THE BATTLE OF WAVRE
Vandamme’s advanced guard, between three and four o’clock, had driven
Borcke’s Division back on Wavre, and Vandamme, eager to burst into
activity after the irritable delays on the march, proceeded to attack
without waiting for Gérard, or even for Grouchy’s orders. He was afraid
that night would come on and allow the Prussians to escape, as they had
done from Sombreffe. He only saw in front of him a force waiting to be
attacked; he had no thoughts for the general situation. He was a
rough-and-ready soldier, and he thought he saw his chance of beating the
Prussians single-handed. He longed for the marshal’s bâton; he was
jealous, too, of Gérard.
At this time, Excelmans was at Dion-le-Mont with his cavalry, slightly
in rear of Vandamme. Gérard was nearing La Baraque, some 4 miles in
rear. Pajol, with his cavalry and Teste’s Division, had just reached
Tourinnes.
Before Grouchy could reach Vandamme, the latter had launched the whole
of his Tenth Division (Habert’s), consisting of the 22nd, 34th, 70th and
88th Regiments of the Line, against the village opposite Wavre. The
French, in heavy columns, supported by a furious cannonade from two
batteries of twelve-pounders placed to the right of the Brussels road,
cleared the few Prussian sharpshooters from the buildings, and pressed
on to the main bridge. But here they were met with a terrible fire from
their front and on their flanks, from the sharpshooters lining the
hedges and buildings on the opposite bank. The Prussian batteries played
fiercely on their columns, and on the whole of the ground behind them,
where their own guns were placed. In a few minutes, General Habert and
600 men were down. Attempts to force the barricaded bridge were beaten
back with frightful loss, and the Division was placed in a very serious
position. If they retreated, they came under the heavy fire of the
Prussian batteries on the opposite heights; if they remained where they
stood, the enemy’s sharpshooters would annihilate them; to advance was
impossible. Gradually, they found shelter, company by company, under the
walls of the buildings along the bank, whence they had just driven the
Prussians. Vandamme was now deeply committed to the fight.
Grouchy, who had by this time arrived on the scene, unaware of the
strength of the Prussians at Wavre, and unaware, too, of Blucher’s march
on St Lambert, made arrangements to support Vandamme’s attack by two
other attacks on either flank. For this purpose, he ordered Excelmans to
move his cavalry from Dion-le-Mont to the front of Basse Wavre, and a
battalion under Lefol to make an attempt to cross at the Mill of
Bierges.
It was now five o’clock, and a message arrived from Napoleon, sent at
1.30 P.M., saying that Bulow’s Corps had just been seen at St Lambert,
and ordering Grouchy to lose no time in moving to join the Emperor’s
right, when he would crush Bulow in flank. Grouchy, knowing that he
could not now disengage Vandamme, sent orders to Pajol to hasten his
march on Limale, and ordered Gérard to lead the Fourth Corps towards
that village at once. He conceived the idea of assaulting and carrying
Wavre with Vandamme’s Corps, aided afterwards by Excelmans’ Cavalry,
while he sent the remainder of his army on Chapelle St Lambert _viâ_
Limale. This was a skilful project, and the best under the
circumstances, no doubt; for the movement on Limale would have had the
double effect of turning Thielemann’s left flank, while it promised to
bring a strong reinforcement on Napoleon’s right. But it was now too
late. The opportunity had passed much earlier in the day.
Hulot’s Division, of Gérard’s Corps, had now reached the scene of
Vandamme’s efforts, and Grouchy ordered it to move to the left and force
a passage at the Mill of Bierges. Lefol’s battalion had made several
attempts to cross the bridges there, but had each time been beaten back
by the Prussian sharpshooters and the batteries in front of Bierges
village. Some guns were sent to aid Lefol and endeavour to silence the
Prussian artillery opposite, but they were themselves outnumbered and
silenced. On Hulot’s arrival, a fresh battalion was sent to relieve
Lefol’s detachment, and the whole Division followed. By this time, both
banks of the Dyle, from Bierges to Basse Wavre, were lined with
skirmishers and sharpshooters, pouring a terrific fire into each other.
Hulot’s Division had great difficulty in moving through the swamps and
mud to the bridge at Bierges, and suffered severely from the Prussian
batteries. The battalion which relieved Lefol’s began at once to make a
fresh attempt to force the bridge, but was beaten off with loss.
Grouchy, impatient and fretful, rode off to meet the remainder of the
Fourth Corps and Pajol’s force, still some distance behind on the
Namur-Brussels road. Ordering Pajol to make all haste for Limale, he
returned to the field, where he found that matters had made no progress.
Infuriated by the repeated failures to carry the bridge and Mill of
Bierges, he himself led a fresh attack with Hulot’s men, but nothing
could overcome the fire of the Prussians. Gérard fell wounded and was
carried off the field.
Finding his attacks on Bierges and Wavre unsuccessful, Grouchy left
Vandamme and Excelmans to carry on the fight, while he himself led the
remainder of Gérard’s Corps to Limale. Pajol had arrived in front of the
Limale bridge shortly before dark, with Teste’s Division and his own
cavalry. Stengel, who held Limale with three battalions and three
squadrons, had omitted to barricade the bridge, and when Pajol perceived
this he sent a regiment of Hussars at full speed on the bridge, and,
charging four abreast only, these horsemen burst through the Prussians
posted at the farther end. The passage was forced and Teste’s Division
was sent across; and Stengel, finding himself very much outnumbered,
abandoned Limale and took up a position on the heights above the
village. Hearing of Stengel’s difficulties, Thielemann sent the Twelfth
Division (Stulpnagel’s) and Hobe’s Cavalry to reinforce him. Thielemann
saw now that the real point of crossing was Limale, and not Bierges or
Basse Wavre, and he moved all the troops he could spare towards his
right. Four battalions of the Tenth Division took up Stulpnagel’s former
position, and three battalions of the Twelfth Division were left to
defend Bierges; the remainder marched to join Stengel.
It was now dark, but the battle continued with vigour. Grouchy posted
his battalions in front of Limale, and, considering the darkness of the
night, it is surprising how he managed to place them without confusion.
Stengel’s men kept up a harassing fire on his columns as they wound
their way through the muddy lanes from the village to the height above
the Dyle and deployed to receive Stulpnagel’s attack. Pajol moved his
cavalry to the French left flank.
Stulpnagel, his Division now reduced to six battalions, left one
battalion (the Fusilier battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr Regiment)
and one battery in a copse north of Bierges, as a reserve, and joined
Stengel, who was now on his right, with his remaining five battalions.
His orders were to endeavour to regain Limale, and drive the French
across the Dyle. He formed his attack with two battalions in first line,
with three in support. His two squadrons were sent to reinforce
Stengel, and the rest of the cavalry posted in rear, to be in readiness
for a flank movement. The darkness was so great that little cohesion was
possible between the units, and it is not surprising that the attack
fell to pieces. The formation of the ground was unknown, and the little
folds and features which make or mar a night attack were plentiful: and
unfortunately for the Prussians, they marred their plans. As the front
line was advancing in fair order, a hollow lane was suddenly met with,
and caused great confusion, being unexpected; but worse than this, the
opposite side was lined with French sharpshooters, who poured volleys
across into the disordered Prussians. There was, for a time, no attempt
to seek cover, and the losses from the fire of the French opposite were
heavy, in spite of the darkness. The second line, which was to have
supported the first, moved too far to its left, and became itself a
front line, engaging more French skirmishers. Stengel, on the right, was
charged by cavalry and compelled to retire.
Stulpnagel perceived that little good could come of an attack the
successive steps of which had merged into a confused line, and resolved
to withdraw to the shelter of the wood behind Point-du-Jour, leaving a
line of outposts to watch the front edge. The cavalry took post behind
the infantry; and the French fearing to venture through the
uncertainties of the night, the fighting on this side ceased.
Meanwhile, on the Prussian left, before Wavre and the Mill of Bierges,
the fighting went on most vigorously. The darkness did not prevent the
fury of the fight; it only seemed to add to the grimness of it. The
whole of Vandamme’s Corps was now engaged, and time after time the
French rushed at the barricades on the bridges. Thirteen separate
assaults were beaten back by the Prussians, and no less than five times
the defenders, in pursuing the routed enemy, attacked and drove them
from the houses on the far side of the Dyle. Once, the French had
possession of the main bridge, and had even occupied some of the
neighbouring buildings, but the Prussian reserves were hurried up, and
these drove out the French. Each time there seemed a chance of the enemy
obtaining a footing on the left bank, the Prussian reserves, judiciously
posted near at hand among the side-streets and dwellings, rushed out and
overwhelmed the intruders. Four battalions defended Wavre against the
whole of Vandamme’s Corps. But while the attackers were exposed at each
attempt to cross the bridges, the defenders were secure behind their
loop-holed walls. Only a great superiority of artillery fire, to
prepare the way for the assault, and to destroy some of the nearer
walls, could have made a crossing successful. A few daring Sappers might
have brought up bags of powder to blow in the barricades; they could
only have done so by sacrificing themselves, but heroes and brave men
were not wanting. Shortage of powder, however, explains the fact that no
such attempt was made.
At Basse Wavre, lower down the stream, the attack had not been pressed.
Excelmans’ Cavalry had been ordered to make a demonstration on that
flank, but cavalry cannot cross a stream without bridge or ford. Only
one French battalion, supported by a single gun and two squadrons, had
shown themselves, and these were of no use without a bridge to carry
them across.
The only advantage which Grouchy had obtained was on his left, which had
rolled back the Prussian right, but had in no way destroyed it. Firing
ceased at about 11 P.M., and great preparations were made on both sides
for a renewal of the fight at daybreak. But Grouchy was well pleased
with his success on the left, since he assumed that he had at least cut
off half of the Prussian army. It was now too late for him to be of
assistance to Napoleon, and the din of the distant battle had long ago
died out. But Grouchy took no steps to ascertain how matters stood with
the Emperor. He merely sent orders to Vandamme to bring his Corps across
the Dyle at Limale, as he intended making an end of the Prussian right
flank, and marching to join Napoleon before Brussels, thinking, for a
reason which cannot be explained, that the allies had been beaten.
Perhaps it was his confident belief in the invincibility of the Emperor;
but yet again he made no efforts to gain information or to confirm his
own views. Teste’s Division came up during the night, and, crossing the
Dyle at Limale, took post on the right flank of Gérard’s Corps, between
Limale and Bierges, and resting its own right dank on the Dyle.
Thielemann, on the other hand, had sent an officer’s patrol to
reconnoitre on his right, and to ascertain what had occurred at Mont St
Jean. This officer returned during the night with the news of Napoleon’s
rout, and consequently Thielemann expected Grouchy, who, he supposed,
was fully acquainted with the situation, to retreat early next morning,
if not during the night. But two incidents occurred which sadly reduced
his numbers and which caused a rearrangement of his troops. Stengel, for
a reason never yet explained, calmly marched off from Stulpnagel’s right
at daybreak, to St Lambert, there to join his own Corps, Zieten’s.
Possibly he had personal views of the situation, and considered the
battle over! It is uncharitable to suppose that he had feelings against
Thielemann or Stulpnagel. But in either or any case, his conduct was
most blameworthy and most unsoldierlike. His departure (which must have
been noticed before his movement had gone far, and therefore could have
been prevented) reduced Thielemann’s force by three battalions and three
squadrons; and this at a moment when every man was of importance. But
even another inexplicable movement was made by Colonel Ledebur, who,
with his detachment of five squadrons and two guns of the Horse
Artillery, marched to St Lambert during Grouchy’s attack, bivouacked
there for the night, and then moved off to join the Fourth Corps on the
19th. These two detachments were thus of no use whatever to Thielemann,
and their extraordinary action must have caused him considerable
anxiety, since it might have appeared as desertion. But Thielemann was
firm in his belief that Grouchy would retreat, and when, at daybreak on
June 19, he saw French troops still in their positions, he assumed that
they were merely acting as a rear-guard to cover the general retirement.
He therefore ordered Colonel Marwitz, with the 8th Uhlans and two
squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, to attack Grouchy’s left
flank above Limale, while Hobe, with the 5th and 7th Uhlans, was to
advance in support on Marwitz’s left. To replace Stengel’s detachment,
the Twelfth Division was extended still further to its right, weakening
the whole of its front line, and leaving only three battalions in
reserve in the wood near Point-du-Jour. On Stulpnagel’s left, six
battalions of the Tenth Division held the line to Bierges and the Dyle.
In support, there were three battalions of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr
Regiment, from the Eleventh Division, while the 4th Kurmark Landwehr
(two battalions) with two squadrons, were posted behind Wavre as a
general reserve. Two battalions from the Twelfth Division were posted to
hold the Mill of Bierges. The remainder of Thielemann’s force was
extended along the Dyle in Wavre and Basse Wavre; but little fighting on
this front was now expected.
To support Marwitz’s attack, two batteries (one horse and one foot)
opened fire on the French columns massed on the plateau above Limale,
but the enemy’s artillery, which was greatly superior, replied fiercely
and soon silenced the Prussian guns, five of which were disabled.
Grouchy, who was still ignorant of Napoleon’s defeat, prepared an attack
on his part. His numbers vastly exceeded Thielemann’s thin forces, and
counted Gérard’s Corps (three divisions), Teste’s Division and Pajol’s
Cavalry. (Vandamme had not obeyed Grouchy’s orders of the previous
night, to march with his Corps to Limale.) Grouchy now formed three
Divisions--Teste’s, Vichery’s and Pecheux’s--in first line, divided into
three columns of attack. Teste’s Division formed the right column,
and was to attack Bierges and the mill; Vichery’s Division in the
centre, to attack the Prussian centre; and Pecheux’s Division against
Stulpnagel’s right flank. Each column was provided with a battery of
artillery, escorted and preceded by skirmishers. The remaining
division--Hulot’s--was in reserve behind the centre column. Pajol’s
Cavalry was to turn the Prussian right flank, which rested on the wood
of Rixensart. Twenty-eight French against ten Prussian battalions.
Thielemann perceived the coming attack, and reinforced his line with one
battalion, which he posted on his left, and which was all he could
spare. The French columns were too heavy for the Prussians, who were
hopelessly outnumbered. The Twelfth Division gave way, and the French
took the wood of Rixensart. Stulpnagel fell back on his supports--the
three battalions of the Eleventh Division and two batteries--and took up
a new position behind the wood. Teste’s attack on Bierges was stoutly
opposed by the two battalions posted there, and four battalions of the
Tenth Division were brought up in support. On the Prussian extreme
right, the cavalry brigades of Marwitz and Lottum--in all, twelve
squadrons--occupied Chambre and secured the flank.
At 8 A.M. definite news arrived of the French rout at Waterloo, and the
Prussians were aroused to renew their efforts. The tidings had a great
effect on the spirits of the men, and they rushed to the attack with
great vigour, recapturing the wood of Rixensart. This counter-stroke
deceived Grouchy, who at first believed that the Prussians had been
reinforced; but Stulpnagel’s effort was short-lived, and could not be
pushed further, for want of supports. Consequently, Grouchy in his turn
ordered a fresh attack, and the Prussians were again driven out of the
wood. At 9 A.M. Bierges fell into the hands of Teste, who had had a very
hard task to drive out the two gallant battalions defending the place.
The capture of this point was a serious blow, for the French had now
broken through Thielemann’s defence at the angle; and it was no longer
possible for the Prussians to resist on both wings. The centre having
been broken, and the right seriously threatened by overwhelming numbers,
Thielemann could not but withdraw.
Vandamme had remained in front of Wavre, but had not attacked, although
the defence had been greatly weakened by detachments for the right.
At 10 A.M. Thielemann ordered the retreat. He knew that Grouchy must
himself retreat sooner or later, but to hold on to Wavre too long would
mean Thielemann’s own destruction. By retreating, he would gain time,
and when the opportunity occurred, he would again advance, and possibly
convert Grouchy’s retirement into a rout. Under the protection of
Marwitz’s Cavalry--the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and 6th Landwehr
Cavalry with three batteries of horse artillery--the infantry retired,
and Zeppelin evacuated Wavre. The rear-guard, posting itself on the
Brussels road, threatened the French left whenever an opportunity
occurred.
As soon as Zeppelin withdrew from Wavre, Vandamme pushed his men across
the Dyle, both at Bierges and Wavre, and advanced up the Brussels road.
In rear of Wavre, in a hollow behind the town, two battalions of the 4th
Kurmark Landwehr Regiment were posted, and these were compelled to fall
back. But one of the battalions, reaching a small wood near La Bavette,
re-formed, and attacked and drove back a squadron of French cavalry
which was pursuing. The other battalion overthrew a French battalion,
and then continued its retreat. Marwitz’s Cavalry repulsed the squadrons
at the head of Vandamme’s columns, which were now advancing towards La
Bavette by the main road and by a parallel lane on the left. The
Prussian infantry retreated towards Louvain, through the villages of St
Achtenrode and Ottenburg; but behind St Achtenrode, Thielemann halted
and took up a defensive position. To retreat too far would hinder his
plan of turning back again to attack Grouchy when he retired. The
French, too, had halted about La Bavette, having at this moment heard
definite news of Napoleon’s disaster. No cavalry pursued the Prussians,
for in the close and intersected country beyond La Bavette it was
impossible for cavalry to manœuvre, and only with difficulty could it be
traversed by infantry.
As to Borcke in the meantime, his Division had reached Couture at 8 P.M.
on the previous evening, and a report was sent to Blucher. A reply was
returned that Borcke was to remain at Couture and await further orders.
But early next morning, hearing from Stengel, who had passed through St
Lambert, that the French were following him, Borcke extended two of his
battalions from St Robert to Rixensart, with the remaining four in
reserve. He had an idea that the French were advancing in his direction,
but had he only known the true position of Grouchy’s troops, he might
have been so bold as to attack them in rear. He certainly would have
caused a panic among Grouchy’s men, who would naturally suppose that
Blucher was returning with the main body. But, seeing three French
cavalry regiments detached to watch him, Borcke held back, and
positively took no action, although the Prussians still held Wavre. What
a diversion he might have made!
In the fighting of the 18th and 19th, Thielemann lost 2,500 men; the
French about 2,200; and the results were very creditable to the
Prussians. Attacked by more than double his numbers, and with very
little time to prepare his defence, Thielemann had held off the French
during all the critical hours of the afternoon and evening of the 18th.
He had successfully occupied the whole of Grouchy’s force during the
time when the latter might still have been of use to Napoleon. Without
knowing it, Grouchy had been almost surrounded, but Borcke’s Division
took no advantage of its position. How near to, and yet how far from,
succouring Napoleon was Grouchy! A little fore-thought, more energy, and
a bolder initiative on Grouchy’s part would have overcome the opposition
of the elements, and rendered Napoleon’s great stroke a success.
As an example of a defence of a river and village, the battle of Wavre
was a brilliant exploit. The courage on both sides was of the highest
order. Thielemann held Wavre as long as he could, and only withdrew when
he saw that his opportunity would occur the moment Grouchy learned the
result of Waterloo. To stay in his position, after the French had taken
Bierges, would have been to court disaster, but to retreat too soon
would have ruined his chances of rallying again to the attack. In the
previous night’s attacks, the Prussians had shown great courage and
tenacity, and the French were no less courageous and determined; their
movements in the darkness were carried out with surprising skill, and
reflect highly on their management and control. Vandamme’s repeated
efforts against the bridges might have been avoided, and every available
man brought across the Dyle at Limale, leaving only enough men to watch
Zeppelin in and around Wavre itself.
[Illustration: MAP ILLUSTRATING GROUCHY’S RETREAT FROM NAMUR, JUNE
20-28, 1815.
_William Stanford & Company, Ltd._, _The Oxford Geographical Institute._
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.]