LOOS AND SALONIKA
Left G.H.Q. at noon to-day, 18th, sailed to Helles; lunched with Davies;
went up to inspect the East Lanes Division. The trenches are in
apple-pie order and the men are in good heart, but the stomach has
always been held to be the mainstay of the fighting man, and theirs are
in the grip of enteritis. Stopped at 5th Corps Headquarters on my way
back.
De Putron and la Borde came back with me. Struck an interesting
scientist called Lawes whilst I was in the Lancashire trenches. As we
were entering the harbour at Kephalos an enemy Taube tried to drop a
bomb aboard. No harm.
Dined with the V.A. together with Birdie, Lord Anglesey and Freddie.
When we got back found this from War Office. Rather amusing to be in the
know of the counter moves and to see their outcome:--
* * * * *
"The exchange of battalions mentioned in No. 7873, cipher, of 14th
September cannot be effected, so that at present the 51st and 53rd Sikhs
will not proceed to France. From the General Officer Commanding,
Egypt's, telegram No. 1854. E. of 15th September, it is understood that
he can send you another double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the
14th Sikhs. Possibly this will suffice for your requirements in the
meantime, and the 51st and 53rd Sikhs will be left at the disposal of
General Officer Commanding, Egypt. If so, will you please make
arrangements with him accordingly?
"Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Egypt."
Our defeat is a foregone conclusion: the Senoussi is too strong for us.
All the same I am determined to press the matter to an issue, if only to
have a clean cut precedent as to whether we do have a first call on
troops in Egypt or whether it is the other way about. We want these men
so badly. They don't get sick here; are worth four European Battalions
at present, and Birdie has become most anxious to get them, especially
the 53rd. So I am cabling to Maxwell just to send us our troops (for
they are ours) forthwith and have cabled to the War Office:--
* * * * *
"With reference to your telegram No. 8012, cipher. In accordance with
your telegram No. 8711, of 11th September, I am asking General Officer
Commanding, Egypt, to send here, at once, the 51st and 53rd Sikhs, as I
cannot do without them. I shall be very glad to receive the Patiala
Sikhs as well, as the 14th Sikhs are badly in need of a reinforcement."
Imagine had we been sent Indian Divisions for Suvla and if the New Army,
Territorials and Yeomen had been sent instead to France! Each category
would have given (let me put it mildly) double value. The heat, the
thirst, the scrub, the snipers, all so disconcerting to our fresh
contingents would have been commonplaces of frontier warfare to our
Indian troops. See what the handful with us here have achieved. Yet in
vain do I write and cable my personal entreaties to Beauchamp Duff, the
all-powerful Commander-in-Chief in India, and a very old friend, for two
hundred Sikhs: first he offers me a couple of hundred Brahmins wherewith
to fill the ranks of the famous 14th Sikhs and then, when I hesitate
before a proposal which appears monstrous, withdraws even that offer.
Again, I beg for 200 recruits for the 14th, saying I will train them
myself; I am refused--very politely and at great length--refused,
because it would be "politically inexpedient" to send them. In vain do
we try to get our own two battalions through the Egyptian morass; they
are going to stick and do sentry go over nothing. Why; were there any
real trouble in Egypt I could land a whole Division there within four
and a half days!
As for the New Army and Territorials, gradually entered with their
veteran comrades in the trenches of France and Flanders, they too would
have had more familiar surroundings and fairer play--as everyone here
now recognizes, too late!
The crystals of history take shape while we fight. As in a glass darkly
the outlines begin to appear to anyone who has a moment wherein to peer
beyond the end of the war. Everything has gone by the contrary. Our
people have done as well as their neighbours, and better, with their
imaginations, whether in diplomacy, strategy or tactics. Where the
Gibbon or Plutarch who survives the War Office Censor is going to damn
their reputations into heaps is over their failure in business
commonsense. Under their noses, parts of their system, were two great
live organisms; the Indian Army and the Territorial Force. From the
moment the mobilization flag was dropped it was up to them to work tooth
and nail to treble or quadruple these sound, vigorous existing entities.
What have they done? After a year of war, the Indian Army and the
Territorial Army are staggering on their last legs instead of being the
best part of our forces. Compare the East Lanes Division, who had the
good fortune to escape from War Office clutches by getting right out to
Egypt at the outbreak of the war, with Territorial Divisions which have
remained since then under the eyes and in the hands of the War Office!
The Turks are still withdrawing troops from the Caucasus front to ours.
Good for the Russians. Whilst I was at Helles, the enemy guns started a
heavy bombardment along the whole of our nine mile front from the right
of Anzac to the left of Suvla; a heavy musketry fire also along the
Turkish trenches. An attempt was then made to launch infantry assaults
against our lines, but these fizzled out, the rank and file having no
heart for the job. There is no doubt the Turks have had enough of it.
They can still hold on, but that's about all.
_19th September, 1915. Imbros._ News in to say that the Turkish rank and
file at Suvla are not equal to any attack. At the end of the bombardment
yesterday a few officers jumped on to the parapet and waved their
swords; the men shouted from the safety of the trenches--that was all.
Alec McGrigor arrived from Alexandria as A.D.C. _vice_ Brodrick. At 9
p.m. an enemy aeroplane dropped a couple of bombs. Very jolly having
Birdie here. He says that his latest returns show a daily sick list of
ten per battalion of British or Australian troops and of one per
battalion of Indian troops.
_20th September, 1915. Imbros._ Nothing doing. There is still scope for
action at Suvla but we can't get them to take up any little schemes we
may suggest. Shell shortage is the invariable answer. At 5 p.m. Birdie
and Anglesey went back to Anzac.
_21st September, 1915. Imbros._ Further development of the Sikh
comedy:--Maxwell cables, "No. 1883 E. Your No. M.F. 648. I have received
no orders to send these regiments. According to my last information from
the War Office they were to remain here, as I require them, but that I
should send you a double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the 14th
Sikhs."
I have cabled this on to the War Office, saying, "As I understand it,
your No. 8012 of 18th September does not mean that the War Office have
withdrawn the offer of these two regiments, which are urgently required
here. I therefore hope that you will give early authority to General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send them on to Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force."
The battalions were thrown at my head when that grand statement was made
as to the grand army I commanded; now where are they?
Started off with Taylor, Freddie and Colonel Napier (British Military
Attaché to Bulgaria) for Anzac. No shelling. Went round the whole left
centre and left of Birdie's position to right and left of Cheshire
Point, and saw the new Australian Division--very fine fellows. Bullets
were on the whistle and "the boys" were as keen and happy as any real
schoolboys. Memories of the Khyber, Chitral and Tirah can hardly yield
samples of a country so tangled and broken. Where the Turks begin and
where we end is a puzzler, and if you do happen to take a wrong turning
it leads to Paradise. Met various Australian friends--a full-blown Lord
Mayor--many other leading citizens both of Melbourne and of Sydney.
At 5 p.m. re-embarked. Napier gave birth to a happy thought on our way
back. His idea is that we should transfer the troops on the Gallipoli
Peninsula to Salonika so as to hearten up the Serbians and Greeks and
dishearten our enemies at Sofia. He has pressed his view, he said, on
the Foreign Office. I asked him if his Chief, the Minister at Sofia,
stood behind him. He said he could not vouch for his Minister's views,
but that he, Napier, had power in his capacity as Military Attaché to
correspond with the British Government direct.
K. himself did at one time toy with the thought of sending his New Army
to Serbia either under Rundle or myself, and was only restrained by the
outbreak of typhus in that country. But, keen as I was for the warpath,
a very little study of the terrain and supply question was enough to
cool my ardour.
Salonika is ruled out by history. In all the campaigns waged of old in
these very regions the part played by Salonika has been naval, not
military. There must have been some reason for this: there was; it still
exists--geography! You could not, and cannot, carry out anything big
_via_ a couple of narrow cracks through a trackless labyrinth of
mountains. The problem is a repetition of the Afghanistan dilemma. A big
army would starve at Nisch and along the Danube; a small army would be
swallowed up by the enemy. Unless they are going to trust to Bulgaria
and Roumania for supplies, one British Army Corps is about as much as
can manage to live and fight in Serbia. If they want to make Serbia safe
their only possible chance is to push through to Constantinople! There
is no other way. I said all this to Napier and a lot more besides and
left him keener on Salonika than ever.
He actually thinks that from Salonika we could do what could be done by
us at any time at the Dardanelles! Salonika is no alternative to the
Dardanelles. I wish the War Office could hear Gouraud; Gouraud, that big
sane man with local knowledge. How strong he used to be on the point
that Greece lay altogether outside the sphere of any military action by
the Entente. We can't feed Russia with munitions through Salonika, nor
can we bring back Russian wheat _via_ Salonika,--not much, seeing we
would not be able to feed ourselves were we fifty miles into the
mountains. Salonika is a military mare's nest.
Scatters Wilson and Captain Cheape dined and stayed the night. The
King's Messenger arrived with the Mails.
Three cables:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 654). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. Only two
machine guns per battalion are being brought by the City of London
battalions, the balance, by order of General Officer Commanding, Egypt,
being handed over to Chief Ordnance Officer, Egypt. The former
telegraphs that this has been done by your order. There is nothing that
is more important to my force than an ample supply of these guns. I
would therefore request that early authority should be given to General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send on these guns."
"(No. I.D. 116). From General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force, to War Office. My No. I.D. 110. Please inform me whether Murdoch
has arrived, and whether my information was correct as regards his
carrying a despatch for Sir Harry Lawson from Ashmead-Bartlett."
"(No. 8108, cipher). From War Office to General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your No. I.D. 116. A despatch
answering the description has been taken from Murdoch at Marseilles. You
should delay action, however, until we have seen it and you hear from us
further."
The despatch should have been censored here and ought, therefore, to be
sent back here for censoring. The War Office, I suppose, want to have
first look in!
_22nd September, 1915._ Scatters and Cheape sailed back for Suvla at
6.45 a.m.--just in good time to avoid a raid on our Headquarters carried
out by three Taubes between 7.50 and 8 a.m. A dozen bombs dropped; no
serious harm done.
Heseltine, King's Messenger, came to dinner.
Bad news from Bulgaria. She is mobilizing, not, we may be sure, for the
sake of helping those who do not help themselves. Well do I remember
Ferdinand, as long ago as 1909, turning to me and saying as he pointed
to a picture of himself in the robes of a Byzantine Emperor, "_Quand
vous arrivez au Bosphore, pensez à moi_." Well, there is one good side
to working over a narrow Peninsula, under the guns of your own Fleet,
all the Bulgars in the Balkans cannot add a rifle to the number of enemy
troops on Gallipoli, who already, can only be munitioned, watered and
fed with the greatest difficulty. The more targets the enemy cram on to
their present narrow front the merrier for our gunners; the better the
chance for our submarines starving the lot of them. So long as our Fleet
holds the Ægean, we may snap our fingers at the Bulgarians, whereas
they, were they fools enough to come here, would live on tenter hooks
lest haply some fine morning our Fleet should sail into the Marmora.
Yes, two or three battleships in the Marmora! Think of it! The sea
communications, Constantinople-Gallipoli and Asia-Gallipoli, would
cease, _ipso facto_, to exist. The railways between Europe and
Constantinople and Asia and Constantinople must shut down. In a
fortnight the Turks on the Peninsula begin to pack up; in a month the
Turks in Constantinople move bag and baggage from Europe to Asia.
Ferdinand watching the cat's jump, prepares to turn those 400,000
bayonets of his against the Kaiser. So wags my world in the might-be;
very much "might-be" for the Navy are turning down the "to be" for the
third time of asking. Three times the Sibyl makes her prodigious offer:
May--August--September a new world for old battleships:--two--four--six!
_23rd September, 1915._ Stormy weather: the _Imogene_ could hardly crawl
out. Have written K. to tell him how day succeeds day, never without
incident, but never with achievement; how we are burnt up with longing
to get on and how we know that he is as anxious. Yet, as I tell him,
_we_ "can't force the pace." How can we? We have not the
wherewithal--the stuff. "Byng would like to have four days' successive
bombardment for an hour, and then attack, and speaks of one H.E. shell
per yard as pat as if they were shells we could pick up on the seashore.
I have assured him it is no earthly use; that he shall have his share of
what I have got, but that stuff for bombardment is simply not in
existence,--not here, at least."
_24th September, 1915. Imbros._ Fought against exasperation all day. As
I thought:--
* * * * *
"(No. 8193, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. In
the existing situation, the two battalions referred to in your No. M.F.
655 of 21st September, should remain for the present in Egypt. I have
informed Maxwell to this effect."
K. has re-opened the idea of giving up Suvla, saying, "it might become
necessary in certain eventualities to abandon that area." In my reply I
have said, "I hope there will be no question now of the abandonment of
Suvla.... In the Northern zone I have now more troops than at the time
of my telegram, my line is stronger, the old troops are resting, the new
troops are improving, and preparations are being made for a local
advance. At this stage withdrawal will be a great moral victory for the
Turks. Moreover, it would release a large number of enemy divisions to
oppose the Russians in Asia, or for other enterprises."
Another cable also sent dealing with the ever present, ever pressing,
ever ghastlier shortage upon the Peninsula generally:--
* * * * *
"My present shortages, 21st September, of infantry rank and file are
2,645 in the XXIXth Division, 17,166 in the three New Army Divisions,
and 23,986 in the four Territorial Divisions, totalling 43,797; out of
respective establishments of 11,652, 37,869 and 44,824, total, 97,345."
Were the Royal Naval Division included the percentage would be worse.
Peter Pollen and I dined with the Admiral. After dinner, we discussed
Fox-Ferdinand's little tricks. The Admiral had heard a lot about his
flirtations with the Duke of Mecklenburg lately sent from Berlin on some
sort of an ambassadorial mission to the Balkans. I told him of my visit
to Sofia during the interval which took place between Prince Ferdinand
proclaiming himself Tsar, and the tardy and unenthusiastic recognition
of his new rank by Great Britain. Ferdinand's Court Chamberlain asked me
to dine. I wanted to refuse as I had meant to go on to Constantinople,
but Sir George Buchanan, our Minister, begged me to accept. Diplomatic
relations were broken off; he had not seen Ferdinand for a month: he
wanted to know what that Prince would say to me: "_but_," he added, "you
must on no account go in uniform. Seeing you are on the Army Council it
would almost amount to a recognition of his Kingship if you went there
in uniform." I thought this a little far-fetched; however, I wrote back
and said that I had the honour to accept, but that, as I was travelling,
I had only my _kleine Uniform_; i.e., undress kit, handy. I proposed,
therefore, with permission to take the liberty of presenting myself in
evening dress, wearing miniature medals and decorations and the ribbon
of the Grand Cross of the Bath. By return messenger an answer came back,
"His Majesty particularly wished once more to see the admirable British
uniform:" would I come in _kleine Uniform_; meanwhile, to put me quite
at my ease, H.M. had commanded the Court also to wear undress. I showed
this to Sir George, who laughed and said, "He is too sharp; he has done
us; you must go now--there is no help for it." So I went in my grubby
blue serge and found Ferdinand and the whole of his Court blazing with
orders in the fullest of full dress!
_25th September, 1915._ To Anzac in the _Arno_. Birdie met me and we
walked along the lower part of the left of the Australian trenches until
we reached the New Zealanders and were joined by Godley. Lunched with
General Inglefield; then plodded through the trenches held by his
Division (the 54th; nice-looking boys) and by the Indian Brigade. On the
left of the Indian Brigade I was met by Peyton who did pilot to me
through the Scottish Horse section. The Bard joined us here and was in
great form, full of administrative good works as in South Africa. The
Scottish Horse are as keen as schoolboys out for their first shoot. They
were very proud of themselves and of the effect their rifles with
telescopic sights had produced when put into the hands of gillies and
deer stalkers, and at every twenty yards or so there was a Scottish
Horseman looking along his sights, finger on trigger, and by his side a
spotter whose periscope was fixed on the opposite loophole. The moment a
Turkish shadow darkened the loophole the word was given, the bullet
sped. Not a very big mark a loophole at over 100 yards but they got it,
they said, one try out of three.
At the end of the Scottish Horse we came to the Worcester Yeomanry
trench. But time was up[12] and I had to make tracks for Anzac where we
had tea with Birdie, who had stuck to us throughout the tour. Imbros by
dinner-time. The quietest day, bar none, we have had on the Peninsula
since we first landed. Not a shot was fired anywhere except by our own
snipers.
_26th September, 1915. Imbros._ Last night, after dinner, Braithwaite
came across with a black piece of news in his pocket:--
* * * * *
"(No. 8229, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. On
account of the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army Greece has asked the
Allies to send a force to Salonika in order to enable her to support
Serbia should the latter be attacked by Bulgaria, as well as by German
forces from the North. No doubt you realize that if by such action
Bulgaria joins hands with the Central Powers they will have a clear road
to Constantinople and Gallipoli, and be able to send large quantities
of ammunition or troops, rendering your position very hazardous.
"Both France and ourselves have promised to send between us the troops
asked for, viz., 150,000 men, and urgency is essential. It is evident
that under these circumstances some troops will have to be taken from
the Dardanelles to go to Salonika, but it must be clearly understood
that there is no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula or of
giving up the Dardanelles operations until the Turks are defeated. Your
staff officer has suggested to me that you saw no difficulty in reducing
the length of your line and concentrating your forces by withdrawing
from the position now held around Suvla Bay to the neighbourhood of the
Kaiajik Aghala position whence a line might be drawn to the sea.
"Before the situation was changed by the Bulgarians' action we
considered that, owing to the marshy nature of the country now occupied
at Suvla and the approaching winter, this reduction of front would be
strategically advantageous. Hence my telegram No. 8162 to which your No.
M.F. 664 replies.
"An offensive along practically the whole line in France has now
commenced. The infantry are attacking to-day. Far-reaching results are
anticipated which, if secured, should greatly affect your situation.
"The projected dispatch of reinforcements of French and British
divisions for Asiatic operations must be in abeyance until a decision
in the Western theatre can be reached. The troops now at the Dardanelles
which are required for Salonika would be two divisions, preferably the
Xth and XIth. The French would also have to withdraw either a brigade or
a division from their force at Helles for the same purpose. The Yeomanry
now _en route_ to you would also have to be diverted to Salonika and we
should have to arrange to mount them from Egypt after their arrival.
"Cable me at once your ideas as to meeting these requirements. The
Dardanelles Committee consider a withdrawal from Suvla to be advisable
under the circumstances, but they had not seen your telegram No. 664. We
have been asked to send the 15-inch howitzer, now on board ship at
Mudros, to Belgrade as soon as possible."
Amen--so be it! Our mighty stroke at the vitals of the enemy is to break
itself to pieces against the Balkans. God save the King! May the Devil
fly away with the whole of the Dardanelles Committee!!
What arguments--what pressure--I wonder can have moved K. to swap horse
in mid-Dardanelles? In December K. as good as told me I was "for it" if
the day should come along for his New Army to help the Serbians. G.H.Q.
in France had belittled his effort to create it; they had tried to throw
cold water on it (the New Army) and now we should see how they liked it
going to Salonika! The reason why K., at that time, turned the project
down was his view that one Army Corps was too small a force to launch
into those regions of great armies and that, if the Germans turned
seriously in that direction, it would be gobbled up. But two Army Corps
would starve, seeing we had no pack transport and that the railway would
only feed 40,000 men. Nor had we any mountain guns. In February he
resurrected the question but that time he was put off by the typhus.
"Whatever destroys my New Army," he said, "it shall not be the Serbian
lice." Now he cables as if he was being quite consistent and sensible,
_now_, when in every aspect, the odds have turned against the
undertaking. As to the Bulgarians having "a clear road to Constantinople
and Gallipoli" my memorable dinner with Ferdinand, and his insistence on
his "pivotal" position, makes me perfectly certain that the bones of no
Bulgarian grenadier will fertilize the Peninsula--whatever happens. And
if the inconceivable were conceivable and Ferdinand were to work for
anything but his own immediate gain--there is no room for them here!
That fact is cast iron. The Turkish Empire is _here_ in full force.
Enver can't feed more! These numbers cause us no alarm. Since the last
abortive effort of the Turkish Command to get their men to attack every
soldier in the trenches knows well that the enemy are afraid of us. They
dare not attack, they will not attack, and they cannot attack. We know
that quite well. If K. would only come out here he would realize that
the Turk has lost his sting. I don't mean to say he is not still a
formidable fellow to turn out of his trench, but he can't attack any
more: and that is just the moment we have chosen to sit down and do
nothing; now, when the enemy has been brought to a standstill!
During my absence Bailloud has wired saying he had received orders from
his own Minister of War to arrange for sending away one Division of the
C.E.O. and Braithwaite has cabled the startling news to our S. of S. for
War.
Well, well. If the Greeks and ourselves are going to push through the
mountains to help the Serbs to hold Belgrade and the line of the Danube,
why then, no doubt, we are embarking upon something that would be fine
were it feasible--something more hopeful than sitting at Salonika and in
its salubrious suburbs, the "political" advantages of which were
preached to us by Napier.
But let no man hereafter talk of Dardanelles adventures. _Mon Dieu!_
Once again see the dupes of maps preparing to dash out their brains, or
rather the brains of others, against the rocks. If only Joffre and K.
had looked at Belgrade over the guns of an Austrian Battery in Semlin,
as I did in 1909! The line of the Danube is untenable except by a very
large force against the very large forces that can, and will, be brought
against it and there is no Fleet there to feed a large force. Also, the
communications of such a defending force will not only be mechanically
rotten but will also be strategically at the tender mercy of the most
cunning Prince in Europe. We may think we have squared Ferdinand. But it
is easier to square the circle than square a fox.
On the Danube, the Central Powers can put _and keep_ six men to our one,
_unless_ we control the river from its mouth to Belgrade. This we can
only do by forcing the Dardanelles.
After outlining an answer for Braithwaite to draft, I started off at
10.45 for Anzac and Suvla. With me were Taylor, Gascoigne, Lieutenant
Moore and Freddie. From Anzac I walked along the old communication
trench for a couple of miles, and then went round General Taylor's
Brigade along the front by Green Hill and the Chocolate Hills. The heat
was very exhausting.
Yesterday's calm has proved to be the prelude to an attempted storm. At
5 a.m. there was a big bombardment of the front line trenches, and the
Turks made a gesture of defiance. The gesture did not go beyond fixing
bayonets and shouting "Allah!" and the only result has been to render
Suvla more convinced than ever that the Turks are absolutely fed up.
After invigorating myself with a good draught of regimental spirit, set
forth to walk back to Anzac. Half way I halted at the Indian Brigade
Headquarters, and, on the invitation of the hospitable Colonel Palin,
had a square meal. Met Allanson, the brave commander of the 6th Gurkhas;
Allanson who scaled the heights of Sari Bair and entered for a few
hectic hours into the promised land. Oh, what a wonderful adventure his
has been! To have seen the Dardanelles and their defences lying flat at
his feet! To feel--as he says he did--that he held the whole Turkish
Army by the throat!
To-day's inspection has once more brought me into personal touch with
the perfect confidence felt both at Anzac and Suvla in the
demoralization of the Turks. This has nerved me to cable agreeing to
spare the 10th and 53rd Divisions from Suvla as well as a Brigade of
French from Helles and four and a half Brigades of British Field
Artillery:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 675). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. Reference your No. 8229. Let me begin by saying that I quite
realize that, to you, playing for your large stakes, the Dardanelles
operation may temporarily become of a secondary nature. In spite of the
Salonika scheme I am, however, particular to note that it is not
intended to withdraw from the Gallipoli Peninsula, nor to give up here
until the Turks are beaten. Bearing this in mind it becomes my duty to
point out the objection to the abandonment of Suvla Bay, the
consequences of which at this stage would, I consider, be so grave that
I am warranted in running much risk to get you your two divisions by
other means. The situation has greatly changed since I first suggested
the possibility of abandoning the Bay, and its abandonment at this stage
would, I feel convinced, enormously accentuate the difficulties of any
subsequent attempt to capture the Narrows; unless, as a result of our
landing troops at Salonika, Bulgaria were induced to side with us and
not against us. Even when I told you in my No. M.F. 578 of 23rd August
that the diminution of my forces might compel me to contract my line, I
could not view the project without misgiving, in spite of the fact
that, at that time, I had landed few reinforcements and little artillery
in the new zone, and my views are not rightly interpreted when it is
said that I saw no great difficulty in the enterprise. After I had
received the reassuring news of reinforcements I sent you my No. M.F.
589 of 26th August and I have from that date been pouring in large
quantities of reinforcements and supplies in anticipation of winter, and
have landed a large additional amount of artillery. Therefore, I could
not hurriedly evacuate the Bay without sacrificing the majority of
supplies and warlike stores. I might also have very considerable losses,
for the Turks, who were previously 700 yards away, are now within
bombing distance in places. They have a large number of guns in the
northern zone and a retirement could only be effected under heavy fire,
which with unseasoned troops would make the retreat a hazardous one. As
explained in my No. M.F. 664 evacuation of the Bay would involve with it
the _eventual_ evacuation of all but the original Anzac position. But
even if this last step were not necessary the withdrawal of British
soldiers from Suvla would be an overwhelming victory for the Turks. Our
position in the Dardanelles would be entirely altered for the worse and
even the effect of our landing of troops at Salonika might be discounted
in Bulgarian eyes. At the present moment the Turkish commissariat
difficulties and tales of starving families which the wounded bring back
from Constantinople are having a bad effect on their _moral_ and the
number of desertions is on the increase. Two Turkish attempts at the
offensive have broken down completely during the last week as their
troops refused to leave cover. If I give ground the Turkish _moral_ will
immediately recover and instead of containing over 60,000 Turks in the
Northern Zone there would be large numbers set free to go elsewhere. All
these arguments seem to prove plainly that to evacuate a yard of Suvla
would be a most serious, and might prove a disastrous step. I would
therefore prefer to run the risk of holding the line defensively with
fewer troops in order to spare two divisions for the new enterprise.
"I have at present one division in Corps Reserve at Suvla and the 1st
Australian Division resting at Mudros and also one brigade resting at
Imbros. By bringing the tired Australians back and making them replace
the Mounted Division in the section north of Susak Kuyu I could spare
Xth and LIIIrd Divisions or else Xth and XIth. I could also spare one
French brigade from Cape Helles without replacing it by troops from
Suvla, and a total of 4-1/2 British Field Artillery brigades. This would
at any rate enable me to postpone any evacuation at Suvla and if the
withdrawal became necessary later on there would be less loss involved
in supplies and stores, as I could gradually make necessary preparations
for this deplorable contingency.
"The 15-inch howitzer is at Alexandria and can be sent whenever you
desire on the receipt of instructions. To-morrow I am having a
conference here with the Corps Commanders concerned to consider the
details. I hope that you realize that though the IXth Corps consists of
Xth, XIth and XIIIth Divisions there are attached to it LIIIrd Welsh
Division, Mounted Division and XXIXth Division, and I therefore
sincerely trust you will not contemplate the withdrawal of the Corps
Staff and Corps Commander to accompany the two divisions destined for
Salonika, for I have absolutely no one to replace them."
_27th September, 1915._ After breakfast a dove, the German sort, flew
across from Chanak and dropped four bombs on our Headquarters; all wide;
no damage. At 11 o'clock Birdwood and Byng came over for a confab on the
last upset. Both Generals went word by word through my M.F. 657 of the
26th September,--(1) as to drawing in our horns at Suvla,--(2) as to our
power of holding on after we lose the 10th and 53rd Divisions. They
concur in my cables and are emphatic as to the futility of making a gift
of ground to any enemy who are shaking in their shoes. What the Turks
want is a gift, not of ground but of high explosive shell. A few
thousand pounds worth of that and Byng would go ahead and settle their
hash for good. Birdie stayed to lunch during which meal I got a message
from Bailloud telling me flat that he had orders from his Government to
get one Division over to Mudros forthwith. As long as I am in command no
soldier but myself shall handle the troops entrusted to me. I have sent
the following reply:--"Sorry that as my orders already telegraphed to
you this morning are specific, I cannot permit any movement of troops
away from the Peninsula pending further instructions."
Ross and Nevinson (Press Correspondents), who have been away on a jaunt,
called on me and had tea. Lord William Percy and Sir Walter Barttelot
dined.
_28th September, 1915._ Office. At midnight an enemy aeroplane let us
have a taste of his high explosive--no harm done. At 10.30 this morning
another came over and dropped a couple of bombs into the aerodrome close
by--two men hit.
Colonel Dorling reported himself to me as Senior Paymaster.
A cable from K. saying he is glad to meet me as to holding on at Suvla.
He agrees in fact that to draw in our horns would merely set free six
Turkish Divisions to attack us elsewhere. He agrees also with my choice
of Divisions for Salonika. K. seems astonished at the behaviour of the
French Government in sending tactical orders direct to Bailloud. Most
extraordinary, he calls it. He wants Byng to go to Salonika and winds up
gloriously by telling me of the great things they are doing in France;
that, up to the present, 23,000 prisoners and over 40 guns have been
taken, and that he hopes there are more of each to follow. This fine
success, he says, should help us along in the East. So it should. I have
cabled the good news across and ordered a _feu de joie_ to be fired
everywhere on the Peninsula in honour of the victory. The ball was
opened at Helles at 7 p.m., the Turks replied vigorously with every gun
and rifle they could bring to bear, and rarely, I imagine, has a
"furious joy" expressed itself more furiously.
Nowhere in the Empire has this fine victory brought more heartfelt
relief and joy than at the Dardanelles: to have been brought to a
standstill, for the third time of asking, for _nothing_; that was the
fear which had haunted us.
_29th September, 1915._ Work. At 11 a.m. tore myself away from my papers
to play principal part in a gay little ceremony. Outside my office a
guard of honour of Surrey Yeomanry, Naval Division and Australians
formed three sides of a square. Bertier, de la Borde and Pelliot were
led in smiling like brides going up to the altar, and, after a tiny
speech, I decorated the first with the D.S.O. and the other two with the
Military Cross. All three Officers are most popular, and there were loud
cheers. De la Borde had tea and Mitchell came in at the same time to say
good-bye. We are all distressed at losing Mitchell. He is a very fine
specimen of the sailor of the modern school. Efficient, modest, untiring
at his work. He has collaborated in the most loyal and devoted manner
with the G.S., and I don't know how we should ever have got on without
him.
Nevinson, the Correspondent, came again with Maxwell, the Press Censor.
Nevinson wants to find out whether it would be worth his while to go to
Salonika. I would like to lend him a hand for he is such a nice fellow,
but the matter is about as secret as can be, and I don't feel myself
free to say much. The Captains of H.M.S. _Cornwall_ and _Cornwallis_
dined; also Flight Commander Samson and Ward, King's Messenger. The last
named starts to-morrow night and carried off with him my letter to K.
Amongst other things I write:--"In the cables which have passed between
us, I have found it anything but an easy business to strike the happy
mean between executing your wishes promptly and cheerfully on the one
hand, and, on the other, giving you a faithful impression of how we
should stand here once your orders had been carried out.
"If I make too little of the dangers which surround me, then you may be
encouraged to weaken me still further, thereby jeopardizing the whole of
this enterprise. But if I allow my anxieties to get too much the upper
hand, why then I may be ruining some larger enterprise, the bearing of
which I have no means of gauging."
I then explain the situation and wind up:--"In the small hours of the
morning, before I have had my matutinal cup of tea, the immediate
outlook gives me a feeling of cold feet in a more aggravated form than I
have hitherto experienced. The whole plan of the French Asiatic
subsidiary operation has gone, for the meantime, by the board. England
and France between them cannot find men enough, I should think, to send
considerable forces to Asia as well as run an entirely new show
elsewhere. Indeed, Naval requirements alone would seem entirely to
forbid it. But I must not worry you any more with surmises. After all,
nothing great in this world was ever easily accomplished. Never has
there been such an example of that as in the Dardanelles Expedition. How
many times has success seemed to be on the point of crowning our
efforts, and yet, on each occasion, just as we are beginning to see
light through the tangle of obstacles, preparing for an assault, or
whatever it may be, something occurs to upset the apple-cart. None the
less we do advance, and we will succeed in the end. I feel I am playing
it rather low down inflicting on you the outline of my own trouble at a
moment when your own must be infinitely greater.
"Reading over this letter which I have not now time to re-write or
correct, it strikes me that in concentrating my mind purely on the
Dardanelles I may have given a wrong impression of my general attitude
towards your latest demand. No one can realize, I believe, more clearly
than I do that the Dardanelles operations themselves hinge for their
success to a very large extent upon the maintenance of a barrier between
the Central Powers and Constantinople. As far as reinforcements of men
to the enemy in the field are concerned, such inter-communication would
not be so fatal as might perhaps be imagined. The Gallipoli Peninsula is
a limited area, and if the Germans had a million men at Constantinople
they could not, under present conditions, add many, if any, to the
numbers already opposed to us. But the free transit of coal, flour,
ammunition and big guns might well put us all in the cart--the cart
being in this instance, the sea."
My A.D.C. has brought me an irritated message from the A.G., War
Office:--
* * * * *
"Your No. M.F.A. 4003 of the 24th instant. Are you aware that your
telegram was really a demand for 60,000 men with a weekly supply in
addition. We do not see how to meet such large numbers in view of the
present situation in France. Have the numbers at Base, Alexandria, and
men returning from hospital, etc., been taken into account? Please state
what are your minimum requirements to carry on with."
Am I aware, etc.? Why certainly; _and so is the A.G._ To ignore facts is
one thing; to be ignorant of them is another. These facts are, or should
be, the daily bread of his Department. I resent this surprise; it is not
genuine. If, as the A.G. says, they have not got the men to send, why in
God's name do they go on telling the people they _have_ got them?
Have drafted out this answer:--
* * * * *
"A.G. My telegram No. M.F.A. 4003 told you the number required to bring
and keep all formations up to establishment and, as an estimate, the
numbers given therein are accurate. There is nothing new in that
telegram; it is only the culmination of many demands, the deficiency,
which was serious enough before, being aggravated by the prevailing
epidemic. I took into account the numbers in Base depots and men
returning from hospital. I certainly hope that there may be a decrease
in the sick rate and that there will be an increase in the numbers
returning from hospital, but that cannot make any difference to my
present shortage of establishment though it would affect the strength of
monthly drafts required.
"I would like further to point out that only 750 of the 20,000 drafts
now coming are for the Territorial Force, the remainder being for the
Regulars. Hence assuming that wastage will be equally distributed over
all the eight divisions, the estimated shortage of 30,490 on 9th October
will be constituted as follows:--Four Territorial Force divisions,
26,583; four Regular divisions, 3,907.
"When my No. M.F.A. 4003 was sent no question had arisen of denuding my
force for a fresh expedition elsewhere. I fully realize that you cannot
send what does not exist and I will do the best possible with what you,
knowing my situation, are able to send; but I do not consider that it is
possible to view my position in winter with any equanimity unless I am
to receive substantial drafts and unless a normal flow of reinforcements
for all divisions can be arranged so as to counter the difficulties that
are inherent in keeping a force operating so far from England up to
establishment."
_30th September, 1915. Imbros._ Peace on the Peninsula; trouble at
G.H.Q. The 10th Division is taking its departure from Suvla undisturbed
by the enemy. Not a shot is being fired. Some say this denotes
extraordinary skill in the conduct of the withdrawal; others,
extraordinary delight on the part of the Turks to see them clearing
out. I don't believe in either theory. The Turks have been fought to a
standstill and there is no attack left in them--not under _any_
circumstances or temptation; that is what I believe in my heart,
otherwise I would refuse point blank to strip myself of two full
divisions under their noses. Still, it is nervous work presuming to this
extent upon their fatigue and I will not agree to the 53rd going too, as
the loss of three Divisions would leave an actual hole in our line.
Meanwhile, it is a relief to hear that the move is going on just like
peacetime. As to G.H.Q., all is held up by uncertainty. Our whole
enterprise hangs still in the balance. No date for the sailing of our
troops for Salonika can yet be fixed, and we may get them back. Am glued
to the cable terminus waiting, waiting, waiting. I have agreed to let
the 2nd Brigade of the French go!
This cable sent to-day to Lord K. explains itself:--
* * * * *
"The following has just been received from Bailloud:--'I have the honour
to inform you that I have received a telegram from the French Minister
of War ordering me (1) to embark one division of the Corps
Expéditionnaire immediately for Salonika; (2) to organize this division,
which will be placed under my command, into two brigades of Metropolitan
Infantry with two groups of 75 mm., one group of mountain artillery, one
battery of 125 mm. howitzer and four 120 mm. guns. I am taking steps to
execute this order and to hold the present section of the French line
with the force remaining in the Peninsula, which will be placed under
General Brulard.'
"I said in my telegram No. M.F. 675, that I could only spare one brigade
of the French. I desire to place on record that if this order of the
French Government is carried out the LIIIrd Division cannot possibly be
spared without seriously endangering the safety of this force and the
whole future of the Dardanelles enterprise. Even if I were to keep the
LIIIrd Division it would not relieve me of intense anxiety. The fact
will not escape your notice that the division to go is being
re-constructed so that nothing but European troops are included, thus
leaving an undue proportion of Senegalese. This constitutes such a grave
danger that, if I had the power, I would refuse to allow Bailloud to
carry out this order of his Government. It need hardly be pointed out
that all your hopes of success in the Balkans would be upset by a
disaster at Cape Helles. Even when I said that I could spare one French
Infantry Brigade the Commander of the VIIIth Corps, who is one of the
last men in the Army to express alarmist views, represented to me, in
view of the physical condition of a large proportion of his troops, the
gravity of the case in the strongest terms."
A reminder of mine _re_ the Ashmead-Bartlett incident has drawn an
amusing and highly unexpected answer from the War Office:--
* * * * *
"Murdoch was found to be carrying a despatch for the Prime Minister
criticizing military operations in Gallipoli. He carried nothing for
Lawson."
I could not help laughing heartily at the blue looks of Tyrrell, the
Head of our Intelligence. After all, this is Asquith's own affair. I do
not for one moment believe Mr. Asquith would employ such agencies and
for sure he will turn Murdoch and his wares into the wastepaper basket.
I have reassured Tyrrell. Tittle-tattle will effect no lodgment in the
Asquithian brain.
Lieutenant Moore from the Military Secretary's office in London dined.
He has been useful to us. During the night there was rain and heavy fog.
The evacuation of Suvla by the 10th Division goes on without the
smallest hitch and is almost finished--all except the guns. Whether the
Turks have fallen asleep or only closed an eye is the question of the
hour but Birdwood's Intelligence are certain they are stone cold and
cannot be dragged to the attack.
_1st October, 1915. Imbros._ S. of S. cables he will not overlook our
wants in the matter of ammunition but that "at the present moment all he
can get has to be sent to France." I have thanked him. Not a word from
France since we fired the _feu de joie_.
K. believes in the East and sends shell to the West. The reason is that
K.'s _beliefs_ are only intuitions; he believes in the same sort of way
that Elijah knew certain things.
The principle underlying the world war seems to me this:--that wherever
the new system of trenches, dug-outs, barbed wire, can reach its fullest
development, _there_ we should prefer the defensive. Wherever this new
system cannot be fully developed, there the old ideas hold good and
there are the theatres for the offensive. In France and Flanders where
both sides are within a few hours' run, on good railways, from their own
chief arsenals and depôts the new system attains prodigious power. In
the Turkish Empire almost all the conditions; railways, material,
factories, etc., are favourable to the old and unfavourable to the new
conditions.
To me these views appear as clear as crystal and as unanswerable as
Euclid. The tenacity of the new system of defence; the pressure of
France; the apathy of a starved military opinion; the fact that all our
most powerful soldiers are up to their necks in the West, combine to
keep us ramming our heads against the big pile of barbed wire instead of
getting through by the gate called strait.
Next Braithwaite with the following electrical bombshell:--
* * * * *
"By Bailloud's report I see that he considers that the French line can
be held by one division. If, on reconsideration, you agree with this
view can you spare the LIIIrd Division?"
K. has pounced like a hawk on Bailloud's statement (which I cabled to
him yesterday) that he is taking steps for Brulard to hold the French
section with one division.
Have answered:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 703). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Your
No. 8409, cipher. Not one word of my No. M.F. 693 can I take back. The
situation at Cape Helles cannot be fully realized. May I remind you that
when on 20th August I moved the XXIXth Division to Suvla, I left at Cape
Helles only the minimum garrison compatible with safety. Since that date
the total British troops there have decreased in strength from 15,300 to
13,300 rifles, and now I am losing a French composite division which is
made up of the only troops of the Corps Expéditionnaire on whom I can
rely, as well as 44 guns. It is my considered opinion that to leave
protection of Cape Helles to one division of Colonial troops, plus
13,300 worn-out British Territorials and Naval Volunteers, is running
too serious a risk. To-day, therefore, I am moving one brigade of XXIXth
Division back from Suvla to reinforce VIIIth Corps in order to have some
regular troops there on whom I can rely. This makes it impossible to
spare the LIIIrd Division. The change of opinion on the part of
Bailloud, when he gets away from a position which I have found it
difficult to persuade him to hold with two divisions, and which he now,
as you say, thinks can be held with one division composed largely of
blacks, is startling enough to need no comment. If you want to get at
his real opinion, suggest that he stays here with one division while
Brulard goes to Salonika.
"A despatch from Bailloud has _just_ reached me on the situation in
French section after his own departure with one division. It is as
follows:--
* * * * *
"'One division will then be defending our present line with an effective
strength reduced by half, and with Infantry which comprises only
Colonial contingents, half European and half native. I feel it to be my
duty to expose the situation to you in order that you may be able to
decide whether the time has not now arrived to reduce the present
section of the C.E.O., making part of it occupied by British troops and
holding a solid reserve in rear of the Allies' first line capable of
dealing with any situation.'
"I believe this indicates Bailloud's real opinion; it is a curious
contrast to that quoted in your No. 8409, cipher, dated 30th September."
At 11.30 crossed to "K" and inspected the 87th Brigade of the 29th
Division. Lucas, of the Berks Regiment, commanded. Saw the Border
Regiment under Colonel Pollard; then the renowned Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers under Major Pierce, the full strength of the Battalion on
parade "all present" was 220! Next the K.O.S.B.s; they were under the
command of Major Stoney; last the South Wales Borderers under the
command of Captain Williams.
The men were in rags and looked very tired. This is the first time in
the campaign our rank and file have seemed sorry for themselves. Ten
days of rest had been promised them and now they are being hurried back
to the trenches before they have had a week. My heart goes out to them
entirely. Were I they I would feel mad with me. The breaking of my word
to the 29th Division has to be shouldered by me just like all the other
results of this new Balkan adventure; the withdrawal of the Irish and
the French for Salonika leaves no margin of rest for what's left.
Inspected also the West Riding Field Company of Royal Engineers under
Major Bayley, and the West Lancashire Field Ambulance.
A long letter from Maxwell putting his point of view about the 51st and
53rd Sikhs. Were we both sealed-pattern Saints we'd be bound to fall
foul of one another working under so perverse a system. He has written
me very nicely; nothing could be nicer. I have replied by return:--
* * * * *
"Yours of 24th just received. As to the wires about the 51st and 53rd
between myself and the War Office, and your remarks thereon, we stand so
much on one platform, and are faced so much by the same difficulties,
that I think it ought to be fairly easy for us to come to an
understanding in most conceivable circumstances, as indeed our
co-operation up to date has shown.
"If Egypt goes, then I shall not last very long. If I am wiped out, I
think it will be the preface to trouble in Egypt.[13]
"As to myself I am 60,000 below strength. I had a cable from the War
Office a day or two ago expressing naïve astonishment at this figure. I
replied that the figure was accurate and that there was nothing new
about it as it only denoted the accumulation of a state of things which
had been continuously reported since the very first day when we started
off from England minus the ten per cent. margin of excess given to every
unit going across to France. This is the essential cause of our repeated
failure to make that last little push which just differentiates partial
from conclusive success. In every case this has been so. Had I been able
to throw in my ten per cent. margin on the third day after landing,
there is no doubt in the world we would have got right up on to Achi
Baba. Afterwards, each engagement we fought, although our total numbers
may have been largely increased, the old formations were always at half
strength or something less. However, I won't bother you about this as
your time is too precious to enter into 'might-have-beens' and so is
mine.
"Meantime, my line is very, very thin, and the men are getting entirely
worn out. In the midst of this I am called upon to send away two
Divisions, the French and the Irish, to ---- you know where. I have done
so without a murmur, although it puts me into a ticklish position.
Reinforcements are now to be diverted elsewhere and my command is not an
enviable one. I quite understand the necessity of trying to maintain a
barrier between Essen and Constantinople. I quite understand also the
danger of doing so at the expense of this attenuated, exhausted force. I
have represented the facts home, and it is for them to decide."
Dined with the Admiral.
_2nd October, 1915._ The despatch of the Salonika force and their outfit
are absorbing all my energies. Our whole Expeditionary Force is being
drawn upon to send the 10th Division creditably turned out to the new
theatre. The twenty-four hours' delay caused by the political crisis at
Athens has been a godsend in enabling me to reclothe and re-equip the
detachment from top to toe. The supplies for my own force are now
exhausted, but,--on the principle of the starving garrison who threw
loaves over the ramparts at the besiegers, we must try and make a good
first impression on the Greeks.
The submarine catcher, or the "Silver Baby" as the men call it, has been
flying about all day, without luck. Gascoigne and Bertier dined. Blazing
hot; quite a setback to August temperatures.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 12: We had to get into Kephalos Harbour before dark; otherwise
the submarine indicator nets were damaged.--IAN H.]
[Footnote 13: The last time this subject was broached between Lord
Kitchener and myself was immediately after the evacuation of Helles.
Everyone was intensely relieved, especially Lord Kitchener, for he had
realized better than our politicians the desperate stakes we had planked
down in our gamble with the Clerk of the Weather. Yet in that very
moment when the burden of an intolerable anxiety had just been lifted
from his shoulders he took the occasion to declare to me that he stood
by every word he had said. What he "had said," was that any withdrawal
from the Dardanelles must react in due course upon Islam, and especially
upon Egypt. Cairo, he held to be the centre of the Mahomedan doctrine
and the pivotal point of our great Mahomedan Imperium. An evacuation of
the Dardanelles would serve as an object lesson to Egypt just as our
blunders in the Crimea had served as a motive to the Indian mutineers.
Ultimate success was not the point in either case. The point was that
the legend of the invincibility of British troops should be shattered in
some signal and quite unmistakable fashion. "The East," he said, "moved
slowly in the fifties, and it will move slowly now. We've had a
wonderful delivery but--depend upon it--the price has yet to be
paid!"--IAN H., 1920.]