousness.
3. In all languages, also, there are distinct _terms_ appropriated to
the expression of these three classes of phenomena, and of the mental
power indicated by the same. In the English language, for example, we
have the terms _thinking_, _feeling_, and _willing_, each of which is
applied to one particular class of these mental phenomena, and never to
either of the others. We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and
Will, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate the mental powers
indicated by these phenomena. In all other languages, especially among
nations of any considerable advancement in mental culture, we find terms
of precisely similar designation. What do such facts indicate? They
clearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the
different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly
marked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold
division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena.
4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence
has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated
by the fact, that there are _qualifying terms_ in common use which are
applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of
the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously
applied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however,
which are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of _clear
thoughts_, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of
_irrepressible feelings and desires_, but never of irrepressible
thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of _inflexible determinations_,
but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect
distinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts,
feelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct
from one another--phenomena differing not in _degree_, but in _kind_,
and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental
powers under consideration.
5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked
is it in their minds, that in familiar intercourse, when no particular
theory of the mental powers is in contemplation, they are accustomed to
speak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, and of their respective
phenomena, as entirely distinct from one another. Take a single example
from Scripture. "What I shall _choose_, I wot not--having a _desire_ to
depart." Here the Apostle evidently speaks of _desire_ and _choice_ as
phenomena differing in kind, and not in degree. "If you engage his
heart" [his feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign
minister, "you have a fair chance of imposing upon his _understanding_,
and determining his Will." "_His Will_," says another writer, speaking
of the insane, "is no longer restrained by his _Judgment_, but driven
madly on by his passions."
"When wit is overruled by _Will_,
And Will is led by fond _Desire_,
Then _Reason_ may as well be still,
As speaking, kindle greater fire."[1]
In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as
consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly
recognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of
mental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the
mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as
suggested to their minds.
The above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the
three-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two
suggestions arise here which demand special attention.
1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either
of the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in
respect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental
science. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental
characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same
characteristics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error will be
introduced not only into philosophy, but theology, too, as far as the
latter science is influenced by the former. What would be thought of a
treatise on mental science, in which the Will should be confounded with
the Intelligence, and in which _thinking_ and _willing_ would be
consequently represented as phenomena identical in kind? This would be
an error no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly
contradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the confounding of the Will
with the Sensibility.
2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of Edwards
in his immortal work on the Will--an error which we meet with in the
commencement of that work, and which lays a broad foundation for the
false conclusions subsequently found in it. He has confounded the Will
with the Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find that he has
subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena
of the former faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter.
"God has endowed the soul," he says, "with two faculties: One is that by
which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it
discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the
_understanding_. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not
merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined _to_ them, or
is disinclined and averse _from_ them; or is the faculty by which the
soul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator; but
either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or
rejecting. This faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are
determined by it, is called the Will."
From his work on the Affections, I cite the following to the same
import:
"The Affections of the soul," he observes, "are not properly
distinguished from the Will, as though they were two faculties of the
soul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of
the Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All
exercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the
soul's appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love
or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one
thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more
than another." "The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of
the Will." "The Affections are no other than the more vigorous and
sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."
Whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental
characteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena
of the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise.
CHAPTER III.
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
WE come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the
Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each
of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty.
SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.
Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as
distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as
expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a
species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they
differ by way of _opposition_. All correct definitions of terms thus
related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually
exclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality,
be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in
their application. The terms _right_ and _wrong_, for example, thus
differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these
terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of
an action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is
not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not
right; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be
either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related.
The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one
from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations
perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between
an _antecedent_ and its _consequent_.
1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can
possibly arise, and that consequent _must_ arise. This relation we
designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example,
constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning
candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in
contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is
the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation
between the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances
supposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent
must arise; to wit--the feeling of pain referred to. The relation
between such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all
instances, designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of
Necessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm
absolutely that of a new antecedent.
2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of
two or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one
consequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have
arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the
appearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the
presence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term
Liberty.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.
On the above definitions I remark:
1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any
phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity
of it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free.
2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All
antecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus
connected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations.
As the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the
nature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms
Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of
the relation between all antecedents and consequents, real and
supposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or
conceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each
other one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with
this antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must
arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or
more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so:
for possibility has, in reality, no degrees.
3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation
of _consequents_ to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under
one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation
between motives and acts of Will is that of _certainty_, still this
certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent
and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the
relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined.
4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present
investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and
perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of
philosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral
necessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different
kinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such
connections, express the nature of the _subjects_ sustaining to each
other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that
of the _relation_ existing between them. This is exclusively expressed
by the term Necessity--a term which designates a relation which is
always one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus
related may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might,
if he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and
consequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words,
solid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use
as many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to
each other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no
error will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to
designate, not the nature of the _relation_ of antecedent and consequent
in any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity
as there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the
_subjects_ sustaining this relation. If, on the other hand, the
impression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms
designates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the
belief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different
kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise--errors
no more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression
often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical
necessity.
5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions
have in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty
and Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and
theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in
difference between them, without the possibility on the part of either,
of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical
necessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their
opponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect
clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see,
that the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the
other of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third
relation differing in _kind_ from both of these, is conceivable. The
question therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the
possibility of misapprehension or evasion--Do you believe, whenever a
man puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act
only is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited
acts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless
providence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only
is possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical
circumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that
for not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely
guilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these
questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he
gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that
doctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the
doctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must
hold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will
is put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and
that for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held
justly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to
the cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different
schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in
difference between them, and that without the possibility of
misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question.
MOTIVE DEFINED.
Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as
designating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations
conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term
which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to
be defined; to wit--_motive_--a term which designates that which
sustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent.
Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will,
are considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be
supposed to influence its determinations, whether called
susceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting
upon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I
use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It
designates _all the circumstances and influences_ from within or without
the mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will.
The term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has
this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The
former includes all that is designated by the latter, together with the
_Will_ itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the
use of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained.
SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE
WILL.
We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations
above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these
phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a
particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of
Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly
but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the
relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either
of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular
consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents
might have arisen in its stead.
Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one
consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this.
The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above
relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all
candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual
contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the
relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will
spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary
agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence.
Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being,
this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To
escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and
particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution
of the argument upon the subject, we will--
I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of
the Will are subject to the laws of Necessity. In taking this position
we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable
difficulties.
1. The conviction above referred to--a conviction which remains proof
against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile
demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity,
still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its
own Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher
demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false--that
man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the
passage already cited, and which I will take occasion here to repeat,
the writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying
experience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. "Even the reader," he
says, "who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if
he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague
dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into
the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems
perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and
will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against
certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary
connection with the premises." What higher evidence can we have that
that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal
consciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory
which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of
consciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response,
"That's true; I have found it." Any theory apparently supported by
adequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such
facts, will induce the internal conflict above described--a conflict
which, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will, in the
very centre of the Intelligence, "condense itself into the form of a
protest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their
apparently necessary connection with the premises." The falsity of the
doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence.
2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no
instance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to
act differently from what they do. The connection between the
determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and
internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will,
for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement,
in these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but
take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and
internal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts
themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which
they originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances
in which Providence places them, power either to will or to act
differently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do
differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine
of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always
sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the
Necessitarian cannot escape.
3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions
together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and
their consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all
instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible
antecedent of all consequents.
4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent
propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being
deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under
circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these
could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive
him under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances,
to different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an
agent under obligation to perform that to which Omnipotence is
inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot
reverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures
placed by Divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or
series of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise--let him,
then, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in
these same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite
acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it
as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation
of space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and
obligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute
impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such
contradictions.
5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility
of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit
me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no
man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to
deny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age
and nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the
doctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind
in which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been
the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost.
How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his
theory?
6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in
all cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act
differently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the
perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required--
(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of
necessity.
(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as
we have seen, cannot reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but--
(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to
resist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation
established by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is
certainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in
the absence of all power, even to attempt the accomplishment of that
which we are required to accomplish.
7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and
intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the
condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed
at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to
wit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of
conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue,
to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued
this course, the only one possible, they are now to be "punished with
everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his
power," must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a
sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is
false. Who can believe, that the pillars of God's eternal government
rest upon such a doctrine?
8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might
with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the
chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary
result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What
must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal
retribution, probation based on such a principle?
9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical
with _Fatalism_ in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has
maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot
control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but
pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This
doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men
cannot "do as they please." All that it maintains is, that they cannot
but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one "jot or
tittle," from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity
between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the
origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing
material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ
at all.
10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of _man_, we
must maintain, that the Will of _God_ is subject to the same law. This
is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining
the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions
force themselves upon us:
(1.) MOTIVES which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will,
are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not
the first cause of anything.
(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will,
we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of
originating "all things visible and invisible," belongs not to Him, but
to motives.
(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently
from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required
not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the
Divine Will, but also the _motives_ by which the action of God's Will is
necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the
face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them.
11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all
instances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality,
required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist
without a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and
that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would
undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under
such circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most
palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this
is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the
doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this
doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is
possible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is
put forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put
forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to
the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the
act of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures,
which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has
a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as
that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such
a difficulty?
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY--DIRECT ARGUMENT.
II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position,
that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of
Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that
as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these
relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of
Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of
Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing
that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable
for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity
for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order
to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.
1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty,
as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously
recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the
facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will.
This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations
of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of
the truth of the doctrine.
2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of
conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to
affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction
resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important
to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon
our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our
circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from
what we did. A man, for example, says to himself--"At such a time, and
in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct.
I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I
not?" These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in
different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such
affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular
circumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of
these circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations
might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to
any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the
influence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a
time, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular
course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite
course, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this
your real meaning? "If my circumstances had been different, I might have
resolved upon a different course." No, he would reply. That is not my
meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I
made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances in
which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the
reason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction,
to wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life
might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on
earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal
conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The
doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal
Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood.
3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct,
deliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is
given in three ways.
(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any
change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the
opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the
Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.
(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind,
consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these
identical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally
possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power
as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations,
let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put
forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two
or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally
possible, as he is of any mental state whatever.
(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past,
the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most
positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations
precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any
such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined
differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He
cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might
have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of
consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.
4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the
phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility
for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a
truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning
furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a
consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and
inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain
subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With
self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I
not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of
Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as
a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the
furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of
self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same
circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach
himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we
account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for
its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject,
his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the
circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such
phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the
condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different
and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular
determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we
account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between
the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the
other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal
consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that
in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the
latter may, be different from what they are.
5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation,
merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will
suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he
cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same
thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these
identical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite
course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what
conceivable meaning can we attach to the word _ought_, here? There is
nothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word, _ought_, or
obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an
individual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning.
Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon "airy nothing,"
without a "local habitation or a name."
On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all
times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one,
he might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other;
infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and
demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to
do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or
punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of
obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with
reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any
other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this
doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize.
6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in
the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other
supposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a
given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and
then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and
opposite course--what can be tyranny if this is not?
OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.
An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an
appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of
the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands
special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in
given circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But
whether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and
opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at
all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness
to determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the
relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to
that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid,
renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and
as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to
examine it with great care. In reply, I remark,
1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will,
it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the
Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a
test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as
an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that "it is
impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be."
Every one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and
other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is
valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the
circumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations;
while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances,
we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should
have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when
he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the
same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally
conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the
opposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make
five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that
three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making
certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an
impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man
is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence
fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any
affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is
possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that
we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether
we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as
absolutely as we know anything, that we _cannot_ affirm perceived
contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our
Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by
consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the
Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the
relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty,
whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation
of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?
2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under
the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that
of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the
propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another,
There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an
utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We
put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and
absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth
different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and
affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former
instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?
3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only
mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such
phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to
what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a
witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or
cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in
conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and
attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to
Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can
or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled
by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find,
that, in the circumstances in which we do originate given
determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same
identical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite
determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to
determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations.
4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under
consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive
acknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go
against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their
Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their
Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as
solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of
Consciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all
men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as
they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity,
no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when
the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder
that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let
the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the
affirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in
mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the
subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher
to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations
of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason.
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN
ALL MINDS.
III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of
Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but
which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above
presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will _from the existence of the
idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there
found_.
If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to
any phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The
action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its
action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the
Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human
mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following
considerations present themselves demanding special attention.
1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a _simple_, and not a
_complex_ idea. This all will admit.
2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection
because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of
observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity,
not free, but necessary.
3. It could not have originated, as _necessary_ ideas do, as the logical
antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For
example, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the
Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body,
succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from
observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of
Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the
objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine,
necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we
account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea
in the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as
the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if
we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness,
we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of
Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm
that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher
to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For
all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection,
or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We
have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is
true.
4. All _simple_ ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have
realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of
Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of
Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder
in the human mind?
The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a
reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is
found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all
Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him,
they maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and
reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that
of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according
to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as
realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again
an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.
5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of
obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the
doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen,
a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or
alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how
happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known
to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it,
that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or
nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of
Necessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are
universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to
produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world
to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the
doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who
denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now,
how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit
and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea
of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea
by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?
6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the
Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as
alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the
mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of
phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself
to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that
this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena,
those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all
men agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence,
the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what
they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why,
if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these
classes, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the
Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once
again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a
difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us
can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the
Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary,
while those of the Will are given as free.
THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.
IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very
appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our
present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above
established, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following
considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry.
1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently
that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then
we have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable
contradiction to each other. As the _works_ of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20)
are as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary
affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths
of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed--a
fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would--that we are not
_necessary_ but _free_ agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation,
the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are _not free_
but _necessary_ agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation
what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation
be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external?
Has the Most High given two such revelations as this?
2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course,
as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of
command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and
consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has
imparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a
condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between
his constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are
possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it
proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the
course which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to
pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under
these identical circumstances, a different and opposite course--a course
which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this
the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system
of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and
demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other
foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny?
3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the
Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose
that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate
masses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class,
"You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience
was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a
condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and
that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and
opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, _you_
deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and _you_ as richly deserve
and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns." What would be the
response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a
principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are
based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of
Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible?
4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a
bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that
class in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which
transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most
decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish.
He takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the
course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a
different and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in
the _circumstances_ in which they are, but that in those circumstances
they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience.
Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is
the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in
circumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in
which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is
not willing that they should disobey and perish, "but that they should
turn from their evil way and live?" What is the meaning of the
exclamation, "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment," if God
himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an
impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in
the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the
passages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of
Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the
obedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render,
and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One
of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from
the Bible, and we have "another Gospel."
5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the
Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest _astonishment_ that men
should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls
upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct
of men under those influences. "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth,"
he exclaims, "for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up
children, and they have rebelled against me." Now, let us suppose, as
the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under
influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his
conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment,
that under these influences they should sin--that is, take the only
course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the
same propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and
then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the
downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the
Bible?
SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.
We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous
questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries.
NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.
I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians
hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they
really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances
of its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but
arise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine
really held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is:
1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here
defined. They must, therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no
third relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the
phenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still
call themselves Necessitarians, they most hold to an inconceivable
something, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define,
and which has and can have no real existence.
2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the
Sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must,
therefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to
those of the former.
3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as
being the same in _kind_ as that which exists between _causes_ and
_effects_ among external material substances. The former relation he
designates by the words _moral necessity_; the latter, by that of
natural, or _philosophical_, or _physical necessity_. Yet he says
himself, that the difference expressed by these words "does not lie so
much in the nature of the _connection_ as in the two terms _connected_."
The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the
antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between
them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity.
4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as
physical, or natural necessity. "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as
absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly
connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its
natural cause."
5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of
Will as that of _cause_ and _effect_; and for this reason necessary.
"If," says Edwards, "every act of Will is excited by some motive, then
that motive is the _cause_ of that act of Will." "And if volitions are
properly the effects of their motives, then they are _necessarily_
connected with their motives." Now as the relation of cause and effect
is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined,
Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are
necessary in this sense.
6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of
Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists
between volitions and external actions. "As external actions," says
President Day, "are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed
by influence." Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and
external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such
action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances,
possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act
of Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do
Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine
of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an
individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are
possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical
circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth
different and opposite acts.
THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.
II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the
words, _certainty_, _moral certainty_, &c., as used by Necessitarians,
are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined?
The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all,
but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the
public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in
distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing
but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is
this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else?
That it is, I argue,
1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no
Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or
Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not,
according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must,
therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and
nothing else.
2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of
Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the
former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not
the former by the latter.
3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes
the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the
influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The
Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a
particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral
obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked
deformity.
III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of
Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians,
with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do
right or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the
other. "A man," says Pres. Day, "is not responsible for remaining in his
place if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to
walk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do
anything for which he has not what Edwards calls _natural_ power." It is
very important for us to understand the _nature_ of this ability, which
lies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat,
what this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This
Ability, according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by
Cousin, to wit: "The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we
take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary
resolution;" and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man's sin, that it is
"chosen by him unnecessarily, _while possessed of a power to choose
otherwise_." The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian
scheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian
Spectator. "If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute
sense, as including _all_ the antecedents to a given volition, there is
plainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the
term," as President Day states, "a man never has power to do anything but
what he actually performs." "In this comprehensive, though rather
unusual sense of the word," says President Day, "a man has not power to
do anything which he does not do." The meaning of the above extracts
cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true
exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the
influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is
absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what
they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act
differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day
has given a correct and definite answer. "The man who wills in a
particular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will
differently under a different influence."
Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man,
for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act,
to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this
obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it.
When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power
to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of
sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that _under a
different influence he might obey_. But mark, it is under the identical
influence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the
doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to
sin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a
given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different
influence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not
sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability,
Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of
Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed
in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these
circumstances, it is said, that he has _natural ability_ not to sin, and
consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting
differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are
"perfect and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, that his
_circumstances_ be changed, and then he might not sin. "In what sense,"
asks President Day, "is it true, that a man has power to will the
contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a
_sufficient inducement_, he will make an opposite choice." Is not this
the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of
obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In
illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York,
cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and
that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon
the irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he
cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is
highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he
has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the
foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is
the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present
circumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know,
I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under
present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be
subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the
powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience,
and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the
first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have,
therefore, _natural_, though not _moral_, power to obey. But stop,
friend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would
ask, if choosing, as in the command, "choose life," is not the very
thing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if
I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should
choose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did
obey?[2] I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have
correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in argument,
however. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as
required, is a change, not of your _powers_, but of the _influences_
which control the _action_ of those powers. With no change in your
constitution or powers, you need only to be placed in Boston instead of
New York, and there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light,
therefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the
ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy
instead of sinful?
I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not
in Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required
not to sin; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot
possibly but sin. It is here, and not somewhere else, that I am required
not to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could
not but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New York, I have
any ability, either natural or moral--am under any obligation
whatever--not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me.
How do you remove them according to your theory?
I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already
given. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your
mind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its
bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian
himself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his
theory.
SINFUL INCLINATIONS.
IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the
Necessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the _reason why_
the sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner
does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of
his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no
means. They constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be
borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the
connection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner's mind--a
nature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is
placed by Divine Providence--that none but these very inclinations are
possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations,
sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far
as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by
throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally
necessary?
NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.
The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme,
next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential
condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man
free, according to the doctrine of Necessity?
"The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty," says
President Edwards, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one
has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from
hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any
respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we
please to call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to
conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise." "The only
idea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will,"
says Abercrombie, "is, that it consists in a man's being able to do what
he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency,
on the other hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by a force
from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he
wills."
With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty
known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not
consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more
different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found
wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will,
considered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal,
considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark,
1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from
_Servitude_, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man
is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints
hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing
to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.
2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the
language of a very distinguished philosopher, "if you cut off a man's
little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;"
because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he
chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may
be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as
distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of
moral obligation?
3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity
reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will
are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at
the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all
acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been
already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a
chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked
together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all
the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose
as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will
followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In
this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location
somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after
"wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none," at length
is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living
habitation.
4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of
moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are
followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and
internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will,
whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it
may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a
greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?