68. His idea of the sovereign is really that of a supreme
disinterested reason, but he fuses this with the ordinary idea of a
supreme coercive power
69. The practical result of his theory has been a vague exaltation of
the will of the people, regardless of what 'the people' ought to mean
70. Further consequences of his ideal conception of sovereignty. It
cannot be alienated, represented, or divided
71. Thus the 'government' is never the same as the 'sovereign,' and
constitutions differ according to where the government, not the
sovereignty, resides
72. The institution of government is _not_ by contract, but by the
act of the sovereign, and this act must be confirmed or repealed
periodically
73. His distinction between the 'will of all' and the 'general will':
the latter always wills the common good, though it may be mistaken as
to means
74. He admits however that it may be overpowered by particular
interests, and so find no expression even in the vote of a general
assembly
75. What then is the test of the 'general' will? Absolute unanimity
is what Rousseau requires of the parties to the original contract
76. But what is to decide whether their successors are parties to it?
Not 'residence,' unless there is also freedom to migrate
77. The element of permanent value in Rousseau is his conception of
the state as representing the 'general will'
78. Difficulties in this conception. It seems that either no actual
state realises it, or that there may be a state without a true
sovereign
79. We may distinguish between _de facto_ and _de jure_ sovereignty,
and say that Rousseau meant the latter; but this is only an
_inference_ from what he says.