80. Hence it may be asked, (1) Is any actual sovereignty founded on
the 'general will'? (2) Can sovereignty _de jure_ be truly said to be
founded on it? (3) If so, must it be expressed through the vote of a
sovereign people?
81. (1) According to (e.g.) Austin's definition of sovereignty, we
should answer this question in the negative
82. (Observe that from Austin's definition it would follow that,
while every 'law' implies a 'sovereign,' a 'sovereign's' commands
need not be 'laws')
83. That definition directly contradicts that of Rousseau, in _(a)_
placing sovereignty in _determinate_ persons, _(b)_ making its
essence lie in power to compel obedience
84. Actual sovereignty combines both definitions; the habitual
obedience of subjects to the sovereign is due to the sense that by
obeying they secure certain ends
85. So far as Austin means that a fully developed state implies a
_determinate_ supreme source of law, he is right as against Rousseau
86. But if sovereign power = the aggregate influences which really
make the people obedient, it must be sought in the 'general will'
87. Such power need not be 'sovereign' in the narrower sense, and may
coexist with a separate coercive power which is 'sovereign'
88. This has been the case in ancient despotisms, and in the modern
empires of the East
89. So in states under foreign dominion, which retain a national
life, the technical sovereign is not the law-making and
law-maintaining power
90. Under the Roman Empire, in British India, in Russia, where the
technical is also the real sovereign, its strength rests in different
degrees on the general will
91. Thus the answer to question (1) depends on the sense of
'sovereign.' If it = a power which guarantees equal rights, it is
implied in every 'political' society
92. But _(a)_ it _need_ not be the supreme coercive power, and _(b)_
if it is so, it is not _because_ it is so that it commands habitual
obedience
93. Thus (retaining the technical use of 'sovereign') it is true that
if the sovereign is to be so _really_, it must express and maintain a
general will
94. Though this is compatible with the fact that some of the laws of
the sovereign conflict with the general will
95. Thus as to question (2) (above, sec. 80), if sovereignty is said
to rest on the general will 'de jure,' either 'sovereign' or 'jus' is
not used in the strict sense
96. An antithesis between sovereign 'de jure' and 'de facto' can only
arise from a confusion between 'sovereign' as = the source of law and
'sovereign' as = the 'general will'
97. Though there are cases in which (in a different sense) a
sovereign may be conveniently described as 'de facto,' not 'de jure,'
or _vice versa_
98. Similarly, to say that the people is 'sovereign de jure' is to
confuse the general will with the coercive power of the majority
99. Rousseau's confusion is due to the theory of 'natural rights'
(that the individual is not bound by anything which he has not
individually approved)
100. The individual must indeed judge for himself whether a law is
for the common good; but though he judge it not to be, he ought as a
rule to obey it