FIRST SCENES OF THE WAR.
I was drawn from my retreat by an invitation from General Bragg, a
particular friend, to visit Pensacola, where he commanded the southern
forces, composed of volunteers from the adjacent States. Full of
enthusiasm for their cause, and of the best material, officers and men
were, with few exceptions, without instruction, and the number of
educated officers was, as in all the southern armies, too limited to
satisfy the imperious demands of the staff, much less those of the
drill-master. Besides, the vicious system of election of officers struck
at the very root of that stern discipline without which raw men cannot
be converted into soldiers.
The Confederate Government, then seated at Montgomery, weakly receded
from its determination to accept no volunteers for short terms of
service, and took regiments for twelve months. The same blindness smote
the question of finance. Instead of laying taxes, which the general
enthusiasm would have cheerfully endured, the Confederate authorities
pledged their credit, and that too for an amount which might have
implied a pact with Mr. Seward that, should war unhappily break out, its
duration was to be strictly limited to sixty days. The effect of these
errors was felt throughout the struggle.
General Bragg occupied Pensacola, the United States navy yard, and Fort
Barrancas on the mainland; while Fort Pickens, on Santa Rosa island, was
held by Federal troops, with several war vessels anchored outside the
harbor. There was an understanding that no hostile movement would be
made by either side without notice. Consequently, Bragg worked at his
batteries bearing on Pickens, while Major Brown, the Federal commander,
strengthened with sand bags and earth the weak landward curtain of his
fort; and time was pleasantly passed by both parties in watching each
other's occupation.
Some months before this period, when Florida enforced her assumed right
to control all points within her limits, a small company of United
States artillery, under Lieutenant Slemmer, was stationed at Barrancas,
where it was helpless. After much manoeuvring, the State forces of
Florida induced Slemmer to retire from Barrancas to Pickens, then
_garrisoned_ by one ordnance sergeant, and at the mercy of a corporal's
guard in a rowboat. Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, was in a similar
condition before Anderson retired to it with his company. The early
seizure of these two fortresses would have spared the Confederates many
serious embarrassments; but such small details were neglected at that
time.
My visit to Pensacola was brought to a close by information from the
Governor of Louisiana of my appointment to the colonelcy of the 9th
Louisiana infantry, a regiment just formed at camp on the railway some
miles north of New Orleans, and under orders for Richmond. Accepting the
appointment, I hastened to the camp, inspected the command, ordered the
Lieutenant Colonel--Randolph, a well-instructed officer for the time--to
move by rail to Richmond as rapidly as transportation was furnished, and
went on to New Orleans, as well to procure equipment, in which the
regiment was deficient, as to give some hours to private affairs. It was
known that there was a scarcity of small-arm ammunition in Virginia,
owing to the rapid concentration of troops; and I was fortunate in
obtaining from the Louisiana authorities a hundred thousand rounds, with
which, together with some field equipment, I proceeded by express to
Richmond, where I found my command, about a thousand strong, just
arrived and preparing to go into camp. The town was filled with rumor of
battle away north at Manassas, where Beauregard commanded the
Confederate forces. A multitude of wild reports, all equally inflamed,
reached my ears while looking after the transportation of my ammunition,
of which I did not wish to lose sight. Reaching camp, I paraded the
regiment, and stated the necessity for prompt action, and my purpose to
make application to be sent to the front immediately. Officers and men
were delighted with the prospect of active service, and largely supplied
want of experience by zeal. Ammunition was served out, three days'
rations were ordered for haversacks, and all camp equipage not
absolutely essential was stored.
These details attended to, at 5 P.M. I visited the war office, presided
over by General Pope Walker of Alabama. When the object of my visit was
stated, the Secretary expressed much pleasure, as he was anxious to send
troops forward, but had few in readiness to move, owing to the lack of
ammunition, etc. As I had been in Richmond but a few hours, my desire to
move and adequate state of preparation gained me some "red-letter" marks
at the war office. The Secretary thought that a train would be in
readiness at 9 o'clock that night. Accordingly, the regiment was marched
to the station, where we remained several weary hours. At length, long
after midnight, our train made its appearance. As the usual time to
Manassas was some six hours, we confidently expected to arrive in the
early forenoon; but this expectation our engine brought to grief. It
proved a machine of the most wheezy and helpless character, creeping
snail-like on levels, and requiring the men to leave the carriages to
help it up grades. As the morning wore on, the sound of guns, reechoed
from the Blue Ridge mountains on our left, became loud and constant. At
every halt of the wretched engine the noise of battle grew more and more
intense, as did our impatience. I hope the attention of the recording
angel was engrossed that day in other directions. Later we met men,
single or in squads, some with arms and some without, moving south, in
which quarter they all appeared to have pressing engagements.
At dusk we gained Manassas Junction, near the field where, on that day,
the battle of first "Manassas" had been fought and won. Bivouacking the
men by the roadside, I sought through the darkness the headquarters of
General Beauregard, to whom I was instructed to report. With much
difficulty and delay the place was found, and a staff officer told me
that orders would be sent the following morning. By these I was directed
to select a suitable camp, thus indicating that no immediate movement
was contemplated.
The confusion that reigned about our camps for the next few days was
extreme. Regiments seemed to have lost their colonels, colonels their
regiments. Men of all arms and all commands were mixed in the wildest
way. A constant fusillade of small arms and singing of bullets were kept
up, indicative of a superfluity of disorder, if not of ammunition. One
of my men was severely wounded in camp by a "stray," and derived no
consolation from my suggestion that it was a delicate attention of our
comrades to mitigate the disappointment of missing the battle. The
elation of our people at their success was natural. They had achieved
all, and more than all, that could have been expected of raw troops; and
some commands had emulated veterans by their steadiness under fire.
Settled to the routine of camp duty, I found many opportunities to go
over the adjacent battle field with those who had shared the action,
then fresh in their memories. Once I had the privilege of so doing in
company with Generals Johnston and Beauregard; and I will now give my
opinion of this, as I purpose doing of such subsequent actions, and
commanders therein, as came within the range of my personal experience
during the war.
Although since the days of Nimrod war has been the constant occupation
of men, the fingers of one hand suffice to number the great commanders.
The "unlearned" hardly think of usurping Tyndall's place in the lecture
room, or of taking his cuneiform bricks from Rawlinson; yet the world
has been much more prolific of learned scientists and philologers than
of able generals. Notwithstanding, the average American (and, judging
from the dictatorship of Maitre Gambetta, the Frenchman) would not have
hesitated to supersede Napoleon at Austerlitz or Nelson at Trafalgar.
True, Cleon captured the Spartan garrison, and Narses gained victories,
and Bunyan wrote the "Pilgrim's Progress;" but pestilent demagogues and
mutilated guardians of Eastern zenanas have not always been successful
in war, nor the great and useful profession of tinkers written allegory.
As men without knowledge have at all times usurped the right to
criticise campaigns and commanders, they will doubtless continue to do
so despite the protests of professional soldiers, who discharge this
duty in a reverent spirit, knowing that the greatest is he who commits
the fewest blunders.
General McDowell, the Federal commander at Manassas, and a trained
soldier of unusual acquirement, was so hounded and worried by ignorant,
impatient politicians and newspapers as to be scarcely responsible for
his acts. This may be said of all the commanders in the beginning of the
war, and notably of Albert Sidney Johnston, whose early fall on the
field of Shiloh was irreparable, and mayhap determined the fate of the
South. McDowell's plan of battle was excellent, and its execution by his
mob no worse than might have been confidently expected. The late
Governor Andrew of Massachusetts observed that his men thought they were
going to a town meeting, and this is exhaustive criticism. With soldiers
at his disposal, McDowell would have succeeded in turning and
overwhelming Beauregard's left, driving him from his rail communications
with Richmond, and preventing the junction of Johnston from the valley.
It appears that Beauregard was to some extent surprised by the attack,
contemplating movements by his own centre and right. His exposed and
weak left stubbornly resisted the shock of attacking masses, while he,
with coolness and personal daring most inspiriting to his men, brought
up assistance from centre and right; and the ground was held until
Johnston, who had skillfully eluded Patterson, arrived and began feeding
our line, when the affair was soon decided.
There can be little question that with a strong brigade of soldiers
Johnston could have gone to Washington and Baltimore. Whether, with his
means, he should have advanced, has been too much and angrily discussed
already. Napoleon held that, no matter how great the confusion and
exhaustion of a victorious army might be, a defeated one must be a
hundred-fold worse, and action should be based on this. Assuredly, if
there be justification in disregarding an axiom of Napoleon, the wild
confusion of the Confederates after Manassas afforded it.
The first skirmishes and actions of the war proved that the Southron,
untrained, was a better fighter than the Northerner--not because of more
courage, but of the social and economic conditions by which he was
surrounded. Devoted to agriculture in a sparsely populated country, the
Southron was self-reliant, a practiced horseman, and skilled in the use
of arms. The dense population of the North, the habit of association for
commercial and manufacturing purposes, weakened individuality of
character, and horsemanship and the use of arms were exceptional
accomplishments. The rapid development of railways and manufactures in
the West had assimilated the people of that region to their eastern
neighbors, and the old race of frontier riflemen had wandered to the far
interior of the continent. Instruction and discipline soon equalized
differences, and battles were decided by generalship and numbers; and
this was the experience of our kinsmen in their great civil war. The
country squires who followed the banners of Newcastle and Rupert at
first swept the eastern-counties yeomanry and the London train-bands
from the field; but fiery and impetuous valor was at last overmatched by
the disciplined purpose and stubborn constancy of Cromwell's Ironsides.
The value of the "initiative" in war cannot be overstated. It surpasses
in power mere accession of numbers, as it requires neither transport nor
commissariat. Holding it, a commander lays his plans deliberately, and
executes them at his own appointed time and in his own way. The
"defensive" is weak, lowering the morale of the army reduced to it,
enforcing constant watchfulness lest threatened attacks become real, and
keeping commander and troops in a state of anxious tension. These
truisms would not deserve mention did not the public mind ignore the
fact that their application is limited to trained soldiers, and often
become impatient for the employment of proved ability to sustain sieges
and hold lines in offensive movements. A collection of untrained men is
neither more nor less than a mob, in which individual courage goes for
nothing. In movement each person finds his liberty of action merged in a
crowd, ignorant and incapable of direction. Every obstacle creates
confusion, speedily converted into panic by opposition. The heroic
defenders of Saragossa could not for a moment have faced a battalion of
French infantry in the open field. Osman's solitary attempt to operate
outside of Plevna met with no success; and the recent defeat of Moukhtar
may be ascribed to incaution in taking position too far from his line of
defense, where, when attacked, manoeuvres of which his people were
incapable became necessary.