BLUCHER MARCHES TOWARDS MONT ST JEAN WITH THE FIRST, SECOND, AND FOURTH
CORPS
At nightfall on the 17th, while Grouchy was still at Gembloux, the whole
of Blucher’s army (except two Divisions, the Ninth and Thirteenth, and
the Reserve Cavalry of Thielemann’s Corps, which were posted as
rear-guards to the Third and Fourth Corps) had reached Wavre and its
neighbourhood. As explained in the third chapter, the Second and Third
Corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Dyle, beyond Wavre, and the
First and Fourth on the right bank. Pirch I. was between St Anne and
Aisemont; Bulow was at Dion-le-Mont. The rear-guards were posted at
Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; these troops fell back next day as the
French advanced. On Blucher’s left, patrols scoured the country towards
Namur and Louvain; on his right they watched the Dyle and its
approaches. Limale was held by a detachment from Zieten’s Corps to
protect the right flank, and cavalry patrols rode to and fro over all
the valley of the Dyle. The reserve ammunition columns with full
supplies reached Wavre in the afternoon of the 17th, and thus all the
batteries were replenished. It speaks well for the Prussian arrangements
that these supplies should have reached Wavre at so important a moment;
when on account of their unexpected retreat to Wavre, all previous
arrangements had to be cancelled.
It was only when Blucher had thus made sure of his concentration and of
the refilling of his waggons and limbers, that he replied to
Wellington:--
“I shall not come with two corps only, but with my whole army;
upon this understanding, however, that, should the French not
attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th.”
Having reached Wavre in safety, the Prussians, though they had lost none
of their courage, began to feel greater confidence. The defeat at Ligny
had merely damped their ardour for a space; it had in nowise impaired
their fighting value. The men were eager for a further trial with the
French, and they were now more determined than before to regain prestige
and humble the victors of Jena. Nevertheless, among the lesser troops
and the newly raised corps from the Rhenish provinces, there had been
many desertions. Most of these had once been French soldiers
themselves, and knew the fear of Napoleon. To the number of 8000 these
men “absented” themselves after the battle of Ligny, while some fled
headlong to Liège. On the whole, considering the heterogeneous
composition of Bluchers army, there was very little bad faith among the
men.
About midnight on the 17th, a message from Wellington, through Muffling,
reached Blucher. It ran:--
“The Anglo-Allied army is posted with its right upon Braine
l’Alleud, its centre upon Mont St Jean, and its left upon La
Haye; with the enemy in front. The Duke awaits the attack, but
calculates on Prussian support.”
Gneisenau was very suspicious of the sincerity of Wellington’s
intentions; he believed that the Duke would fall back at the last
moment, and involve the Prussian army in a serious disaster. But Blucher
had a greater idea of the honour of the words of generals, and finally
overcame the reluctance of his Chief of the Staff. He thereupon replied
to Wellington that--
“Bulow’s Corps will set off marching tomorrow at daybreak in
your direction. It will be immediately followed by the Second
Corps. The First and Third Corps will also hold themselves in
readiness to proceed towards you. The exhaustion of the troops,
part of whom have not yet arrived, does not allow of my
commencing my movement earlier.”
An order to this effect was at once sent to Bulow at Dion-le-Mont:--
“You will, therefore, at daybreak, march with the Fourth Corps
from Dion-le-Mont, through Wavre, in the direction of Chapelle
St Lambert, on nearing which you will conceal your force as much
as possible, in case the enemy should not, by that time, be
seriously engaged with the Duke of Wellington; but should it be
otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack on the enemy’s
right flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct
support; the First and Third will also be held in readiness to
move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a
detachment in observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed,
will gradually fall back on Wavre. All the baggage train, and
everything not actually required in the field, will be sent to
Louvain.”
Now, why was Bulow’s Corps, which was at Dion-le-Mont, to lead the flank
march, while Pirch I., Zieten, and Thielemann were all so much nearer to
Chapelle St Lambert? Dion-le-Mont was 10 miles by road from Chapelle St
Lambert; Aisemont, where Pirch was, was 8 miles; Bierges, Zieten’s
headquarters, was only 4 miles; and La Bavette, Thielemann’s
headquarters, 6 miles. It followed, then, that Pirch could not move
until Bulow’s Corps had passed. Had Bluchers men been so exhausted, it
would have saved most of them many miles of weary marching if Zieten and
Thielemann had been ordered to Chapelle St Lambert, and Pirch and Bulow
to move in nearer to Wavre. Bulow’s Corps had so far taken no part in
the fighting, and it may have been Bluchers desire to give them
opportunities, but for all that he knew Wellington might be in dire
straits as soon as the battle began, so that he should not have
hesitated to send off the nearest Corps.
Bulow commenced his march from Dion-le-Mont at daybreak, with Losthin’s
Fifteenth Division as advanced guard. At 7 A.M. the Division reached
Wavre, but the crossing of the bridges over the Dyle occupied a long
time, and the passage through the town was hindered by a disastrous fire
which broke out in the main street, through which the troops were
marching. Great excitement prevailed, as it was feared that all the
reserve ammunition waggons, parked in the town, were in danger. But the
troops of the 14th Regiment of the line made great exertions, and were
able to overcome the flames. But the Corps had been delayed for two
valuable hours, and did not clear Wavre until 10 A.M. Meanwhile, parties
of cavalry were busy reconnoitring towards Maransart and Couture. A
detachment of Hussars rode out to patrol the valley of the Lasne, and
another detachment to establish communication with Ledebur at Mont St
Guibert. All the country between Plancenoit and the Dyle was carefully
examined, and reports were sent in continually. The Prussian scouting
work was very efficiently performed, and is still worthy of notice, even
in these days. Every opportunity was taken of searching and feeling for
the enemy. Not only were the Prussians accurately informed, but they
hindered Napoleon’s communications with Grouchy, by occupying the roads
their messengers might use, and compelling them to make very wide
détours.
The roads being reported clear, Bulow’s Corps continued on its way, but
progress was not rapid, owing to the state of the roads and the
exhaustion of the troops. The advanced guard reached St Lambert at about
10.30 A.M., and the main body arrived about mid-day, but the rear-guard
(Ryssel’s Division) did not arrive until three o’clock in the afternoon.
At Maransart, the reconnoitring party found that the French had no
detachments watching their flank, and the valley of the Lasne was clear.
The safe arrival of Bulow’s Corps at St Lambert, and the reports from
his scouts, made Blucher resolve to hasten the march of the First and
Second Corps. Pirch’s men had broken up their bivouacs at 5 A.M., but
had had to wait until 12 noon to allow Bulow’s Corps to pass clear of
Wavre. Zieten, on the left bank of the Dyle, marched for Ohain at noon.
Blucher was uneasy about Grouchy’s strength, and his intentions. He was
anxious to take his whole army towards Mont St Jean, but he was afraid
of an attack on his rear and flank. He therefore determined to leave
Thielemann’s Corps at Wavre to await Grouchy’s approach, and if the
French were not in strength, Thielemann was to march to join the main
body, leaving a small force in Wavre as a rear-guard. Blucher himself,
leaving Gneisenau to arrange matters at Wavre, rode on to St Lambert at
11 A.M.
While Pirch’s Corps was passing through Wavre, Ledebur’s detachment
retired on the town from Mont St Guibert, and the enemy’s cavalry
appeared in sight. This was not a pleasant time for action, as the
troops were thickly crowded in the defiles and lanes. Sohr’s Brigade of
Cavalry, forming Pirch’s rear-guard, fell back, and the Seventh and
Eighth Divisions were halted and faced round. The Eighth Division was
posted in the wood of La Huzelle, with the Seventh in support. But the
French did not press their advance, and at three o’clock, the Prussians
retired across the Dyle. Pirch’s Corps then continued its march on St
Lambert, leaving Thielemann in defence of Wavre.
As a flank march, Blucher’s movement to St Lambert was both a tactical
and a strategical success; although under different circumstances, it
would have been a failure. For Grouchy should never have allowed it to
be carried out. By efficient reconnoitring, such as was carried out by
the Prussian Hussars, Grouchy should have discovered the threatened
movement early in the morning of the 18th, and have sent Maurin’s
Cavalry Division, followed by Excelmans’ Cavalry and Gérard’s Corps, to
Moustier and Ottignies. The cavalry could have reached the bridges there
in time to threaten Blucher’s flank, and prevent him, if not from
assisting Wellington with a part of his forces, at least from throwing
his whole weight into the battle against Napoleon. And even at the end,
Grouchy might, had he been too late across the Dyle to prevent Blucher
from joining Wellington, have covered Napoleon’s retreat, and saved the
Emperor’s army from the disastrous rout which befell it.