GROUCHY’S PURSUIT OF THE PRUSSIANS
Grouchy had received orders from Napoleon at about 11 P.M. on the night
of the 16th to send the two cavalry corps of Pajol and Excelmans at
daybreak in pursuit of the Prussians. He was not told in which direction
to pursue, or whether to pursue Thielemann only.
Accordingly, when Pajol started off at 4 A.M., there were no signs to
show in which direction Thielemann had retired. Taking Soult’s Division
of Light Cavalry, Pajol started off from Balâtre and made his way across
to the Namur road, under the impression that this was the true line of
retreat. He sent in a despatch from Balâtre (he must have written it
very soon after his troops had started) to the Emperor, stating that he
was “pursuing the enemy, who were in full retreat towards Liège and
Namur,” and that he had already made many prisoners. Shortly after
striking the Namur road, he came upon a Prussian Horse Battery (No. 14)
which had “withdrawn during the battle of Ligny to replenish its
ammunition waggons”(!) but had failed to fall in with the ammunition
column. Thielemann had ordered it to retire on Gembloux, when he beat
his retreat, but this it failed to do, and wandered about aimlessly near
the Namur road. When Pajol’s men came up, they captured the whole
battery, in front of Le Mazy; and Pajol reported it in great glee to the
Emperor. This tended to increase the belief that the Prussians were
making for Namur. But Pajol, advancing some three miles beyond Le Mazy,
without coming across further traces of the enemy, began at last to
suspect that he was leading a wild goose chase. Accordingly he halted at
Le Boquet, and sent out reconnoitring parties. At midday (while
Thielemann was resting at Gembloux) he started off northwards on
Saint-Denis, with the object of taking the road to Louvain. At
Saint-Denis he was joined by Teste’s Division, which had been sent to
him by Napoleon. Thus Pajol was very far from being of use in the chase.
Meanwhile, Excelmans fared little better. Berton’s Brigade of Dragoons,
belonging to Excelmans’ Corps, started off to follow Thielemann’s
rear-guard, whose departure was only noticed as it left Sombreffe. But
Berton followed down the Namur road behind Pajol. What was the
advantage in searching the country which had just been passed by the
First Cavalry Corps? It is hard to suppose that it was not known which
way Pajol had taken. Berton got as far as Le Mazy, where he was told by
some peasants that the Prussians had retreated by Gembloux. He therefore
halted, sent back the news to Excelmans, and awaited instructions. It
was unfortunate for the French that he did not think of sending this
news _forward_ to Pajol!
Instructions soon arrived, and Berton was ordered to march on Gembloux.
He therefore marched up the valley of the Orneau, a small stream running
southwards to the Sambre, and arrived in front of Gembloux at 9 A.M.
Here he found the Prussian outposts, and descried, on the far side of
the village, the whole of Thielemann’s Corps taking their rest.
Excelmans, with his remaining three brigades of cavalry, arrived before
Gembloux, half an hour later, _i.e._ at 9.30 A.M. He saw that there were
some 20,000 Prussians resting beyond the village, and yet he neglected
to send back word to Grouchy immediately. He did not even inform Pajol
of his discovery, so the latter was still wandering. Although he had
3,000 cavalry and 12 guns, Excelmans made no attempt to harass the
Prussians, who, since they were resting, were obviously not ready to
fight again. But his mistake lay not so much in his avoiding conflict as
in his omission to send immediate news to Grouchy and Pajol. There can
never be a mistake in sending back too much information to head-quarters
(as far as the means of transmission allow); what is not required can
there be disposed of.
So much for the efforts of Excelmans and Pajol to follow up the
Prussians.
Grouchy, meanwhile, at 11.30 A.M., received the following written order
from Napoleon:--
“Repair to Gembloux with the Cavalry Corps of Pajol and
Excelmans, the Light Cavalry of the Fourth Corps, Teste’s
Division, and the Third and Fourth Corps of Infantry. You will
send out scouts in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, and
you will pursue the enemy. Reconnoitre his march, and tell me of
his movements, that I may penetrate his designs. I shall move my
headquarters to Quatre-Bras, where the English still were this
morning; our communication will then be direct by the Namur
road. Should the enemy have evacuated Namur, write to the
general in command of the Second Military Division at
Charlemont, to occupy this town with a few battalions of
National Guards. It is important to discover what Wellington and
Blucher mean to do, and whether they meditate uniting their
armies to cover Brussels and Liège by risking the fate of a
battle. At all events, keep your two Infantry Corps continually
together, within a mile of each other, reserving several ways of
retreat; place detachments of cavalry between, so as to be able
to communicate with Head-quarters.”
This order contains certain very definite instructions. First, Grouchy
was to concentrate all his forces at Gembloux. Secondly, he was to
reconnoitre towards Namur and Maestricht, as it was very possible
(according to Napoleon’s information) that the enemy had gone in those
directions. Thirdly, he was to follow the tracks of the Prussians, and
to try to discover what they intended to do.
As to the first, Grouchy was unaware that Excelmans, with his whole
Corps, was already at Gembloux. But Pajol’s report from Le Mazy might
have helped him to come to the conclusion that the Prussians had not
taken that direction.
Grouchy, when he had received his verbal instructions from Napoleon, had
expostulated and expressed the opinion that no advantage would be
obtained if he carried out the operations he was ordered to. He argued
that the Prussians had already had twelve hours’ start; that although no
definite news had yet been received from the cavalry scouts, it was
extremely likely that Blucher had retired on his base, Namur; and that
in following the Prussians in this direction he would be moving further
and further from Napoleon. He asked to be allowed to march to
Quatre-Bras with the Emperor. But Napoleon, naturally enough, declined,
and firmly repeated his orders to Grouchy, saying that it was his
(Grouchy’s) duty to find which route the Prussians had taken, and to
attack them as soon as he found them.
Grouchy withdrew and proceeded to carry out his orders. But if he was so
far convinced of the importance and infallibility of his own conclusions
as to discuss them boldly before the Emperor, he certainly could not
have been very hopeful or determined when he proceeded to carry out the
very instructions against which he had been arguing!
He then sent orders to Vandamme, who was at St Amand, to march at once
with the Third Corps to Point-du-Jour, at the junction of the Gembloux
and Namur roads. He sent an aide-de-camp towards Gembloux to obtain news
from Excelmans. (Not often is it necessary for a general to send one of
his own Staff to gather news from the advanced cavalry!) He then went
himself to Ligny to give Gérard his orders.
In starting Vandamme before Gérard, Grouchy made a serious mistake; for
Gérard had over an hour to wait before he could march his troops off,
since both Corps had to use the same road, and Vandamme was behind
Gérard at the time. Vandamme’s Corps had suffered less than Gérard’s at
Ligny the day before, but it was no longer a case of fearing an
inferiority in numbers. Vandamme marched with incredible slowness. His
advanced guard did not reach Point-du-Jour until 3 P.M.; (Thielemann was
by this time an hour’s march beyond Gembloux!) The roads were in a very
bad state, it is true, and the heavy rain that was falling made marching
difficult; also the passage of the Prussians had made the roads worse;
but Point-du-Jour is less than 4 miles from St Amand.
Grouchy himself went to Point-du-Jour, arriving at the same time as
Vandamme’s advanced guard. Here he received his aide-de-camp, who had
returned with news from Excelmans; who reported that “he was observing
the enemy’s army,” and “would follow the Prussians as soon as ever they
should begin to march” (Houssaye). Grouchy, instead of giving Vandamme
and Gérard orders to hasten their march on Gembloux, and galloping there
himself, made no effort to hurry. He accompanied Vandamme’s Corps, which
still continued with extraordinary slowness; and arrived at Gembloux at
seven o’clock in the evening; taking four hours to cover 5 miles. Gérard
arrived there two hours later. Thus at the end of the day, Grouchy’s
main body was less than 7 miles from Ligny; and he was supposed to be
vigorously pressing the Prussians! He had not yet found the direction of
their retreat! Compare, allowing even for the rain and the state of the
roads, his rate of marching with Thielemann’s, over the same road, a few
hours previously; and compare Grouchy’s subsequent retreat.
Napoleon’s first instruction to Grouchy was to concentrate all his
forces at Gembloux. To enable both Corps to arrive at Gembloux together,
Gérard’s should have marched off first and taken the cross-country road
from Sombreffe to the old Roman road, and thence along to Gembloux.
Vandamme would then have had a clear road past Point-du-Jour,
undisturbed by Gérard’s troops. As it was, Gérard’s men had to traverse
a road already cut up by the Prussians and Vandamme’s Corps.
Excelmans had lost every opportunity. He should not have contented
himself with watching the enemy; he should have made “feints,” to cause
the Prussians to disclose their intentions, or he should at least have
discovered the direction of their movements. If he was too weak to
attack even the rear-guard, he should have endeavoured to work round
Thielemann and occupy him while Grouchy with the main body arrived. He
should also have sent across to Pajol and asked him to work in towards
his left so as still further to hamper Thielemann. But none of these
things were done, and the Prussians were allowed to move off quietly,
Excelmans merely following behind!
Even when Thielemann moved out of Gembloux at 2 P.M., it was three
o’clock before Excelmans entered the village, and yet his scouts had
been watching the Prussians since 9 A.M. He was content to march
leisurely on to Sauvenière, a village 3 miles north of Gembloux.
Grouchy decided to halt at Gembloux for the night. Although there were
still two hours of daylight left when Vandamme’s Corps reached the
village, yet it was ordered to bivouac there. Grouchy afterwards stated
that the roads were too bad to march on, and the rain too heavy; this is
true, to a certain extent, but considering how well the Prussians had
marched under the self-same conditions, and the urgency of the
situation, Grouchy might have made much more progress.
Excelmans, arriving at Sauvenière at six o’clock in the evening, sent
out Bonnemains’ Brigade (4th and 12th Dragoons) towards Sart à Walhain,
and the 15th Dragoons towards Perwez, to reconnoitre. Scouts were also
sent towards Tourinnes and Nil St Vincent. These scouts found a small
Prussian rear-guard at Tourinnes, but they only watched the enemy for an
hour, and then returned. Bonnemains brought his Brigade back to Ernage,
where he bivouacked for the night. He had gathered information that the
Prussians were retreating towards Wavre; and the 15th Dragoons also
reported from the neighbourhood of Perwez to the same effect; so that
Excelmans, at 10 P.M., knew with comparative certainty that the enemy
were marching on Wavre.
Pajol, in the meantime, finding that he was mistaken in his conclusions
as to the direction of the Prussian retreat, marched back from St Denis
with Soult’s Light Cavalry and Teste’s Division to Le Mazy, the point
from which he had started in the morning. Now, even if he had found that
he was striking in a wrong direction, there can be no possible reason
for his retreating to Le Mazy. He must have known that such a move,
whether right or wrong, would have a very great influence on Grouchy’s
plan; therefore, instead of marching all his forces back, he should have
sent an aide-de-camp or galloper to find where the main body was, or to
find Grouchy and get fresh instructions. Pajol exercised no discretion
whatever in making such a move.
At 10 P.M., at Gembloux, Grouchy wrote the following despatch to the
Emperor:--
“GEMBLOUX, _17th June_, 10 P.M.
“Sire,--I have the honour to report to you that I occupy
Gembloux and that my Cavalry is at Sauvenière.[6] The enemy,
about 30,000 strong, continues his retreat. We have captured
here a convoy of 400 cattle, magazines and baggage.
“It would appear, according to all the reports, that, on
reaching Sauvenière, the Prussians divided into two columns: one
of which must have taken the road to Wavre, passing by Sart à
Walhain; the other would appear to have been directed on Perwez.
“It may perhaps be inferred from this that one portion is going
to join Wellington; and that the centre, which is Blucher’s
army, is retreating on Liège. Another column, with artillery,
having retreated by Namur,[7] General Excelmans has orders to
push, this evening, six squadrons to Sart à Walhain, and three
to Perwez. According to their report, if the mass of the
Prussians is retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them in that
direction, so as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to
separate them from Wellington. If, on the contrary, my
information proves that the principal Prussian force has marched
on Perwez, I shall pursue the enemy by that town.
“Generals Thielemann and Borstel (?) formed part of the army
which Your Majesty defeated yesterday; they were still here at
10 o’clock this morning,[8] and have announced that they have
20,000 casualties. They enquired on leaving, the distances of
Wavre, Perwez, and Hannut. Blucher has been slightly wounded in
the arm, but it has not prevented him from continuing to command
after having had his wound dressed. He has not passed by
Gembloux.--I am, with respect, Sire, Your Majesty’s faithful
subject,
MARSHAL COUNT GROUCHY.”
This despatch would not give Napoleon a very correct idea of the state
of affairs. No mention was made by Grouchy of Pajol’s detachment, so the
Emperor could only infer that Grouchy had all his cavalry together and
all his infantry together. Mention should have been made, too, of the
discovery that the Prussians had not retreated by the Namur road. So far
as could be learnt from this despatch, only 30,000 Prussians had been
accounted for. That Blucher had “not passed through Gembloux” would at
once suggest that he had gone by some other road, not explored by
Grouchy, with his main body.
Grouchy’s orders to his commanders for the next day, sent out at 10
P.M., showed that he still firmly believed that the Prussians were
retreating on Liège, although in his despatch to Napoleon, he had
recognised the possibility of their having taken the road to Wavre.
He ordered Excelmans’ Cavalry and Vandamme’s Corps to march to Sart à
Walhain; Gérard’s Corps to follow Vandamme’s to Sart à Walhain, and the
Seventh Cavalry Division to push on to Grand Leez; Pajol’s force to
march from Le Mazy to Grand Leez. (Pajol had reached St Denis, half-way
from Le Mazy to Grand Leez, on the 17th, so that he now had covered this
ground twice.)
When Bonnemain’s reports to Excelmans reached Grouchy, he should have
had no longer any doubts as to the true line of Blucher’s retreat.
Towards half-past two in the morning, news from Walhain came in, to the
effect that the peasants there had reported that about three Prussian
Corps had passed through on the previous day, marching in the direction
of Wavre. A glance at the map will show that Gembloux to Walhain is in
the direction of Wavre, and not of Liège. Further, from information
gathered by the peasants from Prussian stragglers and the gossips who
seem to find a place in every army, the enemy were talking of the coming
battle near Brussels. As to Grouchy’s thoughts, and the influence these
reports had on him, it is difficult to find what train of reasoning he
followed. He knew that Napoleon expected to fight Wellington near the
Forest of Soignies: he knew, too, that the Emperor was anxious for him
to prevent the Prussians from marching across to join the English, yet
he did not consider the very great possibility that Blucher might
rapidly join Wellington by a short flank march from Wavre. Had such a
possibility entered his mind, he must have reflected on the best means
of thwarting it, ere it became too late. Obviously his only move then
was to make for the bridges at Moustier and Ottignies, _viâ_ Saint Géry.
By reaching the left bank of the Dyle (which he could easily do before
Blucher), Grouchy could have either manœuvred to join Napoleon, when an
addition of 33,000 troops must have overwhelmed Wellington, or he could
have continued to pursue the Prussians, should it happen that he had
been wrong in supposing that they were marching to join the English. It
did not require extraordinary foresight or mental effort to realize how
much more useful and how much more effective a move _viâ_ St Géry and
Moustier and the left bank of the Dyle would have been. If Grouchy was
really as undecided as he appears to have been, as to the Prussian line
of retreat, he should have had recourse to a movement which offered no
doubtful advantages. A move across the Dyle by Moustier would have had a
very great effect, and if the Prussians had really retreated on Liège,
this movement of Grouchy’s would still have its advantages. He could
have thrown his weight into the fight at Waterloo; Napoleon would not
blame him for this assistance, if he knew that the Prussians were out of
reach.
At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 18th, Grouchy sent another message to
Napoleon, stating that further information had been received, which
confirmed the news that Blucher was making for Brussels “_viâ_ Wavre, so
as to concentrate there, or to give battle after joining Wellington.”
Grouchy told Napoleon in his message that he was “starting immediately
for Wavre.” But he himself did not actually start until 9 A.M.
He ordered Vandamme to march at 6 A.M., and Gérard at 8 A.M. Now, at
that time of year, it was light enough to march at 3.30 A.M., hence
Grouchy wasted another valuable two and a half hours, when time was
all-important. Again, there was no necessity to keep Gérard’s Corps
waiting for Vandamme’s to get ahead, as there were no less than four
roads from Gembloux towards Corbaix, and the two inner ones could easily
have been used for this march.
But the troops were still further delayed. Their breakfasts were not
ready for them, and Vandamme’s Corps did not start until nearly eight
o’clock. They had had twelve hours in bivouac at Gembloux, and yet their
breakfasts could not be ready by 6 A.M.! Excelmans’ men at Sauvenière,
too, were not in the saddle until 6 A.M. Grouchy himself left Gembloux
at 8.30 A.M. He overtook Vandamme’s Corps at Walhain at about 10 A.M.,
and here he dismounted for breakfast, allowing the troops to march on.
At half-past ten, Excelmans’ advanced guard came into touch with
Thielemann’s rear-guard, on the road to Wavre near La Baraque. This news
was sent back to Grouchy, while Excelmans extended his men and engaged
the Prussians lightly. At Walhain, Gérard, having ridden ahead of his
troops, joined Grouchy, and during their breakfast, the sound of heavy
firing in the direction of Mont St Jean was heard from the garden of the
house where they had stopped. (This was the opening cannonade of the
battle of Waterloo, which began at half-past eleven.)
Gérard at once urged Grouchy to change his direction and march to the
sound of the cannonade. But Grouchy refused to take the responsibility
of disobeying the orders he had received from Napoleon--“to pursue and
attack the Prussians, and on no account to lose sight of them.” Having
received, a few minutes before, Excelmans’ report from the front, he
considered that he was moving in the right direction. To march across
country to join Napoleon would have been contrary to his orders. To send
a part of his forces across the Dyle would be to separate his army at a
most dangerous moment. But this was just one of those cases when
instructions need not have been implicitly obeyed. Circumstances had
altered considerably since Grouchy had received his orders from
Napoleon. A resolute and capable commander, in Grouchy’s place, would
have marched with his whole force by St Géry and Moustier from Gembloux
at daybreak on the 18th. Certainly it would have been a mistake to
divide his army at this time, but Grouchy should without doubt have
taken upon himself the responsibility of digressing from his original
instructions, and he would have been justified by the change in
circumstances.
At the same time, while blaming Grouchy for his want of foresight and
boldness, it must not be forgotten that the state of the roads and of
the whole countryside was a very heavy factor against him. It was almost
impossible to get the guns through the mud and mire which composed the
roads. The infantry had to wade ankle-deep in many places, and for
wheeled transport the roads were nearly impassable. Rain had fallen
incessantly. Still, much could have been done by the cavalry, which was
the arm which should have been relied upon most during these operations;
and if the infantry had taken to the fields on either side of the road,
they would hardly have marched slower than Vandamme’s men. The
Prussians, who were under the necessity of taking with them all their
guns, waggons, and trains that they wished to save from the enemy on the
same roads that their infantry used, were able to cover nearly 2½ miles
an hour. It might be presumed that the French could cover 2 miles an
hour.
Vandamme, continuing his march while Grouchy breakfasted at leisure at
Walhain, reached Nil St Vincent with his corps at 10.30 A.M. Here, in
accordance with Grouchy’s orders on the previous evening, he halted, and
awaited fresh instructions. It was one o’clock before Grouchy arrived in
person, and gave them to him. Then he and Excelmans, who had met with a
Prussian rear-guard near Neuf Sart and La Baraque, were ordered to
continue their march on Wavre. An hour later, Vandamme’s advanced guard
was attacked by Ledebur’s detachment of Hussars, which had been left at
Mont St Guibert. Ledebur had remained at Mont St Guibert, unaware of
the proximity of the French, until his patrols caught sight of the
troops at Nil St Vincent. Then he was alive to the dangers of his
situation; for he was indeed in peril of being cut off. Excelmans’
Dragoons at La Baraque stood across his rear, and Vandamme’s Corps was
threatening to cut off his retreat by Corbaix. He, however, was a man of
great military instinct, and saw that his only chance of escape lay in
attacking the French advanced squadrons. This he did with his Hussars,
and, being reinforced from Pirch’s Corps by two battalions, which in
addition to the battalions which were with him before, made up his
detachment to the strength of a brigade, he boldly attacked the head of
Vandamme’s column. Grouchy ordered Excelmans to turn Ledebur’s position
by Dion-le-Mont, but before the French Cavalry had developed their
movement, the Prussians had retreated through the wood of La Huzelle and
had fallen back on Wavre. Vandamme was sent off in pursuit, with orders
to follow the Prussians to Wavre, take up a position there, and await
instructions.
Grouchy himself, as soon as Ledebur had retired, rode off to Limelette,
a village on the left bank of the Dyle, to reconnoitre with his own
eyes. It is a pity, for his reputation as a General, that he had not
taken upon himself more of this essential duty, during these operations.
At Limelette, he heard very plainly the distant roar of the guns at Mont
St Jean, and he had no longer any doubts that a big battle was in
progress on his left. On his return to La Baraque, towards 4 P.M., he
received a letter from Napoleon, written at Le Caillou farm-house at 10
A.M., in which the Emperor ordered him to push on to Wavre, at the same
time drawing nearer to the main army, and keeping up the closest
communication by Ottignies and Moustier. This letter had the unfortunate
effect of confirming Grouchy in his own ideas of the correctness of his
movements, while he made no alterations in his dispositions of Gérard’s
and Vandamme’s Corps to bring them nearer the Emperor. But he did order
Pajol, who had reported from Grand Leez that no trace of the Prussians
had been found between that place and Tourinnes, to take his cavalry and
Teste’s Division across country to Limale, on the Dyle, where he was to
force a passage.
This order given, Grouchy rode off towards Wavre, where the impatient
Vandamme was already beginning an attack.