GLORIOUS GALLIPOLI
If ever the true mettle and temper of a people were tried and
exemplified in the crucible of battle, that battle was the naval and
land engagement embracing Gallipoli and the Dardanelles and the people
so tested, the British race. Separated in point of time but united in
its general plan, the engagements present a picture of heroism founded
upon strategic mistakes; of such perseverance and dogged determination
against overwhelming natural and artificial odds as even the pages of
supreme British bravery cannot parallel. The immortal charge of the
Light Brigade was of a piece with Gallipoli, but it was merely a battle
fragment and its glorious record was written in blood within the scope
of a comparatively few inspired minutes. In the mine-strewn Dardanelles
and upon the sun-baked, blood-drenched rocky slopes of Gallipoli,
death always partnered every sailor and soldier. As at Balaklava,
virtually everyone knew that some one had blundered, but the army and
the navy as one man fought to the bitter end to make the best of a bad
bargain, to tear triumph out of impossibilities.
France co-operated with the British in the naval engagement, but the
greater sacrifice, the supreme charnel house of the war, the British
race reserved for itself. There, the yeomanry of England, the unsung
county regiments whose sacrifices and achievements have been neglected
in England’s generous desire to honor the men from “down under,” the
Australians and New Zealanders grouped under the imperishable title
of the Anzacs--there the Scotch, Welsh and Irish knit in one devoted
British Army with the great fighters from the self-governing colonies
waged a battle so hopeless and so gallant that the word Gallipoli shall
always remind the world how man may triumph over the fear of death; how
with nothing but defeat and disaster before them, men may go to their
deaths as unconcernedly as in other days they go to their nightly sleep.
On November 5, 1914, Great Britain declared war upon Turkey.
Hostilities, however, had preceded the declaration. On November 3d the
combined French and British squadrons had bombarded the entrance forts.
This was merely intended to draw the fire of the forts and make an
estimate of their power. From that time on a blockade was maintained,
and on the 13th of December a submarine, commanded by Lieutenant
Holbrook, entered the straits and torpedoed the Turkish warship
Messoudieh, which was guarding the mine fields.
By the end of January the blockading fleet, through constant
reinforcement, had become very strong, and had seized the Island of
Tenedos and taken possession of Lemnos, which nominally belonged to
Greece, as bases for naval operations. On the 19th of February began
the great attack upon the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles,
which attracted the attention of the world for nearly a year.
The expedition against the Dardanelles had been considered with the
greatest care, and approved by the naval authorities. That their
judgment was correct, however, is another question. The history of
naval warfare seems to make very plain that a ship, however powerful,
is at a tremendous disadvantage when attacking forts on land. The badly
served cannon of Alexandria fell, indeed, before a British fleet, but
Gallipoli had been fortified by German engineers, and its guns were the
Krupp cannon. The British fleet found itself opposed by unsurmountable
obstacles. Looking backward it seems possible, that if at the very
start Lord Kitchener had permitted a detachment of troops to accompany
the fleet, success might have been attained, but without the army the
navy was powerless.
The Peninsula of Gallipoli is a tongue of land about fifty miles long,
varying in width from twelve to two or three miles. It is a mass of
rocky hills so steep that in many places it is a matter of difficulty
to reach their tops. On it are a few villages, but there are no
decent roads and little cultivated land. On the southern shore of the
Dardanelles conditions are nearly the same. Here, the entrance is a
flat and marshy plain, but east of this plain are hills three thousand
feet high. The high ground overhangs the sea passage on both sides,
and with the exception of narrow bits of beach at their base, presents
almost no opportunity for landing.
A strong current continually sifts down the straits from the Sea of
Marmora.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA
Showing the various landing places, with inset of the Sari-Bair
Region.]
Forts were placed at the entrance on both the north and south side, but
they were not heavily armed and were merely outposts. Fourteen miles
from the mouth the straits become quite narrow, making a sharp turn
directly north and then resuming their original direction. The channel
thus makes a sharp double bend. At the entrance to the strait, known as
the Narrows, were powerful fortresses, and the slopes were studded with
batteries. Along both sides of the channel the low ground was lined
with batteries. It was possible to attack the forts at fairly long
range, but there was no room to bring any large number of ships into
action at the same time.
At the time of the Gallipoli adventure there were probably nearly
half a million of men available for a defense of the straits, men
well armed and well trained under German leadership. The first step
was comparatively easy. The operations against the other forts began
at 8 A. M. on Friday, the 19th of February. The ships engaged were
the Inflexible, the Agamemnon, the Cornwallis, the Vengeance and
the Triumph from the British fleet, and the Bouvet, Suffren, and
the Gaulois from the French, all under the command of Vice-Admiral
Sackville Carden. The French squadron was under Rear-Admiral Gueprette.
A flotilla of destroyers accompanied the fleet, and airplanes were sent
up to guide the fire of the battleships.
At first the fleet was arranged in a semicircle some miles out to sea
from the entrance to the strait. It afforded an inspiring spectacle as
the ships came along and took up position, and the picture became most
awe-inspiring when the guns began to boom. The bombardment at first
was slow. Shells from the various ships screaming through the air at
the rate of about one every two minutes.
The Turkish batteries, however, were not to be drawn, and, seeing this,
the British Admiral sent one British ship and one French ship close in
shore toward the Sedd-el-Bahr forts. As they went in they sped right
under the guns of the shore batteries, which could no longer resist
the temptation to see what they could do. Puffs of white smoke dotted
the landscape on the far shore, and dull booms echoed over the placid
water. Around the ships fountains of water sprang up into the air. The
enemy had been drawn, but his marksmanship was obviously very bad. Not
a single shot directed against the ships went within a hundred yards of
either.
At sundown on account of the failing light Admiral Carden withdrew the
fleet. On account of the bad weather the attack was not renewed until
February 25th. It appeared that the outer forts had not been seriously
damaged on the 19th, and that what injury had been done had been
repaired. In an hour and a half the Cape Helles fort was silenced.
The Agamemnon was hit by a shell fired at a range of six miles, which
killed three men and wounded five. Early in the afternoon Sedd-el-Bahr
was attacked at close range, but not silenced till after 5 P. M. At
this time British trawlers began sweeping the entrance for mines, and
during the next day the mine field was cleared for a distance of four
miles up the straits.
As soon as this clearance was made the Albion, Vengeance and Majestic
steamed into the strait and attacked Fort Dardanos, a fortification
some distance below the Narrows. The Turks replied vigorously, not only
from Dardanos but from batteries scattered along the shore. Believing
that the Turks had abandoned the forts at the entrance, landing parties
of marines were sent to shore. In a short time, however, they met a
detachment of the enemy and were compelled to retreat to their boats.
The outer forts, however, were destroyed, and their destruction was
extremely encouraging to the Allies.
For a time a series of minor operations was carried on, meeting with
much success. Besides attacks on forts inside of the strait, Smyrna was
bombarded on March the 5th, and on March the 6th the Queen Elizabeth,
the Agamemnon and the Ocean bombarded the forts at Chanak on the
Asiatic side of the Narrows, from a position in the gulf of Saros on
the outer side of the Gallipoli Peninsula. To all of these attacks
the Turks replied vigorously and the attacking ships were repeatedly
struck, but with no loss of life. On the 7th of March Fort Dardanos was
silenced, and Fort Chanak ceased firing, but, as it turned out, only
temporarily.
Preparations were now being made for a serious effort against the
Narrows. The date of the attack was fixed for March 17th, weather
permitting. On the 16th Admiral Carden was stricken down with illness
and was invalided by medical authority. Admiral de Roebeck, second in
command, who had been very active in the operations, was appointed
to succeed him. Admiral de Roebeck was in cordial sympathy with the
purposes of the expedition and determined to attack on the 18th of
March. At a quarter to eleven that morning, the Queen Elizabeth,
Inflexible, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson, the Triumph and Prince George
steamed up the straits towards the Narrows, and bombarded the forts
of Chanak. At 12.22 the French squadron, consisting of the Suffren,
Gaulois, Charlemagne, and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles to aid
their English associates.
Under the combined fire of the two squadrons the Turkish forts, which
at first replied strongly, were finally silenced. All of the ships,
however, were hit several times during this part of the action.
A third squadron, including the Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion,
Ocean, Swiftshore and Majestic, then advanced to relieve the six old
battleships inside the strait.
[Illustration: THE LOSS OF THE “IRRESISTIBLE”
During an attack on the Dardanelles the British battleship
“Irresistible” struck a Turkish mine and sank in a few minutes. Severe
losses of similar character demonstrated that it would be impossible
to force the strait by naval attack.]
As the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in a most brilliant
fashion, was passing out the Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine
and sank in less than three minutes, carrying with her most of her
crew. At 2.36 P. M. the relief battleships renewed the attack on the
forts, which again opened fire. The Turks were now sending mines down
with the current. At 4.09 the Irresistible quitted the line, listing
heavily, and at 5.50 she sank, having probably struck a drifting mine.
At 6.05 the Ocean, also having struck a mine, sank in deep water.
Practically the whole of the crews were removed safely. The Gaulois was
damaged by gunfire; the Inflexible had her forward control position hit
by a heavy shell, which killed and wounded the majority of the men and
officers at that station and set her on fire. At sunset the forts were
still in action, and during the twilight the Allied fleet slipped out
of the Dardanelles.
Meantime, an expeditionary force was being gathered. The largest
portion of this force came from Great Britain, but France also provided
a considerable number from her marines and from her Colonial army. Both
nations avoided, as far as possible, drawing upon the armies destined
for service in France.
In the English army there were divisions from Australia and New Zealand
and there were a number of Indian troops and Territorials. The whole
force was put under the command of General Sir Ian Hamilton. The
commander-in-chief on the Turkish side was the German General Liman von
Sanders, the former chief of the military mission at Constantinople.
The bulk of the expeditionary force, which numbered altogether about a
hundred and twenty thousand men, were, therefore, men whose presence in
the east did not weaken the Allied strength in the west.
The great difficulty of the new plan was that it was impossible to
surprise the enemy. The whole Gallipoli Peninsula was so small that
a landing at any point would be promptly observed, and the nature of
the ground was of such a character that progress from any point must
necessarily be slow. The problem was therefore a simple one.
The expeditionary force gathered in Egypt during the first half of
April, and about the middle of the month was being sent to Lemnos.
Germany was well aware of the English plans, and was doing all that it
could to provide a defense.
On April 23d the movement began, and about five o’clock in the
afternoon the first of the transports slowly made its way through the
maze of shipping toward the entrance of Mudros Bay.
Immediately the patent apathy, which had gradually overwhelmed
everyone, changed to the utmost enthusiasm, and as the huge liners
steamed through the fleet, their decks yellow with khaki, the crews of
the warships cheered them on to victory while the bands played them
out with an unending variety of popular airs. The soldiers in the
transports answered this last salutation from the navy with deafening
cheers, and no more inspiring spectacle has ever been seen than this
great expedition.
The whole of the fleet from the transports had been divided up into
five divisions and there were three main landings. The 29th Division
disembarked off the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula near Sedd-el-Bahr,
where its operations were covered both from the gulf of Saros and from
the Dardanelles by the fire of the covering warships. The Australian
and New Zealand contingent disembarked north of Gaba Tepe. Further
north a naval division made a demonstration.
Awaiting the Australians was a party of Turks who had been intrenched
almost on the shore and had opened up a terrific fusillade. The
Australian volunteers rose, as a man, to the occasion. They waited
neither for orders nor for the boats to reach the beach, but springing
out into the sea they went in to the shore, and forming some sort of
a rough line rushed straight on the flashes of the enemy’s rifles. In
less than a quarter of an hour the Turks were in full flight.
While the Australians and New Zealanders, or Anzacs as they are now
generally known from the initials of the words Australian-New Zealand
Army Corps, were fighting so gallantly at Gaba Tepe, the British troops
were landing at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The
advance was slow and difficult. The Turk was pushed back, little by
little, and the ground gained organized. The details of this progress,
though full of incidents of the greatest courage and daring, need not
be recounted.
On June the 4th a general attack was made, preceded by heavy
bombardments by all guns, but after terrific fighting, in which many
prisoners were captured and great losses suffered, the net result was
an advance of about five hundred yards. As time went on the general
impression throughout the Allied countries was that the expedition had
failed. On June 30th the losses of the Turks were estimated at not
less than seventy thousand, and the British naval and military losses
up to June 1st, aggregated 38,635 officers and men. At that time the
British and French allies held but a small corner of the area to be
conquered. In all of these attacks the part played by the Australian
and New Zealand army corps was especially notable. Reinforcements were
repeatedly sent to the Allies, who worked more and more feverishly as
time went on with the hope of aiding Russia, which was then desperately
struggling against the great German advance.
On August 17th it was reported that a landing had been made at Suvla
Bay, the extreme western point of the Peninsula. From this point it
was hoped to threaten the Turkish communications with their troops at
the lower end of the Peninsula. This new enterprise, however, failed
to make any impression, and in the first part of September, vigorous
Turkish counter offensives gained territory from the Franco-British
troops. According to the English reports the Turks paid a terrible
price for their success.
It had now become evident that the expedition was a failure. The
Germans were already gloating over what they called the “failure of
British sea power,” and English publicists were attempting to show
that, though the enterprise had failed, the very presence of a strong
Allied force at Saloniki had been an enormous gain. The first official
announcement of failure was made December 20, 1916, when it was
announced that the British forces at Anzac and Suvla Bay had been
withdrawn, and that only the minor positions near Sedd-el-Bahr were
occupied. Great Britain’s loss of officers and men at the Dardanelles
up to December 11th was 112,921, according to an announcement made in
the House of Commons by the Parliamentary Under Secretary for War.
Besides these casualties the number of sick admitted to hospitals was
96,683. The decision to evacuate Gallipoli was made in the course of
November by the British Government as the result of the early expressed
opinion of General Monro, who had succeeded General Hamilton on October
28, 1915.
General Monro found himself confronted with a serious problem in the
attempt to withdraw an army of such a size from positions not more than
three hundred yards from the enemy’s trenches, and to embark on open
beaches every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns.
Moreover, the evacuation must be done gradually, as it was impossible
to move the whole army at once with such means of transportation as
existed. The plan was to remove the munitions, supplies and heavy guns
by instalments, working only at night, carrying off at the same time a
large portion of the troops, but leaving certain picked battalions to
guard the trenches. Every endeavor had to be made for concealment. The
plan was splendidly successful, and the Turks apparently completely
deceived. On December 20th the embarkation of the last troops at
Suvla was accomplished. The operations at Anzac were conducted in the
same way. Only picked battalions were left to the end, and these were
carried safely off.
[Illustration: THE HISTORIC LANDING FROM THE “RIVER CLYDE” AT SEDDUL
BAHR
An incident of the Dardanelles Expedition. Terrible losses were
sustained by the Allied troops from the concentrated fire of the
Turkish machine guns on shore.]
The success of the Suvla and Anzac evacuation made the position at Cape
Helles more dangerous. The Turks were on the lookout, and it seemed
almost impossible that they could be again deceived. On January 7th an
attack was made by the Turks upon the trenches, which was beaten back.
That night more than half the troops had left the Peninsula. The
next day there was a heavy storm which made embarkation difficult, but
it was nevertheless accomplished. The whole evacuation was a clever and
successful bit of work.