[Picture: Lord Lucan (on horse)]
THE phrase “Someone had blundered” is familiar to every one, but the
condition of affairs which precipitated the blunder are not known and
have never been stated in history.
After the Heavy Brigade made their glorious charge, the Light Brigade was
placed in the North valley by order of Lord Raglan, Lords Lucan and
Cardigan being absent congratulating the Heavy Brigade officers. Both
Commanders-in-chief and Staffs had assembled at the top of Sebastopol
Heights and were watching the Russian Army. They decided to force a
general engagement and recapture the guns and heights the Turks had lost.
The Russian General could see the allied armies—the French massing on the
heights of Sebastopol and the British Infantry and Artillery marching
down both valleys. The Russians, recognising the uselessness of trying
to take Balaclava, ordered their army on the Causeway Heights to retreat
and abandon the captured guns. Lord Raglan sent General Airey,
Quarter-master General, to give Lord Lucan instructions to which he paid
no attention. The third order was, “The Cavalry to advance and take
advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights; they will be
supported by Infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.”
Now the trouble commenced. Lord Lucan could see that Lord Raglan
intended the whole cavalry to advance in one body, but he could not give
the word of command for his two brigades to move together, not knowing
the drill in vogue. Again, how could he ask the cavalry to advance with
the Artillery without ammunition? How far could he advance against the
Russian Artillery? It would be simple slaughter to charge. Lord Lucan
had invaded the Crimea without any supply for his cannon. He admits that
he did not leave the forts till he had used all his ammunition, and that
was before daylight. He was then only one mile from Balaclava Harbour,
the only place for supply, and he could have sent his ammunition wagons
for it. His artillery being only six-pounders—the smallest in the
Crimea—it was impossible to draw or borrow it. So the humbug went on,
and instead of him informing Lord Raglan he had no supply of ammunition
in the Crimea—which was his first duty to his Queen and country—he
prepared the Heavy Brigade to support infantry at the top of the South
valley, quite reversing the third order.
The two commanders-in-chief had their infantry ready for the general
engagement; the French infantry massed on the top of Sebastopol heights
to support the English; and the French Cavalry was ordered to report to
General Lord Lucan, the English Cavalry commander. The Duke of Cambridge
had his division on top of Sebastopol heights the first and could see the
Russian army retreating on the Causeway heights and abandoning the
captured cannon. The Duke waited some time for Lord Lucan to get a move
upon his command, then marched his troops down the heights of Sebastopol
to the South valley, seeing no signs of the cavalry advancing, ordered
his infantry and artillery in line of battle and marched them towards the
Causeway heights. I am of the opinion—and always have been—that if Lord
Lucan had continued his humbug for ten minutes longer, the Duke of
Cambridge would have attacked the retreating Russians on the Causeway
heights.
The Commander-in-Chief, worn out with Lord Lucan’s delay of nearly 40
minutes, despatched the fourth and last order, viz., “Lord Raglan wishes
the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy
carrying away the guns. Troop of Horse Artillery may accompany. French
Cavalry on your left. Immediate.” Captain Nolan was selected specially
to see this order carried out, being one of the best cavalry officers in
the British Army. When the order was given he started and galloped down
the steep heights to the South valley to Lord Lucan, saluted him and gave
him the order. I suppose he read it, but knowing what took place after,
I rather doubt it. Lord Lucan says after he read the order he said to
Captain Nolan, “Attack! Sir! Attack what? What guns, sir?” and he
states also that Captain Nolan, pointing, said, “There, my Lord, is your
enemy, and there are your guns.” Captain Nolan did not tell him to
attack and he had no proof to show he did.
Lord Lucan left the largest part of his command in the South valley
prepared to support infantry he had never seen. The first thing he did
was to inform Lord Cardigan that Lord Raglan had ordered the Light
Brigade to charge the guns, telling a lie in the Commander-in-Chief’s
name. Lord Lucan then ordered Colonel Douglass to fall back and support
the 17th Lancers, and none of the Regimental Commanders or Lord Cardigan
were informed of the alteration, although just going into the most deadly
charge ever made. Captain Nolan placed himself in front of the 13th
Light Dragoons. Seeing one-third of the cavalry going down the valley to
be sacrificed, they having to charge one mile and a half, leaving army
and supports, and the commander of the Brigade away, Captain Nolan rode
in front of the 17th Lancers, the regiment that gave the speed and
direction, taking Lord Cardigan’s place. He knew the enemy were on the
Causeway Heights retreating and abandoning the captured guns, not more
than half a mile from the Light Brigade, and no danger to the Brigade to
get where Lord Raglan intended. Captain Nolan knew the guns we were
going to charge were sent to that position to cover the Russians’ retreat
from the Causeway heights. After Captain Nolan had galloped about forty
or fifty yards in the front and centre of the 17th Lancers (he did not
know that the 11th Hussars were ordered to fall back) he gave the word of
command “Threes right,” waving his sword and turning to his left. At the
same moment the Russians opened fire and a piece of shell struck him in
the breast near his heart. Had he not have turned he would have been
struck in the back or possibly have been missed altogether. When he gave
that word of command he intended the whole attacking line to move by it.
Though killed his body still remained in the saddle, the horse, seeing
the opening on the right, turned sharply in that direction and flung the
corpse to the ground.
[Picture: The dress worn in the charge by the 17th Lancers, October 25th,
1854]
The dress worn in the charge by the 17th Lancers, October 25th, 1854.
The Russians having opened fire, the 13th Light Dragoons did not hear the
word of command but advanced. If Sergeant-Major Nunnerley had not given
the word of command “Three’s Left” (or front forward), it is a question
how far we should have taken ground towards the Causeway heights. The
13th Light Dragoons had their commanding officer, Captain Oldham killed,
and all the regiment so scattered that a group of men never held
together. The 11th Hussars, through the 17th Lancers taking ground to
the right, lost them entirely. The 8th Hussars that were in the 2-line
under Lord Paget, with the 4th Light Dragoons, got separated and joined
part of the 17th Lancers, after fighting through the guns. Lord Paget,
with the 4th Light Dragoons, found the 11th Hussars through the guns, and
Colonel Douglas commanding would not obey Lord Paget because Lord Lucan
had given him the command of the regiment to support the 17th Lancers,
although Lord Paget was the senior officer. Yet they had to join
together to fight their way out.
In the meantime, Sir George Cathcart marched his division down the
heights of Sebastopol and across the North valley near the 5th redoubt,
(without guns) on the top of the Causeway heights. He could see the
Light Brigade charging 12 to 20 guns in front and receiving flank fire
from 20 other cannon, being the Russian field artillery and the seven
ship guns the Turks had lost, together with ammunition in the three
redoubts. Sir George could also see the French Cavalry charging a
battery of field artillery of six guns on our left. The Russian cannon
were all brass polished, 12 and 24 pounds. Their infantry were in
square, and the commanding hill covered with the Needle riflemen. Sir
George saw all this destruction of life and he could see the Heavy
Brigade and Horse Artillery had not even been ordered from the South
valley to support or assist the Light Brigade or French Cavalry. Sir
George said it would be dangerous to advance further. Lord Lucan brought
up two regiment and yet Cathcart would not budge an inch. I believe I
saw the whole of the regiments—five in all. (See Lord Raglan’s letter
where he states only two regiments).
The Duke of Cambridge is the only General living that commanded a
division in the battles of Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman, and he knows
what I have written is the living truth in every particular. He saw over
400 horses killed in less than 15 minutes after receiving the order to
charge. The combined forces who took part in the Charge numbered 670 all
told, of whom only 198 returned mounted.
Lord Lucan only gave one order to the Light Brigade, and that led to its
destruction, sooner than inform the Commander-in-Chief that he had no
ammunition for his artillery. If Lord Raglan had known, there would not
have required any order or A.D.C., and there would not have been any
murderous charge by order of Lord Lucan. Had Lord Raglan had known there
was no ammunition, he would not have ordered the Horse Artillery to
accompany, (see his letter for proof). Lord Lucan allowed the Russian
cavalry to advance at a trot through the camp ground of the Heavy
Brigade, and none of the commanders knew about it till informed by the
Commander-in-Chief. Lord Lucan could not be found, and in consequence it
was left to five regiments, under General Scarlett, to engage and defeat
the Russians, who numbered seven to one. Lord Cardigan asserts there
were only three regiments engaged. And that seven regiments were mere
spectators, and yet Lord Lucan asserts he was not taken by surprise. If
so, it is an amazing thing that a commander should permit a Russian
cavalry force (3500) to make its way, in broad daylight, directly through
the camp ground of his own troops.
After the charge Lord Lucan ordered the remnant of the Light Brigade six
miles off on the hills near Inkerman to recuperate. In a few days the
rain came down and every thing became a mass of mud, impossible to
procure either meat, drink, or clothing. All the water we could get to
drink was ladled off the ground. The supply consisted of small holes the
horses made with their feet and all kinds of filth being on the ground
helped to make things worse. We were left to die without having any
medicine or even a cup of hot water. Several weeks elapsed before Lord
Lucan found it out, for everyone seemed afraid of him and Cardigan, and
these two never talked together. Lord Lucan occupied all the houses in
Balaclava Harbour, while Lord Cardigan lived on his yacht seven miles
from his command, and never visited them, although they were dying of
hunger and starvation, and even when we went into action at Balaclava and
Inkerman he still lived aboard. It was twelve o’clock when he arrived at
Inkerman and his command never went under fire again during his service.
At last a storm came on the 14th of November, 1854, which continued for
three days, and not a tent could be made to stand up. Some were blown
away and never found again. Think of men dying under such conditions.
The horses also were dying of hunger some of them eating all the hair off
their bodies. If it had not been for Lord George Paget I do not know
what would have become of us. He marched us down to Balaclava but the
journey proved too much for our horses, over 100 stuck fast and died in
the mud. The Light Brigade received several hundred horses that broke
loose on from the Russians on the night of October 25th, 1854, or I would
not be counting horses by the hundred. (See Lord George Paget’s Book for
proof.)
Lord Cardigan died serenely satisfied because he had destroyed his
command in obedience to orders, after stating in the _Times_, “No one man
surpassed another in gallantry.” He is the only officer who had a
command that returned back mounted, and that did not give a helping hand.
He lost the whole of his command, five regiments and staff, and returned
back by himself. He states in _Kinglake_, “I rode slowly up the hill and
met General Scarlett. I said to him, ‘What do you think, General, of the
aide de camp after such an order being brought to us which has destroyed
the Light Brigade, riding to the rear and screaming like a woman’? Sir
J. Scarlett replied, ‘Do not say any more, for I have ridden over his
body.’”
Lord Cardigan, in less than six months after, published a letter in the
_Times_ newspaper, dated April 6th, 1855, viz.:—“The Light Brigade had
not advanced more than 100 yards when they were fired upon, and Captain
Nolan, who had placed himself in front of a squadron of the 13th Light
Dragoons, was killed.” Lord Cardigan’s statement to Kinglake, published
in the appendix 14 years after the charge, viz.:—“After advancing about
eighty yards a shell fell within reach of my horse’s feet, and Captain
Nolan, who was riding across the front retreating with his arms up
through the interval of the brigade.”
I should like to know which statement is true about Captain Nolan. It
was impossible for him to be killed in front of the 13th Light Dragoons.
It was impossible for him to be retreating with his arms up through the
interval in front of Lord Cardigan. The interval was in the rear of him,
and he would have to look back. Did Nolan scream in front or rear of
Cardigan? How did he get in front of Lord Cardigan without him seeing
him go? Lord Cardigan was in front of his command a minute or less
before the attacking line commenced the charge, and this is why so many
saw him. Captain Nolan would not dare take command if Lord Cardigan had
been there. What kind of leading was he doing not to see him; and the
17th Lancers go “threes’ right” and take ground to the right. Many
things I should like to explain if I had space.
* * * * *
LORD RAGLAN _re_ LORD LUCAN.
Before Sebastopol,
Dec. 16th, 1854.