ITALY DECLARES WAR ON AUSTRIA
For many years before the great war began the great powers of Europe
were divided into two great alliances, the Triple Entente, composed
of Russia, France and England, and the Triple Alliance, composed of
Germany, Austria and Italy. When the war began Italy refused to join
with Germany and Austria. Why? The answer to this question throws a
vivid light on the origin of the war.
Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance; she knew the facts, not
only what was given to the public, but the inside facts. According to
the terms of the alliance each member was bound to stand by each other
only in case of attack. Italy refused to join with Austria and Germany
because they were the aggressors. The constant assertions of the
German statesmen, and of the Kaiser himself, that war had been forced
upon them were declared untrue by their associate Italy in the very
beginning, and the verdict of Italy was the verdict of the world. Not
much was said in the beginning about Italy’s abstention from war. The
Germans, indeed, sneered a little and hinted that some day Italy would
be made to regret her course, but now that the Teuton snake is scotched
the importance of Italy’s action has been perceived and appraised at
its true value.
The Germans from the very beginning understood the real danger that
might come to the Central Powers through Italian action. Every effort
was made by the foreign office to keep her neutral. First threats were
used, later promises were held out of addition to Italian territory if
she would send her troops to Germany’s assistance. When this failed the
most strenuous efforts were made to keep Italy neutral, and a former
German premier, Prince von Bülow, was sent to Italy for this purpose.
Socialist leaders, too, were sent from Germany to urge the Italian
Socialists to insist upon neutrality.
[Illustration: ITALY’S TITANIC LABOR TO CONQUER THE ALPS
When the Italians were making their first mighty advance against
Austria descriptions came through of the almost unbelievable natural
obstacles they were conquering. Getting one of the monster guns into
position in the mountains, as shown above, over the track that had to
be built for every foot of its progress, was one such handicap.]
In July, 1914, the Italian Government was not taken by surprise. They
had observed the increase year by year of the German army and of
the German fleet. At the end of the Balkan wars they had been asked
whether they would agree to an Austrian attack upon Serbia. They had
consequently long been deliberating as to what their course should
be in case of war, and they had made up their minds that under no
circumstances would they aid Germany against England.
Quite independently of her long-standing friendship with England it
would be suicide to Italy in her geographical position to enter a war
which should permit her coast to be attacked by the English and French
navies, and her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the
proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was well known
in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers
upon war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from
the Triple Alliance, and planning to use the entire forces of France
against Germany.
A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a
consideration of the origin of the Triple Alliance.
After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of
France, considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use
his own words, “bleeding her white.” He found, however, that if this
were attempted France would be joined by Russia and England and he gave
up this plan. In order, however, to render France powerless he planned
an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league between
Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every
opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia,
however, remained cool. Her Pan-Slavonic sympathies were opposed to the
interests of Germany. Bismarck, therefore, determined, without losing
the friendship of Russia, to persuade Italy to join in the continental
combination. Italy, at the time, was the least formidable of the six
great powers, but Bismarck foresaw that she could be made good use of
in such a combination.
At that time Italy, just after the completion of Italian unity, found
herself in great perplexity. Her treatment of the Pope had brought
about the hostility of Roman Catholics throughout the world. She feared
both France and Austria, who were strong Catholic countries, and hardly
knew where to look for friends. The great Italian leader at the time
was Francesco Crispi, who, beginning as a Radical and a conspirator,
had become a constitutional statesman. Bismarck professed the greatest
friendship for Crispi, and gave Crispi to understand that he approved
of Italy’s aspirations on the Adriatic and in Tunis.
The next year, however, at the Berlin Congress, Italy’s interests
were ignored, and finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the great
indignation of the Italians. It has been shown in more recent times
that the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to Bismarck’s
instigation.
The Italians having been roused to wrath, Bismarck proceeded to offer
them a place in the councils of the Triple Alliance. It was an easy
argument that such an alliance would protect them against France,
and no doubt it was promised that it would free them from the danger
of attack by Austria. England, at the time, was isolated, and Italy
continued on the best understanding with her.
The immediate result of the alliance was a growth of Italian hostility
toward France, which led, in 1889, to a tariff war on France. Meanwhile
German commercial and financial enterprises were pushed throughout
the Italian peninsula. What did Italy gain by this? Her commerce was
weakened, and Austria permitted herself every possible unfriendly act
except open war.
As time went on Germany and Austria became more and more arrogant.
Italy’s ambitions on the Balkan peninsula were absolutely ignored.
In 1908 Austria appropriated Bosnia and Herzegovina, another blow to
Italy. By this time Italy understood the situation well, and that
same year, seeing no future for herself in Europe, she swooped down on
Tripoli. In doing this she forestalled Germany herself, for Germany had
determined to seize Tripoli.
[Illustration: HOW THE POWERS DIVIDED NORTHERN AFRICA]
Both Germany and Austria were opposed to this action of Italy, but
Italy’s eyes were now open. Thirty years of political alliance had
created no sympathy among the Italians for the Germans. Moreover, it
was not entirely a question of policy. The lordly arrogance of the
Prussians caused sharp antagonism. The Italians were lovers of liberty;
the Germans pledged toward autocracy. They found greater sympathy in
England and in France.
“I am a son of liberty,” said Cavour, “to her I owe all that I am.”
That, too, is Italy’s motto. When the war broke out popular sympathy
in Italy was therefore strongly in favor of the Allies. The party in
power, the Liberals, adopted the policy of neutrality for the time
being, but thousands of Italians volunteered for the French and British
service, and the anti-German feeling grew greater as time went on.
Finally, on the 23rd of May, 1915, the Italian Government withdrew
its ambassador to Austria and declared war. A complete statement of
the negotiations between Italy and Austria-Hungary, which led to this
declaration, was delivered to the Government of the United States
by the Italian Ambassador on May 25th. This statement, of which the
following is an extract, lucidly presented the Italian position:
“The Triple Alliance was essentially defensive, and designed solely to
preserve the _status quo_, or in other words equilibrium, in Europe.
That these were its only objects and purposes is established by the
letter and spirit of the treaty, as well as by the intentions clearly
described and set forth in official acts of the ministers who created
the alliance and confirmed and renewed it in the interests of peace,
which always has inspired Italian policy. The treaty, as long as its
intents and purposes had been loyally interpreted and regarded, and
as long as it had not been used as a pretext for aggression against
others, greatly contributed to the elimination and settlement of causes
of conflict, and for many years assured to Europe the inestimable
benefits of peace. But Austria-Hungary severed the treaty by her own
hands. She rejected the response of Serbia which gave to her all the
satisfaction she could legitimately claim. She refused to listen to the
conciliatory proposals presented by Italy in conjunction with other
powers in the effort to spare Europe from a vast conflict, certain to
drench the Continent with blood and to reduce it to ruin beyond the
conception of human imagination, and finally she provoked that conflict.
“Article first of the treaty embodied the usual and necessary
obligation of such pacts--the pledge to exchange views upon any fact
and economic questions of a general nature that might arise pursuant to
its terms. None of the contracting parties had the right to undertake
without a previous agreement any step the consequence of which might
impose a duty upon the other signatories arising under the alliance, or
which would in any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests.
This article was violated by Austria-Hungary, when she sent to Serbia
her note dated July 23, 1914, an action taken without the previous
assent of Italy. Thus, Austria-Hungary violated beyond doubt one of the
fundamental provisions of the treaty. The obligation of Austria-Hungary
to come to a previous understanding with Italy was the greater because
her obstinate policy against Serbia gave rise to a situation which
directly tended toward the provocation of a European war.
[Illustration: _Photo by James H. Hare._
WAITING THE ORDER TO ATTACK
Italian shock troops, young picked soldiers, resting before the order
came to hurl themselves against the Austrians.]
“As far back as the beginning of July, 1914, the Italian Government,
preoccupied by the prevailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid
before the Austro-Hungarian Government a number of suggestions
advising moderation, and warning it of the impending danger of a
European outbreak. The course adopted by Austria-Hungary against
Serbia constituted, moreover, a direct encroachment upon the general
interests of Italy both political and economical in the Balkan
peninsula. Austria-Hungary could not for a moment imagine that Italy
could remain indifferent while Serbian independence was being trodden
upon. On a number of occasions theretofore, Italy gave Austria to
understand, in friendly but clear terms, that the independence of
Serbia was considered by Italy as essential to the Balkan equilibrium.
Austria-Hungary was further advised that Italy could never permit that
equilibrium to be disturbed through a prejudice. This warning had been
conveyed not only by her diplomats in private conversations with
responsible Austro-Hungarian officials, but was proclaimed publicly by
Italian statesmen on the floors of Parliament.
“Therefore, when Austria-Hungary ignored the usual practices and
menaced Serbia by sending her ultimatum, without in any way notifying
the Italian Government of what she proposed to do, indeed leaving
that government to learn of her action through the press, rather than
through the usual channels of diplomacy, when Austria-Hungary took this
unprecedented course she not only severed her alliance with Italy but
committed an act inimical to Italy’s interests....
“After the European war broke out Italy sought to come to an
understanding with Austria-Hungary with a view to a settlement
satisfactory to both parties which might avert existing and future
trouble. Her efforts were in vain, notwithstanding the efforts of
Germany, which for months endeavored to induce Austria-Hungary to
comply with Italy’s suggestion thereby recognizing the propriety and
legitimacy of the Italian attitude. Therefore Italy found herself
compelled by the force of events to seek other solutions.
“Inasmuch as the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had ceased
virtually to exist and served only to prolong a state of continual
friction and mutual suspicion, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna was
instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the
Italian Government considered itself free from the ties arising out
of the treaty of the Triple Alliance in so far as Austria-Hungary was
concerned. This communication was delivered in Vienna on May 4th.
“Subsequently to this declaration, and after we had been obliged to
take steps for the protection of our interests, the Austro-Hungarian
Government submitted new concessions, which, however, were deemed
insufficient and by no means met our minimum demands. These offers
could not be considered under the circumstances. The Italian Government
taking into consideration what has been stated above, and supported by
the vote of Parliament and the solemn manifestation of the country
came to the decision that any further delay would be inadvisable.
Therefore, on May 23d, it was declared, in the name of the King, to
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome, that, beginning the following
day, May 24th, it would consider itself in a state of war with
Austria-Hungary.”
It was a closely reasoned argument that the Italian statesmen
presented, but there was something more than reasoned argument in
Italy’s course. She had been waiting for years for the opportunity to
bring under her flag the men of her own race still held in subjection
by hated Austria. Now was the time or never. Her people had become
roused. Mobs filled the streets. Great orators, even the great poet,
D’Annunzio, proclaimed a holy war. The sinking of the Lusitania poured
oil on the flames, and the treatment of Belgium and eastern France
added to the fury.
[Illustration: _Photo by International Film Service._
TRANSPORTING WOUNDED AMID THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE ITALIAN MOUNTAIN
FRONT
The isolated mountain positions were only accessible to the bases of
operations by these aerial cable cars. This picture, taken during the
Austrian retreat, shows a wounded soldier being taken down the
mountain by this means.]
Italian statesmen, even if they had so desired, could not have
withstood the pressure. It was a crusade for Italia Irredenta, for
civilization, for humanity. The country had been flooded by
representatives of German propaganda, papers had been hired and, by all
report, money in large amounts distributed. But every German effort was
swept away in the flood of feeling. It was the people’s war.
Amid tremendous enthusiasm the Chamber of Deputies adopted by vote of
407 to 74 the bill conferring upon the government full power to make
war. All members of the Cabinet maintained absolute silence regarding
what step should follow the action of the chamber. When the chamber
reassembled on May 20th, after its long recess, there were present
482 Deputies out of 500, the absentees remaining away on account of
illness. The Deputies especially applauded were those who wore military
uniforms and who had asked permission for leave from their military
duties to be present at the sitting. All the tribunes were filled to
overflowing. No representatives of Germany, Austria or Turkey were
to be seen in the diplomatic tribune. The first envoy to arrive was
Thomas Nelson Page, the American Ambassador, who was accompanied by
his staff. M. Barrere, Sir J. Bennell Rodd, and Michel de Giers, the
French, British and Russian Ambassadors, respectively, appeared a few
minutes later and all were greeted with applause, which was shared
by the Belgian, Greek and Roumanian ministers. George B. McClellan,
one-time mayor of New York, occupied a seat in the President’s tribune.
A few minutes before the session began the poet, Gabrielle D’Annunzio,
one of the strongest advocates of war, appeared in the rear of the
public tribune which was so crowded that it seemed impossible to
squeeze in anybody else. But the moment the people saw him they lifted
him shoulder high and passed him over their heads to the first row.
The entire chamber, and all those occupying the other tribunes, rose
and applauded for five minutes, crying “Viva D’Annunzio!” Later
thousands sent him their cards and in return received his autograph
bearing the date of this eventful day. Señor Marcora, President of
the Chamber, took his place at three o’clock. All the members of the
House, and everybody in the galleries, stood up to acclaim the old
follower of Garibaldi. Premier Salandra, followed by all the members of
the Cabinet, entered shortly afterward. It was a solemn moment. Then a
delirium of cries broke out.
“Viva Salandra!” roared the Deputies, and the cheering lasted for a
long time. After the formalities of the opening, Premier Salandra,
deeply moved by the demonstration, arose and said:
“Gentlemen, I have the honor to present to you a bill to meet the
eventual expenditures of a national war.”
The announcement was greeted by further prolonged applause. The
Premier’s speech was continually interrupted by enthusiasm, and at
times he could hardly continue on account of the wild cheering. The
climax was reached when he made a reference to the army and navy. Then
the cries seemed interminable, and those on the floor of the House
and in the galleries turned to the military tribune from which the
officers answered by waving their hands and handkerchiefs.
At the end of the Premier’s speech there were deafening vivas for the
King, war and Italy. Thirty-four Socialists refused to join the cheers,
even in the cry “Viva Italia!” and they were hooted and hissed.
The action of the Italian Government created intense feeling. A
newspaper man in Vienna, describing the Austrian indignation, said:
“The exasperation and contempt which Italy’s treacherous surprise
attack and her hypocritical justification aroused here, are quite
indescribable. Neither Serbia nor Russia, despite a long and costly
war, is hated. Italy, however, or rather those Italian would-be
politicians and business men who offer violence to the majority of
peaceful Italian people, are unutterably hated.” On the other hand
German papers spoke with much more moderation and recognized that Italy
was acting in an entirely natural manner.
On the very day on which war was declared active operations were
begun. Both sides had been making elaborate preparations. Austria
had prepared herself by building strong fortifications in which were
employed the latest technical improvements in defensive warfare. Upon
the Carso and around Gorizia the Austrians had placed innumerable
batteries of powerful guns mounted on rails and protected by armor
plates. They also had a great number of medium and smaller guns. A net
of trenches had been excavated and constructed in cement all along the
edge of the hills which dominated the course of the Isonzo River.
These trenches, occupying a position nearly impregnable because so
mountainous, were defended by every modern device. They were protected
with numerous machine guns, surrounded by wire entanglements through
which ran a strong electric current. These lines of trenches followed
without interruption from the banks of the Isonzo to the summit of the
mountains which dominate it; they formed a kind of formidable staircase
which had to be conquered step by step with enormous sacrifice.
During this same period General Cadorna, then head of the Italian army,
had been bringing that army up to date, working for high efficiency and
piling up munitions.
The Army of Italy was a formidable one. Every man in Italy is liable to
military service for a period of nineteen years from the age of twenty
to thirty-nine.
At the time of the war the approximate war strength of the army was
as follows: Officers, 41,692; active army with the colors, 289,910;
reserve, 638,979; mobile militia, 299,956; territorial militia,
1,889,659; total strength, 3,159,836. The above number of total men
available included upward of 1,200,000 fully trained soldiers, with
perhaps another 800,000 partially trained men, the remaining million
being completely untrained men. This army was splendidly armed, its
officers well educated, and the men brave and disciplined.
The Italian plan of campaign apparently consisted first, in
neutralizing the Trentino by capturing or covering the defenses and
cutting the two lines of communication with Austria proper, the railway
which ran south from Insbruck, and that which ran southwest from Vienna
and joined the former at Fransensfets; and second, in a movement in
force on the eastern frontier, with Trieste captured or covered on the
right flank in the direction of the Austrian fortress at Klagenfurt and
Vienna.
The first blow was struck by Austria on the day that war was declared.
On that day bombs were dropped on Venice, and five other Adriatic ports
were shelled from air, and some from sea. The Italian armies invaded
Austria on the east with great rapidity, and by May 27th a part of the
Italian forces had moved across the Isonzo River to Monfalcone, sixteen
miles northwest of Trieste. Another force penetrated further to the
north in the Crown land of Gorizia, and Gradisca. Reports from Italy
were that encounters with the enemy had thus far been merely outpost
skirmishes, but had allowed Italy to occupy advantageous positions on
Austrian territory. By June 1st, the Italians had occupied the greater
part of the west bank of the Isonzo, with little opposition. The left
wing was beyond the Isonzo, at Caporetto, fighting among the boulders
of Monte Nero, where the Austrian artillery had strong positions.
Monfalcone was kept under constant bombardment.
A general Italian advance took place on June 7th across the Isonzo
River from Caporetto to the sea, a distance of about forty miles.
Monfalcone was taken by the Italians on June the 10th, the first
serious blow against Trieste, as Monfalcone was a railway junction, and
its electrical works operated the light and power of Trieste.
Next day the center made a great blow against Gradisca and Sagrado, but
the river line proved too strong. The only success was won that night
at Plava, north of Borrigia, which was carried by a surprise attack.
The Isonzo was in flood, and presented a serious obstacle to the onrush
of the Italians. By June 14th the Italian eastern army had pushed
forward along the gulf of Trieste toward the town of Nebrosina, nine
miles from Trieste.
Meanwhile, the Austrian armies were being constantly strengthened. The
initial weakness of the Austrian defensive was due to the fact that the
armies normally assigned to the invaded region had been sent to defend
the Austrian line in Galicia against the Russians. When Italy began
her invasion the defenses of the country were chiefly in the hands
of hastily mobilized youths below the military age of nineteen, and
men above the military age of forty-two. From now on Austrian troops
began to arrive from the Galician front, some of these representing
the finest fighting material in the Austrian ranks. The chance of an
easy victory was slipping from Italy’s hands. The Italian advance was
checked.
On the 15th of June the Italians carried an important position on Monte
Nero, climbing the rocks by night and attacking by dawn. But this
conquest did not help much. No guns of great caliber could be carried
on the mountain, and Tolmino, which had been heavily fortified, and
contained a garrison of some thirty thousand men, was entirely safe.
The following week there were repeated counter-attacks at Plava and on
Monte Nero, but the Italians held what they had won.
The position was now that Cadorna’s left wing was in a strong position,
but could not do much against Tolmino. His center was facing the great
camp of Gorizia, while his right was on the edge of the Carso, and
had advanced as far as Dueno, on the Monfalcone-Trieste Railroad. The
army was in position to make an attack upon Gorizia. On the 2d of July
an attack on a broad front was aimed directly at Gorizia. The left
was to swing around against the defenses of Gorizia to the north; the
center was directed against the Gorizia bridge head, and the right was
to swing around to the northeast through the Doberdo plateau. If it
succeeded the Trieste railway would be cut and Gorizia must fall.
[Illustration: AREA OF CADORNA’S OPERATIONS
Showing the Isonzo Valley and the town of Gorizia which fell to the
Italians August 9, 1916.]
Long and confused fighting followed. The center and the right
of the Italian army slowly advanced their line, taking over one
thousand prisoners. For days there was continuous bombardment and
counter-bombardment. The fighting on the left was terrific. In the
neighborhood of Plava the Italian forces found themselves opposed by
Hungarian troops, unaccustomed to mountain warfare, who at first fell
back. Austrian reserves came to their aid, and flung back three times
the Italian charge.
Three new Italian brigades were brought up, and King Victor Emanuel
himself came to encourage his troops. The final assault carried the
heights. On the 22d of July the Italian right captured the crest of San
Michele, which dominates the Doberdo plateau.
Meanwhile the Austrian armies were being heavily reinforced, and
General Cadorna found himself unable to make progress. Much ground
had been won but Gorizia was still unredeemed. Many important vantage
points were in Italian hands, but it was difficult to advance. The
result of the three months’ campaign was a stalemate. In the high
mountains to the north Italy’s campaign was a war of defense. To
undertake her offensive on the Isonzo it was necessary that she guard
her flanks and rear. The Tyrolese battle-ground contained three
distinct points where it was necessary to operate; the Trentino
Salient, the passes of the Dolomites, and the passes of the Carnic Alps.
Early in June Italy had won control of the ridges of the mountains
in the two latter points, but the problem in the Trentino was more
difficult. It was necessary, because of the converging valleys, to push
her front well inland. On the Carnic Alps the fighting consisted of
unimportant skirmishes. The main struggle centered around the pass of
Monte Croce Carnico.
In two weeks the Alpini had seized dominating positions to the west
of the pass, but the Austrians clung to the farther slopes. A great
deal of picturesque fighting went on, but not much progress was made.
Further west in the Dolomite region there was more fighting. On the
30th of May Cartina had been captured, and the Italians moved north
toward the Pusterthal Railway. Progress was slow, as the main routes to
the railway were difficult.
By the middle of August they were only a few miles from the railway,
but all the routes led through defiles, and the neighboring heights
were in the possession of the Austrians. To capture these heights
was a most difficult feat, which the Italians performed in the most
brilliant way; but even after they had passed these defiles success was
not yet won. Each Italian column was in its own grove, with no lateral
communication. The Austrians could mass themselves where they pleased.
As a result the Italian forces were compelled to halt.
In the Trentino campaign the Italians soon captured the passes, and
moved against Trente and Roverito. These towns were heavily fortified,
as were their surrounding heights. The campaign became a series of
small fights on mountain peaks and mountain ridges. Only small bodies
of troops could maneuver, and the raising of guns up steep precipices
was extremely difficult. The Italians slowly succeeded in gaining
ground, and established a chain of posts around the heights so that
often one would see guns and barbed wire entrenchments at a height of
more than ten thousand feet among the crevasses of the glaciers. The
Alpini performed wonderful feats of physical endurance, but the plains
of Lombardy were still safe.