101. Cases in which a doubt may arise

102. _(a)_ Where the legal authority of the law is doubtful, owing to

the doubt where the sovereignty in the state resides

103. In such cases the truth generally is that the 'right,' on the

particular issue, has not yet formed itself

104. But it does not follow that because the 'right' is on both

sides, one is not 'better' than the other; though this may be the case

105. In such cases of disputed sovereignty the distinction of 'de

jure' and 'de facto' may be applied, though it is better to say that

the sovereignty is in abeyance

106. The individual, having no 'right' to guide him, should take the

side whose success seems likely to be best for mankind

107. _(b)_ Another case is where there is no legal way of getting

a bad law repealed. Here it is a question, not of _right_, but of

_duty_, to resist the sovereign

108. Nor is it a question of the right of a majority, _as a

majority_, to resist: it may be the duty of a helpless minority

109. Some general questions which the good citizen may put to himself

in such dilemmas

110. They can, indeed, seldom be applied by the agents at the time as

they can be after the event

111. In simple cases we may judge of the right or wrong of an act by

the character which it expresses, but generally we can only judge

them by its results

112. All that the historian can say is that on the whole the best

character is likely to produce the best results, notwithstanding

various appearances to the contrary.

Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet · 第 20 / 48 题