THE RETREAT OF THIELEMANN’S CORPS FROM SOMBREFFE
General Gneisenau, who had taken Bluchers place in command during his
temporary disablement (his horse had rolled on him during a close
pursuit by French cavalry), gave orders at the close of the battle of
Ligny for the First and Second Corps (Zieten’s and Pirch I.‘s) to
retreat upon Tilly, and for Thielemann to cover the withdrawal until the
centre and right were clear of the field. He was then to retire upon
Tilly, or, should he not be able to make for that point, to retreat upon
Gembloux, and unite there with the Fourth Corps under Bulow. Thielemann
and Bulow were then to effect their junction with the main army.
The First and Second Corps spent the night of the 16th between Mellery,
Tilly and Gentinnes, on the two roads which lead towards Wavre, and join
at Mont St Guibert. Thielemann remained upon the field of battle until 3
A.M., when he began his retreat upon Gembloux. It was only after the
First and Second Corps had reached Tilly and Gentinnes in the middle of
the night that Wavre was chosen as the rallying point. It is most
probable that Gneisenau’s immediate object was to move the shattered
Corps clear of the battlefield under the firm protection of Thielemann’s
men, before he cast about for a point of assembly. To ensure an orderly
retreat and the soonest possible revival of the defeated troops was the
first thing to be aimed at. And Gneisenau, who is credited with
initiating the brilliant strategy of the retreat to Wavre, took care
first of all to rally his men; for he must have feared a vigorous
pursuit by the French, who, he supposed, would soon force Thielemann to
withdraw.
The retreat of a defeated army in face of the enemy is one of the most
difficult and delicate operations in war. The two chief causes of the
success of the Prussian retreat from Ligny were the favourable darkness
and Thielemann’s firm behaviour at Sombreffe.
It is not necessary to enter here into the details of the retreat of
Zieten and Pirch I., except in so far as they bear upon the subject of
Thielemann’s withdrawal, but a brief description of their movements may
be given. The two Corps retreated by the roads Tilly-Mont St Guibert
and Gentinnes-Mont St Guibert. Pirch’s Corps, arriving second, remained
at Mont St Guibert for a time as rear-guard, to protect the cross-roads,
and still further to steady the men; for the best troops are unsteadied
by retreat. Zieten pushed on to Wavre, arriving at noon, and took his
troops across the Dyle, halting at Bierges, about a mile south-west of
the town. Pirch followed, but did not cross the Dyle; he halted between
Aisemont and St Anne, two villages a mile and two miles south-east of
Wavre.
Gneisenau had given Thielemann the choice of retreating upon Tilly or
Gembloux, a point which could only be decided according to
circumstances. Both of these places were on roads converging upon Wavre,
and at Gembloux there were no less than four alternative routes. When
Thielemann made preparations for his retreat, he considered carefully
the respective advantages of these two points. If he chose Tilly, he
would have to make a flank march along the Namur road to Marbais and
strike northwards from there. He would then be following the road taken
by Pirch I. and Zieten; but this very fact was an objection, because
there were sure to be disabled waggons, broken-down guns, and hundreds
of stragglers to hinder his passage. He could only use one road, too.
But was it safe to expose himself to an attack on his flank by the
French, while he was marching on Marbais? Certainly not; for he could
not possibly slip by in the darkness; it would be daylight before his
rear had cleared Sombreffe. He turned to Gembloux. The road from
Sombreffe to that village was direct. He would not expose either flank
by marching along that road. It was not encumbered with the remnants of
a retreating force; and his troops were already in an easy position to
withdraw. At Gembloux, he might expect to meet Bulow’s Corps; and if so,
the two could unite and use any of the four roads from thence towards
Wavre. It would save a great deal of time if he could employ more than
one road for his march, but he would have to make ample provision for
guarding the rear of his columns, and it would be more difficult to
protect three columns than one. He expected to be closely pursued the
moment he began to retreat, but he would leave a strong rear-guard to
cover him.
But it must be remembered that Thielemann, at this time, did not know
whither the retreat was ordered, beyond Gembloux. He guessed that it was
in the direction of Wavre on account of the route taken by the First and
Second Corps.
He therefore decided to retire upon Gembloux. During the night, he drew
in all his outposts, and collected his somewhat scattered battalions.
In the battle, battalions from one division had become mingled with
battalions from another, and the Reserve Cavalry Division now consisted
only of Lottum’s Brigade; Marwitz’s Brigade had retired with Zieten by
Gentinnes. General Borcke, with the Ninth Division, and General Hobe
with Lottum’s Cavalry Brigade, were left as rear-guard, drawn up along
the Namur road, between Sombreffe and Point du Jour. At 2 A.M. the head
of the Corps, consisting of the Reserve Artillery, moved off, and by 4
A.M., after sunrise, the rear-guard started. Two hours’ marching brought
the main body to Gembloux. Here Thielemann, having found out that Bulow
with the Fourth Corps had reached Baudeset, on the old Roman road, about
3 miles behind Gembloux, called a halt to rest his troops. It was a
hazardous step, so far as he knew, for the French might be upon him at
any moment; but it must be remembered that he had had no further
instructions as to his future movements, beyond the bare fact that he
was to join Bulow and together they were to unite with the main army.
But where were the First and Second Corps?
Thielemann sent word to Bulow to ask him if he had had any instructions
as to their movements, and telling him that he had not yet been
followed by the French. Bulow could give no information; but at 9.30
A.M., an aide-de-camp from Blucher arrived with orders for the Fourth
Corps to march on Dion-le-Mont, a village 3 miles east of Wavre, _viâ_
Walhain and Corbaix. The orders further stated that Bulow was to post
his rear-guard (the Fourteenth Division, under Ryssel--9 battalions, or
6,953 infantry) at Vieux Sart at the end of the march, so as to give
notice of the approach of the French; and to send a force consisting of
1 cavalry regiment, 2 battalions of infantry, and 2 guns of horse
artillery, to Mont St Guibert, to support Colonel Sohr, who was at Tilly
with a cavalry brigade and 4 guns acting as rear-guard to the First and
Second Corps. When Sohr fell back, the detachment from Bulow’s Corps was
to remain at Mont St Guibert as rear-guard on the Tilly road. Bulow
therefore detached Colonel Ledebur with the 10th Hussars, the Fusilier
battalions of the 11th regiment of the line and the 1st Pomeranian
Landwehr, and 2 guns of No. 12 Battery Horse Artillery, to Mont St
Guibert, while the remainder of his Corps marched upon Dion-le-Mont. The
movement was painfully slow, and not until 10.30 P.M. were the troops in
position.
Thielemann, meanwhile, who had received orders to continue his march on
Wavre, made preparations to resume his road. At 2 P.M., his troops
having gained a sound and well-earned rest, secure, strange to say, from
pursuit--for not a Frenchman had been seen--he again advanced, and
passed by Ernage, Nil Perrieux, Corbaix, and La Baraque. He reached
Wavre with his main body at 8 P.M., having covered the 15 miles in six
hours, and passed through to La Bavette, a mile north of Wavre, where he
halted for the night. His rear-guard (the Ninth Division and Lottum’s
Cavalry Brigade) did not reach the Dyle until midnight; they bivouacked
on the right bank. Marwitz, with his Cavalry Brigade, which had retired
by Gentinnes with Zieten, now rejoined the Third Corps, and the troops
which had been detached two days before to Dinant (a battalion of the
3rd Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to the Eleventh Division, and two
squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, belonging to Lottum’s
Brigade) also arrived. Thus the retreat of the Third Corps was
accomplished in security, and accompanied by none of the disastrous
effects of a defeat.
Defeat at the hands of so great a master of war as Napoleon usually
meant annihilation. To follow up his victory, to pursue the retreating
force, and to leave no vestige of fighting power in the vanquished, is
the aim and object of every general who wins a battle. When the
Prussians were defeated at Ligny, the advantage of vigorous pursuit with
all the available cavalry and Lobau’s Corps would have been enormous.
The whole aim of Napoleon’s strategy had been to crush the Prussians,
and to prevent them from interfering with his attack on Wellington. He
had found Blucher ready to fight at Ligny, and he had beaten him. To
allow Blucher to retreat with fighting power left in his army was the
very result to be avoided at all cost. Then why did not Napoleon follow
up his victory? What are the facts?
The battle was over at about 9 P.M., on the 16th, the broken centre of
Blucher’s line retreating by Bry. Darkness covered the field. Vandamme’s
Third Corps, Gérard’s Fourth Corps, and Milhaud’s Cuirassiers had
well-nigh exhausted themselves in their vigorous attacks, but Excelmans,
Pajol, with their two Cavalry Corps, and Lobau with the Sixth Corps,
were available for the pursuit. Their troops were comparatively fresh;
Lobau had only arrived on the field towards the end of the day. But no
attempt was made to hinder the retreat of Zieten and Pirch I. Thielemann
maintained a firm hold on Sombreffe, but he did not cover Bry or the
roads to Tilly.
The French bivouacked on the battlefield; the Third Corps in front of St
Amand; the Fourth Corps in front of Ligny; the Imperial Guard on the
hill at Bry; the Cavalry behind Sombreffe (and facing Thielemann); and
the Sixth Corps behind Ligny. Grouchy’s vedettes were almost within
ear-shot of Thielemann’s outposts. Yet, although Thielemann’s rear-guard
did not begin to retreat until after sunrise, nothing was discovered,
and when day broke the French were still slumbering heavily in their
bivouacs. Their vedettes should have been moved forward with the first
streak of dawn, to feel for the Prussians. They should, at least, have
_heard_ something, even if they saw nothing; for a retreat cannot be
carried out with absolute silence. There must be cracking of whips,
rumbling of wheels, cries from the drivers, and excitement among the
animals, however quiet the troops themselves may be. If even
half-a-dozen patrols had been sent out to gather information as soon as
day broke, the French could not have failed to discover Thielemann’s
retreat, and, having found it, they would not have had much difficulty
in locating its direction. There seemed to be a fixed resolve to let the
Prussians go free.
On the other hand, there were many reasons which caused Napoleon’s
decision not to pursue during that night. The Prussian right wing had
not been crushed; it retreated because its position was dangerous as
soon as the centre gave way. The left wing, Thielemann’s Corps, was very
firm. There was also the probable arrival of Bulow’s Corps by the Namur
road. The Prussian army was still full of fight. No news from Ney had
been received during the day. Napoleon was in entire ignorance as to the
state of affairs on his left wing. Lastly, a pursuit by night,
especially the pursuit of a still formidable enemy, is a most dangerous
task.
But if there was no actual pursuit by night, means should have been
taken to ascertain the direction of the retreat, for it was
all-important to discover this, and a very few patrols would have
sufficed to gather the information.
If there were good and sufficient reasons for not pursuing by night,
there were none for the delay when day broke. Grouchy had been summoned
to Napoleon’s headquarters at Fleurus at eleven o’clock at night, when
he received orders to send the two Corps of cavalry under Pajol and
Excelmans to pursue the enemy at daybreak. Grouchy then remained at
Fleurus until 9 A.M., when he was ordered to accompany Napoleon on a
tour of inspection of the battlefield! What was the object of visiting
the field at this critical time? This behaviour was most unusual on
Napoleon’s part. Was he affected at the sight of so much bloodshed, and
desirous of cheering the injured? He had witnessed too much slaughter on
the battlefield to be touched with emotion, which can only be a weakness
in a general. The general should fight with as little loss of human life
as possible, but he should not be filled with pitiful reflections in the
crisis of a campaign. Besides, the wounded, both French and Prussians,
were being cared for. There seems to have been some physical cause for
Napoleon’s strange behaviour on the morning of the 17th; for after he
had visited the field he discussed politics and affairs in Paris with
his generals! He wasted the hours until 11 A.M. Shortly before that hour
he had received news from Ney as to the battle at Quatre-Bras, and this
decided him to make his final arrangements. He ordered Lobau to take the
Sixth Corps (less Teste’s Division) to Marbais, to support Ney and
attack Wellington’s left flank. He himself would follow with the
Imperial Guard and Domon’s Light Cavalry Division. Grouchy was to take
the Third and Fourth Corps, Teste’s Division, and Pajol’s and Excelmans’
Cavalry, and pursue the Prussians. Thus only at 11 A.M. on the morning
of the 17th did Napoleon give his orders for the pursuit.
Of course, it was necessary to know what had happened at Quatre-Bras,
but the fact of having received no news from Ney, and, besides, no
assistance from that quarter during the battle at Ligny, should have
suggested to Napoleon that Ney must certainly be in difficulties. Had he
been victorious at Quatre-Bras, he would have been certain to send a
message of some kind, even if he sent no reinforcements to St Amand.
Ney, under the circumstances, would have been much more likely to send
news if he had been successful, than during a time when all his
attention was occupied with the fighting around him.
But this does not explain why Napoleon neglected to follow up the
Prussians. As soon as day broke, there were two most important steps to
take. Firstly, to find out where the Prussians had gone to, since touch
with them had been lost during the night, and to drive them away from
Wellington; and secondly, to find out how Ney had fared, and to send him
help if he needed it.
Now, a force in retreat does not require an equivalent force to pursue
it. The moral advantages with the victor enable him to press vigorously
with fewer troops. So the force detached under Grouchy (33,600 men) was
ample to follow up the Prussians, and to beat even the fresh Corps
(Bulow’s) which Napoleon suspected in the vicinity of Gembloux. True,
Grouchy’s force was required to do something more than follow up and
beat Thielemann’s Corps, or Thielemann’s and Bulow’s combined: but what
could be Napoleon’s object in keeping back any troops at Ligny? Having
detailed Grouchy’s force, the remaining troops might have been pushed to
Quatre-Bras at dawn, and _not_ at midday.
Whatever may be said in extenuation of Napoleon’s delay and inactivity
on the morning of the 17th, the actual circumstances of the case did not
warrant his wasting his time on the previous day’s battlefield and
discussing politics with his generals when all his energies should have
been concentrated on the great crisis at hand; and having so far
successfully carried out his brilliant strategic plan, he should most
certainly have followed up his success and made sure that he _had_
separated Blucher from Wellington.
It is easy to criticise Napoleon now, when the results of his inactivity
are so apparent, but by taking into account the actual circumstances at
the time, as they must have presented themselves to him, without
reference to the results, and by putting ourselves in the position or
the man in command, it is impossible to find sufficient reasons for his
delays.
What actually happened in the pursuit of the Prussians will be related
in the next chapter.