THIELEMANN’S INSTRUCTIONS AND HIS DISPOSITIONS AT WAVRE
Thielemann had been ordered by Blucher to defend Wavre at all costs if
the French appeared in force, but if there was no fear of a serious
attack, to leave a small rear-guard there and follow the other three
Corps.
As Excelmans’ Cavalry had shown so little activity in their attack on
the outposts, Thielemann, towards three o’clock, decided to move his
Corps towards Ohain, leaving only a small detachment to defend Wavre. In
his judgment, if the French had meant to hinder the march towards
Wellington, they would have appeared in force several hours ago. So
slowly did they appear to be approaching, and in no great numbers, that
Thielemann had every reason to suppose that a small force would be
sufficient to cover his march, and that his main body would be of much
greater assistance at St Lambert than at Wavre. His patrols had so far
only seen the opposing cavalry and the head of Vandamme’s Corps; the
whole strength of Grouchy’s force was as yet undiscovered. Accordingly,
at about 3.30 P.M., the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Divisions,
with the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, were ordered to begin marching
towards Frischermont and Chapelle St Lambert; and a small detachment
under Colonel Zeppelin, consisting of the two Fusilier battalions of the
30th Regiment of the Line and the 1st Kurmark Landwehr Regiment,
belonging to the Ninth Division, was detailed to hold Wavre.
When, at 4 P.M., the head of Vandamme’s Corps appeared on the road from
La Baraque leading towards the main bridge at Wavre, and Excelmans’
Cavalry was seen massing at Dion-le-Mont, one Division, the Twelfth
(Stulpnagel’s) was already on the road to Rixensart, and the Eleventh
was in the act of marching. The Ninth Division (Borcke’s), which had
been posted near the farm of La Huzelle, fell back before Vandamme, but
on reaching Wavre, it was found that the bridges had been barricaded,
and no entry was possible. This left the Division in a situation of some
danger, but Borcke led his men off to the right, to Basse Wavre, where
there was another bridge, about half a mile down the stream. Here they
crossed, and destroyed the bridge behind them. This was a most necessary
step, because Excelmans’ Dragoons were scarcely a mile and a half away
at Dion-le-Mont, and they might at any moment make a dash for Basse
Wavre. The destruction of the bridge, too, saved Thielemann the task of
defending it, and so scattering his troops, which were already none too
numerous. To have left the bridge as a means of possible counter-attack
was not desirable, nor even necessary, as a counter-attack by Limale or
the Mill of Bierges would have had all the points in its favour.
Having no further orders, Borcke lined the left bank of the Dyle at
Basse Wavre with picked marksmen from the 8th Regiment of the Line and
the 1st Battalion of the 30th Regiment. These he placed under the
command of Major Dittfurth, who had already distinguished himself during
the close of the battle at Ligny. These skirmishers extended from Basse
Wavre to Wavre, and took cover behind the trees lining the bank, and the
neighbouring hedges and walls. Borcke continued his way to Wavre, and
there detached one battalion (the 2nd of the 30th Regiment) and two
squadrons of cavalry, to reinforce Colonel Zeppelin’s detachment, which,
by this time, had loopholed all the buildings along the bank of the
river, and were improvising defences. This done, Borcke resumed his
march towards the main Prussian army!
General Borcke’s timely reinforcements to Zeppelin, and his prompt
initiative in lining the Dyle at Basse Wavre with sharpshooters,
afterwards proved to be of the greatest assistance. There was nothing
but his own foresight to cause him to take these measures as he passed
along, and it was fortunate for Thielemann that he did not march off
without detaching these parties.
As soon as Vandamme’s Corps plainly showed signs of attacking,
Thielemann immediately halted all his Divisions and began to dispose
them for defence.
The position afforded favourable means for defence. The Dyle, ordinarily
a shallow stream, but at this time in flood, owing to the heavy rains,
ran along the front in a narrow valley. The town of Wavre, situated on
the left bank, extended for about half a mile along the stream, and was
connected with a few buildings which formed a kind of suburb on the
opposite bank, by two stone bridges, one of which, the larger of the
two, carried the main Brussels-Namur road. About three-quarters of a
mile up-stream, on the left bank, was the Mill of Bierges, destined to
be the scene of the fiercest fighting; here there was a wooden bridge,
carrying a narrow country road, leading from the village of Bierges. At
Limale, a village 2¼ miles up-stream from Wavre, and at Limelette,
another village a mile further, there were also wooden bridges. On the
right bank of the Dyle, there was a series of hills commanding the town,
the river, and the bridges. On the left bank, a similar series of
heights, rather steeper but not so high; and numerous hedges, lanes, and
hollows on the left bank compensated for the greater “command” of the
ground on the opposite side of the stream. All the buildings along the
river were hastily loop-holed, and the two bridges at Wavre strongly
barricaded. Basse Wavre included a few buildings about half a mile below
Wavre; and houses stood on both banks. There were many lanes and
cross-roads branching from the main Brussels road, on both sides of the
stream, so that the movements of troops could be conducted generally
under cover; but the state of the roads was so bad, that any movement at
all was extremely difficult and slow. Grouchy’s side commanded
Thielemann’s, but the latter’s was well covered, both from artillery and
musket fire. Behind Wavre was a hill, which would afford good cover for
reserves.
Thielemann saw that the enemy might attack at any or all of the points
of passage: and he was therefore determined to be prepared for any
emergency. In placing the troops, his one idea was to hold the line of
the stream with skirmishers and sharpshooters in sufficient strength to
prevent any sudden surprise, and to keep his supports together close at
hand, to reinforce any threatened point or to guard his flanks. He
placed the Tenth Division (Kampfen’s) behind Wavre, resting on a small
wood near the Brussels road. The Twelfth Division (Stulpnagel’s), which
had started on its way to St Lambert, was brought back to Bierges, and
placed behind the village. The bridge at Bierges was barricaded, and the
mill prepared for defence. One battery of Horse Artillery (No. 20) was
placed in front of the village. The Eleventh Division (Luck’s) was
placed astride the Brussels road, behind Wavre, and on the left of the
Tenth Division.
The Ninth Division (Borcke’s) was to have been placed in rear of the
Tenth and Eleventh Divisions as a general reserve, but Borcke, after
detaching the troops to hold Basse Wavre and reinforce Zeppelin, had
marched his Division off towards the main army, in the belief that the
whole Corps had already marched. As Borcke had made a wide detour from
Basse Wavre to La Bavette, there was some reason for his misjudgment.
His march was not discovered in time; so Thielemann’s force was reduced
by six battalions and one battery of artillery.
Hobe’s Cavalry Division (Marwitz’s and Lottum’s Brigades) was posted
with one battery of Horse Artillery (No. 18) near La Bavette: a central
position, whence it might be directed on any part of the field. The
remainder of the artillery was distributed along the front. The bank of
the Dyle and the riverside buildings in Wavre were occupied by Light
troops and sharpshooters from the different regiments. Two more
companies of infantry were sent to Basse Wavre, under Major Bornstaedt,
to reinforce the detachment there. Three battalions and three squadrons
under Stengel, from Zieten’s Corps, were sent back to guard the bridge
at Limale.
In point of numbers, Thielemann’s troops were less than half as strong
as those of Grouchy; and it was evident that the coming fight was to be
of the fiercest description. Thielemann’s men were in fine trim and
eager for the enemy’s attack.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF WAVRE.
_Grouchy’s attack at Daybreak, June 19^{th}._
_William Stanford & Company, Ltd._, _The Oxford Geographical Institute._
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.]